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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys opinions in maritime cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, and state and federal courts in Florida. This survey covers the
period from July 1996 through July 1997.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Seaman Status
A frequently asked question, one that is not often addressed consistently
by the lower courts, is whether a maritime employee, who is a Jones Act
seaman,' is entitled to an action against his or her employer/shipowners. In
Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai,2 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
provide clarification and to resolve the conflict existing in the courts of appeal
with regard to the application of the test to determine seamen status which was
set forth in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis3 to determine seamen status.
4
In Harbor Tug, a maritime worker was injured while painting the housing
structure of a docked tug, a one-day job that he had obtained through a union
hiring hall.' The worker brought suit against the tug owner claiming
negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness based upon general
maritime law. The district court denied seaman status in reliance on a test, that
has been since superseded, holding that the "' [plaintiff] did not have a 'more or
less permanent connection' with the vessel on which he was injured nor did he
1. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1994).
2. 117 S. Ct. 1535 (1997).
3. 515 U.S. 347 (1995).
4. Harbor Tug, 117 S. Ct. at 1538.
5. Id. at 1537.
5
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perform substantial work on the vessel sufficient for seaman status."' 6 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and in reliance on Chandris, held that
the relevant inquiry was "'not whether plaintiff had a permanent connection
with the vessel [but] whether plaintiffs relationship with a vessel (or a group
of vessels) was substantial in terms of duration and nature."' 7 The majority
reasoned that if the type of work performed would customarily entitle a
maritime worker to seaman status if performed for a single employer, "the
worker should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry
operates under a daily assignment rather than a permanent employment
system."'
The Supreme Court reiterated the test set forth in Chandris for
determining seaman status under the Jones Ac? as follows: First, "'an
employee's duties must contributfe] to the function of the vessel or to the
accomplishment of its mission," and second, an employee "must have a
connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." 11
Applying the test to the facts of this case, the Court ruled that although the
plaintiffs performance on board the vessel contributed to its function or
purpose, the plaintiff failed to establish a substantial connection to the vessel
or to an identifiable group of vessels.12 The Court held that the fact that the
plaintiff had done similar maritime work on other vessels not owned by the
defendant, did not satisfy the substantial connection test.13 Rather, the vessels
must be "subject to common ownership or control.' 41 Further, the Court ruled
that the focus of the substantial connection requirement is "whether the
employee's duties take him to sea," which the plaintiffs job did not.15 In this
case, the Supreme Court sufficiently narrowed the instances in which a worker
can establish seaman status under the Jones Act.16  This is an important
decision for employers/shipowners.
6. Id. at 1539 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a).
7. Id. (quoting Papai v. Harbor Tug & Barge Co., 67 F.3d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1995)).
8. Id.
9. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1994).
10. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995) (citation omitted).
11. Harbor Tug, 117 S. Ct. at 1540 (citing Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368
(1995)).
12. Id.
13. Id at 1542.
14. Id. at 1541.
15. Id. at 1540.
16. Harbor Tug, 117 S. Ct. at 1543.
1997]
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B. Products Liability
According to United States Supreme Court precedent, 17 "an admiralty tort
plaintiff cannot recover for the physical damage a defective product causes to
the 'product itself,' but can recover for physical damage the product causes to
'other property.' '18 In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M Martinac & Co.,19 the
Court was asked to determine whether equipment added to a product by the
initial owner/user prior to the sale of the product to a subsequent owner/user is
considered part of the "product itself' or "other property. '20 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the added equipment was part of the "product
itself' since when sold to the subsequent owner/user "the added equipment
was part of the defective product.",21 Thus, the court held that the subsequent
owner/user was not entitled to recover in tort for damage to the added
equipment, but rather was limited to principles of warranty and contract law.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.23
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding
that items added to a product by the initial user are not part of the "product
itself' but are "other property," and the character of the product as sold to the
initial user is not changed by the initial user's sale of the product.24 The Court
reasoned that had the product "remained in the hands of the [i]nitial [u]ser,"
the loss of the added equipment could have been recovered in tort.25 To allow
a different rule with the subsequent sale of the product would compromise the
incentive of the law of products liability, which is to encourage the
manufacture of safer products.
17. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
18. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783, 1784 (1997) (citation
omitted).
19. Id. at 1783.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1786.
24. Id. at 1789.
25. Id. at 1788.
[Vol. 22:1
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IMI. OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. Limitation of Liability Act
The Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act,26 ("The Limitation
Act"), allows a vessel owner to bring suit in a court of admiralty to limit its
"liability for any damages arising from a maritime accident to the value of the
vessel and its freight, provided that the accident occurred without the owner's
'privity or knowledge.' 2 7
In Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Schubert,28 the plaintiff brought suit
against a corporate vessel owner for personal injury sustained when he was
thrown from a recreational watercraft operated by the vessel owner's
29
employee. The vessel owner filed an action under The Limitation Act to
limit its liability. Plaintiff argued that since the operator of the vessel was the
corporation's president his actions were attributable to the corporation;
therefore, the vessel owner could not prove absence of privity or knowledge.
Plaintiff argued that under the circumstances, his actions should not be limited
to the admiralty court, which sits without a jury, but should be allowed to
proceed in state court. The district court agreed and denied the vessel owner's
limitation petition.30 The vessel owner appealed.
31
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that it would
be impossible for the corporate vessel owner to prove lack of privity or
32knowledge based on its president's actions. However, based upon the facts of
the case, the court found that it was possible that the corporate owner could
also be vicariously liable for the acts of others even though it lacked privity or
knowledge. 33 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the vessel owner should not
be denied his limitation action.34 Accordingly, the district court's decision was
reversed, and the case was remanded for fashioning of the proper relief.
35
26. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1994).
27. Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Schubert, 86 F.3d 1060, 1062 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
28. Id. at 1060.
29. Id. at 1062.
30. Id. at 1061.
31. Id.
32. Suzuki of Orange Park, 86 F.3d at 1065-66.
33. Id. at 1066.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1066-67.
1997]
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B. Jurisdiction
In Ambassador Factors v. Rhein-, Maas-, Und See- Schiffahrtskontor
36GMBH (VORMALS SANARA REEDEREIKONTOR GMBI), the Eleventh
Circuit had little difficulty determining that a maritime contract assigned to
another may be enforced by an assignee in admiralty.37 The court, relying on
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, reasoned that "the nature of
the disputed contract, not the status or alignment of parties, is the crucial
inquiry in determining whether a contract is in admiralty. 38  Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit held that as long as the assignment is valid, the assigned
contract pertains directly to it, and is "'necessary for commerce or navigation
upon navigable waters,"' 39 the assignee may enforce the assigned
contract.40 This rule applies even if the assignment contract itself is not within
the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction.41
In Hutchins v. Tennessee Valley Authority,42 the plaintiff brought a
wrongful death action under the Jones Act against the Tennessee Valley
Authority ("TVA") for the drowning death of her husband, a deckhand at a
TVA plant in Alabama. 3 The district court dismissed the action, holding that
it was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Federal Employees
Compensation Act ("FECA"),44 which provides that the exclusive remedy is
against the United States with respect to the injury or death of an
employee.45 The plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal order and
urged the court to find, contrary to existing precedent, that a plain reading of
FECA and the Jones Act mandates that federally employed seamen are not
46bound by FECA and may bring suit against the TVA under the Jones Act.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim, holding that it was compelled to follow prior case law which limits a
federally employed seaman to the exclusive remedy of FECA.47 Although the
Eleventh Circuit was apparently not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that
36. 105 F.3d 1397 (1lth Cir. 1997).
37. Id. at 1400.
38. Id. at 1398.
39. Id. at 1399 (quoting Nehring v. Steamship M/V Point Vail, 901 F.2d 1044, 1048
(I lth Cir. 1990)).
40. Id. at 1400.
41. Ambassador Factors, 105 F.3d at 1400.
42. 98 F.3d 602 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
43. Id. at 602-03.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 8116 (1994).
45. Hutchins, 98 F.3d at 603 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1994)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 603-04.
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the court should overturn existing precedent, the court contended that even if it
were so inclined, such a decision would require an en banc decision.
48
In Alderman v. Pacific Northern Victor, Inc.,49 the plaintiff slipped and
fell on an oil drilling vessel that was being converted into a fish processing
vessel.50 At the time of the accident, the vessel was docked on navigable
waters in Florida. More than three years after the accident, the plaintiff filed
suit for personal inury under Florida law against the vessel's interests in
Florida state court. Due to the defending vessel's interests, the case was
removed to federal court based on diversity and admiralty jurisdiction. 2 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff's action
was within admiralty jurisdiction33 and was therefore, untimely under the three
year limitations period for maritime torts.54 The District Court for the Northern
District of Florida granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.55
On appeal, the parties agreed that if the tort were governed by maritime
law, instead of Florida law, the plaintiff's action would have been deemed
untimely.56 In determining the choice of law problem, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Grubart Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.57 The Eleventh Circuit held
that according to Grubart, the test for determining whether a tort action falls
within admiralty jurisdiction requires satisfaction of the following requisites:
First, the tort must occur on navigable waters, or the injury suffered on land
must have been caused by a vessel on navigable waters; and second, the claim
needs to have a sufficient connection with traditional maritime activity. 8 In
determining the second prong of the test, the court must consider "whether the
incident has a 'potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce,"' and
"whether the 'general character' of the 'activity giving rise to the incident'
shows a 'substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity."'
59
Plaintiff argued that although the incident occurred on navigable waters,
the claim did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction because the incident did not
48. Id. at 603.
49. 95 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 1996).
50. Id at 1063.
51. Id
52. Id.
53. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 763(a) (1994).
54. Alderman, 95 F.3d at 1063.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 513 U.S. 527 (1995).
58. Alderman, 95 F.3d at 1063-64.
59. Id. at 1064 (citations omitted).
1997]
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cause any actual impact on maritime commerce. Further, it did not bear z
substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. 6' In addressing the
plaintiffs first contention, that his accident caused no actual impact on
maritime commerce, the court held that the "focus is not on what actually
happened, but upon the potential effects of what could happen." 62  The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[u]nsafe working conditions aboard a vessel
under repairs, maintenance, or conversion.., pose a potentially disruptive
impact upon maritime commerce. 63
With respect to the plaintiffs second contention, namely, that the activity
giving rise to the incident bears no substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity, the court ruled that the focus is not on the plaintiff's
characterization of his job description as a land based "construction worker." 64
Rather, the focus is on the activity of the vessel's interests as putative
65tortfeasors. Since the vessel's interests of converting, repairing, or
maintaining a vessel in navigable waters is substantially related to traditional
66
maritime activity, the court held that substantive admiralty law applied.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the three year statute of limitation
67for personal injury actions brought in admiralty barred the plaintiff's claims.
In Isbrandtsen Marine Services, Inc. v. M/V INAGUA TANL4, 68 seamen
employed aboard a vessel attempted to intervene as claimants against the
vessel on the date of its sale.69 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida rejected the intervening seamen's application on
the grounds that it was not in compliance with the local rules governing such
requests.70 After the sale of the vessel, the seamen filed a motion to set aside
the sale, "and for emergency interim relief allowing it to file" a claim against
the vessel "as priority creditors."71 The seamen argued that they had not
received proper notice of the sale; nonetheless, the court denied their
application as untimely, and/or that the remedy requested at such a late date
,,72 7
"would not be equitable to the interest of all parties. The seamen appealed.73
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Alderman, 95 F.3d at 1064.
64. Id. at 1065.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1065-66.
67. Id. at 1066.
68. 93 F.3d 728 (11th Cir. 1996).
69. Id. at 730.
70. Id. at 731.
71. Id. at 732.
72. Id.
[Vol. 22:1
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On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the intervening seamens' claim was
invalid since the vessel had already been sold. The Eleventh Circuit agreed
with the plaintiff that an "in rem proceeding clears a vessel of all maritime
liens and that the purchaser gained good title against the world. 74 However,
the court reasoned that "since the proceeds of the sale remain[ed] in the
[c]ourt's registry in "lieu of the res," the court retained jurisdiction.75 Having
jumped the initial hurdle of jurisdiction, the court then analyzed whether the
seamen were entitled to intervene.
76
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the seamen's
action was untimely, and thus "they had no automatic right to intervene.
' 77
However, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the local rules permit district
court discretion in allowing a seaman's late claim "'under such conditions and
terms as are equitable."' 78 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that since seamen
are "wards of admiralty whose rights federal courts are duty-bound to jealously
protect," the district court abused its discretion in failing to aid the crew, by not
allowing them to correct deficiencies in their motion to intervene and their
complaint. 7 9 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the case to the
district court "with instructions that the crew be permitted to amend their
complaint and motion to intervene."
80
C. Settling Multi-Party Maritime Actions
In 1994, the United States Supreme Court decided McDermott, Inc. v.
AmClyde8 1 and Boca Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 2 two
decisions having a significant impact upon settlements made in multiparty
maritime actions. In McDermott, the Court adopted the proportionate share
approach for settling multiparty maritime actions, which reduces the award
against a nonsettling tortfeasor by the percentage of fault assigned to a settling
joint tortfeasor.83 In Boca Grande, the Court held that the adoption of theproportionate share approach in McDermott extinguished an action for
73. Isbrandtsen, 93 F.3d at 732.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 733.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Isbrandtsen, 93 F.3d at 733 (quoting S.D. FLA. ADMmALTY AND MARtrrm R.
E(2)(b)).
79. Id. at 733-34.
80. Id. at 735.
81. 511 U.S. 202 (1994).
82. 511 U.S. 222 (1994).
83. McDermott, 511 U.S. at 204.
1997]
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contribution against a settling defendant.8 4 Based on the decisions in
McDermott and Boca Grande, the district court in Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller,5 dismissed contribution claims
brought by a nonsettling party against another settling party. 86 The nonsettling
party appealed, arguing that even if its general contribution claims were
precluded, its claims for maintenance and cure expenses should survive.
87
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the nonsettling party's general contribution claims were
precluded by McDermott and Boca Grande. 88 However, it disagreed with the
district court's conclusion that McDermott and Boca Grande required the same• • •89
result with respect to claims based on maintenance and cure. The Eleventh
Circuit found that, unlike a nonsettling joint tortfeasor, a shipowner is
obligated to provide maintenance and cure regardless of fault; therefore, the
proportionate share approach will never benefit the shipowner.90 The only
means by which maintenance and cure expenses can be apportioned among all
tortfeasors responsible for harm to seamen is to allow claims for contribution. 91
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that McDermott and Boca Grande leave
binding precedent intact with respect to maintenance and cure expenses, and
that the settling party should be allowed to proceed against the nonsettling
party for contribution for such expenses.
92
D. Immunity
In Kasprik v. United States,93 a case of first impression, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the Suits in Admiralty Act
("SAA") 94 bars an injured seaman employed aboard a United States owned
vessel from bringing an action against the operator of the vessel, an agent for
the United States, for punitive damages for the arbitrary and willful denial of
maintenance and cure.95 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
district court that pursuant to the SAA, a seaman employed aboard a United
84. Boca Grande, 511 U.S. at 223.
85. 92 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1996).
86. Id. at 1103.
87. Id. at I105.
88. Id. at 1106.
89. Id.
90. Great Lakes, 92 F.3d at 1107.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 87 F.3d 462 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
94. 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1994).
95. Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 464.
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States vessel is barred from bringing suit "by reason of the same subject matter
against an agent or employee of the United States." 96 Although the Eleventh
Circuit believed that precedent allowed an action for punitive damages against
the United States, the Eleventh Circuit failed to extend the seaman's
entitlement against an agent of the United States. Instead, the court opined
that the exclusivity provision of the SAA effectively abolished such a claim.98
IV. DECISIONS BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS IN FLORIDA
A. Maritime Liens
In Villafores v. Royal Venture Cruise Lines, Ltd.,99 the defendant entered
into extended negotiations for the purchase of a vessel, at which time the
owner of the vessel agreed that the defendant could begin repairs and
refurbishing to the vessel prior to its purchase.100 As security, the defendant
had the plaintiff post an irrevocable letter of credit to the owner of the vessel
on its behalf, so that any debts incurred due to repairs and other work, would
be paid and would not become maritime liens. When the sale transaction did
not close, the owner of the vessel had to draw down on the full amount of the
letter of credit to pay the debts incurred by the defendant for work performed
on the vessel. The plaintiff filed a claim for a maritime lien against the vessel
on the grounds that the vessel owner's drawing down of the letter of credit was
an advance of funds to pay off necessaries.
Although it is generally recognized that a person advancing funds for the
purpose of acquiring "necessaries" has a maritime lien against the vessel, the
court found that under the facts presented that was not the case.102 Rather, the
repairs had already been performed on the vessel when the letter of credit was
drawn down.10 3 Further, the court recognized that the Federal Maritime Lien
Act10 4 defines "necessaries" as "'the things that a prudent owner would
provide to enable a ship to perform well the functions for which she has been
engaged." ' 10 5 Since the repairs were performed by the defendant, a non-owner,
96. Id. at 465 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1994)).
97. Id. at 466.
98. Id.
99. 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D631 (M.D. Mar. 31, 1997).
100. Id. atD631.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 46 U.S.C. § 31301 (1994).
105. Villaflores, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D631 (quoting Espirito Santo Bank of Fla v.
MV Tropicana, 1992 AMC 1672 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 1990)).
1997]
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and were not necessary for sale of the vessel, the repairs did not constitute
"necessaries."' 10 6
In conclusion, the court held that the letter of credit was not to provide
repairs to the vessel, but was to provide security in order to facilitate the sale
of the vessel.10 7 Contracts for sale of a vessel are not maritime in nature.1
08
Therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction. 10 9
B. Rule B Attachment
Rule B(1) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims "provides a vehicle for serving process and obtaining 'quasi in rem'
jurisdiction over a defendant" that cannot be found in the district by attaching
the defendant's "goods and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of
gamishees."" 0 In the case of Oceanfocus Shipping Ltd. v. Naviera Humboldt,
S.A.,"' the plaintiff utilized this rule to attach a secured letter of credit and
assets pledged by third parties as security for the letter of credit maintained at a
local bank on behalf of the defendant, a party not found within the district.'
2
The defendant moved to quash service of process and dismiss the complaint
for lack of quasi in rem jurisdiction on the grounds that a line of credit "is not
a good, chattel, credit or effect of the [d]efendant within the meaning of the
Rule."'13
The court observed that "many [other] courts have recognized that funds
available to a defendant under a letter of credit issued by a third party are not
subject to attachment as property of the defendant."'" 4 The court, agreeing with
this rationale, determined that the funds available under a "line of credit" did
not belong to the defendant, but were "essentially loan proceeds that eventually
must be repaid."'" 5 The court reasoned that a line of credit "is nothing more
than a privilege to incur a debt; and... cannot be considered a 'good, chattel,
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Oceanfocus Shipping Ltd. v. Naviera Humboldt, S.A., 962 F. Supp. 1481, 1483
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing SuPP. R. FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS OF FED. R.
Civ. P. B(1)).
11. Id. at 1481.
112. Id. at 1483.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1484. See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. World Energy Sys. Assoc., 816
F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1987); Diakan Love, S.A. v. Al-Haddad Bros. Enter., Inc., 584 F. Supp.
782, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
115. Oceanfocus, 962 F. Supp. at 1485.
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credit or effect' within the meaning of Rule B."' 6 Further, the court found
that the relationship between the defendant and the assets pledged in support of
the line of credit were too attenuated and were intended to protect the bank, not
the defendant's creditors.1 7 Based on the aforementioned, the court granted
defendant's motion to quash and dismissed the action for lack ofjurisdiction'I s
C. In Rem Claims
In admiralty, it is not uncommon for a plaintiff to sue a vessel in rem, as
the offending object pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims.n 9 The suit is brought in the district in which the vessel
is located under admiralty jurisdiction.r 20 However, in Shaffer v. Tiffany
Yachts, Inc.,121 "in a novel attempt to establish in rem jurisdiction," an action
was brought on behalf of the vessel against the defendant for breach of
contract.1 The court refused to apply in rem jurisdiction on the grounds that
an admiralty proceeding in rem is one brought against a vessel, not by a
vessel.123 The court held that in order for the vessel to establish jurisdiction
over the defendant it must establish in personam jurisdiction.124
D. Maritime Contracts
There is a constant battle in cases involving admiralty and maritime
matters with respect to what law should apply. Clearly, if there is an
established rule in admiralty, it should apply irrespective of a contrary state
law. However, often times the query is whether there actually exists a rule in
admiralty and whether it is clearly established. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida was confronted with this issue in
ABB Power T & D Co., Inc. v. Gothaer Versicherungsbank VVAG.
125
In ABB Power, pursuant to a sales contract a seller agreed to deliver a
transformer to the buyer.126 The seller then contracted with another for the
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1488.
118. Id.
119. SunP. R. FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS OF FED. R. Civ. P. B(1).
120. Id.
121. No. 96-1463, 1996 WL 870734, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 1996).
122. Id. at*1.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id at *2.
125. 939 F. Supp. 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
126. Id at 1569.
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manufacture and delivery of the transformer to the buyer. During transport, the
transformer was destroyed. Although the seller obtained marine insurance to
cover the transformer during transport, the insurer refused coverage on the
grounds that neither the seller nor the manufacturer possessed insurable
interests and thus lacked standing to bring suit against the insurer. The court
denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment; and the insurer moved to
have the court reconsider its decision arguing, among other things, that the
court erroneously failed to follow Fifth Circuit precedent. 127 In support of its
motion to reconsider, the insurer made the same arguments, produced the same
cases, and raised the same discussions as in its earlier motion for summary
judgment. 128
The court, as a preliminary matter, admonished the insurer for improper
use of the rules of procedure. 129 The court held that a motion to reconsider
"'should not be used as a vehicle to present authorities available at the time of
the first decision or to reiterate arguments previously made' ... [or] to ask the
Court to rethink what [it] ... already thought through.' 130 Rather, its purpose
is to share newly discovered evidence or to clarify an issue that the court may
have misunderstood. 131 Obviously offended by the insurer's suggestion that it
did not know its place in the judicial system with respect to following
precedent, the court explained that contrary to the insurer's belief, it had not
ignored or disregarded otherwise binding and valid precedent. 132 Further, the
court found that there was binding precedent more directly on point than that
cited by the insurer, which required the court to reject the insurer's position. 133
The court determined that United States Supreme Court precedent
requires that firmly entrenched rules of admiralty law, governing the
interpretation of marine insurance contracts, "reign[] supreme over contrary
state law provisions." 134 Applying the most recent and binding panel's test for
determining whether admiralty or state law applies, the court found that the
issue of whether certain parties are insurable interests under a marine contract
is a firmly entrenched principle of federal admiralty law.l35 Finding that
entrenched federal admiralty law defines an "insurable interest" as "any
127. Id. at 1571.
128. Id. at 1572.
129. Id. (citing Z.K. Marine, Inc. v. MN Archigetis, 808 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (S.D. Fla.
1992)).
130. ABB Power, 939 F. Supp. at 1572 (citations omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1574.
133. Id. at 1575.
134. Id. (citing Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 312
(1955)).
135. ABB Power, 939 F. Supp. at 1580.
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pecuniary interest," the court affirmed its earlier decision denying the insurer's
motion for summaryjudgment and held that contrary to the insured's assertion,
conflicting state law was effectively preempted.
136
E. Maintenance and Cure
In Aksoy v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc.,"' the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, in response to a class action,
addressed the issue of whether a crewmember's unearned sick wages should
include tips. 138 The issue arose when the plaintiff commenced a class action
against the defendants seeking "reasonably anticipated tips or, alternatively,
monthly guaranteed tips as part of' the maintenance and cure owed to crew
members who became ill or injured.139 The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had been paid his guaranteed minimum
tips as part of his unearned sick wages, and therefore he had no standing. The
plaintiff retorted that he was owed his actual anticipated wages, an amount
exceeding the guaranteed amount. Relying on Flores v. Carnival Cruise
Lines,40 the plaintiff argued that precedent required the court to calculate tips
by determining the amount of tips plaintiff would have earned had he remained
on the ship.
141
The court disagreed and held that Flores was distinguishable from the
instant case in that in Flores there was no employment contract setting forth
the method of calculating tips.142 In this case, the plaintiff was guaranteed a
minimum amount of tips under the crew agreement. Since the defendants had
paid the plaintiff the guaranteed minimum amount as set forth in the crew
agreement, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.143
In Costa Crociere, S.p.A. v. Rose,144 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida was given another interesting issue for
determination with respect to maintenance and cure. 145 Specifically, the court
was asked to address whether a ship owner was obligated to continue paying
136. Id at 1581.
137. No. 94-632, 1996 WL 764115, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1996).
138. Id. at *1.
139. Id.
140. 47 F.3d 1120 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
141. Aksoy, 1996 WL 764115, at *2.
142. Id
143. Id at *3.
144. 939 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
145. Id at 1539.
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maintenance and cure to a seaman who had been diagnosed with an incurable
disease.
146
The case arose when a seaman on board the MV American Adventure
fell ill with IgA nephropathy, an incurable kidney disease that progressively
results in the eventual loss of kidney function. 147 The cause of this disease was
unknown. The seaman was evacuated from the ship, brought to a hospital, and
immediately placed on kidney dialysis, without which, absent a kidney
transplant, he would die. The shipowner, and the corporation which employed
the seaman, filed a complaint seeking a declaration that their obligation to
provide maintenance and cure to the seaman ended when the seaman became
stabilized on dialysis after being transferred from the ship to a hospital on
shore. The plaintiff argued that once the seaman became stabilized, he reached
the point of maximum medical improvement, and therefore, the plaintiff had
no continuing obligation to provide him with maintenance and cure.
148
The court appeared to have no easy task in addressing this issue.
However, the court agreed with the plaintiff that a seaman's entitlement to
maintenance and cure continues to the point of maximum medical
improvement. 149 Additionally, the court recognized that the point at which a
seaman is determined to have reached maximum medical improvement is a
question that is not easily answered.
150
After reviewing a number of opinions regarding the termination of
maintenance and cure benefits, the court determined that the main concern is
for the seaman's overall medical condition.'15  In determining whether a
seaman has reached maximum medical improvement, the pertinent test in the
Second Circuit is whether there is a possibility of a betterment in the seaman's
"condition.' ' 2 The court held that the term "condition" should be defined
broadly and not be limited to whether a disease has been deemed incurable.
153
The court based its decision on the fact that the admiralty courts have always
been liberal in interpreting the doctrine of maintenance and cure for the benefit
and the protection of seamen.154 Additionally, the court found that ambiguities
or doubts in the application of the law of maintenance and cure are resolved in
favor of the seamen.1
55
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1540.
148. Id. at 1548.
149. Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1549.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1550.
152. Id. (citing Pelotto v. L&N Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1979)).
153. Id. at 1550.
154. Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1558.
155. Id.
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The court held that the record makes it clear that treatment in the form of
dialysis or a transplant will unquestionably result in a betterment of the
seaman's condition. 5 6 The proposed treatment differs from other treatments
that merely treat pain and suffering without enhancing bodily function, in that
the proposed treatment represents the difference between life at a reasonable
level of functioning for an indefinite period of time and immediate death.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the seaman had not yet reached the point
of maximum medical improvement.
57
Having concluded that the duty of maintenance and cure continued as to
the subject seaman, a new issue then reared its ugly head; namely, whether the
shipowner/employer became obliged under the law of maintenance and cure to
provide the seaman with a kidney transplant in lieu of, or in addition to, kidney
dialysis.15 8  The plaintiff argued that statistically, a kidney transplant is
unlikely to be successful, it is costly, and it is unusual treatment beyond the
scope of maintenance and cure. Further, the plaintiff argued that even if the
transplant was successful, it would do no more than enhance the quality of the
seaman's life. 59
The court disagreed and held that the record indicated that the seaman has
a reasonable probability of survival with a transplant; a successful transplant
will better the seaman's condition to a greater extent than chronic dialysis; and,
although not determinative, a successful transplant, with time, ends up
considerably less expensive than chronic dialysis for three years. 16 The court
ruled that the probability of an improvement in the seaman's condition was
sufficient to bring treatment within the obligation of maintenance and cure.
1 61
In conclusion, the court found that the obligation of maintenance and
cure is not finite, and there need not be a definite and absolute ending
point. 1 - The shipowner's obligation may continue for the life of the
seaman. As one can imagine, this case raises significant monetary
concerns for the employers of seamen.
F. Admiralty Contract Jurisdiction
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1559.
158. Id. at 1555.
159. Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1555.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1556.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1557.
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In Terra Nova Insurance Co., v. Acer Latin America, Inc.,164 the
plaintiffs, foreign insurance underwriters, filed a complaint under the
Declaratory Judgment Act 165 seeking declaration of no coverage under a
marine cargo insurance policy issued to the defendant, a Florida corporation. 1
66
The defendant counterclaimed against the underwriters and their insurance
agent, also a Florida corporation, alleging diversity as the basis for jurisdiction.
The underwriters' insurance agent moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the
grounds that complete diversity was lacking since both it and the
counterclaimant were Florida corporations. The counterclaimant argued that
the court had supplemental jurisdiction' 67 over its compulsory counterclaim
and thus, the court retained subject matter jurisdiction despite the nondiversity
of the parties.'
68
In the first instance, the court seemed to battle with whether to entertain
the action for declaratory relief.169 The court recognized that the decision of
whether to entertain an action for declaratory relief is within the discretion of
the court.170  However, one of the factors for consideration in determining
whether to entertain such an action is whether the action is brought for the
purpose of "procedural fencing," a situation in which a party seeks declaratory
relief in order to accomplish something it could not do through removal.
171
In the instant case, the court found that had the defendant/counterclaimant
brought suit in the first instance, the presence of the nondiverse underwriters'
agent would have precluded removal absent admiralty jurisdiction. 172 Thus,
the court held that in order for the declaratory action to be proper, admiralty
jurisdiction must exist. 73 The plaintiffs argued that the policy at issue is a
maritime insurance contract, and, thus, is within the ambit of the court's
admiralty jurisdiction. 174 In response, the defendants argued that although the
policy was "captioned a 'marine cargo' policy[,] [i]t cover[ed] conveyances
'per land, water or air.' ' 175 Since the suit centered around theft of property on
164. 931 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
166. Terra Nova, 931 F. Supp. at 854.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) (providing the basis for supplemental jurisdiction).
168. Terra Nova, 931 F. Supp. at 854.
169. Id. at 854-55.
170. Id. at 854. See Casualty Indem. Exch. v. High Croft Enter., Inc., 714 F. Supp.
1190, 1193 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
171. Terra Nova, 931 F. Supp. at 854.
172. Id. at 855.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 855-56.
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land, the plaintiffs argued that the policy should not be considered a maritime
contract.
The court considered both parties' arguments and determined that the
policy covered both maritime and nonmaritime obligations.177  Based on
existing law, the court held that in order for the policy to fall within admiralty
jurisdiction, the nonmaritime obligations had to be "'incidental' in an
otherwise maritime contract."'178 The court concluded that in this case, the
policy's nonmaritime elements were not "incidental" to the contract as a
whole. 7 9 The policy applied regardless of where the loss occurred, and in this
case, the loss occurred on land. 18  Thus, the court found that there was no
admiralty jurisdiction over the subject matter, and it dismissed the case without
prejudice to be filed in state court. 1
H. Duty of Shipper
In Narcissus Shipping Corp. v. Armada Reefers, Ltd,182 a bareboat
charterer brought suit against the time charterer and shipper/consignee to
recover damages it suffered as a result of a deviated voyage which resulted
from cargo shifting and the vessel taking on a severe list that could not be
corrected at sea. 18F The bareboat charterer alleged an action against the time
charterer for unpaid charter hire and breach of the duty to "load, trim, and
stow" the cargo as required by the charter party.184 The bareboat charterer
alleged an action against the shipper/consignee for negligence in failing to
warn interested parties of prior shifting problems with respect to their product.
In response, the defendants filed counterclaims against the bareboat charterer
and cross-claims against each other.
185
According to the facts of this case, the shipper/consignee contracted with
the time charterer for the shipment of juice products from Florida to the
Netherlands. Prior to contracting with the time charterer for the subject
176. Terra Nova, 931 F. Supp. at 855.
177. Id. at 856.
178. Id. (quoting Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Balfour Maclaine Int'l, 968 F.2d 196, 199
(2d Cir. 1992)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 855-56.
181. Terra Nova, 931 F. Supp. at 856.
182. 950 F. Supp. 1129 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
183. Id. at 1131. The court found that the shipper and consignee were closely related
companies that did not act without the consent of the other. Id. at 1132 n.1. Thus, for all
practical matters, the court considered them as one and the same. Id.
184. Id. at 1138.
185. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1139-41.
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voyage, the shipper/consignee, in an effort to reduce costs, experimented with
transporting its product in plastic containers break bulk, rather than in
refrigerated containers. The shipper/consignee attempted to utilize this method
on thirteen voyages, each resulting in a shifting of cargo and a dangerous
resulting list. Despite the numerous problems encountered by the ship's
transportation of the shipper/consignee's product in this manner, and
recommendations made to the shipper/consignee for resolving these problems,
the shipper/consignee failed to advise the time charterer of the risk or to alter
its method of transporting its product.181
Before sailing, the shipper/consignee and its stevedore submitted a load
plan to the master of the vessel. After reviewing the load plan, the master
decided to erect side boards and to screw dunnage to the deck grating of the
vessel's holds to better secure the cargo. The master and his crew supervised
as the cargo was loaded. 188
Once at sea, the vessel began to roll port-side. Despite efforts to secure
the cargo, it shifted, causing the side boards to collapse and the vessel to
experience a severe list. As a result of the list, the master deviated from the
ship's intended route and sought refuge at a nearby port. Although the master
probably had good intentions, the port was not equipped to handle the
discharge, cold storage, and restow of the cargo. Consequently, the ship was
forced to return to its port of departure.
189
After hearing counsels' arguments and reviewing all the evidence of
record, the court concluded that the shipper/consignee was forty percent at
fault for failing to provide adequate securing materials, and for failing to warn
other parties of the numerous problematic voyages on which their cargo was
carried. 190 In finding that the remaining sixty percent was attributable to the
time charterer, the court focused on the master's decisions: To erect side
boards in order to restrain the drums (which had exacerbated the list when it
was destroyed); and to seek refuge in a port ill-equipped to store the cargo
during the required restow.
191
With respect to actions between the bareboat charterer and the time
charterer the court found that the incident constituted an "'accident to her
cargo."' Pursuant to the charter party, "'any detention or expenses related to
the accident to cargo are for the account of the charterer,"' unless the accident
186. Id. at 1132-33.
187. Id. at 1133.
188. Id. at 1135-36. A stevedore is "[a] person employed in loading and unloading
vessels." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (6th ed. 1990).
189. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1136.
190. Id. at 1137.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1138 (quoting clause 11(B) of the contract).
[Vol. 22:1
23
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
O'Sullivan /Davis
is caused or contributed to by the negligence of the bareboat charterer. 193 The
court determined that the master's negligence, which contributed significantly
to the subject incident and to the unseaworthiness of the vessel, was
attributable to the bareboat charterer. 194 Thus, the court denied the bareboat
charterer's action against the time charterer for unpaid charter hire.
195
However, the court found in favor of the bareboat charterer with respect
to its claim against the time charterer for breach of the charter party for failure
to "load, trim, and stow the cargo."'196 The court determined that the master's
supervision of the loading, stowing, and discharging of the subject cargo did
not relieve the time charterer of financial responsibility for such actions.'
97
Therefore the court found the time charterer liable to the owner for breach of
contract. 
1
'
As to the bareboat charterer's claim against the shipper/consignee for
failure to warn the parties of the previous shifting problems, the court
concluded that since the propensities of the cargo were dangerous and not open
and obvious, the shipper/consignee did indeed owe a duty to inform the other
interested parties to the maritime venture. 199 The court concluded that the
shipper/consignee breached its duty to warn the other interested parties of its
prior problematic voyages, and, as such, the court held it liable to the other
parties of the venture.
As to the time charterer's counterclaim against the bareboat charterer for
the master's failure to adequately supervise the loading, stowing, and
discharging of cargo, the court concluded that the clause requiring the master
to supervise the loading, stowing, and discharging of cargo merely reiterated
what is always implicitly true, i.e., that the master retains the right "to
supervise any operations aboard the vessel to ensure that the same do not
adversely affect the seaworthiness of the vessel."201 Since the time charterer
remained under a duty to the charter party with the responsibility to load, stow,
and discharge the cargo, the master had no viable counterclaim.
The court addressed the time charterer's and shipper/consignee's
counterclaims against the bareboat charterer for failure to exercise due
193. Id.
194. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1138.
195. Id.
196. Id. 1138-39.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1139.
199. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1139.
200. Id
201. Id. at 1140.
202. Id.
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diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel.2°3 The court concluded that since
the duty of providing a seaworthy ship requires an owner to exercise due care,
not only in providing a seaworthy vessel, but also in ensuring the adequacy of
204the ship's equipment, the bareboat charter breached its duty. The court
determined that the problematic equipment was the ship's sideboards, which
the master installed to retain the cargo.20 5 The vessel was deemed unseaworthy
because of its inadequate equipment.20 6 Therefore, the court concluded that
the bareboat charterer was liable to both the time charterer and the
207
shipper/consignee for unseaworthiness.
The time charterer and shipper/consignee cross-claimed against each
other for breach of the contract of affreightment. 208 The shipper/consignee
argued that the time charterer was liable for contribution/indemnity pursuant to
the contract provision which held that the time charterer was "'responsible
for.., delay in delivery of the goods only in case the.., delay has been
caused by the improper or negligent stowage of the goods.' 20 9 The court
disagreed, and held that the time charterer's agreement, pursuant to contract, to
bring cargo "'into the holds, loaded, stowed, and/or trimmed and taken from
the holds and discharged.., free of any risk, liability, and expense whatsoever
to the owners [time charterer],"' insulated time charterer from liability for
stowage problems. 21 As a result, the court discarded the shipper/consignee's
cross-claim against time charterer.
2 1
Further, the court rejected time charterer's cross-claim against the
shipper/consignee for breach of the contract of affreightment for failure to
adequately pack the cargo.212 The court found no evidence indicating that the
cargo was inadequately packaged and held that the lack of damage to cargo
213
supported the conclusion. However, the district court did find value in the
time charterer's cross-claim against the shipper/consignee for breach of its
duty, under the general maritime law, to warn the time charterer of the
203. Id.
204. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1140.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1140-41.
208. Id. at 1141. A contract of affreightment is "a contract with a ship-owner to hire his
ship, or part of it, for the carriage of goods... [s]uch a contract generally takes the form either
of a charter-party or of a bill of lading." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed. 1990) (citation
omitted).
209. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1142 (quoting clause 5(b) of the contract).
210. Id. at 1142.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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potential dangerous nature of the drummed cargo as evidenced by the
shipper/consignee's prior problematic voyages.
214
Additionally, the district court determined that "[u]nder the general
maritime law, cargo owners and shippers each have a duty to warn other
interested parties in the maritime venture of any inherent dangers in the cargo
of which they know or should know and which the others could not reasonably
be expected to know., 215  The shipper/consignee knew of the dangers
associated with the shipment of the drums which were not patently dangerous
and thereby breached its duty by failing to warn other parties.216 Therefore, the
district court ruled in favor of the time charterer's claim against the
shipper/consignee.217
V. FLORIDA DECISIONS
A. Punitive Damages
In Langmead v. Admiral Cruises, Inc.,218 an entertainer employed by a
cruise ship injured herself while exercising in the ship's gym when an elastic
band she was using snapped and hit her in the eye.219 The entertainer sued the
cruise line for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure,
and punitive damages. The trial court directed a verdict for the cruise line on
the issues of maintenance and cure and punitive damages, but submitted the
negligence and unseaworthiness claims to a jury for determination. 220 At trial,' " e 221
the jury denied the entertainer's claim for unseaworthiness..1 However, the
jury award for $50,000 on the claim for negligence was reduced to $5000 upon
finding that the entertainer was ninety percent comparatively negligent. The
entertainer appealed the judgment.2-
The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the jury's verdict,
holding that the comparative negligence issue was properly submitted to the
jury.22 - However, it reversed and remanded the directed verdict, holding that
214. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1142.
215. Id. at 1143.
216. Id
217. Id.
218. 696 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
219. Id at 1190.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id
223. Langmead, 696 So. 2d at 1190.
224. Id.
1997]
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
the determination as to when the entertainer reached "'maximum medical
cure' should have been submitted to the jury.225
On remand, the trial court considered the following issues: 1) whether
certain visits made by the entertainer to a physician were "cure" and should
have been paid for; 2) whether the cruise line owed the entertainer two weeks
worth of lost wages; and 3) whether the cruise line's failure to pay the
entertainer warranted punitive damages. 226 The entertainer was denied her
maintenance claim on directed verdict, but was awarded cure for medical visits
that remained unpaid ($235), two weeks lost wages ($730), and punitive
damages ($3.5 million).
The trial court granted the cruise line's motion for a new trial, holding
that the "jury verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and
was influenced by prejudicial matters."228 The entertainer appealed, and the
third district appeared to have no difficulty in holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the cruise line a new trial on the issue of
liability, and actual damages because the record fully supported the jury's
verdict.229 However, the third district recognized that the more difficult issue
was the issue of punitive damages. 
2 30
The cruise line argued that the punitive damage award was so excessive
that it violated the Substantive Due Process Clause of the United States and
Florida Constitutions. Citing the United States Supreme Court case, BMW of
North America v. Gore,231 the third district set forth three criteria for analysis
in determining the excessiveness of a punitive damage award: "1) the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; 2) the ratio of the punitive
damage award to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff; and 3) the
comparison between the punitive damage award and the civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. ' 232 Applying
these three criteria, the third district found no reprehensible conduct on behalf
of the cruise line; a ratio of 3626 to one with respect to the amount of punitive
damages awarded in comparison to the actual harm inflicted; and that the
cruise line was not guilty of any misconduct.
233
225. Id. at 1190-91 (quoting Langmead v. Admiral Cruises, Inc., 610 So. 2d 565 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
226. Id. at 1191.
227. Id.
228. Langmead, 696 So. 2d at 1191.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
232. Langmead, 696 So. 2d at 1192.
233. Id. at 1193-94.
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In support of its determination that the cruise line was not guilty of
reprehensible conduct, the third district noted: 1) the cruise line provided
medical attention to the entertainer immediately upon learning of her injury; 2)
it referred the employee to a specialist within two days of her injury in order to
ensure that she received the best possible treatment; 3) it continued to pay her
for three days following her injury when she did not work; 4) it paid for her
hotel stay and food expenses for a week while she was treated by a specialist
ashore; 5) it flew her from Mexico to California for treatment; and 6) it paid all
medical bills submitted by doctors not retained by the entertainer's lawyer.234
Further, it found that consistent with its finding of no reprehensible conduct on
the part of the cruise line, the cruise line was not guilty of "callous,"
"recalcitrant," "arbitrary," or "capricious" conduct in failing to pay the
entertainer for maintenance and cure and thus, was not liable for punitive
damages.2 5
Deciding in favor of the cruise line, the third district held that the award
of punitive damages was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Additionally, the court held that the award was "so grossly excessive as to
shock the judicial conscience;" it bore no relationship to the entertainer's harm
and the cruise line's culpability; and it violated the cruise line's rights to
substantive due process under the United States and Florida Constitutions.2
37
Accordingly, it remanded the case with instructions to grant the cruise line's
motion for directed verdict as to punitive damages.
238
In Kloster Cruise Ltd. v. De Sousa,2 39 the trial judge awarded the plaintiff
attorneys' fees following a plaintiff's verdict in an admiralty case seeking an
award for maintenance and cure, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and
costs.2 40 The post-trial judgment was based on the jury's finding that the
defendant 'willfully and arbitrarily' failed to provide maintenance and
cure.)241
The defendant appealed and the Third District Court of Appeal held that
the recovery of attorneys' fees in a suit for willful failure to pay maintenance
and cure is nonseverable from the cause of action.242 Additionally, the third
district held that absent waiver of the parties, the jury is to determine not only
234. Id. at 1192-93.
235. Id. at 1194.
236. Id.
237. Langmead, 696 So. 2d at 1194.
238. Id.
239. 677 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
240. Id. at 50.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 51.
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the plaintiff's entitlement to fees, but also the appropriate amount to award.
243
The third district found that in the instant case, the trial court, without
stipulation of the parties and notwithstanding defendant's objection, severed
the issue of the amount of fees to be awarded from the entitlement issue.
244
The third district reversed the trial court's judgment for attorneys' fees and
remanded for further proceedings. 245  Before concluding, the third district
suggested that should the trial court find it impractical to present the issue of
fee amount to a jury in the same sitting as other issues, it can have the jury
arrive at its verdict, and then receive evidence as to the amount of fees to be
awarded.246
In Kloster Cruise Ltd. v. Segui,247 the plaintiff, while employed as a cabin
steward aboard a cruise line, was diag240sed with a degenerative hip condition
requiring him to have his hip replaced. The plaintiff brought suit against the
employer cruise line for "negligence, unseaworthiness, failure to treat, and
failure to provide maintenance and cure., 249 He alleged that the cruise line
"failed to respond promptly and properly to [his] complaints of pain" causing
his medical condition to become aggravated and requiring hip replacement
instead of a "less intrusive" treatment.250 Four days before trial, the plaintiff
returned to the United States alleging that the surgery was negligently
performed in the Phillipines causing his right leg to measure "three-fourths of
an inch shorter than the left leg."25  The cruise line moved for a continuance
of trial on the grounds "that it could not reasonably be expected to defend
against the newly discovered claim" of medical malpractice on such short
252
notice. The trial court denied the cruise line's motion, and the case
proceeded to trial.253 The plaintiff prevailed, and the cruise line appealed.254
On appeal, the cruise line argued that the judgment should be reversed
based on the fact that the trial court wrongfully refused to grant its motion for
continuance. It further argued that in light of the recent decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Guevara v. Maritime Overseas
243. Id.
244. DeSousa, 677 So. 2d at 51.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 679 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
248. Id. at 11.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Kloster, 679 So. 2d at 11.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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255Corp., punitive damages are no longer available for willful failure to provide
256
a seaman maintenance and cure. The third district reversed judgment on the
ground that the cruise line's motion to continue should have been granted.257
However, the third district ruled that binding precedent prevented the court
from ruling that punitive damages are no longer available for willful failure to
provide maintenance and cure.
B. Coverage
In Florida Marine Towing, Inc. v. United National Insurance Co.,259 the
seller sold a tugboat to buyer/owner who made a down payment and was
obligated to pay the balance in installments over two years. 6 The seller was
considered a lender'and was added as an additional assured on the marine hull
insurance policy issued by the insurer. Although the policy contained a
navigational warranty, which confined the tugboat's use to inland waters in
Florida, the tugboat failed to restrict itself to Florida inland waters and sank in
the Atlantic Ocean. The insurer denied the seller's claim under the insurance
policy on the premise that the tugboat violated the navigational warranty. The
seller sued, arguing that "inland waters" includes anything within Florida's
three mile limit or, alternatively, that the seller lacked control over the
tugboat's navigation, and thus the seller could not be held attributable for the
navigational warranty's breach. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the insurer, and the seller appealed. 261
The Third District Court of Appeal determined that since the contract at
issue was for marine insurance, federal maritime law governed the
interpretation of the navigational warranty.262  Finding that the federal
maritime law requires strict construction of a navigational warranty, and that
such a warranty can release an insurer even if compliance with the warranty
would not have avoided the loss, the third district focused on defining "inland
waters.
,2 63
Finding a plethora of United States Supreme Court cases defining "inland
waters," the third district determined that under the general maritime law,
"inland waters" is generally understood to mean waters on the landward side
255. 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 706 (1996).
256. Kloster, 679 So. 2d at 12.
257. Id
258. Id
259. 686 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
260. Id. at 712.
261. Id.
262. Id
263. Id. at 713.
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264
of the coastline, such as rivers, harbors, and canals. Since the tugboat sank
in the Atlantic Ocean, seaward of the coastline, it was not in inland waters. As
such, the third district found that the seller breached the policy's navigational
warranty.
265
Despite the fact that the seller breached its navigational warranty, the
third district held that its lack of control over the tugboat's navigation
266precluded the insurer from denying it coverage. Additionally, the third
district held that since the seller was not merely a loss payee, but was an
additional assured, its coverage could not be adversely affected by the
mortgagor's wrongful acts. In conclusion, the third district reversed the
268
summary judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The summary of cases provided run wide in range with respect to issues
that may arise in admiralty and should give any novice a general
understanding of admiralty law.
Florida Marine, 686 So. 2d at 714.
Id.
Id. at 714-15.
Id. at 715.
Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida.' Although this article will focus primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1996, and June 30, 1997, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period which are either of
particular interest to the appellate practitioner or which provide the
background for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases
decided during that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those
substantive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this
article will focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and
1. For a discussion of developments in appellate practice for 1993, 1995, and 1996, see
Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NOvA L. REv. 13
(1996) [hereinafter 1996 Survey]; Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1995 Survey of
Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Survey]; Anthony C. Musto,
Appellate Practice: 1993 Survey of Florida Law, 18 NoVA L. Rav. 1 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 Survey].
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will deal with those areas. Additionally, this article will not discuss cases
relating to the preservation of issues, nor the question of whether particular
errors were harmless.
II. FOUR-YEAR CYCLE AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The most significant development in the field of appellate practice in
Florida, during the 1996-97 year, was the four-year cycle revision of the
2Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. As is the case with each set of
Florida court rules, revisions occur every four years pursuant to the cycle
established by rule 2.130(c) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration.3
Proposals are submitted by the Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee to
the Supreme Court of Florida, which adopts such portions of the proposals
as it deems appropriate. The numerous changes that resulted from this
process were initially adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida on4••
November 22, 1996,. were corrected on denial of rehearing on December 26,
1996,5 and took effect on January 1, 1997.
A. Rule 9. 010: Effective Date and Scope
This rule was amended to state that the appellate rules, as provided in
rule 2.135 of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, shall supersede
all conflicting rules of procedure. It is likely that the most significant impact
of this change will be to require circuit courts, considering requests for
extraordinary writs that do not involve the submission of evidence or
testimony to follow the procedure set forth by rule 9.100 of the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure, rather than that contained in rule 1.630 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d 1103 (Fla.
1996).
3. FLA. R. JuD. ADMrN. 2.130(c).
4. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d at 1103.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. As part of its four-year cycle review of the rules of judicial administration, the court
adopted new rule 2.135, which states: "The Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure shall
control all proceedings in the supreme court and the district courts, and all proceedings in
which the circuit courts exercise their appellate jurisdiction, nothwithstanding any conflicting
rules of procedure." Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, 682 So. 2d
89, 103 (Fla. 1996).
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B. Rule 9.020: Definitions
The court defined "Family Law Matter" as "[a] matter governed by the
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure,",8 and amended the definition of
"Lower Tribunal" to include a "judge of compensation claims... whose
order is to be reviewed." 9 The court also added to the list of authorized and
timely motions that delay rendition of orders, a motion to withdraw a plea
after sentencing pursuant to rule 3.170(l) of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure.'0 The reference to one of the motions already included in the
rule, a motion to correct a sentence or order of probation, was amended to
make clear that in order to delay rendition, such motion had to be made
pursuant to rule 3.800(b) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Another amendment to the rule provides that when a notice of appeal is
filed during the pendency of a motion to correct a sentence, or order of
probation, or a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing, the notice "shall
be treated as prematurely filed and the appeal held in abeyance until the
filing of a signed, written order disposing of such motion. 12  A new
provision was created to provide:
An order based upon the recommendation of a hearing officer in
accordance with Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.492
shall not be deemed rendered if there has been filed in the lower
tribunal an authorized and timely motion to vacate until the filing
of a signed, written order disposing of such motion.
1 3
C. Rule 9.100: Original Proceedings
The references to "common law certiorari" were changed to simply
"certiorari" in order to make clear that the thirty-day time limit for instituting
a proceeding applies to all petitions for certiorari. Also, past references to
"administrative" action were changed to "agency" action.15
Added to the list of petitions that must be filed within thirty days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed in order to be timely were petitions
8. FIA. R. APP. P. 9.020(d).
9. Id. 9.020(e).
10. Id 9.020(h).
11. Id.
12. Id. 9.020(h)(3).
13. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(i).
14. See 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100.
15. FLA. R. App. P. 9.100(c).
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challenging orders of the Department of Corrections in prisoner disciplinary
proceedings.
16
A new subdivision of the rule sets forth the procedures to be followed
with regard to petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition directed to a• • 17
judge or lower tribunal. The procedures provide that "[t]he name of the
judge or lower tribunal shall be omitted from the caption," which shall
instead "bear the name of the petitioner" and which shall name the "other
parties to the proceeding in the lower tribunal" as respondents. The judge or
lower tribunal must be named as a formal party in the body of the petition,
which must be served on all parties, including the judge, who are formal
parties. The rule makes clear that "[t]he responsibility to respond to an
order to show cause is that of the litigant opposing the relief requested in the
petition. Unless otherwise specifically ordered, the judge or lower tribunal
has no obligation to file a response" but retains the discretion to do so.19
"The absence of a separate response•., shall not be deemed to admit the
allegations of the petition." 20 2
Another new subdivision2' establishes additional requirements for
proceedings invoking the jurisdiction of the circuit court to review judicial
22or quasi-judicial action. The caption of a petition seeking such review
must contain a statement that the petition is being filed pursuant to the
subdivision.23 When such a petition is filed, "the circuit court clerk shall
forthwith transmit" it to the appropriate judge or judges "for a determination
as to whether an order to show cause should be issued. 24 The clerk shall
not enter a default in a case in which the petition is filed pursuant to the
subdivision.
25
D. Rule 9.110: Appeal Proceedings to Review Final Orders of Lower
Tribunals and Orders Granting New Trial in Jury and Non-Jury Cases
The rule was amended to indicate its applicability to proceedings that
"seek review of orders entered in probate and guardianship matters that
16. Id. 9.100(c)(4).
17. Id. 9.100(e).
18. Id. 9.100(e)(2).
19. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(e)(3).
20. Id.
21. Id. 9.100(f).
22. Id. 9.100(f)(1).
23. Id. 9.100(f)(2).
24. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(f(3).
25. Id. 9.100(f)(4).
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finally determine a right or obligation of an interested person as defined in
the Florida Probate Code."
26
Another amendment provides that in an appeal of an administrative
order:
[T]he appellant shall file the original notice [of appeal] with the
clerk of the lower administrative tribunal within 30 days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed, and file a copy of the notice,
accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of
the [appellate] court.27
A new subdivision of the rule states that "[j]udgments that determine the
existence or nonexistence of insurance coverage in cases in which a claim
has been made against an insured and coverage thereof is disputed by the
insurer may be reviewed either by the method prescribed in this rule or that
in rule 9.130, '28 the rule governing proceedings to review non-final orders.
This subdivision was a response to the opinion in Canal Insurance Co. v.
Reed,29 which suggested that the Appellate Court Rules Committee consider
an appropriate method for providing expedited review in this type of case in
order to avoid unnecessary delays in the final resolution of the underlying
actions.30
E. Rule 9.130: Proceedings to Review Non-Final Orders
The court adopted an amendment that shifted a phrase used in setting
forth one of the rule's appealable non-final orders. The old version of the
rule provided for review of non-final orders that determined "that a party is
not entitled to workers' compensation immunity as a matter of law."31 The
new version refers instead to non-final orders which determine "that, as a
matter of law, a party is not entitled to workers' compensation immunity. 32
This change was made to resolve the confusion evidenced in Breakers Palm
33 34Beach, Inc. v. Gloger, City of Lake Mary v. Franklin, and their progeny
26. Id 9.110(a)(2).
27. Id 9.110(c).
28. Id 9.110(n).
29. 666 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1996). For a discussion of the decision in Canal Insurance,
see 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 25-26.
30. See 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. App. P. 9.110.
31. RA R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi) (amended 1996).
32. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi).
33. 646 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). For a discussion of the decision in
Breakers Palm Beach, see 1995 Survey, supra note 1, at 42-43.
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by clarifying that the rule does not intend "to grant a right of nonfinal review
if the lower tribunal denies a motion for summary judgment based on the
existence of a material fact dispute. 35
Added to the list of reviewable non-final orders were those that
determine "that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to absolute or
qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law."36 This
addition was in response to the decision in Tucker v. Resha,37 which asked
that the Appellate Court Rules Committee submit a proposed amendment to
allow for review of orders of this nature.38
A new subdivision was also added to the rule making it clear that
multiple non-final orders within the scope of the rule may be reviewed by a
single notice of appeal if the notice is timely filed as to each such order.3 9
F. Rule 9.140: Appeal Proceedings in Criminal Cases
Several amendments expanded the number of appealable orders. The
rule now allows defendants to appeal from: 1) orders granting or modifying
community control;40 2) unlawful sentences;41 or 3) sentences, if appeals are
permitted by general law42 or "as otherwise provided by general law., 43 In
addition, it now allows the state to appeal from orders: 1) dismissing
affidavits "charging the commission of a criminal offense, the violation of
probation, the violation of community control, or the violation of any
supervised correctional release;" 44 2) granting motions for judgment of
acquittal after jury verdicts; 45 3) finding a defendant incompetent;46 4)
"imposing an unlawful or illegal sentence or imposing a sentence outside the
range permitted by the sentencing guidelines;" 47 5) "imposing a sentence
outside the range recommended by the sentencing guidelines; '48 or 6)
34. 668 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
35. 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. App. P. 9.130.
36. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130 (a)(3)(C)(viii).
37. 648 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1994). For a discussion of the decision in Tucker, see 1995
Survey, supra note 1, at 10-11.
38. Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1190.
39. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(h).
40. Id. 9.140(b)(1)(B) and (C).
41. Id. 9.140(b)(1)(D).
42. Id. 9.140(b)(1)(E).
43. Id. 9.140(b)(1)(F).
44. FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A).
45. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(E).
46. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(H).
47. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(J).
48. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(K).
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"denying restitution;" 49 or "as otherwise provided by general law for final
orders." The amendments also indicate that "[tihe state as provided by
general law may appeal to the circuit court non-final orders rendered in the
county court. '' 1r
A new subdivision was added to the rule to accurately reflect the
limited right of direct appeal after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 5 3 It
states that "[a] defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may
expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower
tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved. 54
The new subdivision goes on to state:
(B) A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may
otherwise directly appeal only
(i) the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
(ii) a violation of the plea agreement, if preserved by a motion to
withdraw plea;
(iii) an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to withdraw
plea;
(iv) a sentencing error, if preserved; or
(v) as otherwise provided by law.55
Except for those appeals in which a defendant expressly reserves the right to
appeal a dispositive order, the record for appeals involving a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere shall be limited to:
a. all indictments, informations, affidavits of violation of probation
or community control and other charging documents;
b. the plea and sentencing hearing transcripts;
c. any written plea agreements;
49. FLA. R APP. P. 9.140(c)(1)(L).
50. Id. 9.140(c)(1)(M).
51. Id. 9.140(c)(2).
52. Id 9.140(b)(2).
53. See 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140.
54. FLA. R APP. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A).
55. Id. 9.140(b)(2)(B)(i)-(v).
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d. any judgments, sentences, scoresheets, motions and orders to
correct or modify sentences, orders imposing, modifying, or
revoking probation or community control, orders assessing costs,
fees, fines, or restitution against the defendant, and any other
documents relating to sentencing;
e. any motion to withdraw plea and order thereon;
f. notice of appeal, statement of judicial acts to be reviewed,
directions to the clerk, and designation to the court reporter.
56
In addition, "[u]pon good cause shown, the court, or the lower tribunal
before the record is transmitted, may expand the record.""
The rule was also clarified to indicate that a defendant may institute an
appeal by filing a notice of appeal "at any time between rendition of a final
judgment and 30 days following rendition of a written order imposing
sentence. 58
Pursuant to the dictates of Lopez v. State,59 the rule now also provides
that when the state appeals an order, a defendant may cross appeal on related
issues involved in the same order b Z serving a notice within ten days of
service of the state's notice of appeal.
Another amendment affects the procedures to be used in death penalty
cases. It provides that in such cases "all petitions for extraordinary relief
over which the supreme court has original jurisdiction, including petitions
for writ of habeas corpus, shall be filed simultaneously with the initial brief
in the appeal from the lower tribunal's order on the defendant's application
for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850."61 It further
indicates that the provision of the rule relating to belated appeals62 shall not
63
apply to death penalty cases.
A new subdivision 64 dealing with sentencing errors provides that claims
of such errors "may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first
been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of
56. Id. 9.140(b)(2)(C)(i)(a)-(f).
57. Id. 9.140(b)(2)(C)(ii).
58. Id. 9.140(b)(3).
59. 638 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1994).
60. FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(4).
61. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(b)(6)(E).
62. Id. 9.1400).
63. Id. 9.140(b)(6)(E).
64. Id. 9.140(d).
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sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure3.800(b)."'
The portion of the rule relating to transcripts was amended to allow
nonindigent defendants to order just the original transcripts from the court
66reporters and to make copies for all parties. Parties electing to use the
procedure must serve notice of its use on counsel for the state, file the
original transcripts and copies for the state and each defendant with the clerk
of the lower tribunal for inclusion in the record, and attach a certificate to
each copy certifying that it is an accurate and complete copy of the original
transcript.67 When this procedure is used, the clerk of the lower tribunal
shall be required to "retain the original transcript[s] for use as needed by the
state in any collateral proceedings and shall not destroy the transcripts
without the consent" of the Attorney General's office.68 The procedures can
also be utilized by the state when it appeals.
69
The adoption of this amendment is intended to supersede the dictates of
Brown v. State,70 and allow the use by nonindigent defendants and the state
of a procedure previously available only in civil cases pursuant to rule
9.200(b)(2) of the Florida Rules ofAppellate Procedure.71
In cases in which the defendant is indigent, or in which the party taking
the appeal elects not to use the above discussed procedure, "the parties shall
designate the court reporter to file with the clerk of the lower tribunal the
original transcripts for the court and sufficient copies for the state and all
indigent defendants."72  The lower tribunal may, however, in publically
funded cases, direct its clerk, rather than the court reporter, to prepare the
necessary copies of the original transcripts.
73
Regardless of the method of transcript preparation, the clerk of the
lower tribunal shall within fifty days of the filing of the notice of appeal,74
prepare and serve copies of the record to the court, counsel for the state, and
all counsel appointed to represent indigent defendants on appeal.75 The clerk
"shall simultaneously serve copies of the index to all nonindigent defendants
65. Id. 9.140(d)(2).
66. FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(e)(2)(D).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. 9.140(e)(2)(E).
70. 639 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). For a discussion of the decision in
Brown, see 1995 Survey, supra note 1, at 51-52.
71. Brown, 639 So. 2d at 635.
72. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(e)(2)(C).
73. Id 9.140(e)(2)(F).
74. Id 9.140(e)(1).
75. Id. 9.140(e)(4).
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and, upon their request, copies of the record or portions thereof at the cost
prescribed by law."
"Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the clerk of the lower tribunal
shall retain all original documents except the original transcripts designated
for appeal which shall be included in the record transmitted to the [appellate]
court., 7 7 "Except in death penalty cases, the [appellate] court shall return
the record to the lower tribunal after final disposition of the appeal. 78
The appellant's initial brief "shall be served within 30 days of service
of the record or designation of appointed counsel, whichever is later.,
79
The time period for filing any appellant's brief in appeals from orders
denying relief under rules 3.800(a) or 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure was limited to within fifteen days of the filing of the notice of
80
appeal .
Another new subdivision of the rule establishes the procedure for
petitions seeking belated appeals or alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. 81 The procedure calls for both of these types of claims to be
82presented directly to the appellate courts. Previously, the dictates of State
v. District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District,83 mandated that a claim
that an appeal was frustrated by ineffective assistance of trial counsel (most
frequently, the failure to file a notice of appeal) must be raised by a motion
in the trial court pursuant to rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and that a claim of ineffective appellate counsel was to be raised
in a habeas corpus petition filed in the appellate court.84 The second district,
in Stephenson v. State,8' had expressed frustration with its inability to grant
relief when trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of
appeal. 86  On review of the 'district court's decision in Stephenson, the
87Supreme Court of Florida continued to require the then-existing procedure,
but gave some indication of a willingness to eventually change the process,
noting that it was adhering to the principle established in District Court of
76. Id.
77. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(e)(3).
78. Id. 9.140(e)(5).
79. Id. 9.140(f).
80. Id. 9.140(i).
81. Id. 9.140().
82. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.1400)(1).
83. 569 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1990).
84. Id. at 441-42.
85. 640 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
86. Id. at 119.
87. Stephenson v. State, 655 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 1995). For a discussion of both
Stephenson opinions, see 1995 Survey, supra note 1, at 52-53.
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Appeal "for now" and that the issue was at that time under review by both
the court and the Appellate Court Rules Committee.
88
The new subdivision requires both petitions for belated appeals and
petitions "alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel [to] be filed in
the appellate court to which the appeal was or should have been taken."
89
Such petitions are to be in the form prescribed by the rule dealing with
original proceedings in the appellate courts9" and shall recite in the statement
of facts:
(A) the date and nature of the lower tribunal's order sought to be
reviewed;
(B) the name of the lower tribunal rendering the order;
(C) the nature, disposition, and dates of all previous proceedings
in the lower tribunal and, if any, in the appellate courts;
(D) if a previous petition was filed, the reason the claim in the
present petition was not raised previously;
(E) the nature of the relief sought; and
(F) the specific facts sworn to by the petitioner or petitioner's
counsel that constitute the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
or basis for entitlement to belated appeal, including in the case of a
petition for belated appeal whether the petitioner requested counsel
to proceed with the appeal.
91
The petitioner is required to serve copies of the petition on both the attorney
general and the state attorney. 92 "The [appellate] court may by order identify
any provision of this rule that the petition fails to satisfy and, pursuant to
rule 9.040(d), allow the petitioner a specified time to serve an amended
petition."'93 The appellate court may also "dismiss a second or successive
petition if it does not allege new grounds and the prior determination was on
the merits, or if a failure to assert the grounds was an abuse of procedure." 94
88. Stephenson, 655 So. 2d at 87 n.1.
89. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.1400)(1).
90. Id. 9.100.
91. Id. 9.140j)(2)(A)-(F).
92. Id. 9.1400)(4).
93. Id. 9.1400)(5)(B).
94. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.1400)(5)(C).
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The appellate rule relating to original proceedings95 shall govern the
processing of the petition.96 "An order granting a petition for belated appeal
shall be filed with the lower tribunal and treated as the notice of appeal, if no
previous notice of appeal has been filed." 97
The new subdivision also establishes time limits for the filing of
petitions:
98
(A) A petition for belated appeal shall not be filed more than two
years after the expiration of time for filing the notice of appeal
from a final order, unless it alleges under oath with a specific
factual basis that the petitioner
(i) was unaware an appeal had not been timely filed or was not
advised of the right to an appeal; and
(ii) should not have ascertained such facts by the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
(B) A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
shall not be filed more than two years after the conviction becomes
final on direct review unless it alleges under oath with a specific
factual basis that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the
results of the appeal by counsel.
(C) Time periods under this subdivision shall not begin to run
prior to the effective date [January 1, 199799] of this rule. 100
G. Rule 9.145: Appeal Proceedings in Juvenile Delinquency Cases
This new rule provides that appeal proceedings in juvenile delinquency
cases shall be as in criminal cases, except as modified by this rule. 101 It
states:
95. Id. 9.100.
96. Id. 9.140(j)(5)(A).
97. Id. 9.140(j)(5)(D).
98. Id. 9.140(j)(3).
99. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d 1103, 1107
(Fla. 1996).
100. FLA. R. App. P. 9.1400)(3).
101. Id. 9.145(a).
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(b) Appeals by Child. To the extent adversely affected, a child or
any parent, legal guardian, or custodian of a child may appeal
(1) an order of adjudication of delinquency or withholding
adjudication of delinquency, or any disposition order entered
thereon;
(2) orders entered after adjudication or withholding of
adjudication of delinquency, including orders revoking or
modifying the community control;
(3) an illegal disposition; or
(4) any other final order as provided by law.102
It further indicates the state may appeal an order:
(A) dismissing a petition for delinquency or any part of it, if the
order is entered before the commencement of an adjudicatory
hearing;
(B) suppressing confessions, admissions, or evidence obtained by
search and/or seizure before the adjudicatory hearing;
(C) granting a new adjudicatory hearing;
(D) arresting judgment;
(E) discharging a child under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure
8.090;
(F) ruling on a question of law if a child appeals an order of
disposition;
(G) constituting an illegal disposition;
(H) discharging a child on habeas corpus; or
(I) finding a child incompetent pursuant to the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure.1
0 3
102. Id. 9.145(b)(l)-(4).103. Id. 9.145(e)(1)(A)-(I).
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Under the rule,
[i]f the state appeals a pre-adjudicatory hearing order of the trial
court, the notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days and before
commencement of the adjudicatory hearing.
(A) A child in detention whose case is stayed pending state appeal
shall be released from detention pending the appeal if the child is
charged with an offense that would be bailable if the child were
charged as an adult, unless the lower tribunal for good cause stated
in an order determines otherwise. The lower tribunal retains
discretion to release from detention any child who is not otherwise
entitled to release under the provisions of this rule.
(B) If a child has been found incompetent to proceed, any order
staying the proceedings on a state appeal shall have no effect on
any order entered for the purpose of treatment.
104
Appeals in juvenile delinquency cases "shall be entitled and docketed with
the initials, but not the name, of the child and the court case number. All
references to the child in briefs, other papers, and the decision of the court
shall be by initials."105 The rule does not require the deletion of the name of
the child from pleadings or other papers transmitted to the court from the
lower tribunal.
All papers in juvenile delinquency appeals "shall remain sealed in the
office of the clerk of court when not in use by the court, and shall not be
open to inspection except by the parties and their counsel, or as otherwise
ordered."
0
H. Rule 9.146: Appeal Proceeding in Juvenile Dependency and
Termination of Parental Rights Cases and Cases Involving Families
and Children in Need of Services
This new rule provides that "[a]ppeal proceedings in juvenile
dependency and termination of parental rights cases and cases involving
families and children in need of services shall be as in civil cases except as
104. Id. 9.145(c)(2).
105. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.145(d).
106. See 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. App. P. 9.145.
107. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.145(e).
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modified by this rule."108 It permits "[a]ny child, any parent, guardian ad
litem, or legal custodian of any child, any other party to the proceeding
affected by an order of the lower tribunal, or the appropriate state agency as
provided by law" to appeal to the appropriate court within the time and in
the manner prescribed by the appellate rules.
109
"The taking of an appeal shall not operate as a stay in any case unless
pursuant to an order of the court.'10 With two exceptions, a party seeking to
stay an "order pending review shall file a motion in the lower tribunal, which
shall have continuing jurisdiction, in its discretion, to grant, modify, or deny
such relief, after considering the welfare and best interest of the child."
The two exceptions are as provided by general law 112 and that a termination
of parental rights order with placement of the child with a licensed child-
placing agency or the Department of Children and Family Services for
subsequent adoption shall be suspended while the appeal is pending, but the
child shall continue in custody under the order until the appeal is decided.
1 13
Transmittal of the record in cases governed by the rule will not remove
the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal to conduct judicial reviews or other
proceedings related to the health and welfare of the child pending
appeal.... When the parent or child is a party to the appeal, the appeal shall
be docketed and any papers filed in the court shall be entitled with the
initials, but not the name, of the child or parent and the court case number.
All references to the child or parent in briefs, other papers, and the decision
of the court shall be by initials.
114
The rule "does not require deletion of the names of the child and
parents from pleadings and other papers transmitted to the court from the
lower tribunal."
'1 15
All papers in cases governed by the rule "shall remain sealed in the
office of the clerk of the court when not in use by the court, and shall not be
open to inspection except by the parties and their counsel, or as otherwise
ordered.,,116-
The appellate court is required to give priority to appeals under this
rule.11
7
108. Id 9.146(a).
109. Id. 9.146(b).
110. Id. 9.146(c)(2).
111. Id. 9.146(c)(1).
112. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.146(c)(1).
113. Id. 9.146(c)(2).
114. Id. 9.146(d)-(e).
115. 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.146.
116. FLA. R. AlP. P. 9.146(f).
117. Id. 9.146(g).
19971
48
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
I Rule 9.180: Appeal Proceedings to Review Workers' Compensation
Cases
This new rule consolidates and moves into the appellate rules the
procedures previously set forth in Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation
Procedure 4.160, 4.161, 4.165, 4.166, 4.170, 4.180, 4.190, 4.220, 4.225,
4.230, 4.240, 4.250, 4.260, 4.265, 4.270, and 4.280.'18 The change was
intended to eliminate duplicative rules and not to change the general nature
of workers' compensation appeals."
19
. Rule 9.200: The Record
A new subdivision was added to the rule to provide that in family law
cases "the clerk of the lower tribunal shall retain the original orders, reports
and recommendations of masters or hearing officers, and judgments within
the file of the lower tribunal and shall include copies thereof within the
record.'120 This subdivision "was added because family law cases frequently
have continuing activity at the lower tribunal level during the pendency of
appellate proceedings and that continued activity may be hampered by the
absence of orders being enforced during the pendency of the appeal.
The wording of the rule was also changed to require that "[t]he
transcript of the trial shall be securely bound in consecutively numbered
volumes not to exceed 200 pages each, and each page shall be numbered
consecutively."' 122 Prior to the amendment, the rule referred to the
"transcript of proceedings." 123  The purpose of the change was "to be
consistent with and to clarify the requirement in subdivision (d)(1)(B) that it
is only the transcript of trial that is not to be renumbered by the clerk."' 124
Under the amended rule, "it remains the duty of the clerk to consecutively
number transcripts other than the transcript of the trial.' 125 The Appellate
Court Rules Committee indicated its view that "if the consecutive pagination
requirement is impracticable or becomes a hardship for the court reporting
entity, relief may be sought from the court."'
126
118. 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.180.
119. Id.
120. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200(a)(2).
121. 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200.
122. FLA. R. App. P. 9.200(b)(2).
123. 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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K. Rule 9.210: Briefs
The rule, which had required briefs to be bound in book form and
fastened along the left side, 12rwas amended to state that briefs "should" be
bound and fastened as previously required and added the words "in a manner
that will allow them to lie flat when opened. 128 The amended rule also
provides that "[a]ltematively, briefs may be securely stapled in the upper left
corner" and that no method of securing the brief other than the two set forth
in the rule is acceptable.
2 9
The rule was also amended to require references to the appropriate
volume, as well as the appropriate page number of the record on appeal, in
the statement of the case and of the facts. 3°
Another change to the rule eliminates the requirement that in answer
briefs, the statement of the case and of the facts shall be omitted unless there
are areas of disagreement, which should be clearly specified.1' The new
version of the rule simply states that "the statement of the case and of the
facts may be omitted.' 2 The purpose of the change is "to permit appellees
to file their own statements of case and facts."'33 In amending the rule, the
court recognized "that there are some instances in which it is difficult, if not
impossible, for the appellee to intelligibly specify the area of disagreement
in the statement of the case and facts of the appellants,"'1 4 but encouraged
"appellees not to rewrite the statement... except where clearly
necessary.',
135
The portion of the rule dealing with notices of supplemental authority
was transferred to the new rule 9.225 of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
36
127. FLA. R. App. P. 9.210(a)(3) (amended 1996).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. 9.210(b)(3).
131. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(c).
132. Id.
133. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d 1103, 1106
(Fla. 1996).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See 1996 Committee Notes to FLA. R. Ap. P. 9.210.
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L. Rule 9.225: Notice of Supplemental Authority
This new rule is an amended version of the former rule 9.210(g) of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.37 It adds language that requires that
supplemental authorities be significant to the issues raised.
138
M Rule 9.300: Motions
This rule was amended to add "[m]otions relating to expediting the
appeal" to the list of motions that do not toll the time schedule of
proceedings in appellate courts.
1 39
N. Rule 9.310: Stay Pending Review
This rule was amended to eliminate former subdivision (b)(3), which
provided that the timely filing of a notice of appeal automatically operated as
a stay pending review of an award by a judge of compensation claims on a
claim for birth related neurological injuries.
0. Rule 9.315: Summary Disposition
The references in the rule to "expedited" disposition, affirmance, and
reversal were changed to "summary" disposition, affirmance, and reversal.
141
P. Rule 9.400: Costs and Attorneys'Fees
An amendment clarified the fact that only orders rendered "by the lower
tribunal" are subject to review by the appellate court under this rule.142
Q. Rule 9.420: Filing; Service of Copies; Computation of Time
This rule was amended to require that certificates of service must
specify the party each attorney being served represents.
43
137. Id.
138. FLA. R. App. P. 9.225.
139. Id. 9.300(d)(9).
140. Id. 9.3 10 (amended 1996).
141. Id. 9.315.
142. Id. 9.400(c).
143. FLA. R. App. P. 9.420(c)(2).
[Vol 22:29
51
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Musto
. Rule 9.430: Proceedings by Indigents
Added to this rule was a new paragraph that provides that "[a]n
appellate court may, in its discretion, presume that an incarcerated party who
has been declared indigent for purposes of proceedings in the lower tribunal
remains indigent, in the absence of evidence to the contrary."
144
The language replaced an emergency amendment that the court had
adopted in McFadden v. Fourth District Court of Appeal145 in response to
concerns expressed by the fourth district in McFadden v. West Palm Beach
Police Officer 146 regarding the need for an amendment to the rules that
would allow determination of indigency for appellate purposes to be made at
the appellate level. 47 The emergency amendment, which had called for an
indigent incarcerated party to file a motion and affidavit with the appellate
court and which allowed the court to either determine the issue or remand to
the lower tribunal for determination when an objection is filed, 148 had been
retroactively stayed due to concerns that it could create procedural
problems. 149 The new language submitted by the Appellate Court Rules
Committee was agreed upon by representatives of each of the district courts
of appeal15 0 and, in the view of the supreme court, apears to give "each
court the flexibility necessary to handle these matters."'
S. Rule 9.600: Jurisdiction of Lower Tribunal Pending Review
The portion of this rule relating to family law matters was amended to
state that "[t]he receipt, payment, or transfer of funds or property... shall
not prejudice the rights of appeal of any party.' 52  Added was a new
sentence which provides that "[t]he lower tribunal shall have the jurisdiction
to impose, modify, or dissolve conditions upon the receipt or payment of
such awards in order to protect the interests of the parties during the
appeal.' 53  Additionally, "[r]eview of orders entered pursuant to this
144. Id. 9.430.
145. 682 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 1996).
146. 658 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). For a discussion of both opinions
in McFadden, see 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 16.
147. West Palm Beach Police Officer, 658 So. 2d at 1048.
148. Fourth Dist. Court of Appeal, 682 So. 2d at 1069.
149. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 696 So. 2d 1103, 1106
(Fla. 1996).
150. Id.
151. Id
152. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.600(c)(2).
153. Id.
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subdivision shall be by motion filed in the appellate court within 30 days of
rendition."
154
A new subdivision of the rule 155 recognizes that while an appeal is
pending, trial courts have the jurisdiction to rule on motions for posttrial
release and motions pursuant to rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure.'5 The new subdivision requires that within ten days of
any order granting relief under the criminal rule, the movant must file a copy
of the order with the appellate court.
1 57
T. Rule 9.700: Guide to Times and Acts under Rules
This rule was eliminated.
U. Rule 9.800: Uniform Citation System
Examples of citations were adopted for the Florida Rules for Certified
and Court-Appointed Mediators, the Florida Rules for Court-Appointed
Arbitrators, and the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure. They are as
follows:
Fla. R. Med. 10.010;
Fla. R. Arb. 11.010;
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.01 0
58
The court eliminated the requirement that initial references to the
United States Supreme Court should cite to the United States Reports,
Supreme Court Reporter, and Lawyer's Edition and that subsequent
citations, as well as pinpoint citations, shall be to the United States Reports
only. Substituted was the following language: "Cite to United States
Reports, if published therein; otherwise cite to Supreme Court Reporter,
Lawyer's Edition, or United States Law Week, in that order of
preference."'
159
154. Id. 9.600(c)(3).
155. Id. 9.600(d).
156. 1996 Committee Note to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.600.
157. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.600(d).
158. Id. 9.800(i).
159. Id. 9.800(k).
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III. OTHER AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted, on an emergency basis, changes
to the appellate rules necessary to facilitate administrative appeals pursuant
to the new Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes,
which took effect on October 1, 1996. 16 The court redefined the term
"administrative action" to include:
(1) final agency action as defined in the Administrative Procedure
Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes;
(2) non-final action by an agency or administrative law judge
reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act;
(3) quasi-judicial decisions by any administrative body, agency,
board or commission not subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act; and
(4) administrative action for which judicial review is provided by
general law. 161
The court also adopted a new rule162 relating to judicial review of
administrative action; except as specifically modified by the rule such
review shall be governed by the general rules of appellate procedure. 1?3 The
rule further states that an appeal from a final agency action or other
administrative action for which judicial review is provided by law shall be
commenced in accordance with rule 9.110(c), the rule governing review of
final orders of administrative tribunals. 164 On the other hand, unless judicial
review by appeal is provided by general law, review of a non-final action is
commenced by the filing of a petition for review in accordance with rules
9.100(b) and (c), 165 which deal with the commencement of original
proceedings in appellate courts. 166  Similarly, unless judicial review by
appeal is provided by general law, review of a quasi-judicial decision is also
160. Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(a) & Adoption of
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.190, 681 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1996).
161. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(a)(1)-(4).
162. Id 9.190.
163. Id 9.190(a).
164. Id. 9.190(b)(1).
165. Id. 9.190(b)(2).
166. FLA. R. App. P. 9.190(b)(2).
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to be commenced by the filing of a petition for certiorari in accordance with
rule 9.100 (b) and (C).1 67
The rule also sets forth the materials to be included in the record in
cases in which judicial review of administrative action is sought. 168 The
requirements of the rule are quite extensive, s ecific, and vary significantly
depending on the type of order under review. Regardless of the nature of
the order, however, the rule provides that when "hearing testimony is
preserved through the use of videotape rather than through an official
transcript, the testimony from the videotape shall be transcribed and the
transcript shall be made a part of the record before the record is transmitted
to the court., 170 The rule also provides that "[t]he contents of the record may
be modified as provided in rule 9.200(a)(2),"'' which at the time of
adoption of Rule 9.190, allowed an appellent to direct the clerk to include or
exclude other documents and required a statement of judicial acts to be
reviewed if the clerk was being directed to transmit less than the entire
record or less than all testimony in a proceeding.1 72
The rule also addresses attorneys' fees, stating that a motion for such
fees may be served not later than the time for service of the reply brief and
shall state the grounds on which the recovery is sought, citing all pertinent
statutes. The assessment of attorneys' fees may be remanded to the lower
tribunal or the administrative law judge or referred to a special master.173
Review of attorneys' fees orders rendered under rule 9.190(d)(2) shall
be by motion filed in the court within thirty days of the order's
rendition.1 74 "Review of objections to reports of special masters shall be on
motion filed in the court within 30 days of the report's filing."' 75
IV. COURT DIVISIONS
In an administrative order,176 the first district, the only Florida district
court that has divided itself into divisions, 77 merged its Criminal Division
167. Id. 9.190(b)(3).
168. Id. 9.190(c).
169. Compare id. 9.190(c)(2)(A)-(E), (c)(3) and (c)(4).
170. Id. 9.190(c)(5).
171. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.190(c)(6).
172. Id. 9.200(a)(3). As part of the subsequent four-year cycle amendments to the
appellate rules, rule 9.200(a)(2) was renumbered as (a)(3).
173. Id. 9.190(d)(1).
174. Id. 9.190(d)(2).
175. Id.
176. Fla. Admin. Order No. 97-1 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. May 20, 1997).
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into its General Division effective January 1, 1998. After the effective date,
the court will sit in two divisions called the General Division and the
Administrative Division.
V. JURISDICTION
The fourth district, in Caruso v. Terry's Foods, Inc.,178 transferred to
the first district, a case which sought review by certiorari of an order entered
by ajudge of compensation claims.179 The court noted that although the first
district has exclusive jurisdiction over workers' compensation appeals, there
exists no specific provision relating to jurisdiction over extraordinary writs
in such cases.180 In determining that the case should be transferred, the court
relied on cases 181 expressing the principle that extraordinary writs can only
be issued by courts with appellate jurisdiction over the tribunal whose order
is challenged.
182
VI. APPEALS TO CIRCUIT COURTS
In Montero v. Oak Casualty Insurance Co., 83 a direct appeal to the
circuit court in Dade County was dismissed by an order entered by one
judge.14 Reviewing the order of dismissal on a petition for certiorari, the
third district noted that the Supreme Court of Florida rule establishing the
appellate division of the Dade County Circuit Court provides for cases to be
heard on their merits by three-judge panels.185  Although the rule also
permits "matters preliminary to final determination" to be decided based on
subsequent rules, the court noted that it appears no subsequent rules have
ever been adopted. 186  The court found in any event that, "[o]rders
177. In In re Court Divisions, the court was split into a "General Division" and an
"Administrative Division." In re Court Divisions, 648 So. 2d 761, 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994). In a subsequent administrative order, the Criminal Division was created. Fla. Admin.
Order No. 95-2 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1996).
178. 683 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
179. Id. at 1136.
180. Id.
181. State ex rel. Bettendorf v. Martin County Envtl. Control Hearing Bd., 564 So. 2d
1227 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Nellen v. State, 226 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
182. Caruso, 683 So. 2d at 1136-37 (citing State ex rel. Bettendorf v. Martin County
Environmental Control Hearing Bd., 564 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
183. 693 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
184. Id. at 1024.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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dismissing appeals are of lasting import[,]" and that they are "not merely
'preliminary to final determination,"' but are "the end of the road" for
appeals.1 7 The court, therefore, granted certiorari concluding that any order
of the appellate division which dismisses an appeal "must be entered by the
majority of a three-judge panel assigned to the case."188
VII. ORDERS REVIEWABLE
As usual, a large number of cases dealt with the question of whether
certain orders were reviewable, either by appeal or by certiorari. The sheer
volume of these cases precludes discussion of the reasoning relied on in each
case. Therefore, this article will set forth some of the cases indicating the
type of order involved and the conclusion reached. 89
A. Orders Reviewable by Appeal
Among the orders found to be reviewable by appeal were: 1) an order
denying a motion to dismiss and compelling arbitration under a
homeowner's insurance policy, in a case in which the appellate court
determined that an appraisal provision in the policy constituted an agreement
to arbitrate; 190 2) an order denying a motion to dismiss that rejected a
defense of qualified immunity, as a matter of law;191 3) an order on a motion
for permanent injunction, which allowed an election to proceed with a
disputed question on the ballot and that reserved ruling on the legality of the
ballot question; 192 4) an order compelling a law firm to disburse funds
partially to the guardian ad litem of a minor with the residue to be paid to a
particular attorney; 193 5) an order denying a motion by a personal
representative to strike and dismiss a decedent's brother's petition to revoke
187. Id.
188. Montero, 693 So. 2d at 1024.
189. This section of the article will deal only with civil cases. Criminal cases will be
discussed in section XXIV(a).
190. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sheaffer, 687 So. 2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
191. Junior v. Reed, 693 So. 2d 586, 588-89 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
192. Miami Heat Ltd. Partnership v. Leahy, 682 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
193. Garel and Jacobs, P.A. v. Wick, 683 So. 2d 184, 185-87 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
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probate; 194 and 6) an order expressly granting recognition of a foreign
judgment. 95
B. Orders Not Reviewable by Appeal
Among the orders found nonreviewable by appeal were: 1) an order
setting an evidentiary hearing in a dissolution case on the propriety of a
wife's relocation out of state;"96 2) an order denying a motion seeking relief
from an order denying without prejudice a motion for final judgment; 197 3)
an order denying a motion for summary judgment in an action against an
insurance company for failure to defend claims and stating that the "duty to
defend may well have been triggered" by certain allegations; 19 4) an order
granting a creditor's motion to extend the time for filing a statement of claim
in an estate; 199 and 5) an order requiring a plaintiff to have no contact with
the defendants, except through counsel, nor to go within a certain distance of
a law firm representing the defendant in one case, and that was itself a
defendant in a second case brought by the plaintiff.
200
C. Orders Reviewable by Certiorari
Among the orders found reviewable by certiorari were: 1) an order
revoking a clerk of the court's reassignment of the trial court clerks and
making assignments of the trial court clerks to a circuit judge;20 1 2) an order
disqualifying counsel;202 3) an order sustaining an objection to a request for
admission, as to the amount in controversy, when the requested admission
involved the defendant's right to remove the case to federal court;20 3 4) an
order requiring a wife to undergo a psychological evaluation;20 4 5) an order
denying an objection to accounting and a motion to extend the time for filing
194. In re Estate of Pavlick, 697 So. 2d 157, 157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
195. Chabert v. Bacqui6, 694 So. 2d 805, 808 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
196. Shaw v. Shaw, 696 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
197. Bell v. Broward County Personnel Review Bd., 691 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
198. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bethune-Cookman College, Inc., 687 So. 2d 991, 992
(Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1997).
199. In re Estate ofLejkowitz, 679 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
200. Lamothe v. Sellars, 695 So. 2d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
201. Morse v. Moxley, 691 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
202. Laino v. Laino, 686 So. 2d 786, 786 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
203. Sunrise Mills (MLP) Ltd. Partnership v. Adams, 688 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
204. Vo v. Bui, 680 So. 2d 601, 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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further objections when an allegation was made that the trial court's decision
was based on improper ex parte communication; 2°5 6) an order dismissing
numerous defendants due to a conclusion that they were improperly
joined;206 7) an order denying a motion to strike a lis pendens;20 7 8) an order
denying dismissal of a complaint in a medical malpractice action alleging
that the plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory pre-suit screening and
corroboration requirements; 208 9) an order awarding costs and attorneys' fees
after a voluntary dismissal;209 and 10) an order returning a child to the
custody of her mother in a dependency proceeding.10
D. Orders Not Reviewable by Certiorari
Among the orders found non-reviewable by certiorari were: 1) an order
denying a motion for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel; 211 2)
an order denying a motion to compel a defendant to produce a photograph of
an accident scene; 212 3) an order granting a motion to strike from a wife's
witness list, two lawyers in her husband's law firm; 213 4) an order denying a
motion for summary judgment based on the contention that certain claims
were preempted by federal law;2 14 and 5) an order imposing the sanction of
attorneys' fees and costs for discovery violations.2
15
205. Wilson v. Armstrong, 686 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
206. Intercapital Funding Corp. v. Gisclair, 683 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
207. Archer v. Archer, 692 So. 2d 1009, 1009 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
208. Citron v. Shell, 689 So. 2d 1288, 1292-93 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
209. Sholkoffv. Boca Raton Community Hosp., Inc., 693 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
210. In re Interest of K.D., 679 So. 2d 39, 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
211. South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Dupont, 683 So. 2d 1135, 1135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
212. Calfin v. Mclnnis, 683 So. 2d 1137, 1137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
213. Young v. Young, 682 So. 2d 678, 678 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
214. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 680 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1996).
215. Leonhardt v. Masters, 679 So. 2d 73, 74 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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VIII. NOTICES OF APPEAL
A. Designation of Order to be Reviewed
In Duran v. John Stalder, Inc.,216 the court reviewed, by certiorari, a
decision of a circuit court which, acting in its appellate capacity, decided a
case in favor of an appellee because an appellant's notice of appeal
designated the wrong order to be reviewed.217 The fifth district indicated
that the notice of appeal was timely filed with regard to the reviewable
order.218 The district court indicated that it was clear from the initial brief
what order was being appealed from, and that the circuit court's order did
not even discuss whether the appellee had been prejudiced by the defective
notice.219 "In the absence of serious prejudice," and in light of the fact that
"the defective notice of appeal did not affect the circuit court's jurisdiction,"
the court concluded that the case "should have been disposed of on the
220
merits" and therefore granted certiorari.
B. Timeliness
In Broward County v. Bell,221 the fourth district granted certiorari to
quash a circuit court order that dismissed, as untimely, a petition filed in that
court challenging an order of the county's personnel board.222 The record
reflected that the petition had been filed in the clerk's office on the last
allowable date. However, the clerk's computer recorded it as having been
filed the following day because it was filed between four o'clock, "the time
at which filing is clocked in as of the next business day, but before five
o'clock, when the office closes for the day. 223
In Tanner v. State,224 an appeal was reinstated, after the case's
dismissal, because of an apparently untimely notice of appeal. 225  The
appellant's counsel demonstrated that a timely, authorized motion for
rehearing of the order under review was filed, but was returned by the clerk
216. 686 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
217. Id. at 628.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 629.
220. Id at 628-29.
221. 681 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
222. Id. at 918.
223. Id.
224. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1471 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. June 18, 1997).
225. Id. atD1471.
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because it had the wrong case number.226 The fourth district concluded that
such an error "is no basis for refusing to accept the paper for filing 227 nor
does it "authorize the clerk to return the paper to the lawyer who filed it.",
228
Thus, the court held that the motion was deemed filed as of the date it was
originally received.229 Therefore, the motion served to delay rendition of the
order to be reviewed, making the appeal timely.21 The court suggested that
in such situations, "[a] simple telephone call [from the clerk] to the filing
lawyer could sort out any discrepancies in file numbers, or other errors in the
caption that inhibit the clerk's ability to file the paper in the properplace. ,,0 31
IX. SUPERSEDEAS BOND
In Shvarts v. O'Connor,232 the appellees instituted an independent
appeal from an order determining the amount of a supersedeas bond rather
than seeking review, by motion, under rule 9.310(f) of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure.2  The appellate court consolidated the two cases,
affirmed the underlying appeal, and therefore, found the appeal challenging
the bond to be moot.23 The court noted that if review of the order setting
the bond had been sought by motion, the matter would have been disposed of
months earlier.235  By taking a separate appeal, however, the matter
"followed the lengthy course of all full appeals."
X. MOTIONS FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME
In Merritt v. Promo Graphics, Inc.,237 the appellant's counsel filed a
motion for extension of time which failed to contain a certificate indicating
counsel had consulted with opposing counsel as required by rule 9.300(a) of
the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. 38 The denial of this motion
226. Id.
227. Id. at D1472.
228. Id.
229. Tanner, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D 1471.
230. Id.
231. Id. atD1472.
232. 692 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
233. Id. at 960.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 679 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
238. Id. at 1277.
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because of this failure, triggered a series of pleadings setting forth
conflicting versions of the facts relating to what efforts were made to comply
with the rule, some of which involved contact between secretaries or other
support personnel. Stating that it relies on "representations made to us by
lawyers, not their support staff,"239 the court discussed the rule's
requirement:
An allegation that a lawyer has complied with rule 9.300 by relying
on a staff person's statement that he or she spoke to another
lawyer's secretary is simply not adequate to comply with the
personal obligation imposed on lawyers by the rules. Rule 9.300
requires some actual contact with opposing counsel. That was
missing here. Apparently, neither the lawyer nor the paralegal
spoke with opposing counsel. We realize that, in a rush, it may be
difficult to contact opposing counsel, or opposing counsel may not
return calls. In such case it would be far better to allege that an
attempt to contact was made, but failed after due diligence.
Further, to avoid this kind of triple-hearsay buck passing between*
staff persons, illustrated by this case, some sort of
acknowledgement of the contact should be made. The modem era
of technology provides creative lawyers with a feast of such
opportunities, including e-mail, voice mail, fax machines, and other
devices. These can be employed to confirm oral communications
and avoid misunderstandings, if written confirmation cannot be
timely obtained. 240
XI. TRANSCRIPTS
In Weise v. Repa Film International, Inc., a plaintiff claiming on
appeal that a remark in closing argument by the defendant's counsel
constituted fundamental error did not provide the court with any part of the
transcript, other than the defense counsel's closing argument. Pointing out
that appellants must demonstrate that errors are not harmless, the court
indicated that when appellants argue that the alleged prejudice from a remark
in closing argument resulted in an adverse verdict, the liability portion of the
transcript will generally be necessary for the court to determine whether a
new trial is warranted.2 3
239. Id. at 1279.
240. Id.
241. 683 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
242. Id. at 1129.
243. Id.
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The court, in Estrada v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,2 44
concluded that it was unable to review a claim that a decision was not
supported by competent substantial evidence because of the appellant's
failure to provide a transcript of the hearing conducted by the appeals
245
referee. The court took this approach despite the fact that after the briefs
in the case were submitted, the appellant filed a motion with the court in
which he requested permission to supplement the record with the
transcript.246 The court recognized that rule 9.200(f) of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure states that "' [n]o proceeding shall be determined,
because of an incomplete record, until an opportunity to supplement the
record has been given."' 247 The court declined to apply the rule, however,
because the day after he filed his notice of appeal, the appellant had been
advised by the Unemployment Appeals Commission "that a transcript would
be prepared for him at no cost upon his request and that, if he wished to have
a transcript prepared, it was his responsibility to make the request within ten
days of the appeal." 4 Since the appellant made no such request, the court
concluded that he had waived his opportunity to obtain the transcript.
249
XII. STATEMENTS OF PROCEEDINGS
No record was made in Warnken v. Warnken250 of a trial court hearing
and thus, the appellant sought to rely on a "state of proceedings" attached to
his brief25 1 The court noted that although under rule 9.200(b)(4) of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure an appellant can utilize a statement of
proceedings, such a statement must be submitted to and approved by the trial
252
court . Since the appellant in the case failed to comply with that
requirement, the court concluded that it was unable to fully review the
matters about which he complained. 3
244. 693 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
245. Id. at 1092.
246. Id.
247. Id. (quoting FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200(f)).
248. Id.
249. Estrada, 693 So. 2d at 1092.
250. 689 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
251. Id. at 1123.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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XIII. BRIEFS
A. Page Limitations
In Johnson v. Singletary,254 a criminal defendant sentenced to death
sought habeas corpus. The defendant's petition alleged, among many other
claims, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal
because the Supreme Court of Florida refused to accept his ninety-four page
brief, limiting him to seventy pages instead.255 In denying habeas corpus, the
court noted that the appeal had "occurred before [the court] had adopted a
policy of allowing briefs of up to one hundred pages in capital cases as a
matter of course. An 'exception' to the fifty page-limit prescribed by rule
was, therefore, still an 'exception' to the rule."2  Finding that the twenty
page enlargement that was granted was not inadequate, and pointing to the
fact that the full seventy pages allowed were not used, the court found that
no prejudice had occurred and that the issue was without merit.257
B. References to Matters Outside the Record
In Ullah v. State,258 the appellant's appointed counsel, pursuant to the
dictates of Anders v. California,259 filed a brief indicating that he could
"discern no reversible error in proceedings below."260 In response, the State
filed an answer brief which included a preliminary statement referring to the
case as "another" Anders appeal, listing 112 other pending appeals in which
Anders briefs had been filed during the calendar year, and suggesting "that
these cases should be submitted to an 'Anders panel' for determination of the
common question of whether the appeal is wholly frivolous or requires
adversarial briefing" on the merits.261
The court struck the State's brief,262 finding that the other pending cases
were matters outside the record and thus, not proper for consideration in the
case under review.263 The State's suggestion that "all Anders cases present
the common issue of whether the appeal is wholly frivolous," the court said
254. 695 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1996).
255. Id at 264.
256. Id. at 266.
257. Id.
258. 679 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
259. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
260. Ullah, 679 So. 2d at 1243.
261. Id. at 1244.
262. Id. at 1245.
263. Id at 1244.
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"ignores the fact that our review in this appeal is limited to the record of
proceedings as they occurred in this case," and "is akin to suggesting that
reference to any other pending appeal in a brief before this court is
necessarily appropriate because all appeals, at their heart, present the
common question of whether reversible error occurred in the proceedings
below.
264
XIV. NOTICES OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY
On the afternoon prior to oral argument in Brown & Williamson
'65Tobacco Corp. v. Young, the appellee filed a notice of supplemental
authority to which was attached copies of five cases, the most recent of
which was decided in 1989.266 The first district struck the notice,267 and
stated in its opinion that "the filing of last-minute notices of supplemental
authority is occurring in this court with increasing frequency., 268 The court
published its ruling to quote and reiterate the advice it had set forth in Ogden
269Allied Services v. Panesso. In that case, the court had indicated that rule
9.2 10(g) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,27° which allowed for
the filing of notices of supplemental authority, was "not intended to permit a
litigant to submit what amounts to an additional brief, under the guise of
'supplemental authorities'; [sic] or to ambush an opponent by deliberately
withholding significant case citations until just before oral argument., 271
The quoted portion of Ogden Allied Services indicated that filing such last
minute notices "places the opposing party at a disadvantage," forces that
party to "divert attention from preparation for the argument," and frequently,
requires that party "at oral argument to request an opportunity to respond in
writing" to the notice.272
264. Id.
265. 690 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
266. Id. at 1380.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. (referencing Ogden Allied Servs. v. Panesso, 619 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1993)). For a discussion of the decision in Odgen Allied Services, see 1993 Survey,
supra note 1, at 25.
270. The rule referred to in Odgen Allied Services was subsequently renumbered as rule
9.225 of the Florida Rules ofAppellate Procedure. See sections II (K) and (L) of this article.
271. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 690 So. 2d at 1380 (quoting Odgen Allied
Servs. v. Panesso, 619 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
272. Id.
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XV. DISMISSAL
In Leonard v. First Union National Bank of Florida,273 the third district
reviewed an order of the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, that
had dismissed an appeal because of the late filing of the initial appellate
brief.274 The appellant filed the brief three days after receipt of the denial of
the last of several motions for extension of time.2 " Finding "dismissal to be
too harsh a sanction for the minimal time involved," the district court
granted certiorari and quashed the dismissal order.
276
An appeal was taken in Robbie v. Robbie277 from an order requiring the
appellant to pay attorney's fees and costs to his ex-wife's attorney.278 The
fourth district entered an order requiring the appellant to pay the amounts
due within twenty days and indicated that the failure to do so would result in
the dismissal of the appeal.279 When the appellant did not make payment,
280the appeal was dismissed.
XVI. REINSTATEMENT OF APPEALS
In Fletcher v. State,281 the appeal was dismissed because of the
282defendant's escape from custody. Six months later, the defendant's public
defender filed a motion to reinstate the appeal because the defendant had
been returned to custody.283 The second district published its denial of the
motion because of what it termed the "disturbing argument" presented by the
public defender, which suggested that the defendant had "not 'thwarted the
orderly effective administration of justice' because the 'immense apellate
backlog' render[ed] his escape a harmless footnote in the process." The
court pointed out that "no 'immense appellate backlog"' existed in the court,
but that one "exists and has existed for years in the Office of the Public
273. 685 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
274. Id. at 98.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 683 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
278. Id. at 1132.
279. Id.
280. Id. (citing Gazil v. Gazil, 343 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 1977)).
281. 696 So. 2d 794 (Fia. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
282. Id. at 795.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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Defender of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, which is responsible for handling
appeals for indigent defendants throughout the Second District.
285
The court noted that "[m]any believe that the legislature's chronic
underfunding of the public defender's office has contributed significantly to
this problem," but indicated that it was "unable to state with certainty,
however, that underfunding is the sole cause leading to the backlog in the
office of the Public Defender of the Tenth Judicial Circuit because that
office appears to be the only appellate public defender in Florida with such a
severe problem. 28 6 The court went on to say that "[r]egardless of the
causes, the public defender's office continues to fail to serve many of its
clients in a timely fashion" and that when the court "relieves that office of its
statutory obligations in many cases," the costs of those appeals are
"frequently shifted to taxpayers in counties who have no right to vote for or
against the person who holds the Office of Public Defender in the Tenth
Judicial Circuit."
287
Turning to the facts, the court noted that the public defender had spent
time and resources on the case long after the appeal would have been
288dismissed had the court known of the defendant's escape. Those
resources, the court said, "should have been employed for the benefit of a
prisoner lawfully awaiting the resolution of his or her appeal. 289
The court concluded by stating: "Admittedly, the public defender's
office would cease to have a backlog if many of its clients successfully
escaped. This court has been willing to consider a wide array of potential
solutions to the public defender's backlog. Suffice it to say, escape is not
among them."29 °
XVII. MOOTNESS
In Archer v. State,291 an appeal was taken from an order that
involuntarily committed the appellant for a period of no more than six
months.292 Although that period had long elapsed and the appellant might
have been released, the first district found that the appeal was not moot. n
3
Relying on the principle that "an otherwise moot case will not be dismissed
285. Id. at 795-96.
286. Fletcher, 696 So. 2d at 796.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 681 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
292. Id. at 297.
293. Id.
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if collateral legal consequences that affect the rights of a party flow from the
issue to be determined," the court found that because an order of
commitment may serve as the predicate for continued involuntary placement
orders, it would address the substance of the appeal.294
The third district rejected a mootness claim in Consortion Trading
International, Ltd. v. Lowrance, 29 in which the defendants in a foreclosure
action paid the final judgment and satisfied the mortgage.296 The plaintiff
argued that had "the defendants wanted to preserve their right to appeal, they
should have obtained a stay of execution by posting a supersedeas bond,
instead of paying the final judgment. 297 The court pointed out that '"t]he
majority rule is that if a defendant who has suffered the entry of an adverse
money judgment against him voluntarily pays the judgment, the case is
moot, but ifBayment is involuntary, it does not result in a waiver of the right
to appeal.' Because in the case under review the defendants paid the
judgment to avoid the public sale of their property, the court considered the
payment to be involuntary and therefore, the appeal not to be moot.
299
XVIII. LAW OF THE CASE
In State v. Owen, a criminal defendant faced a retrial after the
Supreme Court of Florida reversed his conviction due to its conclusion that
the defendant's confession was improperly admitted into evidence. 301 After
the reversal but before the retrial, the United States Supreme Court issued a
decision that demonstrated that the confession was admissible as a matter of
federal law. 02 The trial court refused a request by the state to reconsider the
admissibility of the confession in light of the new precedent. 0 3 The fourth
district denied the state's petition for certiorari review of the trial court's
order.30 4 The district court, however, certified the question of whether the
principles announced by the United States Supreme Court applied to the
294. Id. at 297-98 (quoting Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211,212 (Fla. 1992)).
295. 682 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
296. Id. at 222.
297. Id.
298. Id. (quoting Ronette Communications Corp. v. Lopez, 475 So. 2d 1360, 1360 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
299. Id. at 223.
300. 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
301. Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990).
302. Id (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 452 (1994)).
303. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 717.
304. State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). For a discussion of the
district court's decision in Owen, see 1993 Survey, supra note 1, at 33-34.
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admissibility of confessions in Florida courts. 05 After determining that the
Florida Constitution placed no greater restrictions on law enforcement than
those mandated under federal law, and that confessions of the sort with
which the case was concerned were admissible in Florida,306 the Supreme
Court of Florida faced the question of how the particular confession before
the court should be treated.
The court recognized that "[g]enerally, under the doctrine of the law of
the case, 'all questions of law which have been decided by the highest
appellate court become the law of the case which must be followed in
subsequent proceedings, both in the lower and appellate courts."'30 8 The
court went on to note, however, that this "doctrine is not an absolute
mandate ' 30 9 and that the court "has the power to reconsider and correct
erroneous rulings in exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the
previous decision would result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that
such rulings have become law of the case." 31°  Since "[a]n intervening
decision by a higher court is one of the exceptional situations that this Court
will consider when entertaining a request to modify the law of the case"311
and since, under the facts of the case, reliance on the prior decision "would
result in manifest injustice to the people of this state because it would
perpetuate a rule which [the court] determined to be an undue restriction of
legitimate law enforcement activity," the court quashed the district court's
decision and remanded with directions to grant the State's petition for
certiorari.312
However, the court refused the State's request that it reinstate the
convictions on the ground that a retrial is unnecessary in light of the court's
decision on the admissibility of the confession. 313 The court stated that its
prior decision, which reversed the convictions, was a "final decision that was
no longer subject to rehearing., 314 The court also indicated that with respect
305. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 202.
306. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 718-20.
307. Id. at 720.
308. Id. (quoting Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552
(Fla. 1984)).
309. Id. (citing Strazzaella v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1965)).
310. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720 (citing Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1984),
vacated, 564 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1990)).
311. Id. (citing Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552
(Fla. 1984); Strazulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965)).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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to the issue in question, the defendant stood in the same position as any other
defendant who had been charged but not yet tried.
315
An approach similar to that taken in Owen was utilized by the third
district in Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Viera. There, while the case was
pending on remand after a reversal, the court decided another case en bane in
a manner that overruled the principle that had formed the basis for the
reversal.317 The court concluded that "this is one of the exceptional cases in
which we should reconsider the law of the case because to do otherwise
would work a manifest injustice. '318 The court therefore affirmed a trial
court order granting a new trial based on the en bane decision.319
Other cases in which courts found it aggropriate to depart from the law
of the case included: 1) Trotter v. State, in which the court stated that
"[a]n intervening act of the legislature refining a portion of Florida's death
penalty statute may be sufficiently exceptional to warrant" such an
approach;321 2) Zolache v. State,322 in which the court found that reliance on
a previous erroneous ruling would require the defendant to serve a sentence
in excess of that legally authorized;3  and 3) Horton v. State, in which a
previously argued claim that a county judge was improperly assigned to the
circuit court was proven to be meritorious by a subsequent decision of the
Supreme Court of Florida.
325
XIX. AFFIRMANCES WITHOUT OPINION
In Lowe Investment Corp. v. Clemente,326 the court denied a motion for
rehearing in a case that had been affirmed without opinion.327 In doing so,
the court discussed some of the reasons why cases are decided in such a
manner:
315. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720.
316. 693 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
317. Id. at 1108.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1109.
320. 690 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1996).
321. Id. at 1237.
322. 687 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
323. Id. at 300.
324. 682 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
325. Id. at 648.
326. 685 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
327. Id. at 84. In doing so, the court expressed some thoughts about the nature of
motions for rehearing. Id. at 85. That portion of the opinion is discussed in section XX of
this article.
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There are many reaso, s this court decides that a written opinion is
unnecessary when affirming a trial court. Usually, the panel of
judges considering the appeal agrees that no error occurred. It may
be that the claim of error involves the discretion of the trial judge
and the panel concludes that such was not abused. Or, the
perceived error was harmless. The considerations involved in
preparing written opinions were addressed in Whipple: "We write
opinions in all reversals and remands and, as noted, in affirmances
where we believe an opinion will make a substantial contribution to
the law, or where necessary to disclose conflict or certify
questions." 431 So. 2d at 1015-16. In addition, this court is
frequently presented with claims of error which were not properly
preserved at trial. Such a claim of error does not warrant a written
opinion because the law in this area is clear. This is the reason why
this appeal was affirmed-trial counsel failed to properly preserve
328the error.
XX. REHEARING
In Goter v. Brown,3 29 the appellees presented in support of a motion for
rehearing a missing second page to an agreement that was at issue in the
case. 330 The page had not been previously presented to either the trial or the
appellate court.31 In its opinion on rehearing, the fourth district indicated
that had the page been presented to the trial court and accepted as the
332controlling document, it would have ruled in the appellees' favor. In
denying rehearing, the court stated it had "little hesitancy in concluding that
this is all too late to change our initial decision. 333 The court expressed the
belief that it would be "starkly unfair to allow a party who has fought the
battle below and on appeal on one evidentiary basis, to be given leave to
fight it on appellate rehearing on quite a different one. 334 The court also
stated that even if there was no unfairness present, "it hardly needs
belaboring by us that none of this relates to something we overlooked or
misapprehended, the standards for rehearing on appeal.'
328. Lowe Inv. Corp., 685 So. 2d at 85. (quoting Whipple v. State, 431 So. 2d 1011,
1015-16 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
329. 682 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
330. Id. at 157.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 158.
334. Goter, 682 So. 2d at 158.
335. Id.
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Noting that much of the motion was in open defiance of the prohibition
against argument in such motions, the court also took the opportunity to
discuss the proper nature of rehearing requests.336 The court stated that
"[m]otions for rehearing are strictly limited to calling our attention-without
argument-to something we have obviously overlooked or
misapprehended. 337 Such a motion, the court continued, "is not a vehicle
for counsel or the party to continue its attempts at advocacy 338 but should be
"demonstrative only-i.e. merely point to the overlooked or misunderstood
fact or circumstance., 339 The court concluded: "If we want additional
argument, we knoN' how to say so."
340
The second district, in Lowe Investment Corp. v. Clemente, also
discussed rehearing motions.341 There, the court affirmed the case without a
written opinion, and the appellant filed a motion for rehearing that asked the
court to reconsider one of the points previously briefed and argued.342
The court denied the motion, finding that it did not contain a point of
law or fact that the court overlooked or misapprehended,343 but used its
opinion doing so to express some thoughts regarding rehearing:
Motions for rehearing directed to this court are overused, if not
abused. See Whipple v. State, 431 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983). The motions seem to spring from a belief among some
attorneys that this court failed to understand the arguments, ignored
those same arguments, or worse, failed to consider the
arguments. None of these beliefs are valid, but certain advocates
seem to believe one of the above is the only explanation for their
loss on appeal. Some losing advocates, as here, apparently believe
that a request for rehearing has a better chance for success if
demanded in the strongest of terms. See Patton v. State Dep't. of
Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 597 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1991) ("We also understand that human emotions
occasionally cause such motions to be written with stronger
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Goter, 682 So. 2d at 158.
340. Id.
341. 685 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
342. Id. at 85.
343. Id. at 86.
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rhetoric than is truly necessary or effective.") This is especially
true in cases where the court has not issued a written opinion.
34
XXI. MANDATE
About four and a half months after issuance of the mandate following
the affirmance of an order, but within the same term of court as the• • 345
affirmance, the appellants in Peter v. Seapine Corp. filed a motion to
recall mandate. 3  The term of court expired before the appellate court ruled,
and the appellees contended that such expiration deprived the court of
jurisdiction to grant the motion.347 The fourth district disagreed, finding that
the timely filing of the motion within the same term of court as the
challenged judgment and mandate vested the court with jurisdiction.3
XXI. ATTORNEYS' FEES
In U.S.B. Acquisition Co., v. Stamm, 349 a trial court on remand after an
affirmance on a main appeal and a reversal on a cross appealaS° entered two
separate final orders awarding attorney's fees, one in favor of an attorney
who had handled the appeal and one in favor of the individual appellees for
their trial court attorney's fees. 351 The payor of the fees filed a single notice
of appeal directed to both orders3 52 and the appellate attorney filed a motion
under rule 9.400(c) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to review
the appellate fee award.353  The fourth district entered an order granting
review of the award of appellate fees and, upon such review, affirmed the
order.35 4 The payor moved for rehearing or clarification of that order, as
well as for consolidation with its pending appeal of the trial court fees,
arguing that the court's affirmance of the award had the effect of cutting off
the payor's separate appeal of the appellate fees award.35 5
344. Id. at 85. The court went on to discuss some of the reasons why cases might be
affirmed without opinion. Id. See section XIX of this article.
345. 678 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
346. Id. at 508.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 509.
349. 695 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
350. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., v. Stamm, 660 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
351. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 695 So. 2d at 373.
352. Id. at 374.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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Relyin on Magner v. Merrill Lynch Realty/MCK Inc.,356 and Starcher
v. Starcher, 5 the payor argued that it properly appealed the appellate fees
award, as opposed to seeking review by motion in the appellate court under
rule 9.400(c).358 The court disagreed, stating that the principal holding of
Magner and Starcher "is that review of awards of appellate attorney's fees
after remand is strictly under rule 9.400(c), rather than by separate
appeal., 35 9 The court went on to indicate:
Properly read, Starcher and Magner recognize a very limited
exception to the command of rule 9.400(c) that applies only when
the same parties are involved in a single judgment after remand that
encompasses both an appellate fees issue and another issue, and
one party seeks review of both issues at the same time.360
This exception to the rule, the court continued, "does not apply when there
are multiple and discretely different judgments entered, and the appellate
fees issue involves a different party than the other issue determined on
remand. 36'
The court also took the opportunity to discuss the purpose of rule
9.400(c):
There is, after all, an important policy behind rule 9.400(c).
Review by simple motion is far more expeditious and less costly
than review by plenary appeal. It is obviously the intent of the rule
to speed up what may very well be the last court determination in a
law suit, especially where it occurs after all trials and appeals have
been had, and the issue is the amount of the appellate lawyer's fee.
Society has an interest at the point in expediting the closing
judicial determination so that at long last finality and the end of
litigation are at hand. That is the singular mission of rule
9.400(c). 62
Also recognizing that review of appellate fee orders should be by
motion under Rule 9.400(c) was the decision in Pellar v. Granger Asphalt
356. 585 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
357. 430 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
358. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 695 So. 2d at 374.
359. Id. at 375.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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36336Paving, Inc.. There, an appeal was taken from such an order.364 The first
district applied the principle set forth in rule 9.040(c) of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which provides that "'[i]f a party seeks an improper
remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been
sought.' 365 The court then treated the notice of appeal as a motion for
366
review of the order at issue. The court also discussed the nature of reviewby motion under rule 9.400(c):
Rule 9.400(c) enables the parties to pursue a one-step method of
review that is more practical than an appeal and much less
expensive. The procedure does not require the payment of a filing
fee or the preparation of a formal record. Testimony and other
evidence before the trial court can be presented in an appendix to
the motion filed in the appellate court.
367
XXII. COSTS
In Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 368 the
court reviewed an order granting costs that were incurred by virtue of the
fact that a party's claims department was required to pay a nonrefundable
sum of money to its surety department as a premium for a supersedeas
bond.369 The third district noted that the term "cost" is not defined by rule
9.400 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,37 ° which deals with
appellate costs. The court therefore looked to the term's "plain and ordinary
meaning' '371 and pointed out that costs have been defined to mean "'[a]n
amount paid or required in payment for a purchase; a price; ... [t]o cause to
lose, suffer or sacrifice .. .
Given this meaning, the court found that "[t]he term taxable 'costs' as
utilized in rule 9.400 then presupposes that the prevailing party on appeal
has sustained a loss of funds or incurred an expense by virtue of the
appellate process for which it is entitled to reimbursement by the losing
363. 687 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
364. Id. at 283.
365. Id. at 284 (quoting FLA. R. APp. P. 9.040(c)).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. 688 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
369. Id. at951.
370. Id. at 952.
371. Id.
372. Id. (quoting AMERIcAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 424 (3d ed. 1992)).
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party. 373 Under the facts of the case, the court concluded that the party had
incurred no expenditure for bond premiums.374 "The fact that one of its
department's budgets had to be debited for the benefit of another 375 did not
alter this conclusion because both of those departments were "7rt and
parcel of one company which is the only prevailing party on appeal."
In Vella V. Vella,377 the fourth district denied a motion for costs without
prejudice to refile the same motion in the trial court.378 The court wrote an
opinion on the matter because it had seen a large number of similar motions
and because of the need to address some inappropriate language in the
court's prior opinion in Anderson v. State.
379
The court noted that rule 9.400(a) of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure "expressly provides that the authority to tax costs in favor of the
prevailing party [on appeal] is vested in the trial court. 380 In Anderson,
however, the court had stated that .' [w]ithout permission from the appellate
court, the trial court cannot award appellate costs."' 381 Clarifying the matter
in Vella, the court stated that "[w]hat had become a headnote should now be
considered a dead note. 38 2
The Vella court went on to point out that the decision in Anderson also
quoted accurately from Boyer v. Boyer,383 a portion of that opinion which
indicates that rule 9.400(a) provides for taxation of costs on motions heard
within thirty days after issuance of the mandate.384 In so doing, the Vella
court said "we perpetuated an error. The word 'heard' should have been
'served. , , ,385
The second district, in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Polackwich,
386
addressed the question of which party should pay for transcripts when both
373. Lone Star Industries, 688 So. 2d at 952.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. 691 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
378. Id. at 612.
379. Id. (citing Anderson v. State, 632 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
380. Id (emphasis omitted).
381. Id. (quoting Anderson v. State, 632 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994)).
382. Vella, 691 So. 2d at 612.
383. 588 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
384. Vella, 691 So. 2d at 612 (citing Boyer v. Boyer, 588 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in Swartz v. Swartz, 691 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
385. Id.
386. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D626 (2d Dist. Ct. App. March 5, 1997).
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387parties sought review and both prevailed on significant issues. The case
reached the court on review of the trial court's denial of the appellant's
motion to tax costs, including a $37,500 cost for preparation of the record,
which included a lengthy trial transcript.
388
The court noted that "[w]hen both parties appeal and the cases are
consolidated, one party must be selected by the court to be the
appellant... [and that the selected party] has the initial responsibility to
obtain an adequate record on appeal."389 Frequently, the court pointed 'out,
the decision as to which party will be designated as the appellant "is based
on nothing more than the fact that one notice of appeal was the first to reach
the court. 3 90 Thus, the court indicated that "[t]here would be little sense in
a rule that forced that party to bear all the costs when both parties wished to
challenge the judgment and both parties prevailed on significant issues. ' 391
The court, therefore, reversed the order denying costs and remanded with
directions that the trial court "use its discretion to aportion the costs
between the parties so that each party pays its fair share." The court stated
that "[f]airness suggests that the cost of that portion of the record needed by
both parties should be shared equally... [and that if there were portions]
that were necessary for only one of the apeals, the party who lost that
appeal should probably bear [those] costs."
3
XXIV. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. Orders Reviewable in Criminal Cases
1. Orders Reviewable by Appeal
Among the orders found to be reviewable by appeal were orders: 1)
imposing an unauthorized sentence of incarceration suspended in its entirely
on the condition that the defendant successfully complete community
control; 394 2) withholding adjudication of guilt, but not placing a defendant
387. Id. at D626.
388. Id.
389. Id. at D627 (citing FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200(a)(2)(e)).
390. Id.
391. Polackwich, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D627.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. State v. McEachern, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D323, D324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. Jan.
31, 1997).
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on probation;395 3) striking a restitution requirement from a probation
order;3 96 and 4) denying a petition for a writ of prohibition alleging the
denial of a speedy trial in county court.397
2. Orders Not Reviewable by Appeal
Among the orders found not to be reviewable on appeal were orders: 1)
denying a motion for postconviction relief as to seven grounds, when the
trial court also granted a belated appeal from the challenged conviction;
398
and 2) denying a motion for case reassignment.399
3. Orders Reviewable by Certiorari
Among the orders found to be reviewable by certiorari were orders: 1)
requiring disclosure of a confidential informant's identity;400 2) suppressing
evidence of a defendant's medical treatment records for a sexually
transmitted disease;40 1 3) dismissing an appeal to a circuit court on the
ground that the order in question was not appealable;40 2 4) determining the
admissibilitv of hearsay evidence;40 3 and 5) excluding similar fact
evidence.
40
,r
B. State Appeals after Jeopardy Attaches
In State v. Livingston,4°1 the defendant filed pretrial motions to suppress
certain evidence and statements. Pursuant to an agreement by all concerned,
395. Waite v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 681 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
396. State v. Hitchmon, 678 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
397. Loftis v. State, 682 So. 2d 632, 633 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
398. Gordon v. State, 688 So. 2d 995, 995 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
399. Ortiz v. State, 689 So. 2d 353, 353 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
400. State v. Roberts, 686 So. 2d 722, 722 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
401. State v. Issac, 696 So. 2d 813, 813 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
402. Johnson v. State, 683 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Garrepy v.
State, 679 So. 2d 353, 353-54 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996), cause dismissed, 687 So. 2d
1303 (Fla. 1997).
403. State v. Skolar, 692 So. 2d 309, 309 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App 1997).
404. State v. Dennis, 696 So. 2d 848, 848 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
405. 681 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Although not reflected in the
Southern Reporter, the opinion in Livingston was issued upon the appellee's motion for
rehearing. State v. Livingston, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D2041 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. Sept. 11,
1996). It was substituted for a prior opinion that had been reported at 21 Fla. L. Weekly
Musto
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the motions were not heard until after a jury was selected and sworn.406 The
trial court granted the motions and subsequently granted a mistrial, despite
the fact that the defendant neither moved for nor consented to the mistrial.
40 1
The State appealed from the suppression orders and the second district
reversed.40 8 Rather than remand for further proceedings, however, the court
remanded with directions to discharge the defendant. The court pointed
out that in most cases, suppression motions can be easily disposed of prior
to trial.10 "[W]hen the judge rules at trial to suppress evidence," however,
the court continued, "the state is foreclosed from appealing that decision
unless the defendant moves for a mistrial, consents to one, or by his conduct
causes one."4 11 Since "jeopardy [had] attached when the jury was sworn,
and since none of these circumstances [were] present in the record, [the
court concluded that] the state lost its right to prosecute the [defendant] any
further [once the mistrial was declared]."
C. Review of Sentences
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Franquiz v. State,413 clarified the
remedy that appellate courts should apply when trial courts fail to provide
written reasons for downward departures from the sentencing guidelines
upon revocation of probation or community control in instances in which the
initial placement on probation or community control was a downward
departure based on a plea agreement.414 The court concluded that cases in
which the sentence was imposed prior to the date of the Franquiz decision
(October 10, 1996), 4' s should be "remanded and the trial court given the
option of a downward departure revocation sentence with proper written
reasons for the departure." 416  Sentences imposed after the date of the
opinion are to be "remand[ed] with direction that the defendant be allowed
D1237 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. May 22, 1996), and it contains extensive changes from the
earlier opinion. For a discussion of the initial opinion that was withdrawn by the court, see
1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 52-53.
406. Livingston, 681 So. 2d at 762.
407. Id. at 764.
408. Id. at 765.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 764-65.
411. Livingston, 681 So. 2d at 765.
412. Id.
413. 682 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1996).
414. Id. at 537.
415. Id. at 536.
416. Id. at 538.
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to withdraw a plea made conditioned upon the departure sentence or be
sentenced within the guidelines."
417
D. Death Penalty Cases
In State v. Fourth District Court of Appeal,418 the Supreme Court of
Florida dealt with a petition for mandamus that sought to require the Fourth
District Court of Appeal to transfer to the supreme court a prohibition
petition filed by a death row inmate.419 The inmate had filed a motion for
postconviction relief in the trial court and moved to disqualify the
judge.420 After the motion was denied, the inmate sought prohibition in the
fourth district.421 In granting the State's mandamus request and ordering the
case transferred, the supreme court held that "in addition to our appellate
jurisdiction over sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review
all types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases." 422 The court
limited its holding, however, by noting that its jurisdiction in this regard
"does not include cases in which the death penalty is sought but not yet
imposed... or cases in which we have vacated both the conviction and
sentence of death and remanded for a new trial."423
XXV. APPEALS IN JUVENILE CASES
424
In I T. v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida dealt with the question
of how appellate courts should dispose of cases in which they find that the
evidence is insufficient with regard to the offense for which the juvenile was
adjudicated, but is sufficient with regard to a permissive lesser included
offense.425 The court found that section 924.34 of the Florida Statutes,
which requires appellate courts dealing with similar circumstances in
criminal cases to direct the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser
offense, applies to juvenile delinquency cases.426 The court went on to rejecta contention that the statutory provision should be read to apply only to
417. Id.
418. 697 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1997).
419. Id. at70.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 71.
423. Fourth Dist. Court ofAppeal, 697 So. 2d at 71.
424. 694 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1997).
425. Id. at 721.
426. Id. at 722 (citing FLA. STAT. § 924.34 (1995)).
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necessarily lesser included offenses.427  Thus, although the adjudications
under review in .T were ordered vacated due to the wording of the charging
document,428 the case demonstrates that in the absence of such unique
circumstances, appellate courts finding sufficient evidence as to either a
necessary or permissive lesser included offense should remand the case for
the entry of an adjudication of delinquency for that lesser offense.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Z.F. v. State,4 2 9 dealt with a
situation in which the parents of a juvenile who had been convicted in the
court below were not indigent and decided not to proceed with an appeal.430
The court noted that section 27.52 (2)(d), Florida Statutes, provides:
A nonindigent parent or legal guardian of a dependent person
under the age of 18 years shall furnish such person with the
necessary legal services and costs incident to a delinquency
proceeding in which the person has a right to legal counsel under
the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the
State of Florida.43
The court conceded that the statutory provision includes appeals and
permits the court to appoint either the Public Defender or a private attorney
to appeal and to assess costs of up to $1,250 against the parents.432
However, the court focused on the question of whether an appeal constitutes
"necessary legal services. 433 The court asked "Who should determine what
is a necessary legal service?, 434 The court noted that parents may feel, after
hearing the testimony, that the child would benefit more by admitting a
mistake and getting on with his or her life or that the matter is so
unimportant to the child's future that the family would benefit more from
435
using the money it cost to appeal for other purposes.
The court recognized, however, that a conflict could exist if, for
example, the parents are the victims of the child's crime, or that the child
could be innocent and that 436under such circumstances it would seeminappropriate to deny the child an appeal, especially if the youth may have a
427. Id. at 724.
428. Id.
429. 683 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
430. Id. at 1084.
431. Id. at 1084 (citing FLA. STAT. § 27.52(2)(d) (1995)).
432. Id. at 1085.
433. Id.
434. ZF., 683 So. 2d at 1085.
435. Id.
436. Id.
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legitimate appeal on an important issue that may dramatically affect his or
her future, but have parents who choose not to appeal solely for financial
considerations.437
Balancing these factors, the court set forth the appropriate procedure for
trial courts to follow in such situations:
We submit that when the court announces the defendant's right to
appeal (or as soon thereafter as practical so that if a guardian ad
litem is appointed, he or she can make a recommendation within
the 30-day appeal period), it should determine whether the juvenile
is entitled to the appointment of an attorney under the statute. If it
appears that the parents are nonindigent, the court should solicit the
views of the trial attorney and the parents as to whether an appeal
would constitute "necessary legal services." If the court has any
doubt, it should remove the parents as the decision maker on this
issue and appoint a guardian ad litem in their place. If the court
determines that an appeal is a "necessary legal service," then an
attorney should be appointed for that purpose. If the court finds
that an appeal, under the circumstances of the case, is not
necessary, then it should decline to appoint an attorney. In that
event, no Notice of Appeal will be automatically filed. If an
attorney files an appeal without proper appointment, then a
recovery of a fee, if a fee is expected, is the attorney's
responsibility.
438
XXVI. APPEALS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES
In Hill v. Division of Retirement,439 the first district wrote an opinion
"to describe the essential attributes of reviewable final orders entered under
the Administrative Procedure Act."440 The court stated:
Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.190(b), review of
final agency action begins with the filing of a notice of appeal, in
accordance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(c),
instead of with the filing of a petition for review of a preliminary,
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. 687 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
440. Id. at 1377.
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procedural, or intermediate order, in accordance with Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.100(b) and (c)."
"Review of final agency action taken under the Administrative Procedure
Act is, moreover, a matter of right,"442the court continued, while "[o]n the
other hand, immediate review of a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate
agency action or ruling is available only 'if review of the final agency
decision would not provide an adequate remedy.',
4 43
The court went on to note that: 1) final orders in proceedings affecting
"'substantial interests must be in writing and include findings of fact, if any,
and conclusions of law separately stated[;]'444 and 2) that an agency has not
rendered a final order until the order is "'filed with the agency clerk.'
445
The court indicated that "[f]inal agency action may take the form of an
order whether 'affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory' in tenor"446
and that "[a] final agency order may articulate jurisdictional boundaries;
require a party to cease or desist; grant, suspend, or revoke a license; impose
an administrative penalty deny an evidentiary hearing; or deny substantive
relief of various kinds." 4  Additionally, the court recognized that "[a] final
order may or may not dismiss a petition for hearing or some other
pleading.,
448
The court summed up its discussion by concluding that the finality of an
order "depends on whether it has brought the administrative adjudicative
process to a close. 449
In W. T Holding, Inc. v. State,45° the fourth district found that the
reissuance of a final order by an administrative agency is appropriate when a
party does not receive a copy of the order until after the time for appeal has
elapsed.45'
The first district, in Libby Investigations v. Department of State,452
rejected an argument that an appellate court cannot reverse an agency's
decision to increase the penalty suggested in a hearing officer's
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (Supp. 1996)).
444. Hill, 687 So. 2d at 1377 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.569(2)0) (Supp. 1996)).
445. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.52(7) (Supp. 1996)).
446. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.52(7) (Supp. 1996)).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Hill, 687 So. 2d at 1377.
450. 682 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
451. Id. at 1225.
452. 685 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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recommended order as long as the penalty is within the limits permitted by
the applicable statute.453
XXVII. APPEALS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES
• 454
In Hastings v. Demming, the Supreme Court of Florida answered a
certified question by indicating that "[n]onfinal orders denying summary
judgment on a claim of workers' compensation immunity are not appealable
unless the trial court's order specifically states that, as a matter of law, such
a defense is not available to a party.' ' 5  The court stated that "[i]n those
limited cases, the party is precluded from having a jury decide whether a
plaintiff's remedy is limited to workers' compensation benefits and,
therefore, an appeal is proper."456 In other than those limited cases, the court
noted that "the denial of the summary judgment may be based on a factual
dispute and the party is still likely able to present an immunity defense to the
jury. 457 The court also pointed out that prior to its decision, it had amended
the appellate rules to address this matter, 45 and that "the new rule makes
clear that the district courts have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the
nonfinal order.
'As9
The change in the appellate rules discussed in Hastings was held in
Stucki v. Hopkins,460 to apply retroactively to summary judgments entered
prior to its effective date.46 6
In Betancourt v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,462 the first district set forth the
guidelines for determining whether the court has jurisdiction to consider an
appeal in cases in which a judge of compensation claims ("JCC") fails to
rule on a claim that is ripe for adjudication and that is properly before the
JCC.46 3 The court found that "[i]n cases wherein a JCC expressly reserves
jurisdiction on a fully tried issue that is ripe for adjudication, such
reservation renders the order nonfinal and nonappealable., 464 Therefore,
453. Id. at 71.
454. 694 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1997).
455. Id. at 720.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. See section II (E) of this article.
459. Hastings, 694 So. 2d at 720.
460. 691 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
461. Id. at 562.
462. 693 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
463. Id. at 681.
464. Id at 682.
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appeals from such orders will be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction 65 On the
other hand, the court stated:
In cases in which the JCC fails to enter a ruling on a fully tried
issue that is ripe for adjudication and does not reserve jurisdiction
on the issue, this court will consider the absence of a ruling to
constitute a denial of the claim only for jurisdictional purposes, and
the order will, therefore, be deemed final and appealable.
In considering the merits of such cases, the "court will continue to consider
the JCC's failure to rule reversible error based on the JCC's noncompliance
with the duty to adjudicate all issues that are ripe for adjudication.' '4 7 The
court went on to indicate that "in regard to cases involving claims that are
ripe for adjudication at the time of the hearing, for which claimant failed to
produce evidence or obtain a ruling, this court will consider the claim
abandoned and the issue waived, and will consider the order final and
,0468
appealable. As to such matters, "[a]ny subsequent claim for the same
benefits will be barred by the principle ofresjudicata.,469
In reaching its decision, the court "recognize[d] that motions for
rehearing in workers' compensation cases do not toll the time to appeal,
unlike those in other classes of cases., 47' Noting that it is "of the firm
conviction that much of the uncertainty that attends orders which fail to
address mature claims could be remedied by the adoption of an amended
rehearing rule that would allow the filing of a timely motion to toll the time
for appeal,, 471 the court "therefore commend[ed] to the Workers'
Compensation Rules Committee of The Florida Bar the adoption of an
amended rehearing rule for the purpose of achieving the above stated
goal. 472
XXVIII. APPEALS IN FAMILY LAW CASES
The fifth district in In re JA.,473 joined the third and fourth districts474
in holding that court-appointed counsel in appeals from orders terminating
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Betancourt, 693 So. 2d at 682.
468. Id. at 683.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Betancourt, 693 So. 2d at 683.
473. 693 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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parental rights, who find there to exist no issues of arguable merit, are not
required to follow the procedure set forth in Anders v. California475 for use
in similar circumstances by court-appointed counsel involved in criminal
cases.
476
XXIX. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
A. Prohibition
The fifth district, in Rollins v. Baker,477 granted a petition for a writ of
prohibition that sought the disqualification of a trial judge in a pending
case.478 Although the court found prohibition warranted as to the merits of
the petitioner's claim, it also noted the existence of an additional ground for
disqualification,479 the fact the judge had "filed a pro se response to the
court's order to show cause" in which he went beyond stating his position as
to why the petition was legally insufficient,48 and commented on facts not
alleged in the petition or the underlying motion to disqualify, tried to explain
his actions, and attempted to correct or explain allegations in the petition.
4 81
The court suggested that when judges are "confronted with the dilemma of
whether or not to respond to a show cause order in these types of cases[,] 48 2
[p]erhaps the best course of action is to request the attorney general's office
to file a response on behalf of thejudge limited to the legal sufficiency of the
facts set forth by the petitioner."
4
In Ellis v. Henning,484 a trial judge was represented by the attorney
general's office in a prohibition proceeding, but the ultimate result was the
same as the result in Rollins. 481 In Ellis, the fourth district concluded that it
was compelled to grant a writ of prohibition "because the responses, filed on
behalf of the trial judge by an assistant attorney general in each of the
474. See Jimenez v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 669 So. 2d 340,
341 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Ostrum v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs.,
663 So. 2d 1359, 1361 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). For a discussion of the opinions in
Jimenez and Ostrum, see 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 59-61.
475. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
476. JA., 693 So. 2d at 724.
477. 683 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
478. Id. at 1139.
479. Id. at 1139-40.
480. Id. at 1140.
481. Id.
482. Rollins, 683 So. 2d at 1140.
483. Id.
484. 678 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
485. Id. at 827.
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consolidated cases, imperrissibly took issue with the accuracy of the
allegations in the petition.,' S6
The court "recognize[d] that the trial judge may have merely referred
this case to the attorney general's office for a response as judges frequently
do[,], 487 and indicated that "[i]t is thus also the responsibility of the office of
the attorney general as the judge's representative not to file a response on the
judge's behalf, which, as in this case, requires the judge's
disqualification. ' 488 The court reiterated a warning it had expressed in
Fabber v. Wessel,489 "that it is the safer practice 'for the judge to remain
silent and let the adversarial party supply the response."'
490
The Ellis court granted the trial judge's motion for clarification to
address the concern "that a failure to respond could result in the issuance of
a writ of prohibition if a respondent judge follows [the court's] advice and
remains silent., 491 The court pointed out that "[t]his concern arises only in
those cases where the adversarial party-for whatever reason-also does not
respond[,] ' '492 and that "[i]n practical terms, there may be those times that
both parties desire that anotherjudge hear the case or where an adversarial
party simply fails to respond.,
493
Also, the court on clarification discussed its caution to the assistant
attorney general, indicating that its "concern was that a response, which
contests the accuracy of the facts alleged by a petitioner, impermissibly
places the trial judge in an adversarial posture."4494 The court noted that,
"[o]n the other hand, nothing prevents the assistant attorney general, on
behalf of the trial judge, from limiting a response to the legal sufficiency of
the facts set forth by the petitioner., 49 The court went on to state that "[t]he
respondent simply4 must avoid the temptation to dispute the facts if a
response is filed"96 and that "[i]n the overwhelming majority of the cases,
the office of the attorney general has struck the necessary balance. 497
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 827-28.
489. 604 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
490. Ellis, 678 So. 2d at 828 (quoting Fabber v. Wessel, 604 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Ellis, 678 So. 2d at 828.
496. Id.
497. Id.
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B. The Effect on Appeals of Prior Denials of Prohibition
In Hobbs v. State,498 a criminal defendant appealed to the fourth district
from his conviction asserting that he was improperly denied discharge on
speedy trial grounds. 499 The defendant had raised the speedy trial issue in a
pretrial petition for a writ of prohibition which the fourth district had denied
without opinion.500  The State asserted that the denial of prohibition
constituted the law of the case and that relitigation of the issue on appeal
was therefore barred. °0
The court noted that in Petrullo v. Petrullo,50 2 it had stated that a
"denial of a writ without opinion cannot be the law of the case. 5°3 The
court recognized that Petrullo dealt with a petition for prohibition, but
pointed out that the only authority it had cited for its statement was Bing v.
A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,504 a case that involved the denial without
opinion of a petition for certiorari.50 5
The court then discussed the difference between the two extraordinary
writs by noting that the vast majority of petitions for certiorari are dismissed
because the petitioner has an adequate remedy on appeal and that no matter
how clear the error of a trial judge may be, an appellate court has no
jurisdiction so long as an adequate remedy existed on appeal. 06 The court
continued, "[t]here is no similar jurisdictional hurdle, separate and apart
from the propriety of the action of the trial court, when an appellate court
reviews a petition for writ of prohibition.,
50 7
The court went on to cite the specially concurring opinion of Judge
Anstead in DeGennaro v. Janie Dean Chevrolet, Inc., which asserted
that unless an order on opinion denying prohibition indicates to the contrary,
such a ruling should constitute the law of the case because "[j]udicial
498. 689 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
499. Id at 1249.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. 604 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
503. Id. at 538.
504. 498 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
505. Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1250.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Judge Anstead is currently a Supreme Court of Florida Justice.
509. 600 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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resources, already heavily taxed, are hardly efficiently allocated when they
are used to twice review the same issue.
' 5
Opting to follow the approach adopted by the third district in Obanion
v. State, the Hobbs court concluded that "[h]enceforth a denial of a
petition for writ of prohibition will be a ruling on the merits, unless we state
otherwise. ' 51 2
The court adopted this approach despite recognizing that the supreme
court, in Barwick v. State,5 13 "although approving the procedure which we
adopt from Obanion, adopted the opposite approach for itself, announcing
that if a denial of a petition for writ of prohibition is intended to foreclose
further review on direct appeal, the order will state that it is with
prejudice."5 14
The court did not, however, discuss its previous decision in Thomason
v. State,15 in which Judge Farmer, who joined in the unanimous en banc
Hobbs decision, wrote a dissenting opinion that expressed disagreement with
the Obanion approach.516
510. Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1250 (quoting DeGennaro v. Janie Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 600
So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Anstead, J., specially concurring)).
511. 496 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
512. Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1251.
513. 660 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 823 (1996). For a discussion
of the opinion in Barwick, see 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 40-42.
514. Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1250, n.2.
515. 594 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed on other grounds, 620 So.
2d 1234 (Fla. 1993).
516. In Thomason, the defendant, who was appealing from an order withholding
adjudication and placing him on probation, raised a double jeopardy claim that he had
previously asserted in a petition for prohibition that had been denied without opinion. Id.
The court affirmed without opinion, but Judge Farmer, who wrote primarily to dissent on the
merits, discussed the question of whether consideration of the double jeopardy claim was
proper in light of the prior petition. Id. at 312 (Farmer, J., dissenting). He noted that such
consideration was appropriate because prohibition is an extraordinarily prerogative writ that is
sometimes denied for "good reasons having nothing to do with the underlying merits of [a
petitioner's] position ...." Id. at 312 n.2. He recognized that his view was contrary to
Obanion, but stated that the fourth district had never adopted the Obanion approach and that
he hoped it never would, "at least as long as prohibition is deemed a matter of mere grace."
Id. Although disagreeing with Judge Farmer on the merits of the case, it appears that the other
members of the panel agreed with him on the jurisdictional issue because the case was
affirmed, rather than dismissed, Thomason, 594 So. 2d at 310, because Judge Stone wrote a
specially concurring opinion that set forth the reasons why he felt the case should be affirmed
on the merits, and because the court, on rehearing, certified a question that dealt only with the
merits of the case. Id. at 318.
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C. Mandamus
In Van Meter v. Singletary,517 an inmate sought review of a circuit court
order dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus, which had challenged a
loss of gain time imposed upon a finding that the inmate had committed a
disciplinary infraction.5 18 The petition had been dismissed because it was
filed some six months after his administrative appeal was affirmed 19 and
because section 95.11(8), of the Florida Statutes, states that any court action
challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings must be commenced within
thirty days after final disposition of the proceeding. 2 Finding the statutory
provision to be an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers, the first district reversed the order of dismissal.522 Relying on a
long line of precedent from the Supreme Court of Florida, the first district
held that the Florida Constitution vested in the courts the complete power to
issue extraordinary writs and "that the legislature was prohibited from
interfering with that power in any way. 523 The court recognized that rule
1.630(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides that requests for
extraordinary writs "other than common law certiorari must be filed within
the time provided by law,, 524 but was "unwilling to presume that the
supreme court," in enacting the rule "intended so cavalierly to surrender to
the legislature a power which it had zealously guarded for so long. 5 25 The
court thus interpreted the rule "to refer to the judicially developed law
regarding the time within which such relief must be sought-i.e., the concept
of laches. '26
D. Certiorari
In Stilson v. Allstate Insurance Co.,527 the second district denied a
petition for a writ of certiorari that sought review of a circuit court appellate
decision, "reluctantly conclud[ing] that [it was] faced with an error that [it]
517. 682 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 696 So. 2d 342
(Fla. 1997).
518. Id. at 1163.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 1164.
522. Van Meter, 682 So. 2d at 1165.
523. Id. at 1164.
524. Id at 1164-65.
525. Id. at 1165.
526. Id.
527. 692 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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lack[ed] the discretion to correct. 5 28 The court found that the county court
had improperly granted summary judgment, but declined to disturb the
529
affirmance without written opinion by the circuit court. The district
court's determination was based on the limited standard of review that
applies when district courts review decisions of circuit courts acting in their
appellate capacity.53°
The court noted that "certiorari should not be used as a vehicle for a
second appeal in a typical case tried in county court., 531 Rather, the court
continued, district courts must be guided by decisions of the supreme
court532 that "[i]n essence.., cautioned the district courts to be prudent and
deliberate when deciding to exercise this extraordinary power but not so
wary as to deprive litigants and the public of essential justice."
The second district recognized that "the departure from the essential
requirements of the law necessary for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is
something more than a simple legal error 534 and that district courts should
use their discretion to correct an error "only when there has been a violation
of [a] clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of• • ,,535 •• ,
justice. The court stated that the error in the case before it was "[a]t
worst 536 a misapplication of the correct law and "not sufficient by itself to
be a miscarriage ofjustice. ' 3
The court noted that there may never be clearly established principles of
law governing a wide range of county court issues because "[i]t is difficult
for the law to evolve in unreported decisions issued in circuit court
appeals."538Therefore, the court admitted to "a great temptation in a case like
this one to announce a 'miscarriage of justice' simply to provide precedent
where precedent is needed., 539 However, the court resisted the temptation
because it did not interpret Heggs as giving it that degree of discretion and
528. Id. at 983.
529. Id. at 980.
530. Id. at 982.
531. Id.
532. Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 982 (citing Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.
2d 523 (Fla. 1995); Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983)). For a discussion of the
decision in Heggs, see 1995: Survey, supra note 1, at 31-2.
533. Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 982.
534. Id.
535. Id. (quoting Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla.
1995) (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 95-96 (Fla. 1983))).
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 982.
539. Id. at 983.
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because "[s]uch an interpretation would invite certiorari review of a large
number of appellate decisions issued by circuit courts. 540
As a possible solution to the problem, the court pointed to section
54134.017(1) of the Florida Statutes, which permits county court's to certify
to district courts of appeal questions that may have statewide application and
that either are of "great public importance" or will "affect the uniform
administration of justice." The second district indicated that "[c]ounty
court judges should understand that this provision can be used to create
precedent needed for the orderly administration of justice in their courts, 543
and that the district court "rel[ies] upon them to screen their cases so that the
district courts may receive an occasional appeal rather than numerous
petitions for certiorari.",
544
The first district in Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v.
Smith,545 reviewed a circuit court order that had granted certiorari and
reversed an order suspending a driver's license. 46 The appendix to the
petition in the circuit court did not include a conformed copy of the order to
be reviewed. 47 The first district found that this fact alone demonstrated that
the circuit court could not have applied the correct law, and that it could not
have determined whether the findings of the order under review were
supported by competent substantial evidence.5 4 8  Relying both on those
conclusions and a finding that the circuit court reweighed the evidence in its
ruling on the merits the district court granted certiorari and quashed the
circuit court's order. ?49
E. Habeas Corpus
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention
Center v. TO.,550 dealt with a situation in which a juvenile was detained
pursuant to a detention order issued by a circuit court located within the
territorial jurisdiction of the fifth district.551  The place of detention,
540. Id.
541. FLA. STAT. § 34.017(1) (1995).
542. Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 983 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 34.017(1) (1995)).
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. 687 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
546. Id. at31.
547. Id. at 32.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 33.
550. 684 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996) [hereinafterAlachua II].
551. Id. at 815.
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however, was located within the territorial jurisdiction of the first district. 52
After the juvenile's motion for release was denied by the circuit court, he
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the first district.5 3 In granting
relief, the first district certified to the supreme court as a question of great
public importance the question of whether, in light of the fact that the order
detaining the juvenile was entered by a circuit court located in another
district, it was the proper court to consider the petition. 54
The court said that "it appears that a district court of appeal does not
have the constitutional power to issue a writ directed to a person outside the
district court's territorial jurisdiction." '555 Further, "the proper respondent in
a habeas corpus petition is the party that has actual custody and is in a
position to physically produce the petitioner., 556  The supreme court
concluded that "the Fifth District Court could not have issued the writ.
5 57
The Supreme Court of Florida went on to consider the question of
whether the first district, "not having supervisory or appellate jurisdiction
over the.., court" that issued the detention order, "had the authority to
review its detention order. 558 In concluding that the first district did have
such jurisdiction, the supreme court pointed out certain restrictions apply
under such circumstances. 59 When a court entertaining a habeas corpus
petition does not have supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the court
that entered the order or other process under challenge, the supreme court
concluded that "the scope of the reviewing court's inquiry is limited to
whether the court that entered the order was without jurisdiction to do so or
whether the order is void or illegal., 560 The supreme court further found that
"[t]he reviewing court may not discharge the detainee if the detention order
is merely defective, irregular, or insufficient in form or substance. 56'
XXX. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
In May of 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida Judicial Management
Council ("JMC") Committee on Appellate Court Workload & Jurisdiction
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. T.O. v. Alachua Reg'l Juvenile Detention Ctr., 668 So. 2d 243, 245 (Fla 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1996), decision approved, 684 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996) [hereinafter Alachua ]].
555. Alachua I, 684 So. 2d at 816.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Alachua II, 684 So. 2d at 816.
561. Id.
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produced a draft report that may well impact on the future of appellate
practice in Florida. "The JMC asked the committee to review the
jurisdiction, workload, resources, and case management practices of the
district courts of appeal, and make recommendations on alternative
approaches that allow the courts to meet anticipated workload levels." 562
The committee summarized its recommendations as follows:
Adopt a new appellate court workload standard of 225 dispositions
after submission on the merits per judge (committee voted 8 in
favor, 2 opposed);
In combination with the above, adopt an additional appellate court
workload standard of 385 case filings per judge (committee voted 6
in favor, 2 opposed, 2 abstaining);
This committee should develop, for court approval, a uniform
method of counting cases prior to, or concurrent with, efforts to
develop performance-based budgeting (committee voted 9 in favor,
0 opposed, 0 abstaining);
Redistribute administrative appeals and workers' compensation
cases to the district courts of appeal in which the matters arose,
with the exception of broad rule-making activities by state agencies
(committee voted 8 in favor, 0 opposed, 2 abstaining);
Move the 8th Judicial Circuit from the 1st District Court of Appeal
to the 5th District Court of Appeal and move the 20th Judicial
Circuit from the 2nd District Court of Appeal to the 3rd District
Court of Appeal (committee voted 7 in favor, 2 opposed, 0
abstaining);
Balancing district court of appeal workload by combining the
recommendations concerning redistributing administrative appeals
and workers' compensation jurisdiction with geographic changes
(committee voted 9 in favor, 1 opposed, 0 abstaining);
Do not create an additional district court of appeal at this time but
revisit this issue in five years (committee voted 5 in favor, 4
opposed, 0 abstaining);
Do not create specialized appellate courts (committee voted 7 in
favor, 0 opposed, 3 abstaining);
562. Report of the JMC Committee on Appellate Court Workload & Jurisdiction, May,
1997, at 1.
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Subject-matter divisions should remain an option available to each
district court of appeal to establish as it sees fit (committed voted 7
in favor, 1 opposed, 1 abstaining);
Severely limit the availability of appeals from non-final orders
(committee voted 6 in favor, 3 opposed, 1 abstaining);
The use of senior judges as additional appellate resources, not just
as replacements in individual cases, should be encouraged and
funded (committee voted 9 in favor, 0 opposed, 0 abstaining); and
The use of central staff attorneys should be within the discretion of
each district court of appeal, but they are not the alternative to
additional judges (committee voted 9 in favor, 0 opposed, 0
abstaining).563
The Florida Courts Technology Commission is presently considering
recommending to the supreme court the adoption of a vendor neutral citation
system that would include the sequential numbering and paragraph
numbering of opinions from the supreme court and the district courts of
appeal. Clearly, the adoption of such a system would significantly affect all
Florida lawyers, particularly appellate practitioners.
Of course, the courts over the coming year will provide answers to
many of the questions raised by the cases discussed in this article. These
answers, as they frequently do, will likely generate new questions. These
questions, and others, will continue to provide the large number of court
decisions that shape the field of appellate practice.
563. Report at 1-2.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys significant developments in the area of criminal
procedure between June 1, 1996, and June 1, 1997. The primary focus of
this branch of criminal procedure is on the interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments, more specifically cases involving the substantive
areas of search and seizure and confessions. To do so effectively, the
authors have selected notable cases from the United States Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the various Florida courts. This
article seeks to clarify established principles, indicate continuing trends, and
signify a new emphasis or direction without discussing the application of
settled or fairly standard fact situations. The author's purpose is to provide
the reader with insight into recent changes on the federal and state level, and
the case law's general legal impact on criminal practitioners and citizens in
the State of Florida.
II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
A. Pretextual Police Conduct
Between June 1, 1996, and June 1, 1997, the United States Supreme
Court issued a number of significant decisions involving investigatory and
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pretextual traffic stops. Arguably, the most controversial decision of the
survey period was Whren v. United States, which addressed the Fourth
Amendment's concern of "reasonableness" when law enforcement officials
conduct traffic stops. 2 In Whren, the Court held that the temporary detention
of a motorist is reasonable where an officer has probable cause to believe a
motorist has violated a traffic law, even if a reasonable police officer would
not have detained the driver for such a violation.3 The facts of Whren
involve police officers who stopped petitioner Brown's vehicle in a "high
drug area" after Brown was driving at an "unreasonable" speed and failed to
properly signal. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers observed the
passenger, petitioner Whren, handling plastic bags of what appeared to be
crack cocaine. Petitioners were arrested, and quantities of several types of
illegal drugs were retrieved.4  Prior to trial on federal drug charges,
petitioners moved to suppress the evidence alleging the stop was pretextual
and was not justified by either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
believe the men were engaged in illegal activity. The motion to suppress
was denied and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed.5
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Whren, dismissed the
petitioner's argument that a subjective "reasonable officer" standard should
have been used based upon the Supreme Court's previous disapproval of
police attempts to use valid bases of action against citizens for other
investigative purposes.6 Generally, the decision to stop an automobile is
reasonable if probable cause exists that there has been a traffic violation,
reiteratinP the traditional common law rule justifying search and
seizures. More significantly, the Supreme Court rejected any inquiries into
the subjective state of mind of the individual police officer, stating that
"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis[,]" foreclosing any argument that the ulterior motives
1. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
2. Id. at 1772.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)). In Wells,
the Court stated that "an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order
to discover incriminating evidence." Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 372 (1987) (approving an inventory search where there had been no evidence of
improper police procedure or bad faith). An inventory search is the search of property
lawfully seized and detained in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items
(such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims of loss or damage.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
7. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1769.
1997] i;
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of individual police officers could invalidate justifiable police
conduct. 8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court refused to apply a detailed
balancing analysis 9 by stating such inquiries are necessary only in cases
involving searches or seizures conducted in a manner unusually harmful to
the individual.'0 Accordingly, although a routine traffic stop by plain clothes
officers based on probable cause may generate "concern" or "fright," the
existence of probable cause to believe that a law has been broken outweighs
the private interest in avoiding police conduct." Historically, the standard in
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for determining if a traffic stop was
"pretextual" has been whether "a reasonable officer would have made the
seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation."' 12 Nevertheless, the
Eleventh Circuit appears to have embraced Whren, thereby strengthening
pretextual police conduct without reducing the incentive of officers who act
upon ulterior motives to investigate into other matters.
In United States v. Holloman,13 the court found that the seizure of
Holloman's vehicle after a traffic stop comported with the Fourth
Amendment notwithstanding the officer's subjective desire to intercept
narocotics.' Holloman refused to have his truck searched after police
officers, working with a drug interdiction unit, stopped his vehicle for failing
to have an illuminated license tag. 5 However, using a canine who alerted
8. Id. at 1774.
9. Petitioners argued that a balancing test should be used to weigh the governmental and
individual interests implicated in a traffic stop. Petitioners claim such balancing does not
permit investigation of traffic violations by plain clothes officers in unmarked cars since it
minimally advances the government's interest in traffic safety and unduly burdens the motorist
by creating "substantial anxiety." Id. at 1776. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657
(1979). The Court in Whren distinguished itself from Prouse and the use of a balancing
analysis because the latter was based on a random traffic stop to check a motorist's license and
vehicle registration, a claim that involved police intrusion without the probable cause that is
its traditional justification. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776.
10. Id. at 1776. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 1, 934 (1995) (unannounced entry
into a home); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (seizure by means of deadly force);
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985) (physical penetration of the body); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984).
11. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
12. See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11 th Cir. 1986).
13. 113 F.3d 192 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
14. Id. at 196. See Riley v. Alabama, 104 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 1997) (stopping
of vehicle was justified where automobile was traveling over 60 miles an hour in a residential
neighborhood, and passenger was throwing paraphernalia out of the window).
15. Holloman, 113 F.3d at 193. Section 316.221(2) of the Florida Statutes "requires a
tail lamp or separate lamp to illuminate the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible
from a distance of 50 feet to the rear." Id. at 193 n.1 (citing FLA. STAT. § 316.221(2) (1996)).
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the presence of narcotics on the passenger side of the vehicle, officers
discovered 694 grams of crack cocaine. Neither the nature of the minor
traffic infraction nor the use of a canine to establish probable cause were
viewed by the Eleventh Circuit as significant differentiating elements.16 The
court in Holloman also concluded that the facts were identically
indistinguishable from the Supreme Court's decision in Whren.17 In both
cases, the police officers had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had
occurred, conducted constitutionally valid seizures of the narcotics of each
petitioner, and were appropriately decided by their respective courts who did
not analyze the officer's subjective motivation to conduct the traffic stop.18
The Whren decision will likely have a significant impact on pretextual
stops in the State of Florida. In State v. Holland,19 the First District Court of
Appeal noted that the Whren Court unequivocally rejected the reasonable
officer test set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Daniel. Consequently, the First District Court of Appeal certified a
question to the Supreme Court of Florida to determine the actual scope of
Whren.2 1 The Holland court, applying the reasonable officer test, held that
16. Holloman, 113 F.3d at 194.
17. Id. See United States v. Griffin, 109 F.3d 706 (11th Cir. 1997). Defendants were
pulled over for driving 65 miles an hour on the interstate. Id. at 707. After the stop for the
traffic violation, the officers conducted a canine sniff of the vehicle and found marijuana on
the front seat. Id. Although the arresting officer testified that the speed defendants were
traveling was not unreasonable, the court followed Whren by finding probable cause based
upon the traffic violation. Id. at 707-08.
18. Holloman, 113 F.3d at 194. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772
(1996).
19. 680 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev. granted, 689 So. 2d 1069 (Fla.
1997).
20. Id. at 1042 (rejecting State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040, 1046 (Fla. 1995)). The
Supreme Court of Florida held that "a stop is permissible if effected by specialized officers
properly acting within the scope of their usual duties and practices." Daniel, 665 So. 2d at
1046. The Daniel court expressly rejected both the so-called "'subjective test,' which
'attempts to inquire into the actual subjective reasons why the officer made the stop,"' and the
"objective test," now adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Whren. Holland, 680
So. 2d at 1045 (quoting State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 1995)). Daniel
described the objective approach as a "'could arrest approach,"' dismissing such an
examination because the test "'would authorize stops for the subject infractions, however
unrelated those infractions may be to the true motive for the stop."' Id. (quoting State v.
Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Fla. 1995)).
21. The question, as originally certified asked:
WHETHER WHREN V. UNITED STATES, -- U.S. ---, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135
L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), OVERRULES STATE V. DANIEL, 665 So. 2d 1040,
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detaining the appellant driver for questioning on drug charges after being
stopped for traveling seventy miles an hour was permissible.22 Judge Van
Nortwick, in his reluctant concurrence, recognized the flaws with a purely
objective test later adopted by Whren, specifically its inherent failure to
address the problems that sometimes will arise with specialized
officers.2 3 For this reason, the trial court found a lack of credible evidence to
support a finding that narcotics officers would, under their usual practice,
make a traffic stop absent an invalid motive.2 4 In this particular case, they
did not even issue a traffic citation after the stop. One judge stated: "Well, I
think that's all a fraud.., they sit here and testify-they got smirks on their
faces when they are testifying.... They know what they are doing. You
know what they are doing. I know what they are doing .... ,,25
Courts in a number of jurisdictions have attempted to find a solution to
the problem of pretextual traffic stops without focusing upon the subjective,
ulterior motivations of police officers. One attempt to limit the authority of
officers to order passengers out of a lawfully stopped vehicle was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wilson.2 7 In Wilson, the
Supreme Court held that "an officer making a traffic stop may order
passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop. ''28  A
Maryland state tropper stopped the speeding car in which appellant Wilson
was a passenger. Upon noticing his apparent nervousness, the officer
ordered Wilson out of the car. When Wilson exited the vehicle, a quantity of
cocaine fell to the ground and he was arrested for possession of cocaine. 29
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision,
holding that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 30 that an officer may order
the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle, does not apply for
31passengers.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police officer making a
traffic stop may require passengers to get out of the car pending a
1046 (Fla. 1995), AND WHETHER THE PRESENT SUPPRESSION
ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Holland, 680 So. 2d at 1044.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1045 (Van Nortwick, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 1046.
25. Holland, 680 So. 2d at 1046.
26. Gary T. Kedler, Criminal Procedure, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 465, 472 (1997).
27. 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997).
28. Id. at 886.
29. Id.
30. 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977).
31. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 883.
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completion of the stop.32 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the decision,
explained the Court's decision in Mimms which stated that the "touchstone
of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness
in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's
personal security."' '33 Using the statistical figures of the danger of traffic
stops for police officers, particularly when there is more than one occupant
34
the additional intrusion on a passenger already in a stopped vehicle is
minimal. 35  The result of the ensuing balancing test, between the public
interest in protecting law enforcement officers and an individual's rights
against intrusion, signifies a more expansive role for police officers during
traffic stops and sets a precedent that, at the very least as common motorists,
may further erode personal civil liberties.
B. Constitutionality of Roadblocks
The legality of roadblocks once again posed significant dilemmas for
law enforcement officials in the State of Florida. The general standard
requires a written set of guidelines to be issued before a roadblock can be set
up. 6 Because roadblocks involve seizures without any articulable suspicion
of illegal activity, they should be based on the following considerations:
"(1) specific evidence of an existing violation; (2) a showing that reasonable
legislative or administrative inspection standards are met; or (3) a showing
that officers carry out the search pursuant to a plan embodying specific
neutral criteria which limit the conduct of the individual officers."
38In Campbell v. State, a decisive statement was made requiring detailed
written guidelines issued to officers that set forth governing procedures for
individual roadblocks. 39 The Supreme Court of Florida noted that "[t]he
32. Id.
33. Id. at 884-85 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977))
(citation omitted).
34. Justice Stevens points out that "these statistics are not further broken down as to
assaults by passengers and assaults by drivers." Id. at 885 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 886.
36. See State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986).
37. Id. at 438.
38. 679 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1996). The undisputed facts are that during the roadblock,
petitioner Campbell was stopped and transported to county jail for driving with a suspended
license. Officers searched Campbell and found powder cocaine and marijuana in his sock.
"Campbell moved to suppress the contraband seized from him and contended that the police
roadblock constituted an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 1169-70.
39. Id. at 1172.
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requirement of written guidelines is not merely a formality.... [but rather a
method] to ensure that the police do not act with unbridled discretion in
exercising the power to stop and restrain citizens. 40  In Campbell, a
roadblock to check motorists for traffic and safety violations was set up by
the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office in response to residents' complaints about
speeding and an accident that had occurred the previous weekend.4 1 Officers
prepared a written deployment strategy to stop motorists for a traffic safety
check on Mandarin Road and gave oral instructions to the other law
enforcement participants regarding procedural issues for the roadblock.
Nevertheless, the limited written instructions were deemed insufficient since
the operational order failed to contain guidelines restricting the discretion of42
the officers who took part in the road block. The Supreme Court of Florida
has made it emphatically clear that substituting general operating procedure
contained in a standard operational order will not replace the requirement of
detailed written guidelines for individual roadblocks.
4 3
C. Consent to Search
An attempt to limit what police may do after a stop by scrutinizing
when an officer has consent to search was rebuffed by the United States
Supreme Court.44 The Supreme Court categorically rejected the bright line
prerequisite for consensual interrogation requiring that an officer clearly
state when a citizen validly detained for a traffic offense is "legally free to
go. ' 45 Officer Newsome stopped petitioner Robinette for speeding. Neither
at the time of the stop nor prior to the search of Robinette's vehicle did the
40. Id. The purpose of written guidelines is to ensure that police officers do not
exercise their "power to stop and restrain citizens who have manifested no conduct that would
otherwise justify an intrusion on a citizen's civil liberty." Id. at 1172. The law is clear that
police do not have the authority to set up "routine" roadblocks at any time or place.
Campbell, 679 So. 2d at 1172. Therefore, stopping and detaining a citizen requires specific
advance planning and strict compliance thereafter. Id.
41. Id. at 1169.
42. Id. at 1171.
43. Campbell, 679 So. 2d at 1171.
44. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996).
45. Id. at 419-20. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). The Court expressly
disavowed any "litmus-paper test" or single "sentence or... paragraph... rule...," in
recognition of the "endless variations in the facts and circumstances" implicating the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 506. See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). When the
Supreme Court of Florida adopted a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus always
constitutes a seizure, the United States Supreme Court reversed, reiterating that the proper
inquiry necessitates a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 439.
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officer have any basis for believing that there were drugs in the car. After
ordering Robinette out of the car, issuing a warning, and returning his
driver's license, the officer took no further action related to the speeding
violation. He did, however, ask if Robinette had any weapons or illegal
contraband in his car. Thereafter, he obtained petitioner's consent to search
46
and found a small amount of narcotics.
Recognizing knowledge of the right to refuse as one factor for effective
consen, the court declined to confine valid consent to the limit of that one
factor. The test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be
voluntary, and voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from "all
the circumstances surrounding the encounter." 48  In another decision
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court noted that while it
would be impractical to impose detailed warning requirements for consent
searches, it would be equally unrealistic to require police officers to always
inform detainees that they are free to go in order for a consensual search to49
be deemed voluntary. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, recognized the severe
limitations upon states to limit the action of its police officers.50 No federal
rule exists precluding a state from requiring its police officers to explain to
individuals detained at valid traffic stops when they may leave. 51 Since the
Constitution neither mandates nor prohibits the issuance of such warnings
during traffic stops, such a practice should be decided by lawmakers in each
state.5
United States v. Butler 3 further limited the defense of involuntary
consent to search, even in the face of a significant police presence.54 The
standard to be applied is "'whether the police conduct would have
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline
46. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419.
47. Id. at 421.
48. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
49. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227
(1973).
50. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 424-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens denotes the obvious, that most
motorists have no interest in prolonging the delay occasioned by a valid traffic stop and
maintain an interest in preserving the privacy of their vehicles and possessions from others.
Id. at 425. However, the fact that Robinette's arresting officer successfully used a similar
method of obtaining consent to search roughly 786 times in one year, indicates that motorists
generally respond in a manner that is contrary to their self-interest. Id. "Repeated decisions
by ordinary citizens to surrender that interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any
hypothesis other than an assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do so." Id.
52. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 428.
53. 102 F.3d 1191 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1712 (1997).
54. Id. at 1197.
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the officer's request' to search. 55  Even though officers had stationed
themselves around the perimeter of the house in order to prevent its
occupants from leaving, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that codefendant Williams consented to the search of her home by opening
her door voluntarily. 6 Dismissing the ample assemblage of officers, it was
sufficient that Williams was informed that she could refuse the search,
signed a consent form, and was cooperative. 7
The Fifth District Court of Appeal followed the same logic when a
motorist, properly stopped for speeding, was asked additional questions
about his vehicle after his license was returned, including a request for his
58registration. During the conversation, another officer observed a handgun,
and a subsequent search revealed narcotics. Failing to advise a motorist that
he is "free to leave" does not show that law enforcement forced the
defendant to consent to a search of his vehicle or to talk to the officer. 9 The
ensuing observation of a weapon within the appellant's vehicle, as appellant
purported to obtain his registration, entitled the officer to arrest appellant
and conduct a further search of the vehicle.60
A warrantless search is constitutional, even if the consenting party does
not have the requisite relationship to the premises that are
searched.61 Hence, there is no Fourth Amendment violation if an officer has
an objectively "reasonable" though mistaken, good faith belief that he has
obtained valid consent to search a particular area.6 2 In United States v.
Brazel,63 the search of a tenant's apartment after obtaining the consent of the
landlord was upheld based upon the officer's belief the premises were
64
vacant. The landlord, who rented his apartment to petitioner Brazel on a
month to month basis, could not remember why he thought the apartment
was vacant. Nevertheless, the officer had further evidence to believe Brazel
was living with his grandmother, warranting a search of the allegedly
55. Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)).
56. Id. at 1198.
57. Id. at 1197.
58. Watson v. State, 689 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
59. Id. at 1091.
60. Id. See Stafford v. State, 532 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
61. See Illinois v. Rogriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
62. See United States v. Fernandez, 58 F.3d 593, 598 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that
where a defendant told police that a trailer belonged to his codefendant, it was reasonable for
officers to believe that the codefendant had authority to consent to a search).
63. 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1997).
64. Id. at 1148-49.
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abandoned property.65 The court concluded that any mistake made by the
detective as to whether the premises were vacant was a mistake of fact, not
one of law.66
Based on a distinct set of facts, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
used comparable logic in United States v. Mathis.67 In his appeal, petitioner
Mathis asserted error in the district court's admission of evidence alleged to
be the product of searches of his residence on two occasions.
61 Mathis'
mother consented to the search of her home and the garage area, which she
said she owned.69 Although the garage area actually belonged to Mathis, it
was "objectively reasonable" that the searching officers believed that
Mathis' mother had the authority to consent to a search of the entire
70premises.
D. Length of an Automobile Stop
Establishing the rule that an officer's ulterior motives cannot invalidate
legally justifiable police conduct has not terminated the debate over the• • 71
actual time parameters of an automobile stop. In State v. Brown, appellant
Brown's vehicle was stopped for speeding.7 The officer reported suspicious
statements made by the passengers in the vehicle; whereupon minutes later, a
backup K-9 unit arrived as Brown's tag and driver's license numbers were
still being run. Without completing the citation, the officer conducted a
license and tag check while the canine searched around the vehicle for
approximately ten minutes, eventually discovering marijuana. After the
65. Id. at 1148. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (concluding that a
tenant who abandons property loses any reasonable expectation of privacy he once had).
66. Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1149. See United States v. Elliott, 50 F.3d 180, 187'(2d Cir.
1995) (recognizing that the question of whether a given unit is unleased is one of fact, the
officers' belief that an area was vacant and that the owner could consent to a search was a
factual error). But see United States v. Brown, 961 F.2d 1039, 1041 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that a warrantless entry of tenant's apartment was unconstitutional where officer made the
mistaken legal conclusion that a landlord's authority to turn off electrical appliances or lights
also validated the officers' search of the apartment).
67. 96 F.3d 1577 (11th Cir. 1996).
68. "Two warrantless searches of the garage were conducted that day .... [Tihe [second
search] revealed information that aided the officers' investigation [in obtaining] a search
warrant for the garage, where they subsequently found a safe hidden by Mathis containing
thousands of dollars." Id. at 1584 n.5.
69. Id. at 1584.
70. Id.
71. 691 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
72. Id. at 637.
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marijuana was secured in the trunk of the patrol car, the officer completed
the citation.3 In reversing the trial court's motion to suppress, the court
held that a traffic stop should not be considered completed until all
information, if it can be obtained within a reasonable time, is
returned.74 Therefore, it is permissible for officers to run a dog sniff until a
traffic stop is entirely complete.75
E. Automobile Search Warrant Exception
The so-called "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment search
warrant requirement continued to broaden during this survey
period. Generally, an automobile has been one of the last few vestiges of an
76individual's Fourth Amendment rights. Recent decisions, however, have
put such a claim in jeopardy, making it closer to the truth to merely state that
'[a] citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment
by entering an automobile."' 77  In Pennsylvania v. Labron,8 the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that the ready mobility of a
car and probable cause that it contains contraband, without more, permits a
warrantless search of a vehicle.79 The case, decided by the Supreme Court,
reversed two decisions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which ruled
that warrantless searches of automobiles are limited "where 'unforeseen
circumstances involving the search of an automobile [are] coupled with the
presence of probable cause."'
80
In Commonwealth v. Labron,8' the police observed respondent Labron
and others engaging in a series of drug transactions on a street in
Philadelphia.82 The police arrested the suspects, searched the trunk of a car
83in which the drugs had been stored, and found bags containing cocaine. In
Commonwealth v. Kilgore,s4 an undercover informant agreed to buy drugs
73. Id. at 638.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 147 (1991).
77. Id. (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986)) (emphasis added).
78. 116 S. Ct. 2485 (1996).
79. Id. at 2487.
80. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 901 (Pa. 1995)) (citations
omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 677 A.2d 311 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Labron, 669 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1995).
81. Labron, 669 A.2d at 918.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 677 A.2d at 311.
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from respondent Randy Lee Kilgore's accomplice, Kelly Jo Kilgore. 8 To
obtain the drugs, Kelly Jo drove from the parking lot where the deal was
made, to a farmhouse where she met with Randy Kilgore, and obtained the
narcotics. After the drugs were delivered and the Kilgores were arrested,
police searched both the farmhouse and Randy Kilgore's pickup truck,
discovering cocaine on the floor of the truck which was parked in the
driveway of the farmhouse.86 In each case, the court upheld the respondent's
motion to suppress, concluding that although probable cause existed, no
exigent circumstances justified the failure to obtain a warrant.87
The Supreme Court concluded that the state court's analysis of the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was
flawed, as an automobile's "ready mobility" is an exigency sufficient to
excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause is
clear.88 Consequently, without acknowledging the residential location of the
car in Kilgore or the actual mobility of either vehicle, the Supreme Court
noted that probable cause and exigent circumstances existed because both
respondents were involved in illegal drug activity.89  With apparent
unbridled acceptance, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there have been
recent cases that have continued to reduce the expectation of privacy in an
automobile, further justifying their position. 90  Justice Stevens, in his
dissenting opinion, recognized the debilitation of individual citizen's rights
as motorists, and suggested the effect is not only on the individual but on the
state, noting the Supreme Court's "lack of respect" for the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and the "sophistication of its state search and seizure
law."9' As a result, Justice Stevens suggests that the Supreme Court's edict
will make it harder for states who expressly indicate their intent to extend
the protection of their constitution beyond those means available in the
Constitution.
92
The issue of whether probable cause and exigent circumstances existed
to justify a warrantless search of an automobile was addressed in United
States v. Brazel.93 In Brazel, prior to the search of the car in question,
85. Id.
86. Id. at 312.
87. Id. at 313. See also Labron, 669 A.2d at 918.
88. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 (1996).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. 102 F.3d 1120, 1129 (1lth Cir. 1997). A federal grand jury indictment handed
down drug trafficking indictments against 32 people including petitioner Jefferson. Id. at
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detectives were aware that the true purchaser of the vehicle had a minimal
income. Petitioner Jefferson had been seen driving the same car in the
vicinity where officers were investigating a drug ring. Although cocaine was
never observed in the car by detectives, straight single-edged razor blades
were seen. The razor blades were similar to those previously found with
cocaine residue on them after a search of a garage outside the address which
surveillance photos showed Jefferson frequented.
Taking into account the totality of the circumstances at the time the
search was conducted, the court in Brazel determined that there was
probable cause to believe the car contained some evidence of drug
trafficking activities. 95 The Eleventh Circuit also found that the potential
mobility of the car satisfied the exigency requirement.96 Petitioner Jefferson
was in custody at the time of the search, and a second set of car keys was
discovered in his girlfriend's possession at the private residence where the
car was parked. However, the court in Brazel ruled that the inherent
potential for mobility created an exigency justifying the warrantless search,
especially when other codefendants were not yet in custody, and there was
presumably a chance that a person might remove incriminating evidence
from the car.97 As a result, Jefferson's motion to suppress evidence from the
car was denied. Consequently, Jefferson was convicted of conspiracy to
98distribute cocaine and sentenced to life in prison.
An additional noteworthy decision clarified the rule that grants officers
the right to search the passenger compartment of an automobile, incident to a
lawful custodial arrest of the vehicle's occupants. 9
9 In State v. Johnson,100
the record revealed that upon being approached by police officers, the
passengers of the vehicle exited and began to walk away.' 10  After
discovering marijuana on one of the men, officers searched the passenger
compartment of the petitioner's car. The Johnson case establishes that the
occupants of an automobile may not avoid the consequences of a vehicle
search by stepping outside as officers approach when a subsequent legal
arrest is made.'
1129. Jefferson, along with seven other defendants, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine with each defendant receiving at least one life sentence. Id.
94. Id. at 1146-47.
95. Id. at 1147.
96. Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1147.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1129.
99. State v. Johnson, 696 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
100. Id. at 880.
101. Id. at 881-82.
102. Id. at 881.
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F. Warrantless Search of Property
During this survey period, in a case of first impression, the
constitutionality of the Florida Forfeiture Act was challenged. 10 3  The
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act authorizes law enforcement agencies to
seize vehicles of any kind used to "facilitate the transportation, carriage,
conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter,
exchange, or giving away of any contraband article."'0 4  "Contraband
article," includes "[a]ny controlled substance," including cocaine and its
derivatives in the statute's list of controlled substances.115  Thus, the
Forfeiture Act clearly authorizes law enforcement officials to seize any type
of vehicle used to facilitate the distribution of cocaine." 6 The Forfeiture Act107
sets forth the procedure to be used in seizing personal property, with the
only significant pre-seizure requirement being notice of the right to a
subsequent hearing. 10 8  Furthermore, there is no requirement to obtain a
warrant or court order before seizing a vehicle.1
0 9
103. See White v. State, 680 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev. granted, 687
So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1997).
104. FLA. STAT. § 932.702(3) (1995).
105. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(a)(1); see also FLA. STAT. § 893.03(2)(a) (1995).
106. White, 680 So. 2d at 552.
107. The procedure to be followed is set out in the Florida Statutes:
Personal property may be seized at the time of the violation or subsequent to
the violation, [provided that] the person entitled to notice is notified at the
time of the seizure or by certified mail, return receipt requested, that there is a
right to a [sic] adversarial preliminary hearing after the seizure to determine
whether probable cause exists to believe that such property has been or is
being used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.
FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2)(a).
A postseizure adversarial preliminary hearing may be requested within 15
days after receipt of this notice and the hearing must be set and noticed by the
seizing agency and held by the court within 10 days of receipt of the hearing
request or as soon as practicable thereafter. At the hearing, the court must
determine whether probable cause existed for the seizure.
White, 680 So. 2d at 552 (citation omitted).
108. Id.
109. See State v. Pomerance, 434 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that the Forfeiture Act does not specifically mention the necessity of a warrant and
finding no rationale for judicially engrafting onto the statute a requirement that a warrant be
obtained).
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In White v. State,110 based on eye-witnesses and videotape, police
officers seized White's automobile under the Forfeiture Act because it had
been used in the delivery and sale of cocaine.II The car was seized without
a warrant after a routine inventory search produced two pieces of crack
cocaine in the ashtray. The petitioner was charged with possession of a
controlled substance and convicted.
11 2
At trial, the petitioner argued that the warrantless seizure of a motor
vehicle violates constitutional prohibitions against illegal search and
seizure.1 3 However, "[n]either the Florida nor United States Supreme Court
has.., addressed whether the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement
officers to obtain a warrant prior to seizing a vehicle under the Florida
Forfeiture Act or similar statute."' 1 4 Nevertheless, the Florida Forfeiture Act
is substantively similar to the Federal Forfeiture Act and the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act.'15
Although the federal circuits are split in their analysis of this issue, the
majority of the circuits that have considered this question have held that a
warrantless search of a vehicle under the Federal Forfeiture Act does not
violate the Fourth Amendment, and evidence obtained in subsequent
inventory searches is admissible in a criminal prosecution." The First
District Court of Appeal joined the majority of federal circuits by holding
that a warrantless search of a motor vehicle based on probable cause that the
110. 680 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev. granted, 687 So. 2d 1308 (Fla.
1997).
111. Id. at551.
112. Id. at 551-52.
113. Id. at 553.
114. Id. Because of the significance of this issue and the fact that it is a case of first
impression, the court certified the following question:
WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
UNDER THE FLORIDA FORFEITURE ACT (ABSENT OTHER EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES) VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION SO AS TO RENDER EVIDENCE
SEIZED IN A SUBSEQUENT INVENTORY SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE
INADMISSIBLE IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
White, 680 So. 2d at 555.
115. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1997).
116. See United States v. Decker, 19 F.3d 287, 287 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1241 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554, 1560
(11th. Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d
1297, 1302 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 368 (3d Cir. 1981). But see United States v. Dixon, I F.3d
1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1989).
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vehicle was used in violation of the Forfeiture Act does not violate the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 7 The court, affirming the conviction of White, reasoned that if
police officers with probable cause can arrest drug traffickers without a
warrant, they should be equally able to seize "the vehicle the trafficker has
been using to transport his drugs."' 8 Since the expectation of privacy with
respect to one's automobile has gradually declined under the "automobile
exception," a motor vehicle may be seized for the same reasons under the
Forfeiture Act without a prior warrant absent exigent circumstances other
than the characteristics inherent in a motor vehicle.1
9
It should be noted, however, that Judge Wolf admonished the majority
for upholding the search and permitting property to be seized merely upon120
probable cause. By applying this concept, the warrant requirements for
the seizure of a vehicle will be crippled. 2i Moreover, it mistakenly suggests
that the forfeiture statute authorizes the seizures of property absent exigent
circumstances, trivializing the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement.
122
G. Use of Informants to Establish Probable Cause
The continued problems with the use of informants to establish
probable cause during the past survey year beleaguered the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, which intertwined varied legal standards to find common
ground for such elicited information. For example, in Ortega v. Christian,12 3
the court concluded that an informant's tip lacked the essential elements to
constitute probable cause to believe appellant Ortega participated in a
robbery, thereby validating his false arrest claim.
124
In Ortega, a confidential informant told the Metro-Dade Police
Department that an organized group, of which he was a member, committed
the robbery. The informant provided the address of the alleged robber's
residence and proceeded with officers to that address. The informant
identified Ortega who vehemently proclaimed his innocence and requested
an opportunity to prove a case of mistaken identity. Officers refused to
117. White, 680 So. 2d at 553.
118. Id. at 554 (quoting United States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (1lth. Cir.
1989)).
119. Id. at 554-55 (citing Califomia v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985)).
120. Id. at 559 (Wolf, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id.
122. White, 680 So. 2d at 559.
123. 85 F.3d 1521 (11th Cir. 1996).
124. Id. at 1525.
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comply with Ortega's request and failed to make any inquiries into the
claims of innocence, denying the opportunity for Ortega to appear in a line-
up or photo spread. Despite the fact that Ortega was never identified by the
victim as the perpetrator of the robbery, petitioner was incarcerated for five
months without bond.
125
In determining whether an informant's tip rises to the level of probable
cause, the totality of the circumstances must be assessed.126 Relevant factors
include the "informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 'basis of
knowledge."",127  "In addition, the corroboration of the details of an
informant's tip through independent police work adds significant value to
the probable cause analysis. ' 128 In reversing the dismissal of Ortega's false
arrest claim against the officer, the Eleventh Circuit strictly examined
additional factors that demonstrated that the informant's information had not
given the arresting officer probable cause to believe Ortega had participated
in a robbery. 129 There must be evidence in the complaint that demonstrates a
past history between the informant and the arresting officer. 30 Furthermore,
"an informant's tip that is bolstered [through] the fact that it is based on his
own personal observation rather than hearsay." 131 Finally, making
statements "against one's penal interests without more will not raise an
informant's tip to the level of probable cause required under the Fourth
Amendment.
' r
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Talley133 relied
exclusively on whether the information provided by the confidential
informant, when combined with the government's independent
corroboration, gave rise to probable cause. Without reference to the
relationship between the informant and the officers or the informant's
personal knowledge of the petitioner, the court affirmed Talley's conviction
of aiding and abetting another in possession with the intent to distribute
crack cocaine. The accurate information provided by the informant
125. Id. at 1524.
126. Id. at 1525.
127. Id. See United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1003 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).
128. Ortega, 85 F.3d at 1525 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1003
( lIth Cir. 1992)).
129. Id. at 1525.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing United States v. Reyes, 792 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1986)).
132. Id.
133. 108 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1997).
134. Id. at 281.
135. Id. at 282.
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included the location and description of petitioner's vehicle and a report that
Talley possessed cocaine.136 This was corroborated by officers who noticed
a visible bulge in Talley's pants, thus providing sufficient probable cause to
search the codefendant's car for contraband.
137
The scope of an informant's information used to establish probable
cause to justify a search warrant was enlarged further in United States v.
Butler.138 The standard set forth in Butler asks whether there is a "'fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found."",139 One
informant stated that appellant Campbell kept cocaine in his garage at his
residence for the past two years, yet the affidavit did not state the basis for
this information. However, other informants told of purchases they had
made from Campbell at his home. Finally, based upon the appellant's
employment status, he was found to have a substantial amount of
unexplained wealth. 14° Based on these facts, and applying the "fair
probability" standard, the issuance of the warrant was deemed appropriate
since the affidavit supported allegations that appellant was involved in the
drug trade.
141
H. Warrantless Use of Thermal Image Detectors
The utilization of advanced technology by law enforcement officials to
help combat crime continues to raise interesting questions regarding whether
the use of a particular technology in a given situation violates a person's
expectation of privacy. 142  One technological advance that has raised
frequent debate is the use of thermal or infrared image devices to gather
information of possible criminal activity. 143 Without directly answering the
constitutionality of its use, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v.
Siegel,144 affirmatively recognized the information from thermal infrared
detectors to support the issuance of a search warrant.
145
136. Id. at 281.
137. Id.
138. 102F.3d 1191 (1lth Cir 1997).
139. Id. at 1198 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
140. lad
141. Id.
142. See Thomas M. MeIsheimer & Thomas M. Walsh, Criminal Procedure:
Confession, Search and Seizure, 49 SMU L. REV. 853 (1996).
143. Id. at 866.
144. 679 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
145. Id. at 1204. No Florida court has expressly ruled on the constitutionality of using
such thermal or infrared imaging devices, although the issue has been raised in many other
jurisdictions. Id. at 1204 n.3. Generally, the discussion is based upon an individual's
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In Siegel, investigators received an anonymous tip that Siegel desired to
establish an indoor marijuana-growing operation with the use of a
trailer. They discovered that Siegel had rented a trailer and was generating
inordinately high electric bills for particular months. With the use of
infrared detectors, officers from the Aviation Division of the Sheriff's Office
conducted a flight over the rented trailer. The equipment allows its operator
to see a depiction of heat escaping into the environment from an area or
structure. The results from the flight revealed a large amount of heat
escaping from Siegel's trailer. Since weather conditions did not warrant
such heat usage, the large amount of heat may have come from high intensity
lights, commonly used in indoor marijuana-growing operations. 46 Another
thermal imager, used at ground level to detect differences in temperature,
revealed excessively high levels of heat being emitted into the environment
from the trailer.
147
After a warrant was executed and the marijuana-growing operation was
discovered, the trial court granted Siegel's motion to suppress the seized
evidence concluding that law enforcement officers were on a "'fishing
expedition"' specifically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 48  In
reversing the ruling of the lower court and following the lead of the majority
of federal district courts of appeals, Siegel clearly recognized the use of
thermal image devices. 49 The court held that although no single shred of
evidence may be conclusive, the various pieces of information created a fair
probability that marijuana would be found in the trailer.150
expectation of privacy, requiring a warrant if an individual has evidenced a subjective actual
expectation of privacy and if that expectation is one that society is prepared to acknowledge as
reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). The weight of authority
is that the use of thermal or infrared image devices does not require a warrant. Butler, 102
F.3d at 1204 n.3. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328-31 (1lth Cir. 1995);
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d
286, 288 (6th Cir. 1994). Only a minority of courts have held that such activities may amount
to searches under the Fourth Amendment. Butler, 102 F.3d at 1204 n.3. See United States v.
Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1518-19 (W.D. Wis. 1994); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 604
(Wash. 1994).
146. Siegel, 679 So. 2d at 1202-03.
147. Id. at 1203.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1204.
150. Id. at 1205.
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I11. MINIMALLY INTRUSIVE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
A. Reasonable Suspicion-Grounds for a Terry Stop
The controlling factors surrounding what constitutes reasonable
suspicion to warrant a Terry stop151 continue to be debated in the State of
Florida and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, culminating in several
noteworthy decisions during the past year. Generally, however, the issue
continues to remain the one area of criminal procedure that the courts in this
survey give great scrutiny and analysis, particularly since it is the first stage
of infringement upon an individual's liberty.
By virtue of the fact that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause, the license to use anonymous tips to establish
reasonable suspicion has been abused yet unrebuked by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. In Riley v. Montgomery,152 the Eleventh Circuit held that
reasonable suspicion existed justifying an automobile stop and subsequent
pat-down searches of the vehicle's passengers. 153 In Riley, an anonymous
tipster had indicated that Riley was transporting cocaine. In fact, Riley was
seen entering a vehicle matching the informant's description. Another tip,
corroborating this information, gave the license plate number of the vehicle
Riley was driving. The court found the anonymous tip, corroborated by the
other informant and independent police work, to show a "greater indicia of
reliability" for the officers to have "reasonable suspicion" to make a stop.
154
Despite the dismissal of Riley's earlier indictment for possession of cocaine
and an investigation into the Montgomery Police Department Narcotics and
Intelligence Unit, the court expressed absolute faith in the reliability of these
anonymous tips. 155  The court unabashedly accepted the fact that the
investigation uncovered evidence of extensive abuse involving the existence
of a fund used to pay confidential informants for tips, including falsifying
151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). As a result of Terry, police may conduct a wide
array of searches and seizures on a basis of reasonable suspicion, a significantly lesser
standard than probable cause, for the purpose of concluding whether a crime has been or is
about to be committed and if the suspect is the person who committed or is planning the
offense. See JOSHUADRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 185 (1991).
152. 104 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff Riley brought civil rights and
malicious prosecution actions against the City of Montgomery and the relevant police officers
involved in his arrest. The Eleventh Circuit, dismissing the actions, found that Riley failed to
provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate misconduct on behalf of the arresting police
officers. Id. at 1251-52.
153. Id. at 1251.
154. Id. at 1252.
155. Id.
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the identity of informants and smuggling money by recording transfers of
payments to informants who did not exist.
The skepticism of anonymous tips to establish reasonable suspicion has
resulted in more careful and thorough examinations by Florida courts during
this survey period. In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Riley,
who briefly examined the role of an informant, the Third District Court of
Appeal meticulously analyzed both the content of the information possessed
by police and its degree of reliability when deciding whether the facts from• • • 157
an anonymous 911 emergency call constituted reasonable suspicion.
In State v. Gonzalez,158 a citizen made a 911 emergency call to report
that two men were removing what appeared to be appliances from a
neighborhood house into a white van at approximately 3:00 a.m. 159 The
caller gave the dispatcher the address in an area which had continual
problems with theft of air conditioners and other appliances. Furthermore,
earlier investigations had also focused on locating a suspicious white
van. Officers who received the message encountered the van and discovered
numerous air condition units after appellants consented to a vehicle
search. The Third District Court of Appeal thoroughly assessed the
anonymous tips and how they related to the relevant facts, yet nevertheless
recognized that although it was "theoretically possible that this was the
owner's 3:00 a.m. moving party, common experience teaches that the
probabilities were otherwise and a stop for investigation was reasonable in
the circumstances."'160 In its detailed decision the court acknowledged that
the process to determine reasonable suspicion is one of "probability" not
"hard certainties."' 161 The court in Gonzalez concluded that "[w]hen the
'whole picture' is considered, there was more than enough reasonable
suspicion to support the investigatory stop.' 62
Therefore, in the State of Florida, courts have generally maintained
strict standards in what constitutes reasonable, articulable suspicion, an area
where an individual's civil liberties have not rapidly eroded:
[A]n officer may temporarily detain an individual for investigative
questioning if the officer has a reasonable suspicion based on
articulable facts that the individual is committing, has committed,
or is about to commit a crime. In determining whether an officer
156. Riley, 104 F.3d at 1250.
157. State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170-71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
158. Id. at 1168.
159. Id. at 1169.
160. Id. at 1171.
161. Id. at 1170 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
162. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d at 1172.
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possesses a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify an
investigatory stop, the totality of the circumstances must be taken
into account.
63
In considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may look
at: "'[T]he time of day, the day of the week, the location, the physical
appearance and behavior of the suspect, the appearance and manner of
operation of any vehicle involved or anything incongruous or unusual in the
situation as interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge.""51
4
The scrutiny by which the courts of Florida analyze reasonable
suspicion is exemplified in Welch v. State. 65 In Welch, the Second District
Court of Appeal narrowly tailored the meaning of the phrase "anything
incongruous or unusual," as perceived by law enforcement.166 Welch was
sitting on a bicycle with a very small plastic baggie in his hand, when two
officers in a patrol car approached him from behind. As soon as Welch saw
the officers, he shoved the baggie down his pants motivating one officer to
grab the appellant by his trousers and causing rock cocaine to fall to the
ground.167 The court held that neither the mere sight of Welch sitting on a
bicycle with a baggie in a high crime location, nor the subsequent
concealment thereof, established a legitimate suspicion to seize or detain
Welch.168 Although the officers could have properly engaged in a police-
citizen encounter with Welch, they acted prematurely in actually seizing
him.
169
Other cases where officers lack reasonable suspicion involve activities
that may be equally attributable to legal activity as to illegal activity. 70 In
Bowen v. State,171 an officer patrolling a parking lot of a motel where prior
criminal activity had taken place approached a vehicle with persons who
were allegedly acting nervous and attempting "'to tuck something away."
' 72
The officer ordered the occupants out of the car whereupon petitioner
Bowen dropped a straw with white powder, later identified as cocaine. The
163. Jenkins v. State, 685 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citations
omitted) (footnote omitted).
164. Id. (quoting State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1978)).
165. 689 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
166. Id. at 1241.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Bowen v. State, 685 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
171. Id. at 942.
172. Id. at 943.
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fact that the officer could not see clearly into the car or that the occupants
could have been engaTing in criminal activity is insufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion. Once again, a Florida court emphasizes that an
officer's fear does not justify ordering an occupant out of a vehicle that is
not legally stopped.174 This would open the door for police officers to order
persons "'out of their automobiles under almost any circumstances.""1
75
Several Florida district courts of appeal have decidedly contrasting
analyses in applying furtive movements to constitute reasonable
suspicion. For example, in Jenkins v. State,176 the officer's knowledge of
burglaries in the area, coupled with Jenkins' furtive movements with objects
consistent with the type of products recently stolen from a Radio Shack,
justified an investigatory stop. 77 In stark contrast, in JB. v. State,178 the
court held that the appellant's quick movement to conceal something as an
officer approached "did not create a founded suspicion of criminal activity
justifying an investigative stop.' 79 In a high crime area, an officer who
observes someone make a furtive movement may have his "suspicions
aroused," but is prohibited from legally detaining the person for further
investigation. 80
The distinction between "stop then drop" and "drop then stop" was at
issue in State v. Woods. Woods, who was sitting on a chair, got up and
walked away when officers approached. An officer followed him and yelled
for him to stop at which time Woods turned and dropped two bags of cocaine
and a handgun onto the ground. 82 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held
that the trial court erred in its finding that the stop preceded the drop and
reversed the lower court's order granting the appellant's motion to
suppress. 83 An unlawful seizure does not take place when a person fails to
184
stop when requested to do so. An unlawful seizure occurs "only if the
person either willingly obeys or is physically forced to obey the police
173. Id. at 944.
174. Id.
175. Bowen, 685 So. 2d at 944 (quoting Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 187 n.1 (Fla.
1993)).
176. 685 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
177. Id. at 921.
178. 679 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
179. Id. at 1297.
180. Id.
181. 680 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
182. Id. at 631.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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request."' 85 Therefore, it is not considered an unlawful seizure when the
person "'drops then stops,"' even if the drop occurs after an order to stop.
8 6
Evidence that justifies "a] valid stop does not necessarily mean that
there can be a valid frisk."18  The First District Court of Appeal found it
unnecessary to decide whether there was a basis for reasonable suspicion
that a person was engaged in criminal activity because probable cause is the
essential requirement As both Florida Statutes 1 9 and case law indicate,
an officer must have probable cause to believe a suspect is armed before the
officer can conduct a pat-down search or frisk of a suspect to ascertain the
presence of a weapon.
r90
In Stalling v. State,'9' the appellant was a passenger in an automobile
stopped for a traffic infraction. The vehicle was rented and neither the
driver nor appellant were authorized as drivers on the rental agreement. The
officer told Stalling that he and the driver would be driven to a telephone
where they could arrange for transportation. Prior to permitting Stalling to
enter the police car, the officer patted him down discovering three packages
of crack cocaine.
193
It is undisputed that the officer did not have a warrant to conduct
the pat-down search of the appellant. When no warrant has been
secured, the rule is that the search or seizure is per se unreasonable
185. Id.
186. Woods, 680 So. 2d at 631.
187. Stalling v. State, 678 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Shaw
v. State, 611 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
188. Id at 845.
189. Section 901.151(5) of the Florida Statutes states:
Whenever any law enforcement officer authorized to detain temporarily any
person under the provisions of subsection (2) has probable cause to believe
that any person whom he has temporarily detained, or is about to detain
temporarily, is armed with a dangerous weapon and therefore offers a threat
to the safety of the officer or any other person, he may search such person so
temporarily detained only to the extent necessary to disclose, and for the
purpose of disclosing, the presence of such weapon. If such a search
discloses such a weapon or any evidence of a criminal offense it may be
seized.
FLA. STAT. § 901.151(5) (1996).
190. See Shaw v. State, 611 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
191. 678 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
192. Id. at 844.
193. Id.
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unless it falls within one of the well established exceptions to the
warrant requirement.1
94
Although Terry created the right of a law enforcement officer to conduct a
pat-down search "to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are
then in possession of the person whom he has stopped,"'195 there is still no
blanket exception for an officer's "routine" pat-down of a detainee prior to
placing him in a police cruiser. 196 As a result, the First District Court of
Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion
to suppress and Stalling's conviction was reversed for a lack of probable
cause.
In Turner v. State,198 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reaffirmed that
an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch alone will not warrant
an investigatory search. 99 In Turner, officers were dispatched to investigate
a report that people were arguing over drugs. When they arrived, there was
no argument and no drugs were visible. Nevertheless, Turner and his friends
were approached by police officers and immediately patted down. At the
officer's request, Turner consented to be searched again and three wrapped
pieces of crack cocaine items were removed from his pocket.
The court held that in order to seize Turner's person and to pat him
down for weapons, the officers needed a well-founded suspicion that Turner
was involved in criminal activity. 200 The law enforcement officer must be
able to articulate the reasons for his suspicion.201 Prior criminal activity at
the same location and an officer's hunch are insufficient evidence to warrant
an investigatory search.202  The court determined that when the officers
his 203initially patted down Turner, they seized his person. After illegal police
conduct, a consent to search is presumptively tainted and is deemed
involuntary absent clear and convincing evidence sufficient to minimize the
taint of prior illegal action by law enforcement officials.0 4 Consequently,
194. Id. (citing Jones v. State, 648 So. 2d 669, 674 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 575 U.S.
1147 (1995)).
195. Stalling, 678 So. 2d at 845 (quoting Shaw v. State, 611 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1992)) (emphasis omitted).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 846.
198. 674 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
199. Id. at 897.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. See also Smith v. State, 637 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
203. Turner, 674 So. 2d at 897.
204. Id. at 898.
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the court ruled that Turner's consent to search was tainted, reversing the trial
court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress. 205
B. Consensual Encounters v. Investigatory Detentions
Perhaps the most divisive issue that has surrounded the Florida district
courts of appeal during the past survey year involves the point when a
consensual encounter becomes an investigatory stop. The underlying theme
in these cases involves requests by officers, to those being questioned, to
remove their hands from their pockets.
In State v. Baldwin,2°6 the Fifth District Court of Appeal applied an
objective test?07 to determine whether a reasonable person would have
thought they were free to leave during an interaction with law enforcement
officials.
20 8
[The] factors that might indicate a seizure, even where the
individual did not attempt to leave, include 'the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language of tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled.'
The subjective intentions of the detainee are immaterial when examining
whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred.210
205. Id.
206. 686 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The undisputed facts are that
Baldwin was sitting on a front cement stoop with another gentlemen when they were
approached by police officers. Id. at 683. Baldwin was asked to remove his hands from his
pockets and complied, but he returned them back to his pockets after numerous requests not to
do so. The last time Baldwin pulled his hands out of his pockets, he threw a paper bag on the
ground which contained cocaine. Id. The court remanded the case back to the trial court to
apply an objective test, i.e., whether a reasonable person would have thought they were free to
leave when the officer asked Baldwin to remove his hands from his pockets. Id. at 687.
207. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); State v. M.J., 685 So.
2d 1350, 1352 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that defendant's spontaneous and
voluntary offer to allow the officer to check him extended from the initial consensual
encounter and pat-down to the officer's later act of reaching into defendant's pocket and
withdrawing a crack pipe).
208. Baldwin, 686 So. 2d at 686.
209. Id. at 685 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
210. Id. at 686.
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211In State v. Woodard, two police officers entered an apartment
building looking for a person with multiple outstanding warrants.212 The
officers knocked on the door and questioned Woodard and the other
occupants about their presence in the building, asked for the names of the
men, and checked them for outstanding warrants. At no time was Woodard
ordered to remain or otherwise told that he was not free to leave. Prior to the
radio response on the warrant checks, Woodard reached into his
pockets. When the officer asked him to remove his hands from his pants,
Woodard discarded a clear plastic bag from his pocket proving to be
cocaine. 213 The court held that the investigating officer's request to have
Woodard remove his hands from his pockets, "when made to ensure an
officer's safety, does not elevate a consensual encounter to a detention. 214
The Second District Court of Appeal distinguished Woodard from their
previous decision in Mayhue v. State,1 5 where the court had ruled that an
investigatory detention resulted when an officer ordered the detainee to open
his clenched fist.21 6 The court reasoned that, unlike the palm of a hand, "a
pocket has the capacity to conceal a lethal weapon. 217 However, such a
distinction may be misguided since a razor blade, knife, or small firearm may
be concealed in a closed fist.
2 18
Acknowledging there is no litmus test for distinguishing a consensual
encounter from a seizure, the Fifth District Court of Appeal did differentiate
between "an order" and "a request" from a police officer.219 In State v.
Johnson,22 officers approached the appellants, Johnson and Ryan, who had
just exited their vehicle.221 During the encounter, the law enforcement
official requested that Ryan remove his hands from his pocket because the
officer felt uncomfortable. Ryan proceeded to empty his pockets revealing a
small amount of cannabis. Based on the facts, the court noted that it is
difficult to imagine how such an inquiry could intimidate Ryan into
emptying his pockets from the unintrusive officer's statement: "Would you
mind removing your hands from your pockets while we talk?, 222 A request
211. 681 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
212. Id. at 734-35.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 735 (citations omitted).
215. 659 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
216. Woodard, 681 So. 2d at735 n.1.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 736 (Parker, J., concurring).
219. State v. Johnson, 696 So. 2d 880, 882 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
220. Id. at 880.
221. Id. at 881.
222. Id. at 882.
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to exit a vehicle might cause a reasonable person to conclude that he is not
free to leave; however, the same may not be said of a request to remove
one's hands from their pockets.
223
The dissent argued that the distinction between "request" and "order" is
not determinative. 224 Whether the officer's directive is characterized as a
request or an order, if a person submits by removing his or her hands from
their pocket, the consensual encounter becomes a seizure.225  To Judge
Thompson, the question is not one of choice: Either follow the directive of
226the officer or disobey the officer and suffer dire consequences. Although
mindful of the officer's need to be careful of citizens who may be armed, "an
officer's concern for his safety is not a basis to violate a citizen's Fourth
Amendment rights. 227
In light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Maryland
v. Wilson,228 the concern for officer safety has widened the parameters of
consensual encounters.229 In King v. State, 230 decided a few months after the
notable decision by the highest court, the Second District Court of Appeal
reiterated that the reasonableness of an officer's request during a consensual
encounter "'depends on a balance between the public interest and the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers."'' 2 1 In King, an officer approached King who was standing in the
223. Id.
224. Johnson, 696 So. 2d at 883 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
225. The dissent cites a number of decisions that suggest how divided the courts in
Florida are over this issue. Id. at 883. See Gipson v. State, 667 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that a person stopped by police on the street who is ordered to
remove his hands from his pocket evolves from a consensual encounter into a seizure); Doney
v. State, 648 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that compliance with
officer's request that appellant spit out contents of his mouth was acquiescence to authority
rather than consent); Palmer v. State, 625 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that abandonment of a razor blade was a product of an illegal stop and thus
involuntary because seizure occurred when officer told defendant to take his hands out of his
pockets); Harrison v. State, 627 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding
that once an officer orders a person to remove his or her hand from a pocket, the consensual
encounter becomes a seizure). But see Sander v. State, 595 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (determining it was not improper for officer to ask defendant to remove hands
from his pockets).
226. Johnson, 696 So. 2d at 884.
227. Id.
228. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
229. Id. at 885. The Court held that an officer making a traffic stop may order
passengers to get out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop. Id.
230. 696 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
231. Id. at 862 (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 (1997)).
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middle of the road apparently dazed. The officer attempted to speak with
King to see if he needed assistance. King did not respond and placed his
hands in his pockets. The officer told the appellant to remove his hands, and
King complied by placing his hands behind his back. The officer, concerned
for his own safety, grabbed King and placed him against the patrol car. As
he did, he observed a crack pipe protruding from King's pants.
232
Accordingly, the court held that when an officer makes a reasonable
request to an individual to remove his hands from his pockets and the person
refuses to comply, "the individual's right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference is outweighed by the public interest in officer
safety." Law enforcement officials should not have to expose themselves
to potential dangers each time they have to investigate a situation.234 The
Second District Court of Appeal appears to have overstepped the boundaries
of what constitutes a consensual encounter by adding that permissible
actions by police officers include "physically" taking whatever reasonable
actions are necessary to "thwart any threatening actions by the person
encountered so as to dispel any reasonable fear of harm." 235  The
repercussions of Maryland v. Wilson236 have already demonstrated their
impact on Florida courts, not only broadening the standard of what
constitutes a consensual encounter, but redefining its boundaries to include
officers' requests made in the interest of safety.
C. Length of an Investigatory Detention
The issue regarding at what point a prolonged detention becomes an
arrest was decided by the Third District Court of Appeal.237 The Third
District Court of Appeal ruled in Saturnino-Boudet v. State,23' that the
detention of appellant Boudet for thirty to forty minutes awaiting the arrival
of a canine unit was "nothing more than a Terry stop239 utilized to dispel the
police officer's reasonable suspicion that Boudet was involved in the sale of
illegal narcotics., 240 Boudet arrived at the home of William Daniels, where
police detectives were conducting a narcotics investigation. The detectives
approached Boudet who voluntarily exited his car, leaving the driver's side
232. Id. at 861.
233. Id. at 862.
234. King, 696 So. 2d at 862.
235. Id.
236. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
237. Satumino-Boudet v. State, 682 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
238. Id. at 188.
239. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
240. Saturnino-Boudet, 682 So. 2d at 192.
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door open. Boudet produced identification upon request but refused to
consent to have his vehicle searched, whereupon detectives visually
observed alleged drug paraphernalia located on the front passenger's side in
his car. Boudet was detained in the Daniels' residence until the arrival of the
narcotics sniff dog who alerted the presence of cocaine. The appellant
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the cocaine in the court below and
appealed on the grounds that he was effectively arrested without probable
cause when police ordered him into the house.2 4'
Courts continue to acknowledge the difficulty in distinguishing
"between an investigative detention and a de facto arrest."242 The standard
set forth in determining reasonableness to make such a detention is whether
law enforcement authorities "'diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to 'conform or dispel their suspicions quickly.' 243  The
detention should "'last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the stop."' 244 However, since Boudet was never physically removed from
the scene nor detained for an unreasonable time,2 6 the court disagreed
with the petitioner's argument that he was de facto arrested without probable
cause.247 Under the circumstances, Boudet was not detained longer than
necessary for officers to dispel their reasonable suspicion that the petitioner
was involved in illegal narcotics activity.248
241. Id. at 190.
242. Id. at 192.
243. Id. (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)).
244. Id. (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 684).
245. Saturnino-Boudet, 682 So. 2d at 193. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815
(1985) (deciding petitioner's involuntary transportation to police station without probable
cause or judicial authorization for fingerprinting violated petitioner's Fourth Amendment
rights); State v. Rivas-Marmol, 679 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding
defendant de facto arrested for D.U.I. where handcuffed, placed in patrol car, and transported
to police station for purposes of administering a breathalyzer test).
246. See Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1990) (approving detention for
45 minutes while awaiting canine unit is reasonable); State v. Nugent, 504 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding 30 minute delay did not transform Terry stop into an arrest);
Finney v. State, 420 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding officers justified in
detaining defendant for approximately 90 minutes).
247. Saturnino-Boudet, 682 So. 2d at 193.
248. Id.
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IV. SEARCH WARRANTS
A. Sufficiency of Description
During this survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida and at least
one district court of appeal made it clear that warrants without sufficient
description and specificity will result in suppression of evidence. 249 In
250Green v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the recurring
problem of how specific a search warrant must be in describing the items to
be seized under the authority of that warrant.25 1 The court adopted the rule
that "when the purpose of the search is to find specific property, the warrant
should particularly describe this property in order to preclude the possibility• • •,, • 252
of the police seizing any other" items.
Petitioner Green, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death,
challenged the admission of the clothes he was wearing on the night of the
murder, which were seized pursuant to a search warrant. 3 Eyewitnesses
identified Green as the shooter and described to police that Green was
wearing a black pinstriped suit, a white shirt, and a brown trench
coat. However, the search warrant authorized the police to search for the
clothes that Green was wearing on the evening the weapon was used, and
other evidence relating to the murder.254 Although the police officers who
executed the warrant had information not contained in the warrant, the court
found it irrelevant in its analysis, and it was not scrutinized.255 The search
must be based on the language of the warrant alone. 6 As a result, it was not
possible for an officer to decide with reasonable clarity which articles of
clothing the officer was empowered to seize. 7 The court concluded that
because of the search warrant's broad description of the items to be seized,,,,,258
the "fruit of [the] search must be suppressed. In considering the use of
the good faith exception, 259 Green held that the facial invalidity of the
249. See Green v. State, 688 So. 2d 301, 306 (1996); Buggs v. State, 693 So. 2d 57, 58-
59 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App 1997).
250. Green, 688 So. 2d at 301.
251. Id. at 306.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 305.
254. Id. at 306.
255. Green, 688 So. 2d at 306.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
[Vol. 22:93
127
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Sale / Seitles
warrant impedes the application of this exception since no officer could
reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.260
When there are omissions in an affidavit that may actually defeat a
warrant, the test is to "consider the affidavit as though it included the
omitted information in determining whether the warrant is based on probable
cause.' 261 In Buggs v. State,262 the affidavit submitted on behalf of the search
warrant described in detail the physical characteristics of Buggs, including
his pattern of speech.263 Yet the petitioner argued that the affidavit lacked
sufficient evidence that should have defeated the warrant.264 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal applied the aforementioned test concluding that
even if the affidavit had mentioned that no fingerprints were found and that
other suspects were in the same area the night of the murder, the affidavit
still would have stated probable cause to justify the warrant.265
B. Detention of Property
Authorizing the seizure of property through civil forfeiture was grounds
to address the threshold procedural requirements mandated under the Fifth266
Amendment Due Process Clause. Applying the policy to the seizure of
real property, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
government must provide notice and a hearing prior to executing an arrest
267
warrant issued against real property. 268
In United States v. 408 Peyton Road, the government secured ex parte
warrants authorizing the seizure of appellant Richardson's properties. 269 The
warrant maintained that Richardson had financed the acquisition and
development of the properties through drug trafficking activities, citing the
fact that the appellant's reported income was insufficient to sustain real
estate activities of this kind. Furthermore, Richardson had allegedly engaged
in a series of suspect financial transactions. The government executed the
warrant to arrest and take into custody Richardson's properties, whereupon
copies of the federal arrest warrants were posted at each of the appellant's
properties. The facts establish that the government neither posted warning
260. Green, 688 So. 2d at 306.
261. Buggs v. State, 693 So. 2d 57, 59 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
262. Id. at 57.
263. Id. at 58.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 59.
266. United States v. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d 1106, 1108 (11th Cir. 1997).
267. Id. at 1109.
268. Id. at 1106.
269. Id. at 1108.
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signs on the properties nor changed the locks. Richardson challenged the
government's failure to provide a pre-seizure notice and hearing, depriving
him of property without due process of law.2
In 408 Peyton Road, the court analyzed "whether the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause prohibits the Government in a civil forfeiture case from
seizing real property without first affording the owner notice and an
opportunity to be heard.",271 To consider whether a hearing was required, the
Eleventh Circuit applied a three part inquiry requiring the consideration
of: 1) the private interest affected by the official action; 2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, as well as
the probable value of additional safeguards; and 3) the Government's
interest, including the administrative burden that additional requirements
would impose.272
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had applied this balancing test
in a factually similar setting, holding "that the lack of notice and a hearing
prior to issuance of the warrants seizing [a person's] properties rendered the
warrants 'invalid and unconstitutional. , However, unlike the seizure in
274that case, the government in 408 Peyton Road elected not to evict the
residents, post warning signs, or change the locks on the property,
concluding that it never "seized '2 75 the property because it refrained form
270. Id.
271. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1108. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993). "As a general matter, the government must provide notice and
a hearing prior to depriving an individual of property." Id. at 48. The United States
Constitution "tolerates exceptions to that general rule only in 'extraordinary situations where
some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the
event."' Id. at 53.
272. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1109. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321
(1976).
273. United States v. 2751 Peyton Woods Trail, 66 F.3d 1164, 1167 (11th Cir. 1995)
(quoting United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Located at 9638 Chicago Heights, St.
Louis, Mo, 27 F.3d 327, 300 (8th Cir. 1994)).
274. Id. at 1164.
275. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1109-10. The Supreme Court in Good has never
explicitly defined the term "seizure," however, the government suggested that physical control
is an essential element of seizure because the facts in Good involved some level of physical
intrusion. See Good, 510 U.S. at 49. Contrary to this assertion, the Supreme Court never
indicated that the exercise of physical control should be regarded as a constitutionally
cognizable seizure. In fact, the term seizure was applied more broadly to refer to
governmental action that deprived claimant Good of significant property interests. See United
States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (holding that a seizure of property occurs when
there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that
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asserting physical control over it.276 While 408 Peyton Road did not involve
a physically intrusive seizure, the court nevertheless assessed whether the
magnitude of the private interests required pre-deprivation notice and a
hearing by applying the Mathews inquiry.
277
Applying the first Mathews factor the mere execution of the arrest
warrant implicated "private interests" 178 protected by the Due Process
Clause because it bestowed upon the government important rights of
ownership.27 9 The fact that the seizures were not physically intrusive was
not dispositive, the court holding that "cognizable seizure of real property
need not involve physical intrusion." 280 An analysis of the second factor led
the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that "the practice of an ex parte seizure
creates an unacceptable risk of error, offer[ing] little or no protection for
innocent owners. ' 281 A breakdown of the final component of the analysis
suggested that no pressing need for prompt governmental action justified ex
parte seizure of real property in the civil forfeiture context. The court
reasoned that "the Government could secure its legitimate interest without
seizing the subject property. 28 2  Therefore, the government deprived
Richardson of due process when it seized 408 Peyton Road, notwithstanding
the decision not to assert physical control over it.
C. Knock andAnnounce Principle
In the case of Richards v. Wisconsin,284 the Supreme Court revisited
their previous decision which ruled that the Fourth Amendment incorporates
property). Therefore, property deprivations, of the magnitude declared in Good, must be
preceded by notice and a hearing. See 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1110.
276. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at I 110.
277. Id. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
278. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1109 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
279. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at I110.
280. Id. at 1111.
281. Id. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 55
(1993). As Justice Frankfurter observed, "[n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving
at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it." Id. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
282. 408 Peyton Rd., 112 F.3d at 1112. The government may prevent the sale of the
property by "filing a notice of lis pendens" as authorized by state law when advised of the
forfeiture proceedings. Id. "If an owner seems likely to destroy his property when advised of
the forfeiture action, the government may obtain an ex parte restraining order." Id. Finally,
the government may prevent further illegal activity with proper search and arrest warrants. Id.
283. Id. at 1114.
284. 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997).
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the common law requirement that police knock and announce their identity
before attempting forcible entry at a person's dwelling.285 Although the
Supreme Court explicitly stated in a prior decision that there does not have
to be an announcement before every entry,286 Richards narrowed such an
assertion by emphatically holding that there would be no blanket exceptions
to the knock and announce requirement for felony drug investigations.
Prior to the Richards decision, "the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
concluded that police officers are never required to knock and announce
their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug• • 289
investigation., 288 Exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry are
always present in felony drug cases because there is an "extremely high risk
of serious if not deadly injury to the police" and the potential for destruction
of narcotics evidence. 290 In addition, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
reasoned that the violation of privacy that occurs when officers with a search
warrant forcibly enter without first announcing their presence is minimal.29'
Conceding that the requirement to knock and announce may give way
under dangerous circumstances or where narcotics evidence is likely to be
destroyed, the Supreme Court noted this would not remove each court's
responsibility to make a reasonableness inquiry into a police decision not to
knock and announce.292  It is the role of individual courts to strike theappropriate balance between the legitimate concerns for police officers'
285. Id. at 1421. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
286. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934.
287. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1417.
288. Id. at 1418. Police officers in Madison, Wisconsin obtained a warrant to search
Richards' hotel room for drugs and related paraphernalia. The search warrant was a
culmination of an investigation that had uncovered substantial evidence that the appellant was
one of several individuals dealing drugs out of hotel rooms in Madison. Police requested a
warrant that would have given advance authorization for a "no-knock" entry into the hotel
room, but the magistrate deleted this portion from the warrant. Officers knocked on the door,
Richards cracked it open and subsequently slammed the door closed, whereupon officers
forcibly entered discovering cocaine and money. Id. at 1418-19.
289. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained that the circumstances that necessitate
this exception are created by the realities of today's drug culture. State v. Richards, 549
N.W.2d 218, 221 (Wis. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997). The blanket exception for
felony drug cases is reasonable because of the "violent and dangerous form of commerce and
the destruction of drugs." Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1420 (quoting Oral Argument of Appellee
at 26).
290. Richards, 549 N.W.2d at 219.
291. Id. at 226.
292. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
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safety while executing search warrants and the individual privacy interests
that are invaded by no-knock entries.
293
The Supreme Court refused to create exceptions to the knock and
announce principle based on the culture surrounding a general category of
294criminal behavior. The first problem with an exception is it tends to
overgeneralize, particularly when assuming that all felony drug
investigations present an inherent danger to police officers or the evidence
sought. 95 A second difficulty with permitting any categorical exception to
the knock and announce principle is that the reasons for creating the
296
exception can easily be manipulated to apply to other situations. If per se
exceptions were allowed for each category where potential danger existed,
the knock and announce element of the Fourth Amendment would be
rendered meaningless.297 The Supreme Court concluded that a no-knock
entry may be justified under unique circumstances where law enforcement
has a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence
would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective
investigation of criminal activity.
2 98
V. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
A. Searches of Public School Students
In a highly controversial case surrounding the strip searches of eight-
year-old female students, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the reasonableness of warrantless searches in public schools and the granting
of qualified immunity for school officials who conduct them.299 In Jenkins v.
Talladega City Board of Education,300 the Eleventh Circuit held that the law
293. Id. at 1420.
294. Id. at 1421.
295. While drug investigations may cause substantial risks, not every felony drug
investigation will pose the same degree of uncertainty. For example, a search could be
conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection with
the drug activity and, thus, will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evidence.
Alternatively, the police could know that the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a
location that made them impossible to destroy. Id.
296. Id.
297. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
298. Id.
299. Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
300. Id. at 821. One of Jenkins' and McKenzie's classmates informed their teacher that
seven dollars was missing from her purse. The teacher took the eight-year-old girls and
another male student into the hallway and questioned them about the money, at which time
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pertaining to applying the Fourth Amendment to the search of students at
school had not been solidly developed to place educators on notice that their
conduct was constitutionally impermissible.30 1 Consequently, the three
school faculty members who oversaw or conducted the search were granted
qualified immunity.
3 2
In the absence of "detailed guidance" by the United States Supreme
Court,303 Jenkins found that the specific application of the factors established
to define the parameters of reasonable school searches was notably
deficient. 30 4  The broadly worded phrases of the United States Supreme
Court failed to address the most essential questions of "whether the search of
a boy or girl is more or less reasonable, and at what age.., and what
constitutes an infraction great enough to warrant a constitutionally
reasonable search or, conversely, minor enough such that a search of
property or person would be characterized as unreasonable., 305  The
Eleventh Circuit noted that "school officials cannot be required to construe
general legal formulations that have not once been applied to a specific set
of facts by any binding judicial authority., 30 6 It is apparent that the Supreme
Court did not intend to clearly establish how the Fourth Amendment right
they mutually accused the other of theft. The teacher instructed the students to remove their
shoes. When these efforts failed to reveal the alleged stolen money, a school counselor
ordered the girls into the bathroom to undress. Having again failed to recover the missing
money, the school principal had the girls escorted back to the restroom and required them to
once again remove their clothes in an effort to locate the seven dollars. Id. at 822-23.
301. Id. at 828.
302. Id. Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability unless they
violate laws or constitutional rights that a "reasonable" person would have been aware of.
Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 823.
303. Id. at 825. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The Supreme Court
held that public school teachers and administrators may search students without a warrant if
two conditions are met. First, they possess reasonable suspicion that the search will result in
evidence that "the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school;"
and second, once initiated, the search is "not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex
of the student and the nature of the infraction." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. However, Jenkins
severely criticized the fact that there is no illustration, indication, or hint as to how the
enumerated factors might come into play when other concrete circumstances are faced by
school personnel. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 825. This issue did not go unnoticed by several
justices who criticized the "reasonableness" test as ambiguous and that it would fail to provide
school officials with a systematic way to predict when their conduct might violate the law. Id.
at 827 n.7. Justice Stevens admonished the majority arguing that this standard would likely
"spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty among teacher and administrators."
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring).
304. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 825.
305. Id. at 826.
306. Id. at 827.
[Vol. 22:93
133
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Sale / Seitles
would apply to the wide variety of school settings, justifying qualified
immunity for those school officials who could not have known that their
conduct violated the students' constitutional rights.0 7
The most disturbing commentary from Jenkins involves the scope of the
search itself, which was not at issue in the decision. With respect to the
extent of the search, it is apparent that having the girls remove their clothing
was deemed reasonably related to the objective of uncovering the stolen
seven dollars.30 8 The stealing of this amount of money should not be
trivialized and was considered by school officials to be a matter of serious
concern. 309 Citing the fact that female teachers conducted the strip search on
the eight-year-old girls, the court denounced the fact that the searches were
excessively intrusive, comparing it to the "common experience" of teachers
who assist students of that age in the bathroom after an accidental wetting.310
Despite the age of the young girls and the successive encroachment on their
physical privacy, Jenkins noted that it would not be apparent to a reasonable
school official that the challenged searches "were 'excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student[s] and the nature of the infraction.' 311
Undoubtedly, challenges to the intrusiveness of public school searches
will surface in upcoming survey periods. However, in light of Jenkins, it is
unclear what the Eleventh Circuit would find intrusive to a student's rightful
expectation of privacy. Considering a significant number of school searches
involve much greater dangers than the loss of seven dollars, strip searches
may soon become one of "common experience" in our public schools.
Several noteworthy decisions in Florida have followed the lead of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, though with less widespread dissension,
by promoting the legal equivalent of "safety-first" in public schools. The
Florida district courts of appeal have tackled the continued debate over
random, suspicionless searches in public schools, and who is authorized to
administer them. In State v. .A., the Dade County School Board
employed an independent security company to conduct searches with metal
detecting wands at randomly chosen secondary schools in response to a
growing presence of firearms in public schools. The court acknowledged
that "the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search
is 'reasonableness.' 31 4 Balancing the students' privacy interest against the
307. Id. at 828.
308. Id. at 827 n.5.
309. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 827 n.5.
310. Id.
311. Id. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
312. 679 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
313. Id. at 318.
314. Id. at 319 (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)).
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necessity of the search, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that
authorizing random, suspicionless weapons searches of high school students
was reasonable and constitutional.3 5  With regard to a reasonable
expectation of privacy, "students within the school environment have a
lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally. 31 6
In weighing the character of intrusion, the Third District Court of Appeal
found that a metal detector search, and the specific guidelines required to
carry it out, provide for a search that involves minimal intrusion. 317
Finally, the court cited the rising incidences of violence3 18 in Dade
County schools, denoting the nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern which is enough to warrant random suspicionless searches.3 19 The
unsettled question over who may conduct a school search upon a student
alleged to be carrying a weapon was answered by J.A.R. v. State.320 In
J.A.IK, a newly appointed assistant principal called upon the assistance of a
police officer assigned to the school to investigate a student who was
allegedly carrying a gun. The student was questioned and a pat-down search
was performed by the officer who discovered a firearm in the boy's
waistband.321
Under these circumstances, a school official or a police officer needs
only reasonable suspicion to conduct an inquiry in the nature of a Terry
stop.322  In terms of the actual search, "[i]t would be foolhardy and
dangerous" for a teacher or administrator, untrained in firearms, to conduct a
weapons search without the presence of an officer.323 Therefore, the Second
District Court of Appeal held that if a school official has a reasonable
suspicion that a student is in possession of a dangerous weapon, "that
official may request any police officer to perform the pat-down search for
weapons without fear that the involvement of the police will somehow
violate the student's Fourth Amendment rights or require probable cause for
315. Id. at 320.
316. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
317. J.A., 679 So. 2d at 320.
318. The court acknowledged that in recent years drug use and violent crimes in schools
has severely worsened. Id. The immediacy of a school board's concern for a student's safety,
and the safety of all school personnel is well justified. "The logical way to keep weapons out
of school is to let the students know that they may be searched for weapons and that
possession of weapons in a public high school is not permissible and will be seriously
sanctioned." Id. (emphasis omitted).
319. Id.
320. 689 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
321. Id. at 1243.
322. Id. at 1244. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
323. JAR., 689 So. 2d at 1244.
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such a search. 3 24 Without distinguishing between public law enforcement
and officers who are employed by the school, the decision undoubtedly
raises constitutional concerns by authorizing any police officer to conduct a
325search on reasonable suspicion alone.
However, the Third District Court of Appeal makes clear the distinction
between a school police officer and an outside police officer who conducts a
326search. A search conducted by a school police officer only requires
reasonable suspicion in order to legally support the search.327 On the other
hand, a search conducted by an outside police officer, who is employed by a
governmental entity unrelated to the school district or its employees, usually
requires probable cause.
328
B. International Border Searches
Persons may be stopped at an international border, where they and their
belongings may be searched without a warrant and even without any
suspicion of wrongdoing.2 Although an airport with incoming international
flights has long been considered the functional equivalent of a border,
neither Florida courts nor the United States Supreme Court has directly
answered the question of whether an airport with departing flights also
constitutes a border. 33  Several federal circuit courts have held that an
airport with departing, as opposed to arriving, international flights meets the
border requirement. M
324. Id. (emphasis omitted).
325. See People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (111. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1692 (1996). Where school officials initiate the search, or police involvement is minimal,
most courts apply the reasonable suspicion test. The same is true in cases involving school
police or liaison officers acting on their own authority. However, where outside police
officers initiate a search, or where school officials act at the direction of law enforcement
agencies, the probable cause standard is usually applied. Id. See also M.J. v. State, 399 So.
2d 996, 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that where a law enforcement officer
directs, participates, or acquiesces in a search conducted by school officials, the officer must
have probable cause for that search).
326. State v. D.S., 685 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
327. Id. at 43.
328. Id.
329. JOsHuA DREssLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 211 (1991).
330. See State v. Codner, 696 So. 2d 806, 807-08 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
331. See United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995). The "long-
standing right of the sovereign" that underlies the traditional rationale for the border search
exception is implicated to a substantial degree where the international borders of the United
States are penetrated by large sums of undeclared currency departing this country. Id. at 1296.
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332In State v. Codner, following the logic of the other federal circuit
courts, the Second District Court of Appeal held that a person "departing"
the country may be the subject of a "border search" for United States
currency and monetary instruments without the necessity of probable
cause. 333 In Codner, the appellant attempted to board a flight to Jamaica at
Tampa International Airport, but was detained by customs officials after a
search of his bag revealed he was carrying more than $11,000... in United
States currency. Personal papers, including a storage lease agreement, were
also confiscated from appellant's wallet during a search for additional
American currency.335
Notwithstanding the fact that an airport with departing flights may
constitute a border, the trial court found that the customs officers exceeded
the permissive scope of their warrantless search when they retrieved papers
from the appellant's wallet, looked them over, photocopied them, and
delivered the copies to the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office.336  The
Second District Court of Appeal dismissed this argument as one "without
merit."337 The court determined the search of the appellant's wallet was a
routine border search as opposed to a nonroutine border
search. Moreover, there is no more logical location to look for currency
other than in someone's wallet. The fact that the wallet contained a storage
lease agreement, where the unit was later found to be full of contraband,
does not violate any principles of a routine border search.3 39
C. Drug Testing
The controversial issue of drug testing for pubic employees reached the
United States Supreme Court during this survey year. The Supreme Court,
in Chandler v. Miller,340 held that the State of Georgia's requirement that
332. 696 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
333. Id. at 808.
334. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1986) states in part that "a person... shall file a report under
subsection (b) of this section when the person.... knowingly-(1)... is about to
transport,. . . monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one time-(A) from a place in the
United States to or through a place outside the United States.. ." Id.
335. Codner, 696 So. 2d at 810.
336. Id. at 809.
337. Id. at 810.
338. Id. At least one court has specifically written that the search of a person's suitcase,
purse, wallet, and overcoat at the border is simply not "sufficiently intrusive to be considered
nonroutine." See United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993).
339. Codner, 696 So. 2d at 810.
340. 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
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candidates for state office pass a drug test did not fit within the category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.
341
The Georgia statute requires candidates for designated office to certify
that they have taken a urinalysis within thirty days prior to qualifying for
nomination or election, and that the test result be negative.3 42  It was
uncontested by the petitioners that this prerequisite for office, imposed by
Georgia law effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.343 Nevertheless, utilizing a balancing test, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court reasoning that
the drug testing program was not inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment
inasmuch as the statute served "special needs," interests other than the
ordinary needs of law enforcement.
The Supreme Court declared that to examine "special needs," concerns
other than crime detection, a specific inquiry must take place examining "the
competing private and public interests." 345 The petitioners contended that
this standard was faithfully satisfied because drug use is incompatible with
holding high state office, since it would systematically undermine the
function and purpose of the office, including jeopardizing law enforcement
antidrug efforts. However, the Court found the petitioners' argument
failed to present any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure
from the Fourth Amendment's bar against search and seizure absent
individualized suspicion.347 Moreover, failing to establish the "special
needs" factor, petitioners offered no explanation why ordinary law
enforcement methods were not appropriate to apprehend drug-addicted state
officials, particularly in light of the public lifestyles of elected officials.348
341. Id. at 1296.
342. Id. at 1298-99.
343. Id. at 1299.
344. Id.
345. Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1297. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 671
(1995) (upholding a random drug testing program for high school students engaged in
interscholastic athletic competitions); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (sustaining a United States Customs Service program that made drug
tests a condition of promotion of transfer to positions directly involving drug interdiction or
requiring the employee to carry a firearm).
346. Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1303.
347. Id. at 1300-01. In writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg noted that nothing in
the record revealed the hazards of drug abuse affecting state elected officials. Id. at 1303. In
fact, the counsel for the respondents directly acknowledged at oral argument that there was no
evidence of a drug problem in Georgia with representatives in state office. Id.
348. Id. at 1304.
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The Supreme Court clearly enunciated that if the risk to public safety is
"substantial and real," then "blanket suspicionless searches" may be justified
as "reasonable., 34 9 Nevertheless, a drug testing requirement where public
officials do not perform dangerous tasks, nor are immediately involved in
drug interdiction efforts, is precluded by the Fourth Amendment which
"shields society" from state efforts that "diminishes personal privacy" for
symbolic purposes. 350
VI. CONFESSIONS
A. Equivocal References to Counsel
One of the most significant developments during this survey period
involves whether police officers are required to make clarifying statements
when a suspect makes an equivocal invocation of his Miranda rights after
having validly waived them. Prior to the recent decision by the United
States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States,351 a person undergoing
custodial interrogation could indicate in any manner and at any time his wish
. .. . .. 352
to remain silent, at which point the interrogation had to cease. However,
in light of the decision in Davis, a defendant must articulate his desire for
counsel with sufficient clarity so that a reasonable officer under the
circumstances would understand the statement to be one requesting an
attorney.353  In United States v. Mikell,354 the Eleventh Circuit further
narrowed the Davis decision by determining that an ambiguous or equivocal
statement by a suspect does not obligate an officer to clarify the suspect's
intent, and the interrogation may proceed.355 The court in Mikell eliminated
the significance between a suspect's equivocal and unequivocal refusal to
answer questions, allowing officers to continue questioning until the suspect
356clearly requests that the questioning cease.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court decision, the majority of the courts
in Florida, until the end of this survey year, repeatedly adhered to the
principle that even an equivocal request to invoke the right to counsel asserts
349. Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1305.
350. Id.
351. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
352. Id. at 452. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
353. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
354. 102 F.3d 470 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
355. Id. at 476. See Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994).
356. Mikell, 102 F.3d at 477.
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the constitutional right to counsel.357 If questioning did continue, it was
allowed only to "clarify" any assertion made by a suspect.
358
Recently, in State v. Owen,359 the Supreme Court of Florida held that in
light of the decision in Davis, the duty to clarify a suspect's intent upon an
equivocal invocation of counsel is no longer good law.360 This same rule
should apply to a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal references to the right to
cut off questioning as to the right to counsel.361 As affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals this year, "a suspect must articulate his desire to
end questioning with sufficient clarity so that a reasonable police officer
would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain
silent., 362  Consequently, it is indisputable that Florida's Constitution no
longer places greater restrictions on law enforcement than those mandated
under federal law when a suspect makes an equivocal statement to remain
silent.3
63
The decision in Owen was based on the practical dilemma that requires
questioning to cease if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request
for an attorney. Without mentioning the pragmatic benefits of such a
clarifying policy, the court noted the result is a judgment call for law
enforcement with the threat of suppression if they guess
364wrong. Therefore, to force a police officer to clarify whether an equivocal
statement is an assertion of a person's Miranda rights "places too great an
, ,,365'
impediment upon society's interest in thwarting crime.
357. The Supreme Court of Florida remarked that to be admissible, confessions must
satisfy both the state and federal constitutions. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla.
1992). If a suspect indicates in any manner that he does not want to be interrogated,
questioning must not begin, or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop. Id. at 966. See
Weber v. State, 691 So. 2d 55, 55-56 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that response by
defendant that "he could not afford an attorney" invoked the defendant's right to counsel
requiring officers to clarify his assertion before interrogation could continue); Almeida v.
State, 687 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that defendant who asked
what was the purpose of having an attorney made an equivocal invocation of his right to
counsel). But see State v. Moya, 684 So. 2d 279, 280-81 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(ruling that defendant who proceeded with questioning after stating that he did not know if he
wanted to talk did not violate Miranda nor the Florida Constitution).
358. See Weber, 691 So. 2d at 56.
359. 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
360. Id. at 718.
361. Id.
362. United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 476 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
363. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720.
364. Id. at 719.
365. Id.
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A number of justices challenged whether the majority's decision
reflects the best interests of the diverse community for which it
speaks. Justice Shaw, in his concurring opinion, emphasized that the new
"clearly invoke" standard must take into account the population of Florida,
which is home to a large number of immigrants. 366 Many Floridians have
little formal schooling or speak minimal English and "have emigrated from
societies where the rules governing citizen/police encounters are vastly
different. ,367 Justice Shaw found it simply unrealistic to expect every
person in the State of Florida to invoke his or her constitutional rights with
equal precision; therefore, courts should use a "reasonable person" standard
when determining whether a person clearly invoked the right to terminate
questioning.368
Chief Justice Kogan, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that "the
'clarification' approach offers the best balance between effective law
enforcement and the rights of the accused. 3 69 Chief Justice Kogan agreed
with Justice Shaw's assessment that requiring an officer to determine
whether a suspect has "clearly" invoked his or her Miranda rights without
compelling further "questioning is not an easy task in light of [Florida's]
unique demographic and geographic makeup., 370  As a result of the
sufficient language and cultural barriers that faces many residents of Florida,
"only the 'clarification"' approach will adequately protect the rights of all
suspects.., while.., maintaining an effective system of law
enforcement.
3 71
B. Invoking Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel Prior to Interrogation
The recent division in the Florida courtS372 over when a person in
custody effectively invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel has
366. Id. at 721 (Shaw, J., concurring).
367. Id. at 722.
368. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 722.
369. Id. at 723 (Kogan, C.J., dissenting).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 724.
372. See Cullen v. State, 687 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) decision
approved, 699 So. 2d 1009 (filing a notice with public defender to invoke right to counsel was
ineffective and the incriminating statements defendant made later to the police were
admissible). But see Fason v. State, 674 So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(defendants signing of notification of exercise of rights form prevented the use of defendant's
incriminating statements obtained during police-initiated interrogation while defendant was in
custody).
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been answered by the Supreme Court of Florida in a 4-3 decision. 373 In
Sapp v. State,374 the court affirmed the decision of the First District Court of
Appeal and held that a suspect may not invoke his right to counsel for
custodial interrogation before it is imminent.
375
Although there are no Supreme Court decisions addressing whether an
individual may effectively invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
376prior to custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court noted they have never
held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights "anticipatorily, in a context
other than 'custodial interrogation.0'3 77 Even though an asserted Miranda
right to counsel is effective to future custodial interrogation, and may be
waived only if the same individual reinitiates conduct with police, it does not
necessarily mean that it may be initiated outside the context of custodial378
interrogation. The underlying premise of Miranda was to protect the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, not when a suspect is taken into
custody, but rather where a suspect is subjected to interrogation.37 9 Sapp
hypothesizes that even if a rule allowed one to invoke the right to counsel
373. The question, as originally certified asked:
WHETHER AN ACCUSED IN CUSTODY EFFECTIVELY INVOKES HIS
[OR HER] FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER
[MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966),] WHEN, EVEN THOUGH INTERROGATION IS NOT
IMMINENT, HE [OR SHE] SIGNS A CLAIM OF RIGHTS FORM AT OR
SHORTLY BEFORE A FIRST APPEARANCE HEARING,
SPECIFICALLY CLAIMING A FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL?
Sapp v. State, 690 So. 2d 581, 583 (Fla. 1997).
374. Id. at 581.
375. Id. at 586. In Sapp, the petitioner was arrested for robbery. He was advised of his
Miranda rights, waived them, and agreed to speak to the police. Subsequently, Sapp was
brought to a holding cell where he was advised by an attorney from the public defender's
office to sign a copy of a "claim of rights form," with which he complied. Id. at 583. A week
later, while Sapp remained in jail, an officer initiated an interrogation with him about another
robbery and murder. Before being questioned, Sapp was advised of his Miranda rights, and
he waived them in writing without requesting an attorney. The trial court denied the motion to
suppress the statements and Sapp was convicted of attempted armed robbery and first degree
felony murder. Id.
376. "Clearly, if Sapp had invoked his Miranda right to counsel during custodial
interrogation on the unrelated robbery charge, police would not have been permitted to
approach him later for questioning on that robbery and murder charge." Sapp, 690 So. 2d at
584 n.5.
377. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991).
378. Id. at 182 n.3.
379. Sapp, 690 So. 2d at 585.
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before interrogation was imminent, it would not provide protection against
involuntary confessions and would actually hamper the ability of police to
obtain voluntary confessions. 380 In essence, requiring a person to invoke the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel either during custodial interrogation or
when it is imminent represents a fair "balance between protection.., from
police coercion... and the State's need to conduct criminal
investigations."'3 81
Acknowledging the harsh blow to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
Justice Anstead, along with three other justices in their dissenting opinion,
expressed his concern that the constitutional rights an accused is informed of
when arrested may not be invoked in writing in an open court. 382 Under the
majority's perplexing logic, "a written directive executed upon the advice of
counsel may be ignored by police even though an uncounseled oral assertion
must be scrupulously honored. 383 In regard to "imminent" interrogation, the
dissent noted that a defendant in jail, who has already been interrogated by
police, categorically establishes the "reasonableness" of a defendant's
384expectation of further interrogation. The dissent concluded that in yet
another decision related to confessions, the Supreme Court of Florida had
once again undermined a fundamental principle set forth in Miranda,
applying justice fairly among every segment of the population.38 5
C. The Functional Equivalent of Interrogation
The question of whether police conduct is the functional equivalent of
interrogation was decided by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In Glover386
v. State, the court found police conduct toward appellant Glover to be
380. Id. at 586.
381. Id.
382. Id. (Anstead, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 587.
384. Sapp, 690 So. 2d at 589.
385. Id. at 587. "If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel
before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on
the basis that the individual... cannot afford [an attorney]." Id. "The need for counsel in
order to protect the privilege [against self incrimination] exists for the indigent as well as the
affluent." Id. This clearly takes advantage of those who are unable to retain counsel by
discounting their prior Fifth Amendment assertion not to be interrogated without an attorney.
Id. at 588. See State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997). The "threshold standard of clarity"
approach to confessions places a hurdle in front of those individuals who are most likely to
have difficulty surmounting that hurdle and successfully invoking their rights. Sapp, 690 So.
2d at 588 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
386. 677 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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"tantamount to custodial interrogation." 87 Glover was arrested without the
benefit of Miranda warnings and was placed in an interrogation room for
over an hour and a half. Although he repeatedly asked why he had been
arrested, the attending police officers refused to respond. Even as appellant
became increasingly agitated, law enforcement officials would not inform
him of the allegations that led to his arrest. As time progressed, Glover
began speaking without any initiation byo the officers, ultimately making
statements that served to incriminate him.ms
Under Miranda, "interrogation" refers not only to express questioning,
but to those words or actions on the part of the police that the officers should
recognize are "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a
suspect."38 9 The rationale for this broader definition is to keep intact the
"safeguards against self-incrimination established by Miranda [which
logically] apply to interrogation initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody. 390 "'Interrogation' . . . must reflect a
measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.
391
As a result, the Glover court ruled that the conduct of the police officers
toward the appellant was "unduly protracted and evocative" such that it
became equivalent to a custodial interrogation.
392
D. Use of Pre-Miranda Silence for Impeachment Purposes
In an important decision likely to be ultimately decided by the Supreme
Court of Florida,393 Hoggins v. State3 94 discussed whether pre-Miranda
387. Id. at 376.
388. Id. at 375.
389. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
390. Glover, 677 So. 2d at 376.
391. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.
392. Glover, 677 So. 2d at 376. See State v. Brown, 592 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991).
393. Because of the discrepancy in the decisions of several Florida district courts of
appeal, the court in Hoggins v. State, 689 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), rev.
granted, 697 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1997), certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida:
DOES FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 9, PREVENT
THE IMPEACHMENT OF A TESTIFYING DEFENDANT WITH THE
DISCLOSURE OF A DEFENDANT'S PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE WHILE
IN CUSTODY?
Id. at 387.
394. 689 So. 2d. at 383. This case arises from the armed robbery of a convenience
store. Hoggins was found upstairs in his mother's apartment with a cash drawer and a cigar
1997]
144
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
silence is permissible for impeachment purposes. 395 In direct opposition to
the ruling by the Third District Court of Appeal,396 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held that the use of custodial pre-Miranda silence for
impeachment purposes violates the due process protections guaranteed by
the Florida Constitution.
397
On the federal level, the United States Constitution does not prohibit
the use, for impeachment purposes, of a defendant's silence even after arrest
if no Miranda warnings have been given.398 However, the Supreme Court
has left open the possibility that states could formulate their own evidentiary
rules defining when silence is viewed as more probative than
prejudicial. 399 As a result, many states have used their own evidentiary
analysis to condemn the use of pre-Miranda silence impeachment.400 Other
states have relied on their state constitutional provisions to do so.40' Still
other states have followed the Supreme Court and approved the use of pre-
Miranda silence for impeachment purposes.40 2
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized the right of state
constitutions to place more rigorous restraints on governmental conduct than
the United States Constitution imposes. In fact, the actual right to remain
silent is entitled to more protection under the Florida Constitution than the
box whereupon he was handcuffed, identified by one of the victims, and arrested. However,
he was not read his Miranda rights until he was placed in the patrol car. Hoggins testified
how he retrieved the items, but upon cross-examination was questioned as to why he never
told police his story when they came to the apartment the night of the robbery. An objection
to this impeachment was overruled. Id. at 384.
395. Id. at 384 n.2.
396. See Rodriguez v. State, 619 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the impeachment of defendant's credibility with his pre-Miranda silence is
proper, validating the prosecutor's extensive commentary on the defendant's failure to give an
explanation at the scene of the robbery).
397. Hoggins, 689 So. 2d at 386.
398. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
399. Id. at 607.
400. Some states make an evidentiary determination on a case by case basis. See People
v. DeGeorge, 541 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y. 1989); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1987).
Others have ruled that impeachment as to custodial pre-Miranda silence is inadmissible based
on their rules of evidence. See Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 1991). In addition,
there are states that have precluded impeachment as to pre-Miranda silence on both
evidentiary and constitutional grounds. See Coleman v. State, 895 P.2d 653 (Nev. 1995).
401. See Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 389 (Wyo. 1995); State v. Davis, 686 P.2d
1143, 1145 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
402. State v. Finley, 915 P.2d 208, 218 (Mont. 1996); State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d
77, 79 (Wis. 1988).
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United States Constitution.40 3 Furthermore, by prohibiting impeachment of a
testifying defendant with custodial silence, all defendants are treated the
same regardless of when Miranda warnings are administered. 404  The
Hoggins court also appropriately expressed its concern that a rule allowing
impeachment as to pre-Miranda silence, but not as to post-Miranda silence,
may result in police unnecessarily postponing the giving of the warnings, so
that silence can be effectively used as impeachment if the defendant
testifies. °5
E. Voluntary Confessions
It is well established that where two defendants are tried together, the
admission of the codefendant's confession without the other defendant
taking the stand violates defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause.40 6 In United States v. Chirinos,4 °7 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals utilized an exception in upholding the admission of a
codefendant's confession against three other appellants in the case.408 The
exception to the Confrontation Clause rule entitles the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction if
the court revises the confession to "eliminate any reference to the
defendant." 409 However, during closing argument in the Chirinos trial, the
prosecutor asked the jury to carefully consider the voluntary confessions of
two codefendants and the testimony of one of the appellants.
The Eleventh Circuit found the prosecutorial comments highly
suggestive and at the very least, implied the involvement of the appellants.
403. See Lee v. State, 422 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982). See also
Willinsky v. State, 360 So. 2d 760, 762 (Fla. 1978) (concluding that impeachment by
disclosure of the legitimate exercise of the right to silence is a denial of due process regardless
at what stage the accused was silent so long as it is protected at that stage); Webb v. State, 347
So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
404. Hoggins v. State, 689 So. 2d 383, 386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
405. Id. at 386.
406. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987).
407. 112 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 1997). The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
("ATF") conducted a sting operation against five members of the Vargas group who planned
to steal 300 kilograms of cocaine from an arriving shipment. Id. at 1093. The men in the
group were arrested at the Opa Locka West airstrip where two of the men approached the
fictitious bags of cocaine located on the runway. Upon arrest, two of the men waived their
Miranda rights and told the ATF of their plan to steal the cocaine. Id. at 1093-94.
408. Id. at 1100.
409. Id.
410. Chirinos, 112 F.3d at 1100.
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Nevertheless, the court determined that the prosecutor did not argue to the
jury that it could consider the post-arrest statements of two of the members
of the Vargas group, since it merely served the purpose of corroborating the
appellant's testimony.41' In an apparent stretch of logic, based on the
principle that incriminating evidence such as post-arrest confessions differs
in a practical effect from evidence requiring linkage, the codefendant's
statements linked with the testimony of the appellant did not constitute
412improper argument.
Another case in which the appellant challenged the admission of a
codefendant's confession in violation of the Confrontation Clause reached a
similar conclusion. In Farina v. State,413 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a codefendant's taped conversations had sufficient "indicia of
reliability" and were properly admitted.414
When a statement against one's own interest also incriminates another
criminal defendant and is admitted during their joint trial such statements are
"presumptively suspect" and must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-
examination. 4 F5 Even if such statements are properly admitted against the
416hearsay exception, they are likely to raise problems with the Confrontation
Clause which does not permit a nontestifying codefendant's confession to
incriminate a defendant.
However, this does not mean that such statements are always
inadmissible. The presumption of unreliability may be rebuffed where there
is a showing of trustworthiness that the statements have an "indicia of
reliability.",4 r Farina determined that since the recorded statements between
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. 679 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1996).
414. Id. at 1157.
415. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
416. Section 90.804(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes creates an exception to the hearsay
rule for statements against interest if that person is unavailable to testify. The statements must
meet the following criteria:
A statement which, at the time of its making, was so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or tended to subject the declarant
to liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, so
that a person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of
the statement.
FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(c) (1995).
417. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191-92. (1987).
418. Id. at 193-94.
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the two brothers took place in the back seat of a police car, and each was
present to confront the other throughout the conversations detailing the
crime, the taped conversations were reliable and had a sufficient "indicia of
reliability" to be admissible against petitioner Farina.
419
In Davis v. State, 42 the Supreme Court of Florida confronted the issue
of whether successive Miranda warnings are a prerequisite for persons in
custody who reinitiate contact with law enforcement officials.421 While in a
holding cell, Davis had requested to be allowed to contact his mother to
retain an attorney for him. Subsequent to his request but before his mother
was contacted, Davis was approached by an officer who expressed
disappointment in him. Davis, who still had not been given Miranda
warnings, then voluntarily confessed to murdering an eleven-year-old girl
and thereafter gave a taped interview during which he was fully informed of
his Miranda rights. One week later, without the advice of counsel or formal
Miranda warnings, Davis gave a second taped confession to the
police.422 The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that Davis' untaped
confession should have been suppressed. 423 However, each of Davis' taped
confessions, including the one given a week later without a fresh set of
Miranda warnings, were deemed admissible and admitted without error.424
Dealing a serious blow to the proponents of Miranda, Davis moved
away from its mechanical application and set forth a contemporary test for
admissibility of statements made in subsequent or successive custodial
interrogations: "Whether the statements were given voluntarily. '425  The
court noted that such an inquiry must consider the totality of the
426
circumstances. The Davis court, in upholding the admissibility of both
427
taped confessions, emphatically rejected the notion that a complete
readvisement of Miranda warnings is necessary each time an accused
undergoes additional custodial interrogation.42 8  The Supreme Court of
Florida concluded that the fact that Davis initiated the contact that led to his
419. Farinav. State, 679 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (Fla. 1996).
420. 698 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1997).
421. Id. at 1189.
422. Id. at 1186.
423. Id. at 1189.
424. Id.
425. Davis, 698 So. 2d at 1189.
426. Id.
427. The untaped confession to the police officer was inadmissible because no formal
Miranda warnings were given. The confession was found to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and did not affect the defendants conviction for murder. Id.
428. Id.
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second taped confession and that he was apprised of his right to counsel
satisfied the underlying concerns of Miranda.
In the well-publicized case of Rolling v. State,430 involving the murder
of five Florida college students, the court scrutinized the role of law
enforcement officers in determining whether a confession was obtained in
violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.43' The court
acknowledged that statements "deliberately elicited" from a defendant after
the right to counsel has been invoked and in the absence of a valid waiver
are inadmissible.432 Nevertheless, the court was not willing to exclude
incriminatory statements by the defendant merely because the statements
were made after judicial proceedings had been initiated.433 "Rather, law
enforcement officials must do something that infringes upon the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right.,
434
The Supreme Court of Florida's standard for such a determination rests
on whether the confessions were obtained through the active or passive
efforts of law enforcement.435 In essence, if a defendant's statement has not
been a product of a strategy "deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating
statement" then the person's right to counsel has not been violated.436
In Meyers v. State,437 the Supreme Court of Florida answered questions
regarding the admissibility of a voluntary confession where circumstantial
- .438
evidence is the basis for a conviction. Meyers, who voluntarily made
statements to inmates with whom he was incarcerated, established the details
of his attempted sexual battery and murder of a fourteen-year-old girl.
439
Although the victim's body was never recovered, Meyers had physical
injuries consistent with a violent confrontation and bore marks on his side
that resembled the shoes the victim was wearing at the time she disappeared.
429. Id.
430. 695 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997).
431. Id. at 289-92.
432. Id. at 290. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
433. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 290.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 291. Rolling made statements to police officials through another inmate.
Each contact with the authorities was actively made by either the appellant or his fellow
inmate. Therefore, statements to a fellow inmate and to investigators were not the result of
Sixth Amendment violations. Id. See Sikes v. State, 313 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (holding that voluntary statements to prison authorities by an incarcerated
defendant are not subject to the Massiah rule).
436. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 291.
437. No. 85617, 1997 WL 109219 (Fla. Mar. 13, 1997).
438. Id. at *1-2.
439. Id. at *1.
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In order to prove corpus delicti in a homicide case, the state must establish:
"(1) the fact of death; (2) the criminal agency of another person as the cause
thereof; and (3) the identity of the deceased person." 40  To admit a
defendant's confessions, corpus delicti may be proved either by direct or
circumstantial evidence that tends to show that a crime was committed,
however, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not mandatory.
441
As a result of these statements, the sufficient circumstantial evidence
presented by the State proved the corpus delicti of the homicide and
permitted the admission of Meyer's confessions to former cellmates 42 The
Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the circumstantial evidence introduced
by the State was sufficient to prove corpus delicti such that defendant's
inculpatory statements were admissible.
443
XII. CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the United States Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and several Florida courts have
demonstrated their attempt to fairly balance the competing interests between
the interests of law enforcement and an individual's concern for
privacy. Without drawing sweeping conclusions, and recognizing the
numerous exceptions, these courts have progressed toward providing greater
authority to law enforcement officials. The path in this direction does not
appear to be shifting and will likely result in future decisions in which the
safeguarding of citizens' rights is subordinated to enhance the powers of
those who serve to protect us.
440. Id.
441. Id. at *2.
442. Meyers, 1997 WL 109219, at *3.
443. Id. at *2. The phrase "corpus delicti ' refers to proof independent of a confession
that the crime charged was in fact committed. See Bassett v. State, 449 So. 2d 803, 807 (Fla.
1984). Since the girl's body was never found, the court relied heavily on the confession
Meyers made to a cellmate about the murder. According to the cellmate's testimony, the
victim apparently violently resisted the sexual advances of the appellant. Eventually, Meyers
killed the girl by cutting her throat and disposed of the body in the woods, piling chunks of
concrete on top of her body so she could not be found. Meyers, 1997 WL 109219, at *2.
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Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRLRA"),' and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). 2 These
changes apply to the treatment of legal and undocumented aliens in the
United States, some of whom have criminal convictions. Congress and the
executive branch, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), have determined the
direction of immigration policy in the United States. This policy is
characterized by harsh treatment of illegal and legal immigrants in the
United States. New immigration provisions indicate tougher laws on
criminal aliens, as well as the withdrawal of meaningful discretionary relief
from all aliens. Other immigration laws seek to insulate federal immigration
decisions from judicial review. These policies not only target illegal aliens,
but also legal immigrants living in the United States who would otherwise
qualify for permanent residency or citizenship under previously existing
immigration laws. The highly publicized decision, involving the suspension
of deportation proceedings initiated by the federal government of
approximately 40,000 Nicaraguans living mostly in Florida, exemplifies
these changes.4
Across the country, states have followed suit and have been interpreting
some of these new provisions. With some exceptions in the area of criminal
prosecutions, federal and state courts in Florida are outlining hard-line
policies against legal and illegal aliens.
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON IMMIGRATION
A. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996
During 1996, the executive branch and the 104th Congress turned their
attention to immigration and, in some cases, radically altered relief available
to lawful residents and others in the United States. The wholesale
transformation of immigration law, under the guise of removing
undocumented and criminal aliens, became a priority for the Republican-led
Congress this past year. It was no surprise that one of the first changes in
1. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
3. Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
4. Id.
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immigration law involved current exclusion and deportation laws. The
IRIRA directly abolished the separate exclusion and deportation hearings
and "replaced them with a uni[tary] removal proceeding." The IRIRA also
cut back legal safeguards which historically protected legal residents from
deportation. In some cases, long-term lawful permanent residents who have
extensive familial and community ties are now subject to deportation
without any relief available to them.
One of the most basic changes in relation to exclusion and deportation
proceedings was URIRA's modification of the "entry" doctrine.6 Before its
passage, "aliens who [had] entered the U.S. whether lawfully or unlawfully,
and who remain[ed], ... [were] subject to deportation [proceedings]." 7
Entry had been defined as: 1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the
United States, i.e., physical presence; 2) an inspection and admission by an
immigration officer; or 3) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the
nearest inspection point; coupled with 4) freedom from restraint.8 Before the
IIRIRA, both illegal and legal aliens who entered the United States enjoyed
the right to deportation proceedings before being forcefully expelled from
the United States. Under the IRIRA, aliens who are not inspected and
admitted by an immigration officer are deemed to be seeking admission and
are subject to exclusion under section 212(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA"), regardless of when they effected an entry into the
United States under prior law and how long they have actually lived here
after entry without inspection. 9
Another area of change has been in the treatment of criminal aliens.
Specifically, the IRIRA has changed the definition of "conviction."10
Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA now states:
5. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 9, N-J-B- v. Reno, _ F. Supp. _ (1 th Cir. 1997) (No.
97-4400).
6. H.R REP. No. 104-879, at 259 (1997).
7. DAviD S. WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 166 (3d
ed. 1992).
8. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 25 (5th ed. 1994).
9. H.R. REP. No. 104-879, at 262 (1997). Section 1101(a)(13)(A), title 8 of the United
States Code states: "The terms 'admission' and 'admitted' mean, with respect to an alien, the
lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (Supp. I 1996).
10. H.R. REP. No. 104-879, at 262 (1997). The definition of "conviction" has been
broadened "for immigration law purposes to include all aliens who have admitted t6 or been
found to have committed crimes. This will make it easier to remove criminal aliens, regardless
of specific procedures in States for deferred adjudication or suspension of sentences." Id.
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The term "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a formal
judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication
of guilt has been withheld, where-(i) a judge or jury has found the
alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment,
penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed."
Additionally, section 101 (a)(48)(B) provides that any period imposed by the
court will be included as part of a term of imprisonment, reardless of
whether the court suspends the sentence or suspends execution. What is
more detrimental to aliens with criminal convictions is that these changes
will apply to "convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date
of the enactment of this Act."'13 Similarly, Congress has redefined the term
"aggravated felony" to include virtually any felony including theft, assault,
and small amounts of money or larceny transaction violations. 14 Since an
aggravated felon is barred from citizenship, as well as most forms of relief
from removal including political asylum, withhold of deportation, voluntary
departure, and cancellation of removal (formerly suspension of deportation),
the definitional change has enormous impact.
The statute also substantially restricts relief for persons who have
resided in the United States for long periods of time without any criminal
problems. Congress abolished the suspension of deportation, which required
a person to demonstrate seven years of continuous physical presence, good
moral character, and establish hardship to himself or his family, or show that
he is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident.' In its place,
11. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 322, 8
U.S.C. § I 101(a)(48)(A) (Supp. II 1996) (amending Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
§ 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(48)(A) (1994)).
12. Id. § 1101(a)(48)(B).
13. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 322(c),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
14. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 101(a)(43) (West Supp. 1997).
15. Id. § 1254(a)(1). The text of section 1254(a) provides:
[T]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust
the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in
case of an alien.., who.., is deportable under any law of the United
States... [and] has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date
of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a
person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in
the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or
[Vol. 22:149
154
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Kurzban / Chaviano
Congress established "cancellation of removal" which requires ten years of
continuous physical presence and the establishment of exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship but only to a United States citizen or a legal
permanent resident spouse, parent, or child.1 6 The alien's own hardship is
irrelevant.
17
A crucial part of the new legislation deals with the courts' power to
review INS decisions. Among them are the attemnts to limit the courts'
jurisdiction, as well as the scope of judicial review Normally, individuals
subject to removal by the Attorney General were able to seek relief from
deportation by the courts. However, section 242(g) of the INA now provides
that:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause
or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under
this Act. 19
Congress has also sought to eliminate review of discretionary decisions by
the Attorney General regarding aliens in proceedings. 20  In addition,
to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
Id.
16. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 240A, 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. II 1996).
17. Id. Section 1229(b) states:
Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent
residents.
(1) In general. The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien -
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period
of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application;
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period;
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2),
or 237(a)(3); and
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
Id.
18. Id. § 1252(g).
19. Id.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (Supp. I 1996). Courts no longer have jurisdiction to
review "any judgment regarding the granting of relief' and "any other decision or action of the
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Congress has sought to limit the power of the federal courts to grant
injunctive relief.21
Congress and the INS have charted the future course of immigration
law in this country by limiting the courts' power to grant relief, and
facilitating the deportation of criminal aliens and countless others awaiting
permanent residency status. Altogether, the IIRIRA demonstrates a sharp
shift from the historical treatment of providing both legal and illegal aliens
due process of law.
B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Following the Oklahoma City federal building bombing,22 the country
was faced with the growing danger of domestic terrorism. 23 Although
primarily designed to target individuals who commit terrorist attacks in the
United States,24 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") broadened the federal government's power over criminal aliens.
Specifically, the AEDPA expanded the definition of an aggravated felony,
allowed for the early deportation of nonviolent offenders, and limited the
courts' authority to provide discretionary relief and review final orders of
deportation.
25
Before the AEDPA was enacted, an "aggravated felony" was defined as
murder, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking of firearms, money laundering,
crimes of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least five years,
foreign convictions, and any attempt or conspiracy to commit those crimes.
26
With the advent of the AEDPA, an "aggravated felony" includes: 1)
gambling offenses; 2) transportation for the purpose of prostitution; 3) alien
smuggling for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least five years;
4) document counterfeiting or fraud for which the term of imprisonment
imposed is at least eighteen months; 5) an offense committed by an alien
who was previously deported due to a criminal conviction; 6) commercial
Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this [chapter] ... to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General." Id.
21. Id. § 1252(f)(1).
22. 143 CONG. REc. S697-01 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1997) (statement of Rep. Gorton).
Senator Gorton stated that "[w]e must not allow the cowards responsibility [sic] for such
atrocities as the downing of Pan Am Flight 103, the bombing of the World Trade Center, or
the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal building to gain from their actions." Id.
23. Statement by the President upon Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 719 (April 24, 1996).
24. Id.
25. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
440(e), 110 Stat. 1276-77 (1996) (codified as amended in section 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
26. KuRZBAN, supra note 8, at 89-91.
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bribery; 7) forgery; 8) counterfeiting; 9) trafficking in vehicles with
identification numbers of which have been altered; 10) obstruction of justice
for which a term of five years or more may be imposed; and 11) failure to
appear before a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony
for which a sentence of two years or more may be imposed. 7
The expanded definition of an aggravated felony clearly permits the
deportation of more criminal aliens and substantially increases the likelihood
that long-term permanent residents will not be eligible for virtually any form
of relief, no matter how minor their criminal convictions. In accordance
with other amendments aimed at expeditiously deporting the majority of
aliens, the AEDPA facilitates the deportation of nonviolent criminal
offenders before completion of their sentences.28
The AEDPA, in conjunction with the IIRIRA, seriously curtails the
courts' authority to grant relief from deportation, where deportation is based
on criminal grounds. Congress amended section 106(a)(10) of the NA with
section 440(a) of the AEDPA, which revokes the courts' exercise of judicial
27. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(e)(1)-(7), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43) (Supp. If 1996).
28. 8 U.S.C.A. § 123 1(a)(4) (West Supp. 1997). Section 123 1(a)(4) states:
(A) Except as provided in section 259(a) of Title 42 and paragraph (2), the
Attorney General may not remove an alien who is sentenced to imprisonment
until the alien is released from imprisonment. Parole supervised release,
probation, or the possibility of arrest or further imprisonment is not a reason
to defer removal.
(B) The Attorney General is authorized to remove an alien in accordance
with applicable procedures under this chapter before the alien has completed
a sentence of imprisonment-
(i) in the case of an alien in the custody of the Attorney General, if the
Attorney General determines that the (I) alien is confined pursuant to a final
conviction for a nonviolent offense (other than an offense related to
smuggling or harboring of aliens or an offense described in section
I101(a)(43)(B), (C), (0), (I), or (L) of this title and (II) the removal of the
alien is appropriate and in the best interest of the United States; or
(ii) in the case of an alien in the custody of a State (or a political subdivision
of a State), if the chief State official exercising authority with respect to the
incarceration of the alien determines that (I) the alien is confined pursuant to
a final conviction for a nonviolent offense (other than an offense described in
section 1 101(a)(43)(C) or (E) of this title), (II) the removal is appropriate and
in the best interest of the State, and (III) submits a written request to the
Attorney General that such alien be so removed.
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review over final orders of deportation.29 Equitable relief for deportable
aliens has also been drastically cut back. Section 440(d) of the AEDPA
amended 8 U.S.C §§ 212(c) and 1882(c), and "provides in relevant part that
section 212(c) relief shall not be available to aliens who are deportable by
reason of having committed certain specified criminal offenses.",30 On June
27, 1996, the BIA decided In re Soriano31 and determined that applications
for relief under 212(c) are barred only if filed after IIRIRA's date of
effectiveness.32  Consequently, section 440(d) should not be applied
retroactively to applicants who were awaiting decisions on appeal prior to
April 24, 1996. Nonetheless, on February 21, 1997, the Attorney General
concluded that it should be applied retroactively.33  The Attorney General
argued that in passing 440(d), Congress withdrew the authority to grant
prospective relief, and she stated that when a statute "either alters
jurisdiction or affects prospective injunctive relief [it] generally does not
raise retroactivity concerns, and, thus, presumptively is to be applied in
pending cases."
3
As a result of the Attorney General's decision, long-term lawful
permanent residents will now be stripped of their ability to remain in the
United States irrespective of the age or nature of their conviction. Ancient
convictions for relatively minor matters will now result in the deportation of
long-term permanent residents without relief. The only bright spot is the
29. Section 440(a)(10) of the AEPDA states: "[A]ny final order of deportation against
an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in
section [1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B),(C), or (D)] of this title for which both predicate offenses are
covered by section [1251(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title], . . . shall not be subject to review by any
court." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (Supp. I 1996).
30. Matter of Soriano, BIA Int. Dec. No. 3289 (1996), 1997 WL 159795, at *1 (Feb. 21,
1997) (Reno, Attorney General) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1996)). "Section 212(c) grants
the Attorney General discretionary authority to admit otherwise excludable permanent resident
aliens. Although the statute expressly authorizes only a waiver of exclusion, courts have
interpreted it to authorize relief in deportation proceedings as well." Id. See Francis v. INS,
532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976); De Osorio v. INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 1039 (4th Cir. 1993).
31. In re Soriano, Int. Dec. No. 3289 (B.I.A. June 27, 1996).
32. Id.
33. Soriano, 1997 WL 159795, at *5-6.
34. Id. at *3. The Attorney General's decision has now been rejected by two district
courts at the time of the submission of this article. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 182
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.) (striking down the interpretation of the Attorney General in
Matter of Soriano, Int. Dec. No. 3289, 1997 WL 159795 at *1 (B.I.A. Feb. 21, 1997) which
stripped long-term lawful permanent resident aliens, who commit virtually any offense, of
their right to remain in the United States). See also Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Chin, J.).
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BIA's recent opinion finding that the statute does not apply to section 212(c)
relief or exclusion proceedings.
35
l. FEDERAL CASES AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. Decisions Affecting Immigration Law
The discussion that follows involves two of the most highly contested
issues in relation to the recent changes in immigration law: federal
jurisdiction and retroactivity. In an effort to further reduce assistance for
aliens in the United States, with or without convictions, the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA have sought to revoke the district courts' jurisdiction to review
deportation orders issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The elimination of judicial review indicates that aliens may no longer have a
forum in which to argue possible violations of substantive rights. Although
the removal of judicial review under section 440(a) of the AEDPA has been
upheld in several circuit courts,36 constitutional concerns are prevalent.
Retroactive application of newly created statutory provisions and
jurisdictional changes under the AEDPA and the IRIRA are of equal
constitutional concern for thousands of immigrants who otherwise would not
be affected by the new legislation. The cases below will touch on these
issues as they affect the legal rights of immigrants in the United States in
light of traditional common law principles.
1. Restraints on Judicial Review
There are considerable arguments against the revocation of judicial
review under section 440(a) of the AEDPA and the newly created section
242(g) of the INA. In a recent decision by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, Senior Judge Weinstein held that there
was "no indication that Congress intended to take the dramatic-and
35. In re Fuentes-Campos, Int. Dec. No. 3318 (B.I.A. May 14, 1997). The BIA held
that before the amendment, section 212(c) barred relief for aliens who "had been convicted" of
certain crimes and that the language of the statute covered aliens in exclusion and deportation
proceedings. Id. at 4. However, section 440(d) eliminated such language and created a "more
limited provision making relief unavailable to any alien 'who is deportable by reason of
having committed any criminal offense... ."' Id. As a result, the statute cannot bar 212(c)
relief to aliens in exclusion proceedings.
36. Ira Kurzban, The Disappearing Federal Courts, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at 13.
See, e.g., Boston-Bollers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396
(9th Cir. 1996); Mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
694 (1997).
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arguably unconstitutional-step of repealing the habeas statute [section 2241
of title 28] with roots traceable to our nation's beginnings. 37 The district
courts continue to have judicial authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, and
to hold otherwise "would call into question the most basic tenets of our
tripartite system of government. 38 Furthermore, the court emphasized that
"despite the AEDPA's withdrawal of jurisdiction, 'some means of seeking
judicial relief remain[s] available." 3 9
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit has concluded that section
440(a) of the AEDPA does eliminate the courts' jurisdiction to hear appeals
from final orders of deportation of persons with criminal convictions.40 In
the case of Boston-Boilers v. INS, the defendant entered the United States in
1987 as a lawful permanent resident.41 On June 19, 1992, Boston-Boilers
pled guilty to a charge of second degree murder. 42 By March of 1993, the
INS "issued an order to show cause charging that Boston-Bollers was subject
to deportation on account of his second degree murder conviction. ' ' 3
Boston-Boilers filed a petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit Court,
after an appeal to the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration
Appeals proved unsuccessful.44 The primary issue was whether section
440(a)(10) 45 prevented the review of the denial of discretionary relief from
deportation of a long-term lawful permanent resident.46
The court held that, upon the President's signature on April 24, 1996,
courts no longer had jurisdiction over petitions pending review on final
orders of deportation of persons with criminal convictions. 47 The opinion
discussed several propositions in support of the holding. First, "passage of
37. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.).
38. Id. at 157.
39. Id. at 161 (quoting Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828, 837 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
40. Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 353.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 354.
45. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996). Section 440(a)(10) states: "Any final order of deportation against an alien
who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section
241(a)(2) (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for
which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to
review by any court." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43) (Supp. 111996).
46. Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352, 354 (11th Cir. 1997). The United States
Constitution states "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
47. Boston-Boilers, 106 F.3d at 355.
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the AEDPA is not [a] retroactive application affecting substantive rights, but
[it] is a prospective application of a jurisdiction-eliminating statute.' 8
Second, the court held that restrictions on the federal courts' jurisdiction did
not violate the Due Process Clause since "[tihe power to expel aliens, being
essentially a power of the political branches of government, the legislative
and executive, may be exercised entirely through executive officers, with
such opportunity for judicial review of their action as congress may see fit to
authorize or permit."49 Third, section 440(a)(10) was not invalid under
Article I because it is the duty of the political branches of the federal
government to regulate "the relationship between the United States and our
alien visitors."50
In Ranirez-Centeno v. Wallis,51 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that the court lacked jurisdiction pursuant
to section 242(g) to review orders of deportation of cases filed after the
Act's date of effectiveness.52  Benito Ramirez-Centeno acknowledged
deportability on February 1, 1991, based on an illegal entry into the United
States in 1990. 53 Ramirez-Centeno petitioned for political asylum claiming
that he had been "a member of the Nicaraguan Social Christian Party" when
he resided in Nicaragua and that he had worked with the Contras in 1985. 54
His claim was dismissed by the immigration judge, and on December 14,
1994, his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was also dismissed.55
Consequently, Ramirez-Centeno requested the district court to grant a writ of
habeas corpus enjoining deportation. 6 The court adopted the Seventh
Circuit's position that "the general effective date of... section 309(a) is 'the
first day of the first month beginning more than 180 days after the date of the
48. Id. at 354. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). The court also
indicated that a majority of the circuits have ruled consistently with this decision. See Kolster
v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 791 (1st Cir. 1996); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 29 (2d Cir.
1996); Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1842
(1997); Mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 694
(1997); Qasguargis v. INS, 91 F.3d 788, 789 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1080
(1997); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396, 400 (9th Cir. 1996).
49. Boston-Boilers, 106 F.3d at 355 (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537
(1952)).
50. Id. (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 81 (1976))).
51. 957 F.Supp. 1267, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
52. Id, at 1269.
53. Id. at 1268.
54. Id
55. Id. at 1269.
56. Ramirez-Centeno, 957 F. Supp. at 1269.
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enactment of this Act,' or April 1, 1997." 7 Beginning April 1, 1997, the
court would no longer have subject matter jurisdiction over pending cases.
Since Ramirez-Centeno's claim was pre-April 1, 1997, the court had
jurisdiction to hear the case. Nonetheless, the effect of this provision will
mean the withdrawal of judicial review from thousands of aliens who
annually receive orders of deportation.
The government also argued that the AEDPA "eliminated all habeas
review of final deportation orders. 58 As a result, the court did not have the
power to issue a writ in Ramirez-Centeno's case. Section 1105(a)(10) of
title 8, United States Code, as amended by the AEDPA, states that "[a]ny
final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of
having committed a criminal offense [without regard to the date of its
commission] shall not be subject to review by any court."59  The court
concluded that section 440(a) of the AEDPA withdrew the court's power to
grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens who are deportable by reason of their
criminal convictions.60  Specifically, the "amended language of section
11 05a(a)(10) refers only to deportations as the result of criminal activity,
while the original language referred to all deportations."
61
The court also favored a strict interpretation of custody in relation to
orders of deportation.62 The court cited Marcello v. District Director of
INS,63 and stated "that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a require[s] that individuals seeking
relief from final orders of deportation must be in the actual custody of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and not merely preparing to be
deported., 64 Since Ramirez-Centeno had not pled guilty and was not in the
custody of the INS, the court would be unable to issue the writ of habeas
corpus.65 Other jurisdictions, however, have insisted that physical restraint
57. Id. (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, § 309(a),
I 10 Stat. 3009 (1996)). The Seventh Circuit decision of Lalani v. Perryman, 105 F.3d 334,
336 (7th Cir. 1997), held that "on April 1, 1997 all cases filed and currently pending that fall
within the boundaries of section 242(g) would be dismissed from federal court for lack of
jurisdiction." Id.
58. Id. at 1270.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1996) repealed by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (West
Supp. 1997).
60. Ramirez-Centeno, 957 F. Supp. at 1270.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1271.
63. 634 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1981).
64. Ramirez-Centeno, 957 F. Supp. at 1271. See Marcello v. District Dir. of INS, 634
F.2d 964, 968 (5th Cir. 1981).
65. Ramirez-Centeno, 957 F. Supp. at 1271.
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is not necessary for habeas jurisdiction.6 Although it appeared that the
district court disfavored the attempts at curtailing judicial review, it
ultimately failed to provide relief from deportation.
Another judge in the Southern District of Florida in Tefel v. Reno,67
disagreed with the analysis that section 242(g) revokes the district court's
jurisdiction over orders of deportation 68  Petitioners Roberto Tefel and
others similarly situated, sought declaratory, injunctive, and mandatory relief
against the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of
Justice, and the Board of Immigration Appeals for denying them the right to
seek suspension of deportation.6 1 On May 20, 1997, United States District
Judge James Lawrence King rejected the government's arguments that
242(g) and other statutes barred judicial review, and, in a lengthy order,70
granted a temporary restraining order.7 ' On June 24, 1997, Judge King
incorporated the May 20, 1997 opinion regarding jurisdiction and then
proceeded to issue a detailed preliminary injunction preventing the INS from
deporting class members. On July 11, 1997, upon the heels of much
criticism concerning the federal government's decision to pursue the mass
deportations, the Attorney General declared that the deportations would not
be effectuated.72 Instead, the administration would introduce to Congress a
legislative proposal that "would enable applicants for suspension of
deportation whose cases were pending prior to April 1, 1997, and who meet
the standards which applied at that time, to be granted such relief on a case
by case basis."73
66. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.). The court
cited to Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1995), noting that "so long
as he is subject to a final order of deportation, an alien is deemed to be 'in custody."' Id at
164.
67. 972 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
68. Id. at 608.
69. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (97-
0805).
70. Tefel, 972 F. Supp at 608.
71. Id. at 620. The court used the traditional four-part test of whether: "(1) there is a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the TRO is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury, (3) the injury to the plaintiff outweighs any harm to the non-movant, and (4) the TRO
would serve the public interest." Id. (citing Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir.
1995)).
72. Carol Rosenberg, A Break for Central Americans, THE MIAMI HERALD, July 11,
1997, at Al, A13.
73. Administration Proposes Finetuning for 1996 Immigration Law to Mitigate Harsh
Effects of Applying New Rules to Pending Cases, Department of Justice, Press Release, July
10, 1997, at 1-2.
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Judge King's May 20, 1997, Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction addressed section 242(g) in relation to the
plaintiff's case.74 The court held that there was "a strong presumption that
the actions of federal agencies are reviewable in the federal courts unless
nonreviewability is explicitly demonstrated in the statutory language. 75
This conclusion is consistent with a long line of Supreme Court cases cited
by the district court.76 Judge King also argued that this presumption of
reviewability is greater in light of constitutional claims that may arise.
77
Based on the statutory language of section 242(g), he also concluded that the
statute did not "bar the review of the decisions or actions of lower level
government officials. 78
Additionally, if the amendments were to deny the power of district
courts to exercise judicial review over claims regarding deportation, aliens
would be unable to have their constitutional claims heard. The plaintiff's
due process, equal protection, and estoppel claims would not be addressed
by an immigration judge or the BIA because they lack jurisdiction over these
matters.79 Furthermore, the district court is the only forum in which a factual
record could be developed for the Eleventh Circuit to review.80  If
jurisdiction is eliminated, Congress would be "intrud[ing] upon the
judiciary's essential function by denying any ,iudicial forum to a plaintiff
who asserts a violation of constitutional rights."
In another unrelated area regarding jurisdiction and aliens, the Eleventh
Circuit recently decided the case of Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman, & Aaronson,
P.A.82 This decision is important in several aspects as it relates to aliens
filing and maintaining suits in federal court based on diversity of
jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit resolved the question of whether "an alien
74. Tefel, 972 F. Supp. at 612.
75. Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, Tefel, (97-0805).
76. Id. (citing Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996); McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 670 (1986); Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1987); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967)).
77. Id. at 3. In Tefel, the judge would later hold that the government's policy inducing
the Nicaraguan immigrants led to the emergence of due process and equal protection concerns.
See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 33-37, Tefel, (97-0805).
78. Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4, Tefel, (97-0805). Section
242(g) states in pertinent part, that "no court should have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any client arising from decision or action by the Attorney General."
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
79. Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 8, Tefel, (97-0805).
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id.
82. 108 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1997).
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who intends to reside in this country permanently but who has not yet
attained official permanent resident immigration status... should be
considered an alien admitted for permanent residence" within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In this case, Appellant Foy filed a diversity action
claiming legal malpractice against a Florida firm.8 4 However, at the time he
applied, he was not yet a permanent resident; he was waiting for a green card
from the INS.8 5  The trial court found no diversity between the parties
because it interpreted section 1332(a) to include someone who had applied
for a "green card" but had not yet received it, and the person satisfied other
criteria for residency in Florida.8 6 The court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.8 7
The Eleventh Circuit held that the word "admitted" under section
1332(a) applied only to those persons who had been granted lawful
permanent residence by the INS, regardless of what status individual states
confered to aliens residing within their borders.88 Foy could, therefore, be
considered a citizen for purposes of diversity because, even though he had
applied for permanent residency, he was not yet a lawful permanent resident
at the time of filing the suit.
89
B. Presumption against Retroactivity
Another issue which has arisen under new immigration laws is the
question of their retroactive effect. An overview of the traditional common
law principles upon which our legal system has been based will demonstrate
the unsoundness of the retroactive application of the criminal alien
provisions under AEDPA section 440(d) as expressed in the Attorney
General's decision in Matter of Soriano.90 The Attorney General's decision
on retroactivity appears to fly in the face of the Supreme Court's recent
83. Id. at 1348. Section 1332(a) of title 28 states that "an alien admitted to the United
States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is
domiciled." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1995)).
84. Foy, 108 F.3d at 1348.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1349. The Eleventh Circuit is not alone in its reliance on the plain statutory
language of § 1332(a). See Chan v. Mui, No. 92-CIV8258, 1993 WL 427114, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1993); Miller v. Thermarite, 793 F. Supp. 306, 308 (S.D. Ala. 1992)
(finding that aliens without green cards are not considered permanent residents for
jurisdictional purposes).
89. Foy, 108 F.3d at 1349.
90. Int. Dec. No. 3289, at I (B.I.A. Feb. 1997).
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decisions of Lindh v. Murphy9' and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,92
which clarify and amplify the Court's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products.93  As the Supreme Court stated in Landgraf. "Elementary
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity
to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled
expectations should not be lightly disrupted. 94  Consequently, there is a
presumption against retroactive legislation, and "the court must ask whether
the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment. 9 5 Retroactive application will "create a situation in
which people who have lived in the community, have established themselves
as valuable members of society, and who are needed to support their
families, are summarily deported without regard to the present and future
interests of their families or the community at large. 96 Such is the case of
Tefel.
On February 20, 1997, the BIA interpreted the IIRIRA in regard to the
provisions on suspension of deportation. In the landmark case, Matter of N-
J-B-,97 the BIA resolved the issue of retroactivity created by the language of
the IIRIRA. In a seven to five decision, the court held that, with respect to
the respondent's claim for suspension of deportation, if a person had been
91. 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The Supreme Court held that the amendments of the
AEDPA in relation to habeas corpus reform did not apply to pending noncapital cases. Id. at
2061. This case is significant in regard to the issue of retroactivity, because it re-enforced the
notion that in the absence of an "express command, the court must determine whether the new
statute would have a retroactive effect." Id. at 2062. Since section 107 of the AEDPA applies
special habeas corpus procedures in capital cases and section 107(c) expressly provides that
the amendment "shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act[,]"
the amendments to noncapital cases, which lack such express language, should be applied
prospectively. Id. at 2063. Furthermore, retroactive application would "have [a] substantive
as well as purely procedural effect[]." Id. This is an example of how, without express
language, the Supreme Court will uphold the presumption against retroactivity.
In Mojica v. Reno, the Eastern District Court of New York held that "[w]ithout manifest
congressional design expressed in clear statutory language, the default rule in statutory
interpretation requires prospective implementation." 970 F. Supp. 130, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
The court found that such express language is lacking and that normally Congress has no
trouble in expressing retroactive application of the legislation it creates. Id.
92. 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997).
93. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
94. Id. at 265.
95. Id. at 269-70; see also Hughes Aircraft Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1876 (citing Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (noting that the "presumption against
retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.")).
96. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 170.
97. Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immigr. Rep. BI-173 (B.I.A. 1997).
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served with an Order to Show Cause before he or she accrued seven years of
continuous physical presence in the United States, then he or she was
ineligible for suspension even if the case was on appeal after obtaining
suspension before an immigration judge.98
Specifically, the BIA analyzed section 309(c)(1) of the IIRIRA as
establishing the Act's effective date as April 1, 1997, and found that section
309(c)(5) 99 created an exception in regard to claims of suspension of
deportation of aliens who received notices to appear before, on, or after the
Act.'00 INA section 240A(d)(1) provides that any period of continuous
physical presence will be terminated "when an alien is served a notice to
appear under section 239(a)."' 0 1 The BIA held that the term used in section
239(a) of the Act was consistent with the formal document titled "Order to
Show Cause" ("OSC"), which is mentioned in 8 U.S.C. § 1252b. 10 2 The BIA
held that the terms "notice to appear" and OSC were synonymous and that
98. Petitioner's Brief, Matter of N-J-B- v. Reno, Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immigr. Rep.
B1-173 (B.I.A. 1997) (No. 97-4400), at 3. Section 240A(d) states:
For purposes of this section, any period of continuous residence or
continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end
when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title
or when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2)
of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under
section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States under
section 1227(a)(2) or (4) of this title, whichever is earliest.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
99. Section 309(c)(5) states: "TRANSITIONAL RULE WITH REGARD TO
SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION.-Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act [section 1229b(d) of this title] (relating to continuous
residence or physical presence) shall apply to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the
date of enactment of this Act." Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 § 309(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. 111996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments).
100. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immigr. Rep. at 19 (B.I.A. 1997).
101. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(d)(1)
(West Supp. 1997).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a) states:
In deportation proceedings under section 242 [8 U.S.C. § 1252], written
notice (in this section referred to as an "order to show cause") shall be given
in person to the alien (or, if personal service is not practicable, such notice
shall be given by certified mail to the alien or to the alien's counsel of record,
if any) specifying the following: (A) The nature of the proceedings against
the alien. (B) The legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted.
(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law. (D) The charges
against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have been
violated ....
8 U.S.C.A. § 1252b(a) (West Supp. 1997).
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receipt of an OSC terminated the seven years of continuous physical
presence.I°3
The petitioner contended that OSCs are not synonymous with the new
notice to appear, arguing that a notice to appear was only first used in
section 304 of the IIRIRA.10 4  Furthermore, in INA section 239(a),
"Congress provided extensive and detailed requirements for new notices to
appear[,]" which never applied to OSCs under prior law.'05 In a brief to the
Eleventh Circuit, the petitioner argued that retroactive application of section
309(c)(5) "ignores basic rules of statutory construction, is contrary to the
statute's legislative history, violates principles concerning the retroactive
application of statutes as established by the Supreme Court, and violates
petitioner's due process and equal protection rights." 106  The petitioner
maintained that the majority's holding violated the rule of statutory
construction, which dictates that "[n]o statute may be read as to render any
word or phrase surplusage" when it disregards the phrase "under section
239(a)."' 07  Similarly, by refusing to give the word "under" its ordinary
meaning, the BIA ignored the rule that "legislative purpose is expressed by
the ordinary meaning of the words used."' 08
Concerning the legislative intent behind the amendments, the petitioner
argued that when the House first introduced the bill (the Senate receded
section 309 to the House), section 309(c)(5) provided that the period of
103. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immig. Rep. at B1-178 (BIA 1997).
104. Petitioner's Brief, N-J-B-, Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immigr. Rep. B1-173 (B.I.A.
1997) (No. 97-4400), at 15 n.5.
105. Id. at 16.
Most significantly, § 239(a) requires that all "notices to appear" shall state
"[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held" and "[tihe
consequences under § 1229a(b)(5) [§ 240(b)(5)] . . .of the failure, except
under exceptional circumstances, to appear at such proceeding." Orders to
show cause under pre-IIRIRA § 242B(a)(1) were not required to include
either of these advisals.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G) (Supp. 111996).
106. Id. at 10.
107. Id. at 22 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
108. Petitioner's Brief at 22, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400) (citing Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S.
129 (1991); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 (1984)). The petitioner also argues that a
third rule of statutory construction was-violated by the BIA's decision. Id. Specifically, the
rule which dictates that "[d]ifferent words or phrases used in the same statute have different
meanings." Id. According to Petitioner, "[t]he BIA majority violated this principle when it
failed to recognize that only notices to appear served under § 239(a) interrupt physical
presence. It also ignored this canon when it failed to note the distinction between notices to
appear that are 'served,' and notices to appear that are 'issued."' Id.
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continuous physical presence "shall be deemed to have ended on the date the
alien was served an order to show cause." 109  However, the Berman
Amendment, adopted in early 1996, established the current language of
section 309(c)(5) and "intentionally deleted the operative language that
service of an order to show cause ends physical presence."'110 As a result, the
final change incorporated as the legislation, which did not reject the Berman
Amendment, could not have intended to incorporate language it had
previously rejected.
The petitioner finally contended that various sections under the IIRIRA,
when read together, provide a correct interpretation of the relevant statutory
sections. Particularly, section 309(c)(1) states that the old law continues to
be applicable to deportation and exclusion proceedings before April 1,
1997. m Section 309(c)(2) states that the Attorney General may choose to
apply the new law to pending cases where an evidentiary hearing has not
been held.' 12 Similarly, section 309(a)(3) provides that the Attorney General
may, at any time before there is a final order of deportation or exclusion,
109. Id. at 33 (citing 104 CONG. REC. at H10898 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1996)). When
H.R. 2022 was introduced into the House on August 5, 1995, section 309(c)(5) provided:
Transitional Rule with Regard to Suspension of Deportation. - In applying
section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as in effect before the
date of the enactment of this Act) with respect to an application for
suspension of deportation which is filed before, on, or after the date of the
enactment of this Act and which has not been adjudicated as of 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the period of continuous physical
presence under such section shall be deemed to have ended on the date the
alien was served an order to show cause pursuant to section 242A of such Act
(as in effect before such date of enactment).
Petitioner's Brief at 33, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400) (citing H.R. 2022, 104th Cong. § 309(c)(5)
(1995)).
110. Id. at 34 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 183-84 (1996)).
111. Id. at 14. Section 309(c)(1) of the IIRIRA states, "GENERAL RULE THAT NEW
RULES DO NOT APPLY. - Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, in the
case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of the title 11-A effective
date .... " 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. I 1996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments).
112. Petitioner's Brief at 14, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400). Section 309(c)(2) of the IIRIRA
states, in pertinent part:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPTION TO ELECT TO APPLY NEW
PROCEDURES. - In a case described in paragraph (1) in which an
evidentiary hearing under section 236 or 242 and 242B of the Immigration
and Nationality Act has not commenced as of title III-A effective date, the
Attorney General may elect to proceed under chapter 4 of title II of such Act
(as amended by this subtitle).
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. 111996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments).
1997]
169
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
terminate proceedings and initiate a removal proceeding by serving a notice
to appear under section 309 of the new law. 1 3 According to petitioner, when
analyzed together, section 240A(d)(1) terminates the period of continuous
physical presence necessary for suspension:
"When the alien is served a notice to appear under
§239(a)"... INA § 240A(d) "shall apply to notices to appear
issued before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act
[September 30, 1997]"... [and] when the Attorney General elects
to apply the new law to old cases, old Orders to Show Cause are
effectively converted into the new Notice to Appear under
239(a). 11
In other words, "the prior-issued Order to Show Cause would terminate a
suspension applicant's physical presence only when and if the Attorney
General elected to apply the new law to him under § 309(c)(2) or §
309(c)(3), and actually or constructively served him with a notice to appear
under § 239.'15 The Attorney General suggested she agrees with this view
by vacating Matter of N-J-B-.16
In response, on November 14, 1997, Congress passed legislation titled
the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act, 117 amending section
309(c) of the IIRIRA." The result is a statutory codification of the decision
in Matter of N-J-B-, solidifying retroactive application of IRIRA, with such
exceptions that would provide relief to certain aliens. The Act grants
adjustment of status to permanent residency to Nicaraguan and Cuban
nationals who have not been convicted of an aggravated felony and who
113. Petitioner's Brief at 14, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400). Section 309(c)(3) states:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPTION TO TERMINATE AND REINITIATE
PROCEEDINGS. - In the case described in paragraph (I), the Attorney
General may elect to terminate proceedings in which there has not been a
final administrative decision and to reinitiate proceedings under chapter 4 of
title II [of] the Immigration and Nationality Act (as amended by this subtitle).
Any determination in the terminated proceeding shall not be binding in the
reinitiated proceeding.
8 U.S.C. § I 101 (Supp. 111996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments).
114. Petitioner's Brief at 26, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. II
1996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments)).
115. Id.
116. Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Newt
Gingrich, Representative, House of Representatives, (July 10, 1997) (on file with author).
117. H.R. 2607, 105th Cong. § 201 (1997) (enacted).
118. Id. § 203
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were residing in the United States prior to December 31, 1995.119"
Furthermore, Guatemalan and Salvadorian nationals who have entered the
United States before October 1, 1990 and September 19, 1990, respectively,
who have not been convicted of an aggravated felony, and who registered for
benefits under the ABC settlement agreement may apply for suspension of
deportation under the previously existing laws.1 20 In addition, the law grants
to persons from the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries the
right to seek suspension of deportation under pre-IIRIRA rules, if they
entered the United States before December 31, 1990, and filed an application
for asylum on or before December 31, 1991. However, the law intentionally
excluded Haitian nationals who will have to seek cancellation of removal
under the strict guidelines of the IURIRA or seek remedial legislation
separately.
121
C. Other Policies on Criminal Aliens
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in
United States v. Lazo-Ortiz,12 2 demonstrated an example of the rigid123
penalties awaiting criminal aliens . In this case, the defendant unlawfully
reentered the United States after being deported.124 In 1990, Lazo-Ortiz had
committed a manslaughter offense. 12  The government requested that he be
given a sentence enhancement of not less than twenty years by virtue of
section 1326(b)(2) 126 of the Immigration and Nationality Act or under the
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines ("USSG"). 127 However, in
1990, the statutory definition of "aggravated felony" did not include crimes
of violence such as manslaughter. At that time, the defendant instead would
have been held to a sentence enhancement of not more than ten years under
119. Id. § 202.
120. Id. § 203.
121. Id.
122. 954 F. Supp. 254 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
123. Id. at 255.
124. Id-
125. Id.
126. Section 1326(b)(2) of title 8, United States Code, states that any alien whose
deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such
alien shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (Supp. 111996).
127. The manual for sentencing states that while the base offense level is eight for aliens
unlawfully entering or remaining in the Unites States, "[i]f the defendant previously was
deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony, increase [is] by [sixteen] levels." U.S.
SENTENING GuImwEns MANuAL § 2L1.2(b)(2) (1995).
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section 1326(b)(1). 128 The court carefully avoided this issue and held that
USSG section 2L1.2(b)(2) was nonetheless applicable.129  Based on the
sentencing commission's guidelines, "all defendants sentenced on or after
November 1, 1991, who have an aggravated felony conviction [are] eligible
for the sixteen-level increase without regard to the date such felony was
committed."' 130 Defendants who have convictions for crimes of violence
which occurred before passage of the new laws will receive longer
sentences. The effect of this policy on criminal aliens is indicative of a
violation of the ex post facto prohibition under the United States
Constitution, since the law enforced did not exist at the time of the
offense.1
3 1
IV. FLORIDA STATE CASES ON IMMIGRATION
The following cases show how Florida state courts are attempting to
preserve the protections afforded defendants in criminal prosecutions. As
federal sanctions against aliens with criminal convictions increase, and as
their opportunities to remain in the United States decrease due to these
convictions, the actions of state courts in vacating convictions becomes
substantially more important.
A. Prosecution of Criminal Aliens
The following cases concern rule 3.172(c)(8) of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which requires a trial judge to inform every defendant
pleading guilty or nolo contendre that if he is not a citizen of the United
States, he may be subject to deportation. 132 In Hen Lin Lu v. State,'33 the
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (Supp. 111996). Under this section,
any alien.., whose [deportation] was subsequent to a conviction for
commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against
the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than
[ten] years, or both.
1d.
129. Lazo-Ortiz, 954 F. Supp. at 256.
130. Id. Application Note 7 states: "'Aggravated felony,' as used in subsection (b)(2),
means ... any crime of violence (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, not including a purely political
offense) for which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of any suspension of such
imprisonment) is at least five years .... Application Note 7 to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
132. See, e.g., Hen Lin Lu v. State, 683 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996). Rule 3.172(c)(8) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
[Vol. 22:149
172
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Kurzban / Chaviano
appellant pled guilty to the charge of burglary.134  In a motion for post-
conviction relief, he claimed that the trial court did not inform him of the
possibility of deportation as a result of the plea. 135 Hen Lin Lu had signed a
preprinted form informing him of the possibility of deportation. 36 The issue
to be resolved was whether a "plea form alone is sufficient to demonstrate
compliance with rule 3.172(c)(8).' 37
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that, although ajudge may use
preprinted forms, he or she "must orally verify that the defendant has
intelligently consumed the written information contained within it.'
138
Furthermore, the court transcripts must affirmatively show that the
defendant's plea was intelligent and voluntary. 39 Upon consideration, the
court found that nothing in the record indicated that Hen Lin Lu's signature
on the form communicated "an intelligent and voluntary waiver of his
rights. , 140
Similarly in Perriello v. State,'41 after a conviction and sentence as a
consequence of a plea bargain, Defendant Perriello, an Italian citizen,
Determination of Voluntariness: Except when a defendant is not present for a
plea, pursuant to the provisions of rule 3.180(d), the trial judge should, when
determining voluntariness, place the defendant under oath and shall address
the defendant personally and shall determine that he or she
understands... that if he or she pleads guilty or nolo contendere the trial
judge must inform him or her that, if he or she is not a United States citizen,
the plea may subject him or her to deportation pursuant to the laws and
regulations governing the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service. It shall not be necessary for the trial judge to inquire as to whether
the defendant is a United States citizen, as this admonition shall be given to
all defendants in all cases.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(c)(8).
133. 683 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
134. Id at 1111.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Hen Lin Lu, 683 So. 2d at 1112.
139. Id. The court examined Koenig v. State, 597 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1992) and State v.
Blackwell, 661 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1995). Id In Koenig, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
nothing in the record showed that Koenig understood the form he signed or that his attorney
told him about its content. Koenig, 597 So. 2d at 258. On the contrary, in Blackwell, the
court found the plea agreements acceptable because before accepting them, the court
confirmed with each defendant that he or she had read the form and understood it. Blackwell,
661 So. 2d at 284. The pleas had been sufficient pursuant to rule 3.172(c)(8) because they
met the intelligence and voluntary requirements. Hen Lin Lu, 683 So. 2d. at 1112.
140. Hen Lin Lu, 683 So. 2d at 1112.
141. 684 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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received notice of deportation proceedings instituted by the INS. 42  In
response, Perriello filed a motion for post-conviction relief, asserting that the
trial court did not inform him of the possibility of deportation. 43  The
defendant appealed upon denial of this motion.' 4  The fourth district held
that since nothing in the court transcript showed that the trial judge had
informed Perriello of the possibility of deportation, as required by rule
3.172(c)(8) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant had
been prejudiced and must be permitted to withdraw the plea and go to
trial. 45 Interestingly, Perriello signed a written plea agreement warning him
of possible immigration problems. 146 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that
there was no evidence that showed that he understood the consequences of
his plea because the deportation warning was one short paragraph in a seven
page document and Perriello had minimal English skills and a low education
level. 
147
In another case, the State conceded that the trial court did not inform
the defendant before he pleaded nolo contendre, as directed in Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8), that he may be subject to deportation. 148
As a result of the conviction, defendant Beckles was taken into INS
custody.149 Evidently, the State's failure to inform him ultimately prejudiced
Beckles.
Consistent with the above summarized cases, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held in Sanders v. State,150 that a criminal alien should be allowed
to withdraw her plea of nolo contendere and proceed to trial. 5' The State
failed to inform defendant Sanders of the possibility of deportation before
she accepted the plea.152 The court rejected the argument that, because the
defendant made false statements regarding to her citizenship status, she
should be impeded from alleging error.153 Rather, "[c]ompliance with rule
3.172(c)(8) is mandatory, thus the rule contemplates a trial court will not
inquire regarding citizenship.' 54
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 259-60.
146. Perriello, 684 So. 2d at 259.
147. Id. at 260.
148. Beckles v. State, 679 So. 2d 892, 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
149. Id.
150. 685 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
151. Id. at 1385.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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In sharp contrast, the Third District Court of Appeal has relied on strict,
often bizarre interpretations designed to have harsh effects on aliens. In
Chaar v. State,55 the third district affirmed the trial court's order denying
Bilal Chaar's petition for writ of coram nobis.15 6 In 1987, Chaar pled nolo
contendere to possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia.1 7  Chaar
voluntarily left the country under threat of deportation and has now been
denied reentry because of his state conviction.'15  Even though the trial judge
failed to inform the defendant of the possibility of deportation, as is required
regardless of the ultimate immigration consequences, the court bizarrely
noted that Chaar departed on his own will and that deportation proceedings
were not instituted against him as a direct result of the plea.
159
In Ross v. State,'60 defendant Victor William Ross pled guilty to a
cannabis possession charge in 1980, and the trial court withheld
adjudication. 61  In 1996, the INS notified Ross of ensuing deportation
proceedings, which Ross claimed were based on the 1980 plea. Ross
argued that the trial judge failed to inform him of the possible consequences
of pleading guilty.16' Ross asserted that the trial court advised him that the
withholding of adjudication was not a conviction and it should not cause any
immigration problems. 64 There was no transcript of the plea colloquy to
verify these assertions. 165 The court avoided the issue of whether such a
misstatement was an error of fact or law and, therefore, did not decide
whether a writ of error coram nobis was appropriate in this case. 66 The
court affirmed the trial court holding that without a plea transcript, the
155. 685 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
156. Id. at 1038.
157. Id.
158. Id. The court relied on State v. Ginebra, which held that "the trial court judge is
under no duty to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of his guilty plea." State v.
Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960, 960-61 (Fla. 1987). However, in State v. Sallato, the court left open
the possibility that the defense counsel's provision of "positive misadvice" may constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in deportation. 519 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 1988).
159. Chaar, 685 So. 2d at 1038.
160. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1073 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1997).
161. Id. atD1073.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Ross, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D1073.
166. Id. The district court noted that in Malcolm v. State, "[ilt is well settled in Florida
that the function of a writ of error coram nobis is to correct fundamental errors of fact and that
the writ is not available to correct errors of law." Malcolm v. State, 605 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
1997]
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defendant could not receive the relief he sought. 67 In effect, the court held
that the government could assert estoppel because of the loss of the
transcript, notwithstanding Ross' affidavit about the lack of notice. Ross
would not only have to assert that "he would not have entered into the plea
agreement but in addition, that had he gone to trial, he most probably would
have been acquitted.' 68 The court then proceeded to entertain Ross' claims
that deportation was unreasonable because of his many years of gainful
employment, long standing position in the United States, since the 1980
incident, and the fact that his children were citizens of this country. 169 Any
analysis of the strength of these arguments went unheard. Rather, the court
found that the proper forum for these claims was the Immigration and
Naturalization Service or the Florida Pardon Board. 170 Yet, under the new
laws of the IRIRA and the AEDPA, Ross will be unable to receive relief
from deportation and a pardon is of no avail.' 7' In contrast, had he been
properly informed of the consequences in 1980, he could have sought relief
167. Ross, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D1073. The court agreed with the trial court that
"[w]ithout a proper record of what was said during the plea colloquy, it is impossible for the
state to defend against the petition, or for the trial court to make an informed evaluation of
defendant's claims." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(48) (Supp. 111996). The statute states:
(A) The term "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment
of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been
withheld, where-
(i) ajudge orjury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a
finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment,
penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. (B) Any reference to
a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to
include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law
regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that
imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.
Id. (emphasis added). Since the trial court withheld adjudication, Ross has a conviction
pursuant to immigration laws and is, therefore, a deportable alien. Furthermore, 8 U.S.C. §
1251 (a)(2)(B)(i), states:
Any alien who at any time after entry has been convicted of a violation of (or
a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in
section 802 of title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for
one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
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from INS. The Third District Court of Appeals has granted rehearing en
bane in Ross.
B. The Right of Criminal Aliens to Bond
In order to guarantee the protected freedoms of all criminal defendants,
immigration laws that affect the criminal prosecution of aliens will be
strictly applied. The case of Santos v. Garrison,172 shows how the Fourth
District Court of Appeal has preserved the right of bond to all criminal
defendants, regardless of citizenship.173 Petitioner Jose Santos had an initial
bond set at his first appearance and was subsequently released on bond. 174 At
a later hearing it was discovered that Santos was an undocumented alien and
the court immediately revoked his bond. 175  Although the government
insisted that the bond be revoked, the fourth district granted Santos petition
for writ of habeus corpus and issued an order vacating the bond
revocation. 176 The court reiterated that an increase or revocation of bond
may only be imposed if there is a "change in circumstances or upon
information not disclosed to the court at the time bond was previously
established.' 77 In addition, it is the state's burden, and not the defendant's,
to bring any new information to light.
178
The court held that to detain undocumented aliens under section 439 of
the AEDPA, the accused must have been convicted of a felony and there
must be "receipt of an appropriate hold from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service for the purpose of taking the individual into federal
custody.' '179  In this case, it was the State that failed to inquire whether
172. 691 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
173. Id. at 1173.
174. Id. at 1172.
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Santos, 691 So. 2d at 1172.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1173. Section 1252c(a) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent permitted by
relevant State and local law, State and local law enforcement officials are
authorized to arrest and detain an individual who - (1) is an alien illegally
present in the United States; and (2) has previously been convicted of a
felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such
conviction, but only after the State or local enforcement officials obtain
appropriate confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of
the status of such individual and only for such a period of time as may be
required for the Service to take the individual into Federal custody for
purposes of deporting or removing the alien from the United States.
1997]
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Santos was an illegal alien and it was the petitioner who acknowledged his
status.80 Furthermore, no showing was made that Santos had been convicted
of a felony, and there was no proof of an appropriate hold from INS that
Santos was to be taken into federal custody.' 8'
C. Probation Condition on Aliens
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held in Madrigal v. State,18 2 that as
a special condition on probation, the presence of an undocumented alien
within the state is not, in and of itself, criminal.1 83 The defendant in this case
entered a nolo contendere plea on several counts, ranging from aggravated
assault on a law enforcement officer to discharging a firearm in public.'8
He was sentenced accordingly and the order of probation required
"appellant, who apparently was an illegal alien, to remain outside the United
States and indicated that being in the United States and particularly Saint
Lucie County shall be a violation of probation."'185 The court employed the
formula found in Biller v. State, 8 6 to determine whether such a condition
was valid. 8 7 Specifically, a condition of probation is invalid "'if it (1) has
no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates
to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality.' 18 8  The court
concluded that the condition was improper because the defendant's presence
in the United States was not criminal.1
89
V. CONCLUSION
The AEDPA and IIRIRA pose new, difficult challenges for lawful
permanent residents and others seeking relief from deportation. The recent
8 U.S.C.A. § 1252c(a) (West Supp. 1997).
180. Id.
181. Santos, 691 So. 2d at 1172-73.
182. 683 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
183. Id. at 1095.
184. Id. at 1094.
185. Id.
186. 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993).
187. Madrigal, 683 So. 2d at 1095.
188. Id. (quoting Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734, 734-35 (Fla. 1993)).
189. Id. The court stated that "'although entering the United States at a time or place
other than as designated by immigration officers can constitute a crime, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325,
the record does not establish that the [defendant's] presence in the United States is in itself
criminal."' Madrigal, 683 So. 2d at 1095 (quoting Martinez v. State, 627 So. 2d 542, 543
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
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federal court cases challenging some of these provisions, particularly in
regard to their retroactive application, have arisen in Florida and have taken
center stage in the interpretation of these laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After a two-year hiatus, the Florida Legislature resumed its tradition of
regularly restructuring the Florida Juvenile Code in response to perceived
problems, particularly in Florida's juvenile justice system. The legislature's
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. B.A., 1967, Colgate University; J.D., 1970, Boston College Law School.
The author thanks Raquel M. Chaviano and Daniel S. Weinger for their assistance in the
preparation of this article. This article covers cases decided through June 30, 1997.
1. For a discussion of legislative changes from 1989 through 1996, see Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 Nova L. Rev. 197 (1996) [hereinafter 1996
Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 Nova. L. Rev. 191
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law,
19 Nova L. Rev. 139 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1993
Leading Cases and Significant Developments in Florida Law, 18 Nova L. Rev. 541 (1993)
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primary focus during the 1996-97 session was on removing the delinquency
part II of chapter 39 and rehousing it with its own title in the Florida
Statutes. The second purpose was to reorganize the structure of the
delinquency section of the juvenile code in a way that would be more
logical.2  The result is a new chapter 985, which became effective on
October 1, 1997. The new statute does not have its own title, but the format
has been changed. The changes are discussed briefly in this survey. In
addition, the legislature moved part IV of chapter 39, governing Families in
Need of Services and Children in Need of Services, to chapter 984 and made
several changes to it as well.
This past year, the appellate courts were particularly active in the
delinquency area, both interpreting chapter 39, and holding the trial courts
accountable for compliance with the 1993 and 1994 amendments to the
Florida Juvenile Code. In light of the legislative changes made in the spring
of 1997, it can be anticipated that the appellate courts will have to parse the
new delinquency law as they have in the past. Interestingly, the courts of
appeal were not as active as they have been in the past in the child welfare
arena. The appellate caseload of dependency and termination of parental
rights cases appears to have been lighter this year, resulting in fewer new
interpretations.
II. DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
The Florida Legislature has changed its approach to juvenile detention
on a number of occasions over the past twenty years.3 It has recently added
changes to deal with children charged with committing the offense of
domestic violence and children alleged to have violated conditions of
[hereinafter 1993 Leading Cases]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey ofFlorida Law,
17 Nova L. Rev. 335 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991
Survey ofFlorida Law, 16 Nova L. Rev. 333 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Survey]; Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 Nova L. Rev. 1169 (1990) [hereinafter 1990
Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law, 14 Nova L. Rev. 859 (1990) [hereinafter Juvenile Law];
Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law, 13 Nova L. Rev. 1159 (1989); see also THE FLORIDA BAR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACIICE (5th ed. 1995).
2. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Juv. Just., HB 1369, Staff Analysis & Final Bill Research Doc. at 2
(Apr. 4, 1997).
3. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 190.
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community control or aftercare supervision to the list of children who could
be securely detained .
The Florida pretrial detention statute provides that the determination of
whether a child will be detained securely is based upon the application of a
risk assessment instrument ("RAr"), which in turn is premised upon the
charge against the juvenile.5 If the child scores high enough, the child shall
6be securely detained. The statute also provides the court with limited
discretion to detain a child in secure detention when the RAI scoring
threshold would not otherwise be met.7 However, when the court chooses to
override the RAI, it must state clear and convincing reasons in writing why it
is making such a placement! As noted in previous surveys, the trial courts
have not always correctly interpreted the detention requirements.' In D. G.H.
v. Gnat,'0 the State Attorney sought to have the child detained securely by
"aggravating" the RAI score arising from the underlying claim of battery
against a school board employee on school grounds in the presence of other
students." The First District Court of Appeal carefully analyzed the
legislative history and background of the RAI and concluded that the trial
court's authority to order a child held in detention during the pendency of a
delinquency case is limited to the statutory factors prescribed in the law. 2 In
essence, the trial court accepted a bootstrapping argument, which the
appellate court rejected. The state claim was that because the battery was
committed in the presence of other students on school grounds and there was
a resulting disruption of school functions, the RAI computation could be
increased. The appellate court held that all of the RAI points assigned to
the child were attributable to the delinquent act for which he had been
charged and no other reasons compatible with the statutory criteria were
given that would justify a departure. 4 Thus, the lower court had no statutory
discretion to order a placement more restrictive than that indicated by the
points scored in the RAI.15 The appellate court thus reversed.
16
4. See FLA. STAT. § 985.207(1)(d) (1997) (recodified at §§ 985.213(2)(b)3; 985.215(2)
(1997)).
5. See FLA. STAT. § 39.042(2)(a)1. (1987) (recodified at§ 985.213(2)(a) (1997)).
6. Id. § 39.042(2)(b)1 (recodified at § 985.213(2)(b)(1).
7. Id. § 39.042(2)(b)(3) (recodified at 985.213(2)(b)(3).
8. RA STAT. § 39.044(2)(f) (1995) (recodified at § 985.215(2)(g) (1997)).
9. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 190.
10. 682 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
11. Id. at 211.
12. Id. at213.
13. Id. at 211.
14. Id. at213.
15. D.G.H., 682 So. 2d at 213.
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A similar abuse of discretion occurred in KC. v. Taylor,17 a case in
which the child claimed he was illegally detained based upon a risk
assessment scoring that justified placement only in nonsecure or home
detention. The trial court had ordered him "placed in secure detention with
the proviso that he could be released after 120 hours at the 'counselor's
discretion."' ' 19 The Attorney General's Office candidly admitted that the
detention was illegal and further advised that the same procedure was often
used by the trial courts in the second district.20 The Second District Court of
Appeal held that use of the RAI is a legislative mandate and the courts must
comply with it.21 The appellate court then added the following:
We sympathize with the trial court's frustration that, absent clear
and convincing reasons to depart from the placement required by
the risk assessment instrument, the court had no choice but to
release K.C. from secure detention, despite his record of a prior
delinquency and his current charge of using a broken table leg to
menace a teacher. Until the legislature empowers juvenile court
judges with the measure of discretion afforded to criminal court
judges to protect society from its dangerous elements, delinquent
offenders will be released back into society despite a belief by the
juvenile court judge that contrary action is warranted.22
The appellate court's frustration is evident and raises an important
question of whether, and if so, to what degree, discretion in handling
juvenile matters should be placed in the hands of the courts or the
legislature. The appellate court expressed additional frustration,
commenting that few petitions involving the legality of juvenile detention
raise challenging legal questions.23 Most petitions are pro forma matters in
which the trial court fails to comply with the statutory provisions of chapter
39.24 As this commentator has written in prior survey articles, and as the
appellate court held in/K C.: "The processing of petitions of obvious merit
such as this one consumes public resources of the public defender's office,
16. Id. at214.
17. 696 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
18. Id. at 858.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 858-59.
21. Id. at 859.
22. K C., 696 So. 2d at 859.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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the attorney general's office and this court-time which could be better spent
on disputes that are honestly debatable. 25
In TB. v. Wright,26 a juvenile petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging that he could not be held in detention on a charge of burglary
beyond twenty-one days without good cause.27 The trial court detained him,
relying on his prior record and the perceived danger to the community. The
appellate court found that this rationale did not comply with the Florida
28statute. The ground for extending detention is a delay resulting from a
continuance granted by the court for cause on motion of the child, his or her
counsel, or the state.29 Here, the detention extension was based upon the
original grounds for detention which the appellate court rejected.30
The Florida detention statute also governs post-adjudication and post-
disposition detention.3' In TM v. State,32 a child appealed from the
imposition of a five-day detention period in addition to other penalties
permitted by law after he had been adjudicated delinquent for carrying a
concealed firearm.33 Section 790.22(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides
that a five-day detention period shall be imposed on any juvenile who
commits an offense that involves the use or possession of a firearm. 34 The
juvenile claimed that the statute violated equal protection because an adult
who committed the same offense was not subject to the same mandatory
incarceration period.35 The Third District Court of Appeal rejected the equal
protection argument on both state and federal constitutional grounds. W It
held first that juveniles and adults are not similarly situated because "the
state's interests in juvenile offenders is vastly different from its interests in
adult offenders."'37 The court also declared that the test for treating the two
groups differently is whether there is a rational basis to do so. 38 Finally, the
court held that the government's objective bore a reasonable relationship to
25. Id
26. 679 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
27. Id at 82.
28. Id at 83.
29. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(d) (1996).
30. TB., 679 So. 2d at 83.
31. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10)(a)1 (1996) (recodified at § 985.215(10)(a)1 (1997)).
32. 689 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
33. Id at 444.
34. FLA. STAT. § 790.22(9)(a) (1995).
35. TM., 689 So. 2d at 444.
36. Id.
37. Id at445.
38. Id.
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the legitimate state objective of reducing the alarming and escalating number
of firearms in the hands of juveniles.39
B. Adjudicatory Issues
The question of whether charging two fifteen-year-old boys who
engaged in consensual sex with two twelve-year-old girls with statutory rape
violated the boys' right to privacy under the Florida Constitution was before
the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. J.A.S.40 The appellate court
upheld the constitutionality of section 800.04, which the State relied upon to
charge the youths.41 In so doing, the court did not rely upon the seminal
opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida in T. W. v. State which upheld the
right to privacy for a minor seeking an abortion.43 Rather, the court relied
upon the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in B.B. v. State," and the
legislature's intent in enacting section 800.04. 45 The court concluded that
sexual activity between minors is prohibited whether or not each of the
46participants believes he or she consented. Further, the legislature viewed
47the problem of consensual sex as serious. Therefore, the statute furthered a
compelling state interest through the least intrusive means, the test set forth• 48
in T. W. The problem remaining in the J.A.S. case was whether the penalty
was appropriate. The court held that the trial court had the power to
adjudicate a minor a felon if the situation justified it.49 As a result, it vacated
and remanded.50 However, the court also certified the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance:
WHETHER THE POTENTIAL PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 800.04, FLORIDA STATUTES, BY A MINOR
UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTEEN FURTHERS A COMPELLING
39. Id. at 445-46.
40. 686 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
41. Id. at 1366.
42. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
43. Id. at 1188.
44. 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
45. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1369.
46. Id. at 1368.
47. Id. at 1369.
48. TW., 551 So. 2dat 1186.
49. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1369.
50. Id. at 1366.
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STATE INTEREST THROUGH THE LEAST INTRUSIVE
MEANS.5
1
Juvenile curfew ordinances are a popular political response to the
complicated problems of youth crime. 52 In Cuva v. State,53 an ordinance in
effect in Orlando generated an appellate opinion on a search and seizure
question.54 An Orlando police officer stopped a juvenile because the
appellant was in downtown Orlando after midnight and appeared to be under
eighteen, thus in violation of the city's curfew ordinance. The appellate
court found that the ordinance allowed the police officers to do several
things, including issuing a trespass warning or ordering the juvenile to leave
downtown Orlando. According to the ordinance, "the officers could only
detain... if there was probable cause to believe [the juvenile] was
abandoned, neglected or a threat to himself., 56 The juvenile in the Cuva
case met none of these criteria. Further, violation of the ordinance was
neither a crime nor a noncriminal violation. There was no provision for the
minor to be detained unless it appeared the minor was abandoned, neglected,
or in danger.57 Thus, the ordinancegave the police no authority to detain the
juvenile once he told them his age. The initial contact was consensual, and
after the youngster answered the officer's questions, the officer could not
detain him absent an articulable suspicion that the youngster had committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime. 59 The appellate court
therefore reversed.60
A child who is unable to assist in his or her defense at trial may be
committed to the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") for
residential treatment in order to restore competency. In KD. v. Department
of Juvenile Justice,61 the child claimed, inter alia, that the commitment
statute was unconstitutional because it did not require a psychiatrist to
recommend commitment as provided under the adult involuntary
51. Id at 1370.
52. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 207-08.
53. 687 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
54. Id at275.
55. Id at 276.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Cuva, 687 So. 2d at 275.
59. Id. at277.
60. Id at 274.
61. 694 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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62
commitment statute. The appellate court held that the comparable adult
rule of criminal procedure dealing with incompetent defendants does not
require the appointment of a psychiatrist or the court's receipt of a
psychiatric report in order to commit an adult defendant found to be
incompetent to proceed.63 Thus, the juvenile offender and the adult criminal
defendant are treated similarly for purposes of the determination of
incompetency, and the court therefore affirmed the commitment.
64
A First Amendment student's rights case was recently decided by the
Third District Court of Appeal in MC. v. State.65 A middle school student in
Dade County was arrested as a result of disruptive activities, including an
intentionally loud tirade and protest in the school's office resulting from the
arrest of her brother on the battery of a police officer. The juvenile was
charged in a one count petition of delinquency for violation of the Florida
statute A overning disruption and interference with the operation of
schools. She moved to dismiss the delinquency petition on the grounds
that it was facially unconstitutional in violation of free speech, overbreadth,
67 68and vagueness. The district court upheld the statute in all respects. The
court rejected the free speech claim relying both on state and federal
constitutional case law.69 In L.A. T. v. State,u the Third District Court of
Appeal had reversed a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for disorderly
conduct based upon the child's screaming obscenities to police officers who
were arresting the juvenile's friend in a shopping center parking lot.71 The
court distinguished the MC. situation, finding that a school setting is
entirely different from an open public setting. Furthermore, the court
relied upon Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
73
which held that the key question was whether the forbidden conduct or
expression "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others. 74 The court held that the Florida statute did
62. Id. at 818; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.0517 (Supp. 1996) (recodified at § 985.223
(1997)).
63. KD., 694 So. 2d at 818; see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.212 (1995).
64. KD., 694 So. 2d at 818.
65. 695 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
66. See FLA. STAT. § 877.13 (1995).
67. M.C., 695 So. 2d at 478.
68. Id. at 484.
69. Id. at 480-81.
70. 650 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
71. Id. at215-17.
72. Id. at 217.
73. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
74. Id. at513.
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not violate the First Amendment under Tinker because its intended purpose
was to prevent only expression or conduct which materially disrupts or
interferes with normal school functions or activities.75
In G.RA. v. State,76 a child appealed a disposition which, inter alia,
placed the child on community control for one year after withholding
adjudication. 77 The appellate court held that the relevant statute specifies the
dispositional powers of the trial court when it has jurisdiction over an
adjudicated child under which circumstances the commitment may not
exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which an adult could serve for
the same offense.78 However, nothing in the statute covers a court's
dispositional powers when the adjudication is withheld. Despite this fact,
the appellate court held that the trial court should not be allowed to impose a
penalty harsher than that permitted for an adjudicated delinquent or an adult
offender.79  Therefore, the court reduced the commitment to the time
established for an adjudicated delinquent or adult.80
In P. W.G. v. State,8 ' one of the issues on appeal was whether the court
could enter an order of disposition placing a child in a high risk level facility
specializing in treatment of adolescent sexual offenders based upon a report
that included a judgment based upon the child's prior uncharged criminal
activity. 2 The court of appeal stated that there was no due process violation
in making that decision.8 The due process analysis contained in In re
Gault8 4 dealt only with procedural due process.35 It did not address
substantive due process rights.86 Because the purposes of the juvenile and
adult criminal justice processes are different, the court held that it was
constitutionally permissible for the trial court to impose whatever treatment
plan it concluded was most likely to be effective for the particular child as
long as it did "not pose a significant threat to the health or well-being of the
child. 87
75. MC., 695 So. 2d at 481.
76. 688 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
77. Id at 1027.
78. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (1996).
79. G.RA., 688 So. 2d at 1028.
80. Id at 1028-29.
81. 682 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. lst Dist Ct. App. 1996).
82. Id at 1204.
83. Id at 1206-08.
84. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
85. P. W.G., 682 So. 2d at 1207.
86. Id.
87. Id at 1208.
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C. Right to Counsel Issues
The right to counsel is a basic precept of the juvenile court system
emanating from In re Gault.8 Florida provides for counsel by statute and
under the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.8 9 Rule 8.165 sets forth the
obligation of the court to provide counsel and the grounds under which the
child may waive counsel.90 Periodically, the trial courts either fail to
appoint counsel or advise juveniles of the right to a lawyer. 91 In N.R.L.v.
State,92 an adjudicatory order was entered following the child's uncontested93
plea to grand theft. The child was not represented by counsel when he
entered his plea, and the appellate court found that no thorough inquiry was
made into the juvenile's desire to waive the right to counsel as required by
Rule 8.165(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.94 The court
reversed, finding that the child must be advised of the right to counsel, and,
if he chooses to waive counsel, the court must determine whether the waiver
was freely and intelligently made.
95
If a child indicates a desire to waive counsel, the court must ensure by
"thorough inquiry" that the waiver is freely and intelligently made.96 In
D.VL. v. State, the Second District Court of Appeal analyzed the
proposition that a plea be knowing and voluntary.98 In D. VL., the trial court
never determined that the plea was entered "voluntarily and with an
understanding of the nature of the allegations," and the possible
consequences of such plea, and that there is a factual basis for such plea. 99
The appellate court found that the "plea colloquy was woefully
inadequate, '"100 and thus reversed and remanded.' 01
The right to a speedy trial, based upon rights secured by the Sixth
Amendment in adult cases, 1 2 also applies in juvenile delinquency cases. In
88. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42.
89. FLA. STAT. § 39.041 (1995); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165.
90. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165.
91. See 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 342-45.
92. 684 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
93. Id. at 299.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 300.
96. Interest of D.L.A., 667 So. 2d 330, 331 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
97. 693 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
98. Id. at 694.
99. Id.; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.075.
100. D. V.L., 693 So. 2d at 694.
101. Id.
102. -arker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972).
[Vol. 22:179
189
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
1997]
PJ.A. v. Foster,10 3 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the right.
10 4
Recently, in State v. .W, the State appealed from an order granting a
motion to dismiss a delinquency petition based upon a speedy trial violation
claiming that the State could file outside the ninety-day speedy trial period
based upon a fifteen-day "window of recapture period" provided by the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.10 6 The court held that the rule does not
allow the State to file a delinquency petition after the ninety day period has
already expired. 10 7 In the case at bar, the speedy trial period expired one day
before the charges were filed against the child. 18 Because the State was not
entitled to file the charges against the child beyond the ninety day period, it
could not avail itself of the recapture period.109
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided a very important case
regarding the constitutional rights of children in public schools. In New
Jersey v. T.L. 0.,11° the Court established the standard for search and seizure
by a school official, holding that it is one of reasonable suspicion as opposed111 112
to probable cause. In J.A.P v. State, a child was adjudicated to have
committed the offenses of possession of a firearm on school grounds,
carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm by a minor.113 The
child argued, inter alia, that the hand gun seized from his person on the first
day of school by a deputy sheriff in the presence of an assistant principal
should have been suppressed. When a teacher learned that the juvenile
might have the weapon, the official called the school resource officer, who
was a deputy sheriff assigned to the school. 114 The deputy performed a pat-
down and felt the holstered pistol in the boy's waist band. The significant
issue was the involvement of the deputy sheriff, who as a police officer,
generally needs to have probable cause to search, as opposed to the assistant
principal, who needed merely reasonable suspicion to interrogate and search
under T.L.O. 115 The court held first that because the child was carrying a
gun on his person in the classroom during the school day, either a school
103. 603 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1992); see also 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 347.
104. Id at 1171-72.
105. 679 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
106. Id.; see FLA. R Juv. P. 8.090G).
107. TW., 679 So. 2d at 70.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
111. Id at341.
112. 689 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
113. Id at 1243.
114. Id
"115. Id.
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official or a police officer needed only have reasonable suspicion to conduct
the inquiry because the inquiry was in the nature of a "Terry stop," referring
to the Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio.1 6 The court further held, in
an apparent expansion of T.L.O., that as a general proposition, a school
official who has reasonable suspicion that a student is carrying a dangerous
weapon may request any police officer to perform a pat-down search and
that the involvement of the police officer will not violate the student's
Fourth Amendment right or require probable cause for such a search. 1 7 The
court's rationale was:
It would be foolhardy and dangerous to hold that a teacher or
school administrator, who often is untrained in firearms, can search
a child reasonably suspected of carrying a gun or other dangerous
weapon at school only if the teacher or administrator does not
involve the school's trained resource officer or some other police
officer."
8
In addition, the court reasoned that courts have held that random
suspicionless administrative searches have been approved because of the
danger of students carrying such weapons.
19
In a second case, A.S. v. State, the Second District Court of Appeal
applied the two-part T.L.O. standard: That the search is grounded in
reasonable suspicion if it is justified at its inception, and that it is reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the search in the first
place.' 21  In A.S., the assistant principal saw a group of boys huddled
together, one of the students with money in his hand, and the appellant
fiddling in his pocket. The official could see no contraband, and thus the
court held the search was not justified at its inception. 122 The court also held
that because the student was fiddling with his pockets, the search of his
backpack and wallet was unreasonable as well.1
23
116. Id at 1244 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and relying upon New York case
law cited in In re Gregory M., 627 N.E.2d 500, 502 (N.Y. 1993)).
117. J.A.R., 689 So. 2d at 1244.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing State v. J.A., 679 So: 2d 316 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
120. 693 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
121. Id. at 1095 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985)).
122. Id. at 1096.
123. Id.
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D. Dispositional Issues
The dispositional alternatives available in the Florida Juvenile Code
include restitution, community control, and commitment to various facilities
operated either directly or under contract by the Department of Juvenile
Justice ("DJJ"). 24 Although the suggestion has been made previously in this
survey that the dispositional statute is not particularly complex,25  the
appellate courts continue to rule primarily on rather mundane and repetitious
issues of error by the trial courts. For example, section 39.052(4) of the
Florida Statutes governs the procedures for disposition, and section
39.052(4)(e)1. specifically states:
If the court determines that the child should be adjudicated as
having committed a delinquent act and should be committed to the
department, such determination shall be in writing or on the record
of the hearing. The determination shall include a specific finding of
the reasons for the decision to adjudicate and to commit the child
to the department.1
26
In KY.L. and N.L. v. State,127 the trial court gave no reason for its
commitment decision as to one child and, as to the other, the court erred by
relying on the child's lack of contrition or remorse to place the child. 12 -
Lack of contrition or remorse is a constitutionally impermissible
consideration in imposing sentence, as at least three earlier appellate court
decisions have held.129 In J.M. v. State,'" the State conceded that the trial
court erred in failing to make the requisite findings and the court reversed.
3 1
The same problem has arisen regularly with regard to the trial court's
obligation to enter a written order when it imposes an adult sentence, as
opposed to a juvenile disposition, when the child has been tried as an
124. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(l)(a) (1995).
125. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 197.
126. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)l. (1996).
127. 685 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct App. 1997).
128. Id, at 1381.
129. Id (citing A.S. v. State, 667 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Holton v. State,
573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 960 (1991); Hubler v. State, 458 So. 2d 350
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
130. 692 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
131. Id at 308; see also 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 198-99; K.M.T. v. State, 695 So. 2d
1309, 1310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); J.RC. v. State, 696 So. 2d 822, 822 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that the court must specify its reasons in writing or on the record of the
hearing).
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adult. 132 Prior to October 1, 1994, the Florida Legislature required trial
courts to make specific, detailed written findings justifying the imposition of
the adult sentence. 133 Now, the court need only make a written order of the
decision to impose adult sanctions.134 In four reported decisions, Culliver v.
State,135 McBride v. State,'136 Ledbetter v. State,137 and Brown v. State,'13 the
courts of appeal reversed for failure to enter a written order as provided by
the revised statute.
139
A relatively new form of disposition under Florida law is a fifteen day
secure detention placement pending transfer to the Department of Juvenile
Justice for commitment.140 In P.E.D. v. Gnat, 141 the First District Court of
Appeal was faced with the question of whether the fifteen day limitation
applied to a juvenile who was going to be placed in a high or maximum risk
facility operated by DJJ. 14 2 The State argued that the fifteen day limitation
on secure detention pending placement applied only to juveniles awaiting
placement in lower to moderate risk residential programs, and that there was
no limitation on those awaiting placement in a high risk program. 143 The
appellate court agreed and found that the more specific provision of the
section controls, and because it placed no time limit on secure detention, the
continued confinement was lawful.
44
In C.H. v. Makemson,145  a second case that interpreted the
post-disposition secure detention statute, the question was how many days a
child may be ordered into secure detention for violating the terms of home
detention care with electronic monitoring while awaiting a moderate risk
placement.146 The court ordered the child placed in secure detention for ten
days. 147 The child argued that the maximum placement was five days.
148
132. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1995); see also 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 202-03.
133. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1993) (amended by FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1994)).
134. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1995).
135. 693 So. 2d 1152, 1152 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
136. 695 So. 2d 405, 405 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
137. 692 So. 2d 257,257 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
138. 692 So. 2d 987, 987-88 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
139. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1995).
140. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10)(a)1 (Supp. 1996) (recodified at § 985.215 (10(a)l
(1997)).
141. 681 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
142. Id. at 848.
143. Id. at 849.
144. Id.
145. 692 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
146. Id. at303.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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The court agreed with the child's interpretation of the statute and granted the
writ of habeas corpus. 49
When a child has been found to have committed a delinquent act and
the court considers its disposition of the case, "the court [must] consider a
pre-disposition report regarding the suitability of the child for disposition
other than by adjudication and commitment to [DJJ].' 150 The dispositional
report results from a multidisciplinary assessment, if needed and a
"classification and placement process" with recommendations.1yi Trial
courts seem to have had difficulty interpreting their responsibilities in
reviewing and evaluating the DJJ recommendation. For example, in RD. v.
State,152 the DJJ prepared a predisposition report recommending community
control but the court rejected it. On appeal, the First District Court of
Appeal found that the trial court rejected the recommendation and imposed a
high risk commitment without first securing another recommendation from
DJJ as to the restrictiveness level which the statute required. 154 The court
relied upon earlier opinions in S.R v. State,155 and K YL. & N.L. v. State,'56
of which held that the court must receive and consider a recommendation
from the DJJ as to restrictiveness level before ordering a commitment.
157
Apparently, the courts were interpreting the statute to require a second
recommendation after the initial rejection. '8
In T.M.B. v. State,'59 the trial court disregarded DJJ's pre-disposition
report recommendation and gave no reason for its decision. 6  Because it
failed to articulate its rationale, the appellate court reversed. 161 Thus, the
trial court's departure from a DJJ recommendation is appealable. 162
Of course, the trial court does have the power to deviate from the DJJ's
recommended commitment level.163 Section 39.052(4)(e)3 of the Florida
149. Id.
150. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(a) (Supp. 1996).
151. Id.
152. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1235 (1st Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1997).
153. Id. atD1235.
154. Id.
155. 683 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
156. 685 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
157. 1RD. v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1235 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. May 13, 1997).
158. See LP.M. v. State, 688 So. 2d 458, 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
159. 689 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
160. Id at 1216.
161. Id.
162. J.M. v. State, 677 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
163. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 200.
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Statutes governs the process whereby the court may disagree with the DJJ
placement recommendation. 64 The statute provides:
The court shall commit the child to the department at the
restrictiveness level identified or may order placement at a
different restrictiveness level. The court shall state for the record
the reasons which establish by a preponderance of the evidence
why the court is disregarding the assessment of the child and the
restrictiveness level recommended by the department. Any party
may appeal the court's findings resulting in a modified level of
restrictiveness pursuant to this subparagraph. 65
The issue in R.L.B. v. State166 was whether the court could deviate from
the recommended commitment level by placing the child at the high risk
restrictiveness level when there was no high risk program available.' The
appellate court held that the trial court acted within its authority when it
168assigned the juvenile to the specific restrictiveness level. What the court
cannot do, according to Florida case law, is choose a particular placement
for the child. The First District Court of Appeal noted that the ultimate
resolution lay in the legislature to provide an appropriate placement, but
nonetheless, the statute gave the appellate court the power to set that level.1 70
Finally, in R.D.S. v. State,171 a child appealed from a dispositional order
disregarding DJJ's minimum risk placement recommendation based upon the
court's observation of the child.172 The court found the child's body
language offensive to the court because it was disrespectful and
contemptuous. 73 The appellate court held that lack of contrition or remorse
is not sufficient to overcome the burden placed upon the trial court when it
disregards placement recommendations.
The extent to which a juvenile court can impose "moral" and "spiritual"
training was before the First District Court of Appeal in MC.L. v.
164. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)3 (Supp. 1996).
165. Id.
166. 693 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
167. Id. at 131.
168. Id. at 131-32.
169. Id. at 131 (citing H.R.S. v. State, 616 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
170. Id.
171. 696 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
172. dat 1189.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing K.Y.L. v. State, 685 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) and AS. v.
State, 667 So. 2d 994 (FIa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
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State.175 The child challenged the order on both state and federal
constitutional grounds. 176  The court held that the imposition of moral
training did not violate either the federal or Florida constitutional provisions
relating to free exercise of religion, but that the spiritual training portion was
unconstitutional. 177 The court concluded that the moral training bore a
relationship to the crime for which the juvenile had been adjudicated and
reasonably related to future criminality.178 Finally, the First District Court of
Appeal upheld the trial court's order that the mother participate with her
child in fulfilling the court ordered sanction. 179 The court held that the order
as to the mother was within the dispositional power expressly granted to the
court by statute. 80
Another dispositional alternative is community control, known in other
jurisdictions as probation. The contours of this dispositional alternative
continue to evade the grasp of the trial courts. Nine reported opinions by
the courts of appeal are illustrative of the kinds of problems that arise. In
JS. v. State,lsr the trial court, as a condition of community control,
instructed the child to stay away from "negative peers."'1 2  The Third
District Court of Appeal reversed on the grounds that the description was too
vague to be enforceable.1
8 3
Section 39.054 of the Florida Statutes governs the placement on
community control. Subpart 4 provides as follows:
Any commitment of a delinquent child to the Department of
Juvenile Justice must be for an indeterminant period of time... but
the time may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment that
an adult may serve for the same offense .... [A] child may not be
held under a commitment from a court pursuant to this section after
becoming 21 years of age.184
Thus, the statute clearly provides that commitment and community
control shall be limited to the maximum adult sentence or to the date of the
juvenile's nineteenth birthday, whichever happens first.
175. 682 So. 2d 1209, 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
176. Id at 1210.
177. Id at 1212.
178. Id at 1213.
179. Id at 1214.
180. MC.L., 682 So. 2d at 1214.
181. 691 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
182. Id at20.
183. Id (citing McCord v. State, 679 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
184. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (1995).
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In C.P. v. State, I" the court committed a child on a third degree felony,
punishable by imprisonment not to exceed five years, to community control
for an indeterminant period exceeding five years. 186 The appellate court
reversed and remanded with instructions to the lower court to clarify the
order to place the child on community control for an indeterminate term not
to exceed five years."' In MS. v. State, 18 the State conceded sentencing
error and the court remanded based upon the C.P. opinion.189 In V. v.
State,19° the trial court placed the child on community control until the
child's nineteenth birthday based upon an adjudication of a first degree
misdemeanor. 191 The maximum sentence for a first degree misdemeanor for
an adult is one year in county jail or community control.192 In light of the
disposition for more than the period an adult would face, the appellate court
vacated the sentence and the case was remanded.
193
However, in MB. v. State, 194 after a child was found to have committed
one count of battery, the court withheld adjudication and placed the child on
community control under Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
supervision for an indeterminate period. 195 The court of appeal held that
because the child was not "adjudicated" for purposes of chapter 39,196 his
case was governed by a separate section of the Florida Statutes: Section
39.053.197 Under this law, the restrictions relating to community control and
comparisons to adult sanctions do not apply.
198
A more technical matter came before the court in C.L. v. State.'99
Among the issues the child raised on appeal was the failure of the court to
announce seventy-five hours of community service at the sentencing.200 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the conditions of
185. 674 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
186. Id. at 1184.
187. Id.
188. 695 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
189. Id. at 891 (citing C.P. v. State, 674 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1996)).
190. 693 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
191. Id. at723.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing G.R.A. v. State, 688 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)); see also
1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 154; 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 358; 1991 Survey, supra note 1,
at 351 n.112; 1990 Survey, supra note 1, at 1185; Juvenile Law, supra note 1, at 877.
194. 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
195. Id. at 1066.
196. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1) (1993) (repealed 1997).
197. M.B., 693 So. 2d at 1067.
198. Id.
199. 693 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
200. Id. at715.
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community control need not be orally pronounced at the sentencing. 201 In
another technical holding, J.KN. v. State,202 a child appealed a final order of
disposition that he violated the community control disposition by failing to
attend school. 203 The appellate court reversed, finding that the evidence at
the violation hearing did not establish that anyone had instructed the child to
attend school. 204 Apparently, existence of an order alone did not suffice.
One of the common conditions of community control is regular school
attendance with no unexcused absences. In a series of consolidated appeals
205in F.A. T. v. State, the juveniles claimed the affidavits alleging violation of
community control were based upon "confidential and inadmissible
computer-generated school attendance records impermissibly obtained and
[employed] by the state attorney's office in violation of [Florida law]. 20 6
Specifically at issue was section 228.093 of the Florida Statutes which
governs privacy of school records and the state constitutional right to
privacy.207 The appellate court first found that the attendance records,
consisting of records of absences and an absence and warning summary from
the school system were covered by the statute, and thus, not subject to
public disclosure.1°8 The court then found that none of the statutory
exceptions to nondisclosure applied.0 9 One of the exceptions to the
disclosure rule involves using the records to determine the appropriate
programs and services for juveniles and their families.2 10 Therefore, the use
of such records is admissible in a dispositional hearing but not in any prior211
proceedings. The court held that a contempt proceeding is neither a
dispositional nor a post-dispositional hearing.212 To the contrary, the act of
indirect criminal contempt constitutes a delinquent act. The contempt
proceeding, therefore, is not a post-dispositional proceeding. 3  For that
reason, the records were held inadmissible.214
201. Id (citing A.B.C. v. State, 682 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1996)).
202. 691 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct App. 1997).
203. Id at 1169.
204. Id.
205. 690 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
206. Id. at 1348.
207. Id (citing Fla. Stat § 220.093 (1995)).
208. Id at 1349.
209. Id. at 1350.
210. F.A.T, 690 So. 2d at 1350.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id at 13501351.
214. Id.
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The appropriate application of Florida's restitution statute continues to
create problems for the trial courts.215 The Supreme Court of Florida, in
J. O.S. v. State,216 recently resolved one significant issue: Whether, in the
absence of a plea agreement, restitution could be ordered in an amount
greater than the maximum dollar figure defining the offense for which the
child had been adjudicated. 217 The Supreme Court of Florida answered the
question in the affirmative. 21 The court first reiterated that damage must be
caused by the charged offense before it would be subject to an order of
restitution in a juvenile proceeding.219 Specifically, the damage must bear a
significant relationship to the convicted offense.220 Next, the court compared
the juvenile restitution situation to that of an adult criminal defendant and
applied the same test it had previously applied to adults in Hebert v. State.
221
In the adult case, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that a trial court could
order restitution that exceeded the amount defined by the maximum dollar
value of the offense when a plea agreement expressly left the amount of
restitution to the discretion of the trial court.222 The only difference between
the Hebert case and the case at bar was the issue of whether discretion ought
to be afforded in the absence of an express agreement leaving the amount of
the restitution to the court's discretion. This question had been explicitly
left undecided in Hebert.224 The court concluded in JO.S. that so long as the
amount of damage bore a substantial relationship to what would be the
conviction if the child were an adult, the court could order restitution in an
amount greater than the maximum dollar value defining the offense for
which the child was adjudicated.225
In CM v. State, the grandmother and legal guardian were ordered to
pay restitution to the victim of the child's theft.227 The appellate court held
that the order explicitly violated the Florida statute governing restitution
215. See 1995 Survey, supra note 1, at 199E200.
216. 689 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1997).
217. Id. at 1062.
218. Id.
219. Id.at 1063 (citing Fla. Stat. § 775.089(1)(a) (Supp. 1994)).
220. Id. at 1064 (citing J.S.H. v. State, 472 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1985)).
221. JO.S., 689 So. 2d at 1064 (citing Herbert v. State, 614 So. 2d 493, 494 (Fla. 1993)).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1065.
226. 676 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also J.T. v. State, 680 So. 2d 564,
564 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996); M.C.L. v. State, 682 So. 2d 1209, 1214 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
227. Id.
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orders.228 Section 39.054(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes provides that a court
imposing restitution at disposition has three alternatives: 1) ordering the
child to make restitution in money; 2) ordering the child to make restitution
in kind; or 3) ordering the child to make restitution through a promissory
note, cosigned by the child's parent or guardian, providing that the parent or
guardian had failed to establish he or she had made a diligent effort to
prevent the child from engaging in the delinquent acts.2 29 The court found
that the trial court did not use any of these alternatives, but instead simply
imposed direct liability upon the grandmother.230  The appellate court
reversed.231
Under Florida law, the parent can be ordered to pay a fee for the
services rendered to the child by the Public Defender.23z In C.M v. State,
23
the trial court ordered the child's guardian to pay $250 to the City of
Jacksonville for services rendered to the child by the Public
Defender.3 4 However, it was undisputed that the guardian, the child's
grandmother, was not afforded either notice of intent to seek such a fee from
her or an opportunity to contest its amount. Therefore, the appellate court
reversed.235
Florida law also provides that when the court enters an order of
restitution as part of community control, the amount may not exceed an23623
amount the child could reasonably be expected to earn. In AJ v. State,237
a fifteen-year-old pleaded guilty to aggravated battery, which resulted in a
restitution order to the victim's parents and a separate amount to the
insurance company2 3 Because there was no record of evidence of what the
child could reasonably be expected to earn, and because the trial court made
no such finding, there was no basis for the conclusion that the child could
pay the amount ordered in restitution. The court of appeal therefore
reversed.240
228. Id at 499.
229. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(o (1995) (repealed 1997).
230. C.M., 676 So. 2d at 499.
231. Id.
232. See FLA. STAT. § 39.041(2) (1995) (recodified at § 985.203(2) (1997)); see also 1994
Survey, supra note 1, at 146; 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 557; 1992 Survey, supra note
1, at 3701374.
233. 676 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
234. Id at 499.
235. Id at 498.
236. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(I)(a)1 (1995) (repealed 1997).
237. 677 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
238. aId at 936.
239. Id. at 938.
240. Id
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A case clearly demonstrating a waste of appellate resources is T.S. v.
State.24' In that case, the trial court adjudicated two juveniles delinquent and
ordered restitution in the amount of $11,874.75.242 The problem was that the
court failed to clarify each child's responsibility for the single restitution
amount. Apparently, the trial court orally announced that the appellants
were each responsible, jointly and severally, with another codefendant for
$9,265.50."4 The two appellants were each also responsible, jointly and
severally, for the remaining $2,609.25.244 The appellate court remanded to
241the trial court so that it could put the oral pronouncements in writing.
In J.K v. State,246 a child who had entered a plea of guilty to burglary
appealed from the amount of restitution for the loss of a cellular phone.
247
The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $690.25, constituting
twenty-five cents for the cost of the phone and $690 for the victim's
248
remaining obligation on the contract . The appellate court reversed based
upon its determination that the award over compensated the victim.49 The
appellate court did recognize that a restoration award could take into account
"consideration that the timing of repayment may cause the victim to suffer
additional loss. ' '25° However, the facts here were that the award of $690.25
for the contract alone over compensated the victim for his loss. Had the
victim been unable to use the telephone, he could have canceled the contract
and been obligated to pay only $400. As the court said, "[r]estitution [does]
not abandon the concept of mitigation of damages. ' 251
A similar miscalculation of restitution took place in B.D.A. v. State.
In that case, the dispositional order resulted from the child's adjudication for
having made false bomb reports to school officials necessitating evacuation
of the school building. 2" The restitution order included assessment for the
254salaries of school staff for each of the days involved. However, theteachers and staff continued to perform services and received their regular
241. 693 So. 2d 119 (FIa. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
242. Id. at 120.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. 695 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
247. Id. at 869.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 870.
250. Id.
251. J.K., 695 So. 2d at 870.
252. 695 So. 2d 399 (FIa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
253. Id. at 399.
254. Id.
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salary.255 Thus, there was no damage or loss caused by the offense. The
Florida statute does not provide for compelled restitution under these
circumstances.256
Finally, restitution orders must be made while the court has
jurisdiction. In MC.L. v. State,25 7 the trial court held a hearing on restitution
after the child's notice of appeal was filed. 25 Therefore, the order imposing
restitution was without effect for lack of jurisdiction despite the fact that the
judge attempted to reserve jurisdiction to consider restitution.2 11 On the
260other hand, in C.A. v. State, the trial court reserved jurisdiction within
sixty days of the sentence, as required by Florida law, 261 having accepted a
plea agreement in which the State reserved restitution and the trial court
orally stated that it was reserving jurisdiction.262 While the written order did
not conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement, the appellate court held
that the oral pronouncement prevailed over the written form.263 There had
been no loss ofjurisdiction similar to that which occurred in M.C.L.2
E. Appeals
The issue of a right of appeal for a juvenile who is indigent, although
not decided by the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault, is provided• • 265
by statute in Florida. The counsel statute includes the appointment of the
public defender for purposes of appeal for an indigent juvenile defendant. 266
An important issue was before the First District Court of Appeal in ZF. v.
State. The question before the court was whether a child had a right to a
public defender on appeal where the parents were not indigent and did not
wish to appeal on the child's behalf.2 The appellate court held that under
section 27.52(2)(d) of the Florida Statutes, the court has the power to
255. Id.
256. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(f) (Supp. 1996).
257. 682 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
258. Id at 1214.
259. Id See Nguyen v. State, 655 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Skaggs v.
State, 620 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
260. 685 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
261. Id at 1037. See FLA. STAT. § 775.089 (1995).
262. CA., 685 So. 2d at 1037.
263. Id.
264. MC.L., 682 So. 2d at 1209.
265. See FLA STAT. § 39.069(1) (1985) (recodified at § 985.234(1) (1997)).
266. See FLA. STAT. § 27.51 (Supp. 1996).
267. 683 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
268. Id at 1084.
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appoint the Office of the Public Defender or a private attorney to represent a
youth on appeal if the nonindigent parent or guardian will not employ
counsel. 2 69 However, in order to do so, the appeal must be necessary. 271 The
court established a test for determining necessary legal services. It
concluded that when the parents are nonindigent, the court should obtain the
opinions of the trial attorney and the parents as to whether an appeal would
involve necessary legal services.2 72  Should the court have any doubts, it
should remove the parents as the decision maker on the issue and appoint a
guardian ad litem. Should the court determine that the appeal involves
274
necessary legal services, an attorney should then be appointed. If the
court, on the other hand, finds the case does not constitute necessary legal
services, it should decline to appoint counsel.
275
F. Legislative and Rules Changes
For several years, the Juvenile Justice Advisory Board27 6 has been
pressing the Florida Legislature to make changes in part II of chapter 39
dealing with juvenile delinquency by providing it with its own title and then
reorganizing it.277 This year, the legislature responded by passing chapter
97-238.278 The resulting chapter 985 did not altogether accomplish the
advisory board's purpose because part II of chapter 39 has been moved, not
to a new title, but to a new chapter within title XLVII which governs
"criminal procedure and corrections." 279 The delinquency part of chapter 39
had been in title V which is entitled "Judicial Branch., 280  When the
delinquency provisions were in the judicial branch section they followed
269. Id. at 1085.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. ZF., 683 So. 2d at 1085.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See FLA. STAT. § 39.003 (Supp. 1996) (establishing and governing the operation of
the Juvenile Justice Advisory Board). The Board's duties are set forth in section 39.003(4) of the
Florida Statutes.
277. Telephone Interview with Timothy Center, Esq., Staff Member, Juvenile Justice
Advisory Board (Sept. 10, 1997).
278. Chapter 9713238 resulted from House Bill 1369 which originated within the
Department of Juvenile Justice and was amended to include SB 2086, the Juvenile Justice
Advisory Board's technical rewrite of chapter 39. See 1997 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 9713238
(West).
279. FLA. STAT. tit. XLVII (1996).
280. FLA. STAT. tit. V (1996).
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chapters governing the functions of the supreme court, circuit courts, county
courts, and district courts of appeal. The delinquency provisions are now
found in the criminal procedure and corrections sections after chapters
relating to youthful offenders and victim assistance and crime in general.281
Placement of the delinquency provisions, as they are currently written under
either title, makes little structural sense.28 2 The simplest approach would
have been to take chapter 39 in its entirety and reproduce it as a single
juvenile code with its own title.
The second purpose of the legislative move to chapter 985 was to
reorganize the statute in a more comprehensible fashion.28 3 Whether the new
format is more logical remains to be seen. It may be that some unintended
284
substantive changes in the law resulted from the change. But at the very
least, practitioners and appellate courts will have to cross-reference case law
from the old chapter 39 to the new chapter 985 provisions. Finally, the new
law does contain some substantive changes which were attached to the law
by the legislature late in the session, although the intent of the Juvenile
Justice Advisory Board had been to make no changes in the law except to
replace and reorganize it.
285
For example, as part of its change from chapter 39 to chapter 985, the
legislature amended the law regarding detention of children charged with
domestic violence by providing that the court shall make written findings
286that form the basis for holding the child in detention. The law had
provided that a child could be held in secure detention for up to forty-eight
287hours prior to a hearing under certain circumstances. The legislature
amended the statute to provide that the child could continue to be held in
secure detention if the court made specific written findings that it was
281. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.05913958.04 (1997).
282. At least chapter 39 had been in the same place for several years. Part of the problem
is that the Florida Juvenile Code contains both court procedure provisions and agency
operational provisions. The sections of the code governing the operation of agencies like DJJ and
DCF should be moved to separate sections of the law specifically related to those agencies.
283. According to DJJ, the current structure of chapter 39 is illogically organized, which
causes confusion and inconsistency in its application. The Juvenile Justice Advisory Board has
recommended that the Florida Legislature remove the current provisions of the statute relating to
delinquency and children in need of services ("CINS") and families in need of services ("FINS")
matters from chapter 39 and place them in separate chapters of the statute. Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Juv. Just., HB 1369, StaffAnalysis & Final Research Doe. at 2 (Apr. 4, 1997).
284. According to the Department of Juvenile Justice, there were to be no substantive
changes except those explicitly made by the legislature. See Department Of Juvenile Justice,
1997 Legislative Session WrapBjp at 3 (1997).
285. See Telephone Interview with Timothy Center, Esq., supra note 206.
286. See FLA. STAT. § 985.213(2)(b)(3) (1997).
287. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(7) (1995).
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necessary to protect the victim from further injury, but that under no
circumstances might the child be held in secure detention beyond the time
limits set forth in section 39.044."' The second and more significant change
in the detention criteria provides that a child who is alleged to have violated
the conditions of community control or aftercare supervision may be
detained, but that detainment must be in what Florida Statutes refer to as a
"consequence unit.', 289
It can be expected that the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure will be
amended to reflect the transfer of the delinquency section of chapter 39 to
chapter 985 as well as the substantive changes. In the fall of 1996, the
Supreme Court of Florida made several changes to the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure in two significant respects. First, the discovery rules,
both in adult felony cases and in juvenile cases, were changed to limit the
use of depositions. There are now three categories of witnesses subject to
deposition. In category A, the individual is subject to deposition under the
former rules. Category B witnesses are subject to deposition upon leave
of court upon a showing of good cause, and, absent a showing that a
Category C witness has been improperly designated, such witness cannot be
291deposed. Category A witnesses are eye witnesses, alibi and rebuttal
witnesses, those present when a recorded or unrecorded statement was made,
investigating officers, witnesses known by the prosecutors that have material
information to negate guilt, child hearsay witnesses, and experts who have
not provided a written report or curriculum vitae but are going to testify.292
In addition, the limitation on the use of depositions in juvenile cases will
now be the same as that in adult cases wherein depositions are restricted in
cases in which only a misdemeanor or traffic offense has been alleged. 293
In separate amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure,
also in the fall of 1996, the Supreme Court of Florida authorized substantial
redrafting of the procedures when a child is believed to be incompetent or
288. Section 39.044 was recodified at section 985.215 and provides that a child may not be
held in secure detention for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing has been
commenced by the court. See FLA. STAT. § 985.215(5)(b) (1997).
289. Section 985.231(1)(a)1.c. (1997) provides that: "[a] consequence unit is a secure
facility specifically designated by the department for children who are taken into custody... for
violating community control or aftercare, or who have been found by the court to have violated
the conditions of community control or aftercare." FLA. STAT. § 985.231(a)1.c. (1997).
290. See In re Amendment to Fla. Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(h) and Fla. Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 8.060(d), 681 So. 2d 666, 684 (Fla. 1996).
291. Id. at 684.
292. Id. at 682.
293. Id. at 685; see also Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.060(d)(2)(I).
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insane at the time of the adjudicatory hearing.2 94 The court also authorized a
change in the procedure for post-dispositional hearings on revocation of
community control.295
111. CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES AND FAMILIES IN NEED OF SERVICES
The legislature also moved part IV of chapter 39 entitled "Children in
Need of Services and Families in Need of Services" ("CINS/FINS") to
chapter 984, also within the title governing "Criminal Procedure and
Corrections., 296 This change was also supported by the Juvenile Justice
297Advisory Board. Part of the justification appears to be that the
CINS/FINS section of the law should be placed within the corrections title
because DJJ is responsible for the juvenile justice continuum which includes
Children in Need of Services. 298 That public policy justification is contrary
to the view of the federal government and other public policy analysts that
children in need of services legislation should not be part of a juvenile
delinquency continuum.299
The legislature also made substantive changes in the CINS/FINS
statute.300  The law now provides that children adjudicated in need of
services may be placed for up to ninety days in a staff secure facility.301 A
child found in direct or indirect contempt of court as in need of services who
has run away from staff secure facilities on at least two occasions may be
294. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 684 So. 2d 756,
761D6 (1996).
295. Iad at 7671358; see also FLA- R. Juv. P. 8.120.
296. FLA. STAT. § 984.04 (1997).
297. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Juv. Just. HB 1369 (1997) Final Research Doe. at 7 (Apr. 4,
1997).
298. See id Prior to 1994, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)
had the sole responsibility for implementing the provisions of Chapter 39. However, the 1994
legislature eliminated HRS authority to administer certain juvenile justice programs by creating
the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) [Ch. 9413209, Laws of Florida]. As a result of this
change, DJJ is now responsible for the juvenile justice continuum which includes delinquent
children, CINS, and FINS HRS's successor, the Department of Children and Family Services,
continues to be responsible for the child welfare system, including dependency, foster care, and
termination of parental rights. Id.
299. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601B5785;
MARK I. SOLER ET AL., REPRESETImG TE CHMD CLIENT 5-12 ( Matthew -ender, 1997); Institute
For Judicial Administration, American -ar Association, Juvenile Justice Standards Project,
Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior 35 (1980).
300. See generally FA. STAT. § 97.280 (1997).
301. FLA. STAT. § 39.4421 (1997) (recodified at§ 984.225 (1997)).
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placed in a physically secure facility.30 2 The child's parent, guardian or
legal custodian may now file a Child in Need of Services Petition.k3
Finally, in addition to other sanctions for contempt of court, the court may
direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to withhold
issuance of or suspend a child's driver license or driving privilege for up to
one year for a first offense and up to two years for a second offense of
contempt of court as a CINS. 04
IV. DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Dependency Issues
Evidentiary issues tend to be generic in nature and, as such, are beyond
the scope of this survey. However, occasionally an evidentiary issue relates
specifically to the child welfare area. Such was the case in M.B. v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services.30 5 In M.B., the trial court
concluded that the child was dependent based upon the finding that the
father had sexually abused her, and the mother was negligent in failing to
protect the child from the abuse. °6
The basis for the lower court's finding was prior hearsay statements
which the child later recanted at trial.3 °7 The court examined the Florida
Evidence Code and determined that once the child recanted the identification
at her father's trial, her earlier unsworn statement became a prior
inconsistent statement which was then inadmissible as substantive evidence
at the dependency proceeding.308
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed. The court held that the
admission and subsequent consideration of the child's statements as
substantive evidence by the fact finder did not require that the child's
testimony at trial be consistent with the out of court statements. 3 The courtfound no consistency requirement in the statute which dealt with the
302. FLA. STAT. § 39.4422 (1997) (recodified at § 984.226 (1997)).
303. See FLA. STAT. § 39.436 (renumbered as 984.15).
304. FLA. STAT. § 39.0145(4)(d) (1995).
305. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1817 (1st Dist. Ct. App., Aug. 13, 1996), quashed 22 Fla. L.
Weekly S295 (May 29, 1997).
306. M.B., 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1817.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1 (citing Williams v. State, 560 So. 2d 1304, 1306 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990); Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321, 325 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
309. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. M.-., 22 Fla. L. Weekly S295
(May 29, 1997).
310. Id. at S297.
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admission into evidence of out of court statements of a child crime victim.311
The court explained that the purpose of the law was to deal with problems
inherent in a child victim's live appearance and testimony at trial and to
provide an additional way of presenting a child's evidence to the trier of
fact. 12 The court added that the trial court must also satisfy the stringent
reliability safeguards established in the law.313 Also, the court held that its
1995 decision in State v. Green,314 in which it held that a prior statement of a
child directly conflicting with the victim's trial testimony standing alone
may not sustain a criminal conviction, is distinguishable.1 5 The court
distinguished Green both on the facts relating to the particular child's
testimony and because Green involved a criminal conviction whereas M.B.
involved a dependency proceeding in which the child's welfare and not
criminal culpability was at issue.316
Interest of rD.,317 is a short opinion worthy of comment because it
clarifies proper appellate practice in dependency cases.318  In KD., the
appellate court explained the appropriate method of review when an order as
part of a dependency 3proceeding requires the return of the child to the
custody of the parent. " Further, the court explained that when a child is
declared dependent and thereafter returned to the custody of the parent, the
trial court retains jurisdiction until the child reaches eighteen years of age320
unless jurisdiction is otherwise relinquished by the court. This is then a
nonfmal order which may be challenged by writ of certiorari and not by
appeal.32'
The question of what parties may intervene in dependency proceedings
was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in J.L. v. G.M. A writ of
certiorari was brought to review two orders of the trial court which allowed
the nonparty maternal grandmother, aunt, and uncle to intervene in an
ongoing dependency proceeding.323 The court relied upon Rule 8.210(a) of
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and the Supreme Court of Florida's
311. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1996).
312. M.B., 22 Fla. L. Weekly at S295.
313. Id at S298.
314. 667 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1995).
315. MB., 22 Fla. L. Weekly at S298.
316. Id at S296.
317. 679 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
318. Id at39.
319. Id
320. Id
321. Id
322. 687 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
323. Id at 977.
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opinion in Beagle v. Beagle,324 to remand the case.325 The Rules of Juvenile
Procedure define parties as "the petitioner, the child, the parent(s), the
department [of Children and Family Services], and the guardian ad litem,
when appointed., 326 The Beagle case establishes Florida's strong public
policy against unwarranted interference with the parenting decisions of an
intact family.32' The court in J.L. remanded to determine whether the
relatives could be granted nonparty participant status pursuant to Rule
8.2 10(b) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.328
An important issue of custody in the context of dependency proceedings
arose recently in Roberts v. Florida Department of Children &
Families.329 In that case, the natural father of a six-year-old who had been
adjudicated dependent as to the mother sought release of the child from the
custody of DCF by writ of habeas corpus. 33 The father had been in prison at
the time of the proceeding against the mother and the dependency petition
against him had been dismissed.331  When the father sought return of the
332children, the DCF denied him custody. Chief Judge Schwartz granted the
writ of habeas corpus and ordered transfer of custody to the child.333 The
court found that there was no evidence that the return would endanger the
safety or well-being of the child which is required under the Florida
statute.334 The court concluded that the DCF lacked authority to make an
324. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
325. J.L., 687 So. 2d at 977-78.
326. Id. at 977.
327. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1271: The issue in -eagle was the ability of grandparents to
enforce visitation rights against an intact family unit in which the parents rejected the visitation.
Id. at 1272.
328. J.L., 687 So. 2d at 978.
329. 687 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
330. Id. at 51.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 52.
334. Section 39.41(1) of the Florida Statutes provides:
When any child is adjudicated by a court to be dependent, and the court finds
that removal of the child from the custody of a parent is necessary, the court
shall first determine whether there is a parent with whom the child was not
residing at the time the events or conditions arose that brought the child
within the jurisdiction of the court who desires to assume custody of the child
and, if such parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the
parent unless it finds that such placement would endanger the safety and
well-being of the child.
FLA. STAT. § 39.41(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
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independent judicial determination of the best interests of the child.335 The
statute, according to the court, represents the legislative policy, and the court
is bound by the statute.
336
B. Right to Counsel Issues
Florida's dependency statute does not provide an absolute right to
counsel for indigent parents in dependency proceedings. 337 This legislative
failure continues to create problems for the appellate courts. This author has
argued in previous surveys in favor of a statute providing free counsel to
indigent parents in all dependency proceedings as occurs in other states.338
The issue came u? again in J.S.S. v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services. 9 A father who was denied counsel brought an
appeal which was treated as a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the
failure to appoint counsel.340 The appellate court found that the procedure
utilized by the trial court in determining whether to appoint counsel
constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law and thus
granted the petition.341 The appellate court's findings and application of law
are probative of need for outright appointment of counsel. First, the trial
court had explained why it had no authority to appoint counsel unless there
was going to be a termination of parental rights proceeding or a pending
criminal proceeding (a clear misunderstanding of the law).342 But in denying
the request, the trial court also explained that it had been at a judicial
conference where it learned that "a couple of judges" had been brought
before the judicial qualifications commission because the judges had been
appointing counsel in dependency proceedings.343 The trial court explained
that "[udges are] getting a lot of maybe rightful pressure from taxpayers and
335. Roberts, 687 So. 2d at 51.
336. Id at 52. For another state's approach to this matter, see -ennett v. Jeffreys, 356
N.E.2d 277 (1976) and -ennett v. Marrow, 399 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). See also
Rumph v. V.D., 667 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Schwartz, C.J., specially
concurring).
337. See In re D.-., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980); Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 705
(Fla. 1975).
338. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 218; 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 146.
339. 680 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
340. Id at 548.
341. Id at 548-49.
342. Id at 549.
343. Id.
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other powers that be., 344 The appellate court explained that the appointment
of counsel under Florida law takes place when parents are threatened with
permanent loss of custody or when criminal charges may arise from the
proceedings.14' However, in all other proceedings, a case by case
determination of factors contained in the Potvin decision are to be used to
346determine the parents' right to appointment of counsel. The Potvin factors
are: "(i) the potential length of parent child separation, (ii) the degree of
parental restrictions on visitation, (iii) the presence or absence of parental
consent, (iv) the presence or absence of disputed facts, and (v) the
complexity of the proceeding in terms of witnesses and documents. 34  The
Potvin test is fact specific and, arguably, mitigates in favor of the
appointment of counsel to indigent parents. However, the statement by the
trial court about the "pressure" being applied does not augur well for
indigent parents who, once there is no appointment of counsel for unstated
political reasons, are usually not in a position to appeal the denial of
counsel. The legislature should set an absolute rule providing counsel to all
indigent parents in dependency cases.
The issue of taxation of costs in dependency cases recently came before
the First District Court of Appeal in W.S.M Jr. v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services.348 After successfully having a petition for
dependency dismissed, a father filed a motion to tax costs against the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS"). The motion was
denied, and the father appealed. 349 Florida law provides in general that in
civil cases a party recovering judgment shall recover all the legal costs and
charges.350 It is irrelevant that the party against whom costs are taxed is a
state agency.35' Several appellate courts have held that the civil taxation
statute applies to juvenile proceedings.352 The general rule is that parties are
344. JS.S., 680 So. 2d at 549 The trial court added:I've been told that I better start
following the statute because I, by not following the statute, lose my judicial immunity and I
become a subject of a taxpayer's suit for the dollars that I am appointing attorneys on that do not
meet the requirements of the statute, and I got to sendC marry one daughter and sendC put another
son through college, and I really don't want to lose my judicial immunity. Id.
345. Id. (citing In the Interest of D.F., 622 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
346. Id. (citing In the Interest of D.-., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980)).
347. Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. 1975) (citation omitted).
348. 692 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
349. Id. at 247.
350. See generally FLA. STAT. § 57.041 (1995); Florida -ar v. Davis, 419 So. 2d 325, 328
(Fla. 1982).
351. W.S.M Jr., 692 So. 2d at 247 (citations omitted).
352. See Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. A.F., 528 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Gordon v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 674 So. 2d
840, 841 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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entitled to collect costs in legal proceedings and in equitable proceedings in
the discretion of the court.353 HRS argued that because the proceedings were
in equity, the court should use discretion and depart from the general rule of
payment.354 The court rejected this argument.355 To deny court costs because
of HRS's statutory mandate to prosecute dependency cases would mean
denying the costs across the board in dependency cases.356 In addition, other
courts had already rejected this approach.357 The costs recoverable do not
include court fees or witness fees for certain witness, specifically any party
to the petition, any parent or legal custodian, or child named in a
summons. 358 On the other hand, other witnesses shall be paid the witness fee
fixed by law.359 With this exception, the court held that the father was
entitled to fees.360
The court's determination as to whether a person is indigent is also
important because it may obligate the parent to find an attorney. 'In
Beveridge v. Mardis,36' the trial court, after a cursory examination of the
mother's financial situation, concluded that she was not entitled to appointed
362counsel. She proceeded pro se and her parental rights were subsequently
terminated despite her ongoing request for an attorney, and the fact that she
could not afford one.363 The appellate court held that the lower court should
have continued the matter until a more thorough investigation of her claim of
indigency and inability to secure counsel could have been
conducted. 64 Further, the court failed to obtain a waiver of counsel asprovided by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.26361
C. Termination of Parental Rights
Issues of mental illness create difficult problems in termination of
parental rights cases. This was true in P.A. v. Department of Health &
353. W.S.M, Jr., 692 So. 2d at 247 (citing The Florida -ar v. Davis, 419 So. 2d 325, 328
(Fla. 1982).
354. Id at 248.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. W.S.M, Jr., 692 So. 2d at 249 (citing FA. STAT. § 39.414 (1993)).
359. See FtA STAT. § 39.414 (1995).
360. W.S.M Jr., 692 So. 2d at 249.
361. 682 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1996).
362. Id at 1143.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.; see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320(b)(2) (1996).
Dale
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Rehabilitative Services.3 6 6 The trial court had terminated parental rights
based upon the mother's chronic bipolar mental disease. 367 However, the
unrebutted evidence was that the mother had substantially met the four goals
of a performance plan. There was no clear and convincing evidence that she
failed to substantially comply with it.368 Further, no clear and convincing
evidence of past abuse, neglect, or abandonment had been presented.
3 6
Other courts in Florida have analyzed the issue of chronic mental illness as a
basis for the termination of parental rights; they have found that it can be the
basis, but only where the parent fails to comply with the performance
agreement and where there was prior abuse, neglect, or abandonment.3 0 The
appellate court in P.A. held that the DCF cannot simply rely upon the
parents' mental status to terminate parental rights.371 Where the parent and
department enter into a case plan, the DCF must make reasonable efforts to
unify the family; this includes assisting the parent to receive the services
needed to become a capable parent including mental health services.372 The
appellate court therefore reversed, but added that termination could occur if
the parent failed to comply with a new case plan despite reasonable efforts
by the DCF, or if reunification would threaten the children's well-being
irrespective of the provision of services.373
A second case dealing with the difficult issue of mental health services
and compliance with case plans is S.Q. v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services.3 74  The Department moved to terminate parental
rights based upon the claim that the mother failed to obtain timely
psychiatric treatment or counseling for schizophrenia as required by the
permanent placement plan.37 The appellate court rearticulated the Florida
test that termination of parental rights is governed by section
39.467(2)(a)-(k) which sets forth eleven factors.3 76 The law provides that
366. 685 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
367. Id. at 92.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 92-93.
370. See -.L.H. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 670 So. 2d 1072 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Wiggins v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 616 So. 2d
127 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
371. P.A., 685 So. 2d at 92.
372. Id. at 93 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(e) (1995)).
373. Id.
374. 687 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
375. Id. at 323.
376. Id. See T.C. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 681 So. 2d 893, 893
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing at note 1 the issue of whether the trial court must
address in its order each of the factors enumerated in section 39.4612, since renumbered at
section 39.469(3)).
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"[w]hen a petition to terminate parental rights is predicated upon allegations
of abuse, neglect, or abandonment, a performance agreement or permanent
placement plan must be offered [and a parent who fails to] ... 'substantially
comply' with the agreement or plan [may then have parental rights
terminated]." '377 Parental rights may be terminated so long as failure to
comply with the performance agreement provisions is not the sole basis for
permanently terminating the rights.378 In the S. Q. case, the trial court
incorrectly terminated parental rights based upon the claimed failure of the
mother to comply with recommendations for mental health treatment and
counseling.379 Indeed, none of the psychological tests and evaluations the
mother went through under the performance plan actually recommended
mental health treatment and counseling.380 Thus, she had no obligation to
undergo them. In addition, the court found that the order terminating
parental rights did not find the factors under the statute proven by clear and
convincing evidence.38' The court therefore reversed.382
D. Legislative and Rules Changes
The legislature amended the provisions of chapter 39 dealing with
termination when a parent is incarcerated in a state or federal correction
institution. The law now provides for the circumstance when the parent is
expected to be incarcerated for a substantial portion of the period of time
before the child will attain the age of eighteen years.
383
In the dependency area, the Supreme Court of Florida authorized
changes in the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure to match case law
determinations over the past few years.38 4 Specifically, the new rules expand
and make precise the procedure for diligent searches and service of
pleadings and papers in dependency proceedings 385 and also change the
procedures for shelter hearings and orders.38 6 Finally, the new rules track
case law with regard to final judgments terminating parental rights as well as
denying termination of parental rights.
387
377. S.Q., 687 So. 2d at 323-24 (citation omitted).
378. Id at 324.
379. Id
380. Id at325.
381. Id.
382. S.Q., 687 So. 2d at 325.
383. FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(d)(1) (1997).
384. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 684 So. 2d 756 (1996).
385. Id at769-71.
386. Id at 772-73.
387. Id at 776.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Legislature made extensive structural changes to the
Florida Juvenile Code in the Juvenile Delinquency and Families in Need of
Services/Child in Need of Services areas this year. The legislative changes
not only move the delinquency and status offense provisions to a new
location in the Florida Statutes but renumber the provisions. These changes
may result in the additional expenditure of time and money. To what extent
these structural changes will generate new appellate opinions remains to be
seen.
In the meantime, the appellate courts continued a process that has been
going on for sometime-routine correction of basic errors by the trial
courts. However, on occasion the courts, including the Supreme Court of
Florida, have clarified significant issues including evidentiary matters as was
the case in MB. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services. 8
388. 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Professional responsibility law in Florida continued to expand in
1997.1 Case law, rules,2 and ethics opinions amplified and, in some areas,
extended the duties that lawyers assume as officers of the judicial branch of
government. This article examines professional responsibility decisions that
are likely to affect the relationships that lawyers have with clients, former
clients, judges, third parties, and The Florida Bar.3
Part II looks at developments affecting the most important relationship
that lawyers establish and operate within: the relationship between lawyer
and client. Part III reviews developments of significance to the lawyer's
relationship to the court and the judicial system. Part IV examines
decisions that could impact the lawyer's relationship with third parties,
* Director, Library and Technology Center and Assistant Professor of Law, Florida
Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida. B.S., 1977, Florida State University; J.D.,
1984, University of Texas at Austin; M.L.S., 1996, Florida State University. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Kelly J. Wright.
** Florida Bar Ethics Director, Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., 1987, University of Florida;
J.D., 1990, University of Florida.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July 15,
1996, through July 14, 1997.
2. Of primary interest here are changes to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct
("RPC"), which comprise Chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
3. Cases and ethics opinions are discussed in the section to which they have the most
significant connection, rather than in every section to which they might possibly relate.
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such as opposing parties, other attorneys, expert witnesses, potential clients,
employers, and creditors. Part V explores the lawyer's relationship with The
Florida Bar and other disciplinary authorities and reviews a number of
disciplinary actions taken against Florida lawyers for widely varying conduct.
4
II. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CLIENTS
For most lawyers, the attorney-client relationship is the professional
relationship that commands the majority of their attention and effort. Ethical
issues can arise at any point in the attorney-client relationship, from the initial
consultation through termination of the matter. Recent decisions have
addressed questions of establishing an attorney-client relationship,
conflicts of interest, confidentiality, communication, fees, fiduciary
duties, competent representation, diligence, and withdrawal.
In Goldfarb v. Daitch,5 the Third District Court of Appeal reaffimned the
basic concepts that the attorney-client relationship is a consensual one, and
that an attorney cannot act on behalf of someone unless the attorney has been
properly authorized to do so.6  Daitch was the defendant in a mortgage
foreclosure suit.7  A final judgment of foreclosure was entered, and the
property was sold at a clerk's sale. On the day that the certificate of sale was
issued, attorney Goldfarb filed a motion seeking disbursement of surplus
funds that were held in the court's registry. Pursuant to the court's order,
funds were disbursed to various parties, including to "'Goldfarb, as attorney
for Marilyn Daitch."' 8
A few weeks later Daitch, through another lawyer, filed an emergency
motion to vacate the disbursement order. Daitch alleged that she had never
met Goldfarb, and that Goldfarb had no authority to represent her in the
foreclosure matter. At the hearing on the motion, Daitch testified that she was
unrepresented in the foreclosure case; indeed, a default had been entered
against her. After the sale, Daitch was approached at her home by two men
who claimed to have purchased the house at the sale and needed to talk to her
about the sale. Intimidated, Daitch signed a blank document and the men left.
Two nights later the men returned with a check for the "'surplus funds less
1/3 fee for collection."' 9 Daitch claimed that she first learned of Goldfarb's
4. Important disciplinary cases are analyzed where appropriate throughout the article,
but most are collected in part V for the convenience of the reader.
5. 696 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
6. Id. at 1199.
7. Id. at 1200.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1201.
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involvement when she signed a receipt for the check. The receipt reflected a
$2000 legal fee.10
Testimony of Daitch and others showed that the document Daitch had
signed was a power of attorney giving two individuals authority to employ an
attorney to represent her in the foreclosure and authority to deduct, "'as a non-
refundable option"' one-third of any funds due Daitch." Goldfarb testified
that he had not met Daitch at the time he was allegedly retained, but filed the
motion for the surplus funds based on the document alone. Although
Goldfarb did not know Daitch, he did know the individuals who held the
power of attorney, having represented them on prior occasions. 12
The trial judge vacated the disbursement order, finding that Goldfarb had
no authority to represent Daitch and that "'there existed no valid
attorney/client relationship by and between' Goldfarb and Daitch."' 3  The
court's order is not remarkable. It simply reflects that the attorney-client
relationship is grounded in agency principles, one of the most fundamental of
which is that an agent can act only when properly authorized by the principal.
Unfortunately, this basic point of law is sometimes ignored or misunderstood
by practicing lawyers.
14
Goldfarb is noteworthy for another reason. Both the trial court and the
Third District Court of Appeal expressed concern about a conflict of interest
on attorney Goldfarb's part. 15  The appellate court noted that Goldfarb
effectively acknowledged the existence of "a patent conflict of interest" when
he replied, after being questioned by the trial judge about a possible conflict
of interest, that "'I don't see anything wrong in representing investors in these
type of deals." '1
6
Business transactions in which a lawyer is a party often result in conflict
of interest problems, especially transactions that involve the lawyer's client.
The obvious potential for conflict is recognized in RPC 4-1.8(a), 7 which
10. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1201.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1202.
13. Id. at 1203.
14. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Giant, 645 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1086 (1995); Florida Bar v. Jasperson, 625 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1993); Smith v. Perry, 635 So. 2d
1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
15. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1199.
16. Id. at 1205 (emphasis added by appellate court) (quoting the Plaintiff, Goldfarb).
17. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client.
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest
1997]
218
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
regulates these types of transactions as an ethical matter. In Florida Bar v.
Laing,18 the lawyer stepped into a client's business deal that had gone bad and
turned it to his own advantage. 19 In imposing a ninety-one day suspension for
this and other violations, 20 the Supreme Court of Florida noted that entering
into a business transaction with his client required the lawyer to comply with
the provisions of RPC 4-1.8(a). 21
A lawyer who represents multiple parties in business matters also must
be alert to conflict of interest concerns. Such representation is not strictly
prohibited,22 but a lawyer who undertakes to represent parties whose interests
appear to be aligned at the outset, takes the risk that those interests could
diverge at some point during the deal. If that happens, the lawyer usually will
adverse to a client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or
expenses, unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the
client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
RPC 4-1.8(a).
18. 695 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1997).
19. Id. at 301.
20. Id. at 304.
21. See supra note 17.
22. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-1.7, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; GENERAL
RULE," provide:
(a) Representing Adverse Interests. A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client will be directly adverse to the interests of
another client, unless:
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the lawyer's responsibilities to and relationship with the other client;
and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) Duty to Avoid Limitation on Independent Professional Judgment. A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's exercise of independent
professional judgment in the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or
by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
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be ethically obligated to withdraw from the entire matter.23 A lawyer who
failed to recognize the warning signs of a serious conflict ended up with
disciplinary problems in Florida Bar v. Joy.24 The lawyer represented three
individuals, including a father and son, who were shareholders in a
corporation that invested in real estate. When an apartment building owned
by the corporation burned, the insurer suspected arson and refused to pay the
claim. The corporation retained the lawyer to pursue its claim for insurance
proceeds. Sometime during this course of events, however, the lawyer began
to distrust the father and son and secretly started providing the third
shareholder with blind copies of his correspondence with the father and son.
To make matters worse, the lawyer attempted to protect the third
shareholder's interest by obtaining an assignment of his shares in the
corporation. This was done without the knowledge of either the father or son.
A substantial settlement was reached with the insurer, but the situation
deteriorated further when the lawyer removed some of the settlement proceeds
from this trust account without authorization and deposited them into an
account bearing his wife's name. The final chapter in this sad saga was a
physical altercation between the lawyer and the son. This conflict-ridden
conduct netted the lawyer a ninety-one day suspension.
25
In contrast, a lawyer was held to be not guilty of conflict violations in
Florida Bar v. Norvell.26 The lawyer had served a disciplinary suspension
and had been readmitted to practice. Prior to his readmission, the lawyer was
involved with a builder in the builder's suit against a construction corporation.
The lawyer then attempted to represent the corporation in its bankruptcy
proceeding, misrepresenting to the bankruptcy court that he was a
"'disinterested person."' 27 The bankruptcy judge, however, declined to allow
RPC 4-1.7(a)-(b).
23. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-1.9, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; FORMER
CLIENT," provide:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
RPC 4-1.9.
24. 679 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1996).
25. Id. at 1168.
26. 685 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1996).
27. Id. at 1297.
1997]
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the lawyer into the case.28 The lawyer next entered into an agreement to
acquire ownership of the corporation and, after doing so, reapplied to
represent the corporation in the bankruptcy case. Unlike the prior application,
however, at this time the lawyer did disclose to the court his prospective
ownership interest in the debtor corporation. Despite this series of events, the
lawyer was found not to have violated the conflict of interest rules,
specifically RPC 4-1.7(b).29 The Supreme Court of Florida noted that most of
the conflict-related information was known to all principals.
30
Sometimes conflicts are apparent at the inception of a representation, as
was the case in Goldfarb.31 Often, however, an actual or potential conflict
problem arises during a representation. Decisions concerning both types of
conflicts in the criminal defense context were handed down in the past
year. Regarding conflict issues to be confronted at the beginning of a matter
The Florida Bar Board of Governors published Florida Ethics Opinion 96-231
to address an issue that had not been reviewed in a formal ethics opinion since
1978: the extent, if any, to which a law firm that represents local law
enforcement agencies may engage in criminal defense work in that same
county.33
Overruling portions of prior opinions, Opinion 96-2 concluded that a
law firm that represents local law enforcement agencies on civil and
administrative matters is not per se precluded from engaging in criminal
defense work within the same county.3 5 Instead, whether such dual
representation is ethically permissible depends on application of the conflict
rules, particularly RPC 4-1.7(b),36 to the specific facts and circumstances
involved. The opinion spoke to several general scenarios. First, it noted that
where the firm's law enforcement clients are completely uninvolved in a
criminal matter, no potential conflict of interest exists and the firm may
defend the accused without triggering the conflict provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.37 Second, if the firm's law enforcement clients are in
some way involved in a criminal matter, the firm may represent the accused
28. Id.
29. See supra note 22.
30. Norvell, 685 So. 2d at 1298.
31. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1199; see also supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text.
32. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-2 (1996).
33. Id.
34. Opinion 96-2 states that Florida Ethics Opinions 74-37, 74-37 (Reconsideration),
and 78-8 were "overly broad" and overruled those opinions "to the extent that they conflict
with" the conclusions reached in Opinion 96-2. Id.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
37. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-2 (1996).
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only if it complies with the provisions of RPC 4-1.7(b), including obtaining
the informed consent of both clients.38 Third, where a law enforcement client
of the firm is involved in a criminal matter "in a direct and material way," the
firm is ethically precluded from representing the criminal defendant.
39
Significantly, the opinion recognizes that attacking an employee of a client
agency on cross-examination presents an unwaivable conflict of interest in
this context.
40
Both the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal addressed conflicts,
or alleged conflicts, that arose or became apparent after a representation had
commenced. In Rodriguez v. State,41 the defendant's trial counsel was a
former assistant state attorney.42 While with the State Attorney's Office years
before, counsel had substituted for the assigned prosecutor at a hearing in a
previous and totally unrelated case against the defendant. Counsel did not
even remember this prior matter until, just before sentencing in the present
case, he was shown certified copies of the defendant's prior convictions.
Under these facts, the court stated curtly that "no conflict exists.'
t 3
Two Fourth District Court of Appeal cases dealt with the not uncommon
situation of a criminal defendant who becomes dissatisfied with appointed
counsel during the case and then moves to discharge that counsel. In
Cunningham v. State,44 defendant Cunningham had pled guilty to certain
charges.45 After the plea hearing but before sentencing, he filed an unsworn
motion to vacate his plea and to have new counsel appointed, citing alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion following
a hearing at which the court inquired into the basis of Cunningham's motion
to discharge his current counsel.46 Affirming the trial court's order, the
appellate court distinguished another recent decision in this area, Roberts v.
State.47 Unlike the situation in Roberts, defendant Cunningham made no
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
92-367 (1992).
41. 684 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
42. Id. at 833.
43. Id. See also McCaskill v. State, 638 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(claim of ineffective assistance properly denied where the defense attorney had been a state
attorney who signed original information against defendant). In the instant case, defendant
knowingly sought out and retained an attorney, and defendant was prosecuted based on
amended information with which the attorney had no active involvement.
44. 677 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
45. Id. at 930.
46. Id.
47. Id. (referring to Roberts v. State, 670 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
The Roberts court found that an actual conflict of interest was present because the very basis
1997]
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specific allegations concerning his counsel's performance and counsel did not
move to withdraw from the case. In fact, the court stated, "nor would we
expect such a motion to be routinely filed under these facts. ',s Recognizing
that Roberts turned on its particular facts,49 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal stated that "Roberts should not be read to establish a per se rule
requiring a trial court to appoint new counsel to argue a motion to withdraw a
plea upon the mere filing of a motion to discharge trial counsel."50
Cunningham is notable because the court "[p]arenthetically" outlined what it
termed a "preferable way" to handle a motion to discharge counsel and vacate
plea based on complaints about counsel's performance.51 Providing advice
that should be helpful to trial courts as well as practicing attorneys, the court
suggested:
The motion to discharge should be addressed first and if, following
a Nelson inquiry, the motion is denied as insufficient, the defendant
could then be given the option of either proceeding with current
counsel, hiring his or her own lawyer, or representing himself or
herself on the motion to vacate the plea.52
In a contrasting case, Hope v. State,53 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
relied upon Roberts in holding that a criminal defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel in connection with a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
5 4
As the court was about to sentence him, Hope orally made a pro se motion to
change his plea to not guilty and to discharge his counsel on the grounds that
counsel had not investigated all of the allegations against him and had not
interviewed all witnesses. Counsel responded by not only defending his
performance but by going much further and offering the trial judge his
for the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was the alleged misconduct of defense
counsel (coercing the defendant to accept the plea offer). Roberts v. State, 670 So. 2d 1042,
1044 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to
withdraw from the representation placed counsel in the untenable position of attempting to
argue the motion to withdraw the plea on the grounds of his own alleged misconduct. Id. at
1045. This conflict between the personal interests of defense counsel and counsel's
obligations to his client was a violation of RPC 4-1.7(b), and thus the trial court erred in not
permitting counsel to withdraw. See Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional Responsibility: 1996
Survey of Florida Law, 21 NOVA L. REv. 231, 253-54 (Fall 1996) [hereinafter "Chinaris"].
48. Cunningham, 677 So. 2d at 930.
49. Roberts, 670 So. 2d at 1042.
50. Cunningham, 677 So. 2d at 930.
51. Id. at 931 n.1.
52. Id.
53. 682 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
54. Id. at 1174.
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opinion that his client would not prevail at trial. This conflict-ridden scenario
tainted counsel's representation of his client. In reversing and remanding for
appointment of "conflict-free counsel" to argue Hope's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, the appellate court stated that "[c]learly, this is the type of
adversarial situation contemplated in Roberts."
55
Confidentiality remains one of the most critical of the duties that is
essential to a proper and effective attorney-client relationship. A law'er's
ethical obligations concerning confidentiality are set forth in RPC 4-1.6. A
significant case concerning both conflict and confidentiality issues was In re
Estate of Montanez57 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed an order
awarding attorneys' fees to a personal representative, which was a corporation
that had served as guardian for the decedent/ward. The circumstances of the
decedent's death in a nursing home while the corporation was acting as
guardian indicated the possibility of a negligence action against both the
55. Id.
56. Rule 4-1.6, "CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION," provides:
(a) Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client except as stated in
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the
client.
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client
specifically requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(d) Exhaustion of Appellate Remedies. When required by a tribunal to
reveal such information, a lawyer may first exhaust all appellate remedies.
(e) Limitation on Amount of Disclosure. When disclosure is mandated or
permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information than is required to
meet the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule.
RPC 4-1.6.
57. 687 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
58. Id. at 944.
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nursing home and the guardian corporation. Yet, upon being appointed
personal representative, the corporation, on behalf of the estate, paid the
nursing home's bill and, incredibly, released the nursing home from any
liability for no consideration. The appellate court correctly observed that the
corporation's actions were "fatally tainted by conflicts of interest.,
59
Regarding the duty of the personal representative's attorney, who apparently
was fully aware of these circumstances, the court stated:
Lawyers are officers of the court and they are responsible to the
judiciary for the propriety of their professional activities. When a
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a client expects
assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or by
the law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the
relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct. The attorneys should
have recognized that [the personal representative] could not act
objectively and neutrally in the settlement of the claim, and with
their client's consent advised the court and procured the
appointment of an attorney ad litem to make the investigation and
file its report. Alternatively, under the facts herein, if the attorneys
were unable to persuade their client of the certitude of their
advice, then the attorneys should have moved to withdraw on
grounds of irreconcilable differences. Of course, in doing so,
counsel would not reveal the client's secrets or breach their
confidential relationship.60
Sometimes lawyers for a fiduciary, such as a personal representative, are
unsure of where their loyalties lie. Florida law holds that a lawyer for a
personal representative is exactly that, the lawyer for the personal
representative, and not for the estate or the beneficiaries. 61  Montanez
emphasizes this point.62 The court's statements help clarify the duty of a
personal representative's attorney when the attorney learns of improper
activity on the part of the personal representative.63  A personal
representative's lawyer should treat this type of representation like any other;
this means that the lawyer ordinarily should withdraw if the client/personal
representative appears reasonably likely to engage in improper conduct
59. Id. at 946.
60. Id. at 947 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
61. In re Estate of Gory, 570 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
62. See In re Estate of Montanez, 687 So. 2d 943, 946 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
63. Gory, 570 So. 2d at 1383.
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despite the lawyer's attempts to dissuade the client.64 Absent a clear duty of
disclosure under the RPC,6 5 upon withdrawal the lawyer must maintain the
confidentiality of all information relating to the representation. Any duties of
64. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING
REPRESENTATION," provides:
(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate Representation. Except as
stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a
client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or law.
RPC 4-1.16.
65. When representing a personal representative situation, the two most likely ways in
which a mandatory duty to disclose confidences could arise are: (1) the personal
representative has made false statements to, or false filings with, the court; or (2) the personal
representative intends to commit a crime or cause substantial bodily harm to someone. RPC
4-1.16(a) (1993). Regarding the former situation, subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-3.3,
"CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL," provide:
(a) False Evidence; Duty to Disclose. A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fall to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) permit any witness, including a criminal defendant, to offer testimony
or other evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer may not offer
testimony that the lawyer knows to be false in the form of a narrative unless
so ordered by the tribunal. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and
thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.
(b) Extent of Lawyer's Duties. The duties stated in subdivision (a) continue
beyond the conclusion of the proceeding and apply even if compliance
requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule 4-1.6.
RPC 4-3.3(a)-(b).
Regarding the latter situation, subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.6, "CONFIDENTIALITY OF
INFORMATION," provides:
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
RPC 4-1.6 (b).
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disclosure are expressly established by the RPC and are not enlarged by the
fact that a lawyer represents a fiduciary.
66
As evidenced by the court's statement in Montanez, the duty of
confidentiality is not always easy to understand and apply.67 In an important
matter of first impression for Florida, as well as nationally, The Florida Bar
Professional Ethics Committee and Board of Governors addressed the duties
of a lawyer who, while representing a married couple in estate planning
matters, was given information by the husband that the husband wished to
keep hidden from the wife.68 The information in question, of course, would
be of significance to the wife. Florida Ethics Opinion 95-469 carefully
analyzed the ethical obligations that govern the lawyer's conduct. 70 The
opinion recognized the tension between the duty that a lawyer ordinarily has
under RPC 4-1.471 to transmit relevant information to a client and the duty to
keep a client's confidence under RPC 4-1.6.72 In the situation presented, the
lawyer faced an apparent conflict between the duty to inform the wife of the
relevant information and the duty to honor the confidentiality obligation owed
to the husband. 3
66. Gory, 579 So. 2d at 1383.
67. Montanez, 687 So. 2d at 946. The court addressed the distinction between the
ethical duty of confidentiality and the evidentiary attorney-client privilege. See, e.g.,
Kleinfeld v. State, 568 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 167
(Fla. 1991) (even if exception to ethical confidentiality rule permits or requires attorney to
disclose certain confidential information, this does not affect whether the evidentiary attorney-
client privilege applies to prevent such information from being admitted into evidence);
Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (ethical confidentiality
rule is broader than evidentiary attorney-client privilege, and applies even though the
confidential information in question is discoverable from other sources); Fla. Bar Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 92-5 (1993) (ethical rule of confidentiality prevents attorney from
voluntarily disclosing any information relating to representation, while evidentiary attorney-
client privilege protects certain specified communications from compelled disclosure).
68. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Rule 4-1.4, "COMMUNICATION," provides:
(a) Informing Client of Status of Representation. A lawyer shall keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information.
(b) Duty to Explain Matters to Client. A lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
RPC 4-1.4 (a)-(b).
72. RPC 4-1.6(b).
73. Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So. 2d 402, 402 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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Opinion 95-4 properly resolved the dilemma by concluding that the duty
of confidentiality is paramount.74 The general rule that applies in any client
representation is that all information "relating to the representation" is
confidential as an ethical matter.75 There is no basis in the Rules of
Professional Conduct for relaxing this rule when a lawyer jointly represents
multiple clients (such as the husband and wife in the situation addressed in
the opinion).76 Unless it is otherwise understood and agreed in advance by
clients and lawyer, all clients, "including those in a joint representation," have
a right to expect that this general rule of confidentiality will be honored by
their lawyer. 7 No such "no-confidentiality" agreement was made in the joint
representation case that was the subject of the opinion.78
The opinion also persuasively rejected the argument that the law of
attorney-client _rivilege should set the ethical standard of attorney-client
confidentiality." Although the information in question might not be protected
by the evidentiary privilege in a future husband-wife suit,80 that fact was
irrelevant to any consideration of whether the lawyer was permitted or
required, as a matter of professional ethics, to transmit the confidential
information to the non-confiding spouse.8 1 As is the case when a lawyer
represents two clients in separate matters and learns in confidence information
from one client that would be relevant to the lawyer's representation of the
other client, Opinion 95-4 concluded that the duty of confidentiality was
controlling and required the lawyer to withdraw without disclosing the
confidence to the non-confiding spouse, here the wife. 2
While well reasoned in most respects, the opinion clearly missed the
mark in one important respect. The opinion opened by concluding, with
virtually no discussion or analysis, that the lawyer was under no duty to
discuss potential conflict of interest and confidentiality issues with the
husband and wife at the beginning of the joint representation.8 3  This
conclusion is both incorrect and illogical. Almost every multiple client
representation presents at least a potential for a conflict of interests.
74. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997). The opinion implies that
the lawyer could have, and perhaps should have, prevented the dilemma by discussing the
confidentiality issues with the clients at the outset of the representation.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.502(4)(e) (1995).
81. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Furthermore, should not the clients be afforded an opportunity to decide
whether they wish to waive the rule of confidentiality that otherwise applies to
their separate disclosures to the lawyer? Without a discussion of the issues at
the outset of the case, the clients are denied the chance to make this decision.
And, of course, the fact that an advisory opinion on this topic was requested
by the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar8 4 and
that the Professional Ethics Committee and the Board of Governors of The
Florida Bar saw the need to publish the opinion, underscores the fact that
ethical problems of this type are not uncommon in this setting.
8 5
The significance of Opinion 95-4 was highlighted by a Second District
Court of Appeal case, Cone v. Culverhouse. 8 6  This case concerned the
applicability of the attorney-client and accountant-client privileges in two
different suits. The scope and extent of the "'common interest"' exceptions to
the privileges were disputed. In language reminiscent of the situation
addressed in Opinion 95-4, the court stated:
The exceptions to the professional privileges also require that the
matter be one "of common interest."..... [T]he clients' interests
must be sufficiently compatible that a reasonable client would
expect his or her communications concerning the matter to be
accessible to the other client. For example, a married couple
creating an estate plan with interrelated documents probably have
no reasonable expectation of confidentiality concerning the matter
of the joint estate plan, but might still have such expectations
concerning their individual, private discussions with their lawyer
about the reasons for including or excluding specific bequests to
third persons in their individual wills.88
The lawyer-client relationship necessarily involves questions of
communication between the parties to that relationship. RPC 4-1.489
requires lawyers to communicate with clients about matters that the lawyer is
handling for them. In Florida Bar v. Glick,90 a lawyer who failed to convey to
his clients the opposing party's settlement offer, and then lied about this to
84. This group is the largest section of the Bar, with more than 7000 members. The
section pursued this matter over a period of years.
85. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-4 (1997).
86. 687 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
87. Id. at 891.
88. Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
89. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
90. 693 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1997).
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The Florida Bar, was suspended from practice for ten days.91 Similarly, a
lawyer's failure to keep a client informed about the status of the case, among
other violations, resulted in a one month suspension in Florida Bar v.
Jordan.92 Not informing the client that the lawyer has let the statute of
limitations lapse is a violation of RPC 4-1.4.93 A lawyer who committed this
violation among others, was suspended for ninety days in Florida Bar v.
Lecznar. 4
Fees are another important aspect of the attorney-client relationship. As
might be expected, fee related issues often are the subject of case law and
ethics opinions. Over the past year, the Professional Ethics Committee
published three opinions dealing with various fee and cost questions. Florida
Ethics Opinion 95-395 responded to the inquiry of a law firm that wished to
assign its delinquent accounts receivable to a corporation that would be
wholly-owned by the firm's partners. The corporation would then attempt to
collect the receivables. If it became necessary to file suit to collect the
accounts, the law firm would then represent the corporation in suing the
fimn's former clients for the delinquent fees.
97
The Professional Ethics Committee initially published a proposed
advisory opinion98 concluding that the conduct in question was unethical
because it appeared to be an attempt to hide behind the wholly-owned
corporation in order to avoid the publicity that could arise when a law firm
sues its former clients over fees.99 The committee believed that this scheme
91. Id at 552.
92. 682 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1996).
93. Although not mentioned in the case, it may be noted that the Supreme Court of
Florida has indicated that a lawyer ordinarily is obligated to inform a client when the lawyer
commits legal malpractice. Florida Bar v. Morse, 587 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1991).
94. 690 So. 2d 1284, 1288 (Fla. 1997).
95. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
96. The accounts receivable represented uncollected legal fees owed by former clients of
the law firm. Id.
97. Id.
98. When it determines that a formal advisory opinion is needed on a particular issue or
matter, the Professional Ethics Committee publishes a "'proposed advisory opinion' in the
Florida Bar News along with a notice inviting comments from any interested Bar members. If
no comments are received within 30 days, the opinion becomes a final Florida Ethics Opinion.
If comments are received, the committee considers those comments and decides whether to
stand by its original opinion. If the committee adheres to its original opinion, any dissatisfied
commenters may appeal to The Florida Bar Board of Governors. The Board's determination
is final; there is no provision for appeal to the Supreme Court. These procedural rules appear
in the Florida Bar Procedures for Ruling on Questions of Ethics, 70 FLA. B.J. 684, 864-85
(Sept. 1996).
99. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1996).
1997]'
230
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
constituted a violation of RPC 4-8.4(c), 100 which prohibits lawyers from
engaging in misrepresentation or deceitful conduct.
The committee's proposed conclusion was rejected by the Bar's Board of
Governors, which revised Opinion 95-3 to permit the conduct in question.
1 1
The Board's opinion traced the trend of ethics opinions issued since the 1970s
to liberalize the guidelines governing lawyer conduct in the area of fee
collection. 10 2 Extending this trend, Opinion 95-3, as revised by the Board,
concluded that the proposed assignment of receivables to the firm-owned
collection corporation, with the firm representing the corporation in collection
actions, violated neither RPC 4-8.4(c) nor RPC 4-1.9(a). 103 The Board
viewed the proposed conduct as a legitimate collection technique for lawyers
who were owed fees by former clients.
10 4
Whether RPC 4-8.4(c)105 was intended to bar the conduct at issue is a
question over which reasonable minds can differ. Thus, the matter boiled
down to a policy question, which the Board answered in favor of law firms
rather than their delinquent clients. 06 The opinion is disappointing, however,
in the manner in which it evaded the reach of RPC 4-1.9(a). This rule
precludes a lawyer0 7 from representing "another person" in a matter that is
the same as, or substantially related to, a matter in which the lawyer
represented a former client.108 As Opinion 95-3 conceded, the literal terms of
this rule bar a law firm from representing anyone other than itself in matters
substantially related to matters in which it represented its former clients. 0 9
Certainly, collection of a fee owed for representing a client in a matter is
"substantially related" to the original matter; the opinion conceded this fact."1°
Why, then, does RPC 4-1.9(a) not apply? The opinion essentially stated that
the firm and the wholly-owned collection corporation were really the same
entity, and therefore declined to apply RPC 4-1.9(a)."' As a matter of
convenience for fee collecting lawyers, the opinion thus ignored the basis for
100. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-8.4, "MISCONDUCT," provides that a lawyer shall not
"engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." RPC 4-8.4(c).
101. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
102. Id.
103. Id. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
104. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
107. All lawyers in a law firm are treated as one for purposes of RPC 4-1.9(a). RPC 4-
1.10(a).
108. RPC 4-1.9(a).
109. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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a large part of the American legal structure-corporations are separate entities
under law, distinct and apart from their owners. As a separate legal entity, the
collection corporation should have been considered "another person" for
purposes of applying RPC 4-1.9(a). It is important to note, however, that
Opinion 95-3 expressly did not address two questions that should be of great
interest to most law firms facing a fee collection problem: first, whether a law
firm ethically may assign its delinquent fee receivables to a collection
corporation not owned by the firm; and second, whether it is ethically
permissible for a law firm to assign its accounts receivable as security for a
Ioan.
112
Two Professional Ethics Committee opinions attempted to clear up some
ambiguities in the application of rules governing lawyers advancement, or
payment of costs on behalf of clients. Florida Ethics Opinion 96-1113 was
issued to a lawyer who was preparing to submit a bid to a state agency that
was seeking to hire lawyers for collection work.1 14 The lawyer asked the
ethics committee whether it would be permissible for the bid to provide that
the lawyer would be responsible for paying all expenses associated with the
representation, even if the lawyer was successful in obtaining a recovery for
the client agency. 115 The committee concluded that, while RPC 4-1.8(e)1 16
permitted the lawyer to advance court costs and expenses of litigation, it
forbade the lawyer from paying for those items. 1 7 The proposed bid was
112. Most jurisdictions that have addressed this second issue prohibit the assignment or
limit a law firm's ability to assign its receivables for this purpose. See, e.g., Arizona ethics
opinion 92-4; Illinois ethics opinion 93-4; Kansas ethics opinion 94-08; Maryland ethics
opinion 93-3; New York City ethics opinion 1993-1.
113. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-1 (1996).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Subdivision (e) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(e) Financial Assistance to Client. A lawyer shall not provide financial
assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation,
except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the
repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and
expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
RPC 4-1.8(e).
117. Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-1 (1996). The opinion noted that
RPC 4-1.8(e) contains an exception that allows lawyers to pay costs for indigent clients, but
this exception was inapplicable because a state agency would not be considered indigent. Id.
1997]
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declared unethical because it would make the lawyer unconditionally
responsible for the costs of expenses of the collection matters.' 1
Florida Ethics Opinion 96-3119 arose in connection with the Florida offer
of judgment statute. 120 A plaintiffs lawyer apparently was unhappy with the
defendant's settlement offer and wanted his client to go to trial rather than
accept the offer. The lawyer wished to guarantee his client that he, the
lawyer, would pay any attorney's fees and costs assessed against the client if
the client proceeded to trial and the defendant ultimately prevailed. The
ethics committee opined that such a promise would defeat the purpose of the
offer of judgment statute, which the committee believed was enacted to
penalize litigants who did not accept bona fide settlement offers prior to
trial. 12' Accordingly, the committee concluded that the proposal was
unethical as prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of RPC 4-
8.4(d). 122
As usual, 1997 saw several cases handed down concerning lawyer-client
fee issues. At issue in Smith & Burnetti, P.A. v. Faulk123 was a trial court
order denying a law firm a charging lien and an award of attorneys' fees.
124
The law firm apparently had withdrawn from the case, rather than being
discharged by its client. Referencing RPC 4-1.7(b),125 the Second District
Court of Appeal stated that, "[b]ased upon the record disclosing serious
conflict between the law firm and [the client], we are persuaded that the law
firm had no ethical choice but to terminate its relationship with [the
118. See Fla. Bar. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 95-3 (1997).
119. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 96-3 (1997).
120. Id.
121. Id. The committee cited:. Goode v. Udhwani, 648 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995), and Florida Bar re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla.
1989), in support of its view. Id.
122. Id. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-8.4, "MISCONDUCT," provides that a lawyer may
not
engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous
indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors,
witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not
limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin,
disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status,
employment, or physical characteristic.
RPC 4-8.4(d).
123. 677 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
124. Id. at 404.
125. See supra note 22.
[Vol. 22:215
233
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Chinaris / Tarbert
client].' 26 Because the firn's termination of representation was required by
the rules of ethics, the lower court erred in not permitting the firm to recover
fees from the client.127 Relying upon the leading case of Faro v. Romani,
128
the appellate court reversed and remanded the matter for determination of
amount of fee to be awarded to firm. 129 Citing Searcy, Denney, Scarola,
Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Poletz,130 the opinion noted that the fee was to be
based upon quantum meruit but without a lodestar.1
3
'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the scope of an attorney's
charging lien in Len-Hal Realty, Inc. v. Wintter & Cummings.132 A law firn
had represented a plaintiff in obtaining certain real property through a
mortgage foreclosure. Part of the firm's work included having a bankruptcy
stay lifted for the plaintiff. Affirming the trial court, the appellate court held
that the charging lien filed by the firm in the mortgage foreclosure case could
include the fees relating to the work done by the law firm in the bankruptcy
matter. The work in the bankruptcy case was "directly related to" obtaining
the property on which the charging lien was imposed.3
Noris v. Silver 13 was a fee-related case with important implications for
any lawyers who share fees from particular matters, whether in a referral
context or otherwise. 136 Noris sued attorney Silver for legal malpractice and
negligent referral. Noris alleged that he was injured while visiting another
state. He then contacted attorney Silver, who referred him to attorney Falk.
In the past, Silver had referred clients to Falk and had received one-third of
Falk's fee. Noris then retained Falk to handle his injury claim. The Noris-
Falk employment agreement did not make reference to Silver, and Silver and
Falk did not execute a written fee-division agreement between themselves.
Falk subsequently let the statute of limitations lapse without filing suit.
Noris' action against Silver ensued.
137
The trial court entered an order of summary judgment for Silver on the
legal malpractice claim, and ordered the negligent referral claim dismissed.
138
126. Faulk, 677 So. 2d at 404.
127. Id.
128. 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994).
129. Faulk, 677 So. 2d at 404.
130. 652 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1995).
131. Faulk, 677 So. 2d at 404.
132. 689 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
133. Id. at 1191.
134. Id.
135. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1859 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1996).
136. Id. at D1859.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment order on
the malpractice claim.139 The court concluded that a genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding whether Silver had retained a financial interest in Noris'
case by expressly or impliedly agreeing to divide the legal fee with Falk.1
40
The legal effect of such an agreement would be the creation of a joint venture,
which would mean that Silver could be held legally liable for any malpractice
committed by Falk.141
While the court rested its decision on joint venture principles, it noted
that its conclusion was consistent with RPC 4-1.5(g)(2),142 which allows
attorneys to split fees on the basis of a written agreement among each
participating attorney and the client. 43 RPC 4-1.5(g)(2) is the rule that allows
a lawyer to receive what is commonly called a "referral fee," a fee that one
attorney receives for referring a client to another attorney. The fee is "earned"
primarily as a result of the referral, rather than from any work performed on
the case by the referring attorney.144  Noris underscored what the plain
language of RPC 4-1.5(g)(2) provides: by agreeing to receive a referral fee in
a matter, an attorney becomes responsible for legal malpractice committed by
the attorney to whom the matter has been referred. 145 Furthermore, it would
appear that any attempt by a referring attorney to avoid such liability by
means of an exculpatory or indemnification agreement would be unethical in
139. The order dismissing the negligent referral claim was affirmed. Id. The court
noted that the negligent referral claim "did not allege that Silver had knowledge of any facts
that would indicate that Falk would commit malpractice" and that Noris' counsel conceded
this during oral argument Noris, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D 1859.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Subdivision (g)(2) of RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer;
or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation and
agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and the
basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
RPC 4-1.5 (g)(2) (emphasis added).
143. Noris, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1859.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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view of the clear command of RPC 4-1.5(g)(2)(A) that each attorney assume
"joint legal responsibility" for the representation. 146
In the statutory fee-shifting context, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Foodtown, Inc. of Jacksonville v. Argonaut Insurance Co.,147
ruled that an oral contingent fee agreement that did not comply with Florida's
ethics rules governing contingent fee contracts could not be considered by the
trial court in determining fees to be awarded to the prevailing party under a
Florida fee-shifting statute. 48 Relying on the authority of Chandris, S.A. v.
Yanakakis,149 the appellate court stated that, "[b]ecause the oral agreement
between [the client] and the law firm violated the rule governing contingent
fees, the district court properly refused to recognize it."' The court went on
to warn that a law firm that failed to have its contingent fee agreements in
writing would be doing so "at its own risk."''1
A Fifth District Court of Appeal decision recognized that the fee-related
aspects of the attorney-client relationship remain a primary factor in the
degree of confidence that the public places in the judicial system. 15 2 In Elser
v. Law Offices of James M Russ, P.A., 53 a lawyer sued a former client for
fees. 5 4 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lawyer.155
The appeals court reversed, finding that material issues of fact existed. 15 6 A
146. RPC 4-1.5(g)(2)(A). Additionally, because RPC 4-1.5(g)(2) requires that the
client join in any fee-division agreement, any liability-limitation attempts by the referring
attorney likely would violate subdivision (h) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST;
PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS," which provides:
(h) Limiting Liability for Malpractice. A lawyer shall not make an
agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently
represented in making the agreement. A lawyer shall not settle a claim for
such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first
advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate
in connection therewith.
RPC 4-1.8(h).
147. 102 F.3d 483 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
148. Id. at 485.
149. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995). See Chinaris, supra note 47, at 260-65.
150. Foodtown, 102 F.3d at 485.
151. Id.
152. Elser v. Law Offices of James M. Russ, P.A., 679 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 311.
156. Id. at 312.
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key fact issue concerned whether it was reasonably necessary for the lawyer to
perform the amount of work completed on the case.157 The court noted that
"public policy demands" that a lawyer "only charge the client for those hours
that are reasonably necessary to perform the legal services under the
contract.', 158 Additionally, a troubling clause in the lawyer-client fee contract
provided that the client would waive objection to the lawyer's bills unless the
client contested the bill within ten days from the date of billing. The court
voided this provision, declaring it unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable.1' 9 "To permit such an egregious clause to be enforceable in an
attorneys' fees contract would undermine the public confidence in the legal
system."
160
Another unconscionable clause in an attorney-client fee agreement was
addressed in Florida Bar v. Spann.16 1  Lawyer and client entered into a
contingent fee agreement, but the agreement further obligated the client to pay
the lawyer based on an hourly rate schedule if the client discharged the lawyer
from the case prior to settlement or final judgment. The Supreme Court of
Florida held that this provision constituted a prohibited penalty on the client's
right to discharge the lawyer and, as such, was a violation of RPC 4-1.5(a). 62
This decision affirmed the special nature of the attorney-client relationship
and the client's absolute right to discharge his or her lawyer at any time, with
or without cause. 63 The court has consistently refused to permit clauses in
fee agreements that would penalize clients for exercising this right.
64
157. Elser, 679 So. 2d at 312.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 313.
161. 682 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1996).
162. Id. at 1072-73. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES,"
provides:
(a) Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees. An attorney shall not
enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly
excessive fee or a fee generated by employment that was obtained through
advertising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar. A fee is clearly excessive when:
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a reasonable fee for
services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear overreaching or an
unconscionable demand by the attorney; or
(2) the fee is sought or secured by the attorney by means of intentional
misrepresentation or fraud upon the client, a nonclient party, or any court, as
to either entitlement to, or amount of, the fee.
RPC 4-1.5(a).
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Charging a fee in excess of that permitted under RPC 4-1.5161 resulted in
a lawyer being publicly reprimanded by the Supreme Court of Florida.166 In
Florida Bar v. Thomas,167 a lawyer who represented a personal injury client
on a contingent fee basis in two separate matters paid a medical provider from
$5000 received in "med pay" funds.168 The original bill was $5000, which
was reflected on the closing statement. The problem was that the lawyer
forwarded only $3100 of these funds to the doctor, keeping the remainder for
himself.
169
As one might expect, fee issues can also implicate conflict of interest
concerns. One segment of protracted litigation 170 dealt with an appeal of an
order awarding attorneys' fees to several lawyers involved in a wrongful death
matter.171 In Moreno v. Allen,172 the Third District Court of Appeal reversed
the order, finding the conduct of the attorneys in seeking the fees to be highly
questionable. 173 The court noted that one of the attorneys had a "severe
conflict of interest" in pursuing a fee claim over the objection of his client
that, if successful, would have substantially reduced the client's recovery.
174
Another of the attorneys was denied fees on conflicts grounds as well.
175
A lawyer, of course, is in a fiduciary relationship with a
client. Annually, the case law reflects that some lawyers breach their
fiduciary duties. Misuse of trust funds is perhaps the most egregious example
of such a breach. Disbarment was the result of misappropriation of trust
money and commingling in Florida Bar v. Tillman176 and Florida Bar v.
Porter.17 7 A lesser sanction of six months suspension followed by two years
163. See also, e.g., Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1982); Goodkind
v. Wolkowsky, 180 So. 538, 542 (Fla. 1938).
164. See Florida Bar v. Hollander, 607 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1992); Florida Bar v. Doe,
550 So. 2d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 1989).
165. The schedule setting forth the maximum contingent fee that ethically can be
charged without specifically procuring court approval is found in subdivision (f)(4)(D) of
RPC 4-1.5, "FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES." RPC 4-1.5 (f)(4)(D).
166. Florida Bar v. Thomas, 698 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. 1997).
167. Id. at 530.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 531.
170. See, e.g., Perez v. George, Hartz, Lundeen, Flagg & Fulmer, 662 So. 2d 361 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
171. Id. at 362.
172. 692 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
173. Id. at 959.
174. Id. at 959 n.3.
175. Id. at 958-59.
176. 682 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1996).
177. 684 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1996).
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probation was imposed for trust account irregularities in Florida Bar v.
Barbone.
178
Competent representation is perhaps the core of the attorney-client
relationship. It is no coincidence that the first RPC is entitled
"[c]ompetence.' '179 Incompetent representation can lead not only to potential
legal malpractice liability but to professional responsibility problems as well.
In 1997, several lawyers were disciplined by the Supreme Court of Florida for
various shades of incompetence. Cases involving sanctions for incompetence
included Florida Bar v. Horowitz, 180 Florida Bar v. Roberts,18 1 and Florida
Bar v. Nunes.
18 2
The ethical obligation of diligence, expressed in RPC 4-1.3,183 follows
closely from the duty of competence. In disciplinary parlance, grievance
complaints accusing attorneys of lack of diligence are referred to as "neglect"184
cases. More neglect complaints are filed with The Florida Bar than any
other type of alleged violation. Inevitably, some of these complaints result in
imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
A lawyer's failure to promptly deliver funds held in trust, when coupled
with other violations, led to a suspension of ninety-one days in Florida Bar v.
Laing. 18 In Florida Bar v. Jordan,186 the lawyer was suspended for ninety-
one days for, among other things, a failure to file required documents that
resulted in dismissal of a client's appeal. 187 In Florida Bar v. Barcus,I8 8 the
lawyer was publicly reprimanded for several instances of neglect, including
failure to appear at a deposition and failure to file necessary motions.189 The
disciplinary sanction could have been greater, as the court noted: "[The
lawyer] committed isolated acts of negligence, but we do not find a pattern of
negligence which would require a suspension.We find this to be a case of an
178. 679 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1996).
179. Rule 4-1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." RPC 4-1.1.
180. 697 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1997).
181. 689 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1997).
182. 679 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1996).
183. Rule 4-1.3, "DILIGENCE," provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client." RPC 4-1.3.
184. RPC 4-1.3.
185. 695 So. 2d 299, 304 (Fla. 1997).
186. 682 So. 2d 548 (FIa. 1996).
187. Id. at 549.
188. 697 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1997).
189. Id. at 74-75.
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attorney who ineptly handled a difficult situation."19° ' And, of course, missing
a statute of limitations violates the duty of diligence, as was the case in
Florida Bar v. Lecznar.
191
A logical, but unfortunate, occasional consequence of a lack of diligence
is the lawyer's failure to follow the ethical rules that govern withdrawal from
a representation. Simply walking away from a representation, even one that is
not in litigation, is not sufficient. A withdrawing lawyer must comply with
RPC 4-1.16,192 which requires, at a minimum, proper notice to the client and
190. Id. at 75. Two justices, however, would have imposed a thirty day suspension. Id.
(Grimes, J., dissenting).
191. 690 So. 2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 1997). See also supra text accompanying note 183.
192. Rule 4-1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION,"
provides:
(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate Representation. Except as
stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a
client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the
lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) When Withdrawal Is Allowed. Except as stated in subdivision (c), a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or
if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that
the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) Compliance With Order of Tribunal. When ordered to do so by a
tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause
for terminating the representation.
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time
for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
1997]
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an attempt by the lawyer to reasonably protect the client's interests upon
withdrawal. 193 Failure to properly withdraw can be considered abandonment
of the client, as was the case in Florida Bar v. Brakefield.194 The lawyer's
neglect and abandonment of several clients resulted in a six month
suspension, along with probation and other sanctions. 195
Ill. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Lawyers often are referred to as "officers of the court" and, as such, they
have ethical responsibilities to the leading officers of the court, judges, and to
the judicial system in general. This position as an integral part of our
jurisprudential system has long required that lawyers comply with certain
standards of conduct, as set forth in the RPC. 196 Florida case law in 1997
addressed a variety of issues in this area, such as a lawyer's duty of candor to
a court, the extent to which a lawyer may communicate with jurors after a
trial, grounds for a lawyer's disqualification from participating in litigation,
and the permissible scope of argument before a jury.
The past year saw interest in the lawyer's status as an officer of the court
and a member of a learned profession carried to a new level. The Supreme
Court of Florida created a "Commission on Professionalism" consisting of
judges, lawyers, legal educators, and public representatives and charged them
with the responsibility of ensuring "that the fundamental ideals and values of
the justice system and the legal profession are inculcated in all of those
persons serving or seeking to serve in the system."' 97 The Florida Bar pitched
in, creating and funding a "Center for Professionalism."' 9 The Continuing
Legal Education ("CLE") Requirement rules were amended to mandate that
the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not
been earned. The lawyer may retain papers and other property relating to or
belonging to the client to the extent permitted by law.
RPC 4-1.16.
193. Id.
194. 679 So. 2d 766, 769 (Fla. 1996). See also Florida Bar v. King, 664 So. 2d 925
(Fla. 1995); Florida Bar v. Hooper, 509 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1987).
195. Brakefield, 679 So. 2d at 769-70.
196. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Such obligations in the current Florida
RPC often are based on ethics rules that existed in prior professional responsibility codes.
See, e.g., Code of Professional Responsibility, 59 FLA. B.J. 439, 439 (Sept. 1985) (citing
former rule DR 7-102(B) of Florida Code of Professional Responsibility).
197. In re Florida Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism, Fla. Admin. Order
(Fla. July 19, 1996).
198. The Center will have a budget of almost $300,000 annually. See, e.g., Gary
Blankenship, Board Okays 97-98 Budget, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 1997, at 1, 6; The Florida
Bar Proposed Budget for Fiscal 1997-98, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 15, 1997, at 12.
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lawyers complete at least five hours every three years of continuing education
courses in some combination of ethics, professionalism, or substance abuse.
199
Despite the interest in Florida surrounding the issue of
"professionalism," 200 it remains to be seen what effect, if any, these initiatives
will have on the conduct of lawyers. "Professionalism" means different
things to different people, so it will be hard to measure whether the behavior
of lawyers becomes more "professional." Although ethics education has been
mandatory for years,20' many Florida lawyers seemingly cannot grasp the most
elemental notions of fiduciary duty.20 2 If the threat of disciplinary sanctions
for the violation of mandatory professional ethics rules has not transformed
the behavior of lawyers, one might question how an aspirational
"professionalism" program can be expected to achieve more favorable results.
Several cases addressed a variety of issues relating to a lawyer's
relationship with the judicial system, including lawyers' ethical obligation of
candor toward a tribunal. Misrepresentation to a court remains one of the
most serious offenses that an attorney can commit.2 3  In Florida Bar v.
Kravitz,204 a lawyer who made multiple misrepresentations to a judge was notonly held in contempt but ultimately was suspended from the practice of law
199. The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 697 So. 2d
115 (Fla. 1997). Ironically, the new rule actually allows a lawyer to escape entirely any CLE
course in the ethics rules (the very rules to which compliance is mandatory) by taking five
hours of courses in "professionalism" or substance abuse. Id. at 133. While these two
subjects are important, it is unfortunate that the new requirement permits lawyers to evade
basic ethics education.
200. See, e.g., Hillsborough Takes Top Professionalism Award, FLA. B. NEWS, Aug. 1,
1997, at 1; Mary Smith Judd, Florida Professionalism Efforts May Be a Model for Others,
FLA. B. NEWs, May 15, 1997, at 9; Mary Smith Judd, President Notes Progress on
Professionalism Front, FLA. B. NEWS, June 15, 1997, at 19; Mary Smith Judd, Professional
Commission Shares Passion for Profession, FLA. B. NEWS, May 15, 1997, at 1; Mark D.
Killian, Frost Tells St. Thomas Students to Strive for Professionalism, FLA. B. NEWS, June 1,
1997, at 11; Workers' Comp Section to Set Professionalism Standards, FLA. B. NEWS, July 15,
1997, at 21.
201. In 1987 the Supreme Court of Florida adopted a "Continuing Legal Education
Requirement," whereby lawyers must take at least two hours of ethics education every three
years. Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar Continuing Legal
Education, 510 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1987).
202. See Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida
Law, 21 NovA L. REV. 231, 254-55, 274-76 (1996); Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional
Responsibility Law in Florida: The Year in Review, 20 NOVA L. REv. 223, 229-30, 251-52
(1995).
203. See supra notes 65 and 100 and accompanying text.
204. 694 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1997).
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205for thirty days. Among other offenses, the lawyer lied to the judge about a
matter of which he had personal knowledge, and falsely represented to the
judge that opposing counsel did not object to entry of a proposed "agreed"
order.20 6 This conduct violated RPC 4-3.3(a)207 and 4-8.4(c). 20 F
A lawyer who filed an affidavit in a bankruptcy case falsely stating that
he had no connection with the debtor was suspended for ninety-one days in
Florida Bar v. Norvell.209 Disbarment was the sanction imposed in Florida
Bar v. Catalano,210 after the lawyer made both written and oral
misrepresentations to the court in a civil matter.211 In Florida Bar v.
Kaufman,2 2 disbarment also resulted when a lawyer falsely testified in an
attempt to evade discovery of his assets in a civil suit in which he was a
party.2
13
In our legal system, a constant source of tension is the conflict between a
lawyer's duty to effectively represent the client and the duty to be honest and
forthright with the court. It seems, however, that in an adversarial system any
legitimate doubts that a lawyer has should be resolved in favor of the client.
A lawyer can have disclosure obligations to a court regarding both the facts
and the law.214 The extent of these obligations may be easier to determine
with regard to the law.215 In addition to general rules that prohibit a lawyer
from making false or misleading statements to a court, a special rule, RPC 4-
3.3(a)(3), imposes a duty to disclose to a court "legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. '216
This duty was addressed in Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc. A trial court
granted summary judgment, relying on a particular statute that apparently
immunized the defendant from liability.218  The problem with the court's
ruling, however, was that the statute had not become effective until after the
date of the accident in question. Defense counsel had failed to disclose this
205. Id. at 725.
206. Id. at 726.
207. See supra note 65.
208. See supra note 100.
209. 685 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1996). The lawyer was guilty of other violations as well. Id.
at 1296-97.
210. 685 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1996).
211. Id. at 1300.
212. 684 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1996).
213. Id. at 807.
214. RPC 4-3.3(a).
215. Id.
216. RPC 4-3.3(a)(3).
217. 687 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
218. Id. at 354-55.
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fact to the court; on appeal, counsel conceded that he had not checked the
effective date before arguing for summary judgment below. The Fourth
District Court of Appeal considered RPC 4-3.3(a)(3) in conjunction with RPC
4-1.1,211 which mandates competent representation, and stated that these rules
"imply a duty to know and disclose to the court adverse legal authority.
220
Trial counsel is required by these rules "to provide full information to the trial
court such that the court has all necessary information to determine the issue
presented to it."221 Trial counsel's failure to know and disclose the effective
date had failed to meet these standards, and the judgment was reversed.222
In contrast to the clear requirement to disclose adverse legal authority,
there is no corresponding duty to volunteer adverse facts. 2 Schlapper v.
Mauer224 was a medical malpractice case in which a defendant doctor was
granted summary judgment dismissing him as a party.225 Plaintiff's counsel
had not opposed the motion for summary judgment because he was advised
by the doctor's law26yer that the doctor "had nothing to do with the treatment
of" the plaintiff.22 After discovering that this statement was totally false,
plaintiff's counsel moved to vacate the summary judgment. Affirming the
trial court's order vacating the summary judgment, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal concluded that defense counsel's conduct violated the ethical
prohibition against misrepresentations of fact that is imposed by RPC 4-4.1.227
The court explained:
Because of the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney's
fiduciary duty owed to a client, an attorney has no affirmative duty
to inform an opposing party or attorney as to the existence of
relevant facts. But misrepresentations about facts, as well as
219. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
220. Dilallo, 687 So. 2d at 355 (emphasis added).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Schlapper v. Mauer, 687 So. 2d 982, 984 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct App. 1997).
224. Id. at 982.
225. Id. at 983.
226. Id. at 984.
227. Id. at 985. Rule 4-4.1, "TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS,"
provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by rule 4-1.6.
RPC 4-4.1.
19971
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procedures and future conduct likewise is forbidden. . . . An
attorney has the option of keeping silent, refusing to answer,
changing the subject or referring counsel to the discovery process.
But he or she cannot misstate the facts.
22 1
A dissenting opinion in Steinhorst v. State229 contained interesting
comments regarding the ethical obligations of a lawyer who was aware that
the trial judge had a conflict of interest that, as a matter of judicial ethics,
would require the judge's recusal from the case.230 The judge had recused
himself in a co-defendant's case due to a conflict, but failed to recuse himself
from this case despite the presence of the same conflict. The majority upheld
the conviction, concluding that the judge's conflict could have been
discovered by defense counsel with the exercise of due diligence.231 Justice
Anstead's dissent expressed the view that the prosecutor, as well as the judge,
had the duty to disclose the judge's conflict to the defense.232
The ethical limitations on a lawyer's post-trial communication with
jurors are set forth in RPC 4-3.5(d)(4).233 In Kriston v. Webster,234 a lawyer
for the defendant interviewed jurors without following the procedure specified
228. Schlapper, 687 So. 2d at 985.
229. 695 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1997) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1251.
231. Id. at 1247.
232. Id. at 1251.
233. Subdivision (d)(4) of RPC 4-3.5, "IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE
TRIBUNAL," provides:
(d) Communication With Jurors. A lawyer shall not:
(4) after dismissal of the jury in a case with which the lawyer is connected,
initiate communication with or cause another to initiate communication with
any juror regarding the trial except to determine whether the verdict may be
subject to legal challenge; provided, a lawyer may not interview jurors for
this purpose unless the lawyer has reason to believe that grounds for such
challenge may exist; and provided further, before conducting any such
interview the lawyer must file in the cause a notice of intention to interview
setting forth the name of the juror or jurors to be interviewed. A copy of the
notice must be delivered to the trial judge and opposing counsel a reasonable
time before such interview. The provisions of this rule do not prohibit a
lawyer from communicating with members of the venire or jurors in the
course of official proceedings or as authorized by court rule or written order
of the court.
RPC 4-3.5 (d)(4).
234. 688 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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by this rule.235 The trial court ultimately granted the defense's motion for a
new trial, but in doing so expressly stated that it was ignoringthe improper
juror interviews and granting the new trial on other grounds. 6 Regarding
counsel's noncompliance with RPC 4-3.5(d)(4), the court stated:
Knowledge and observance of the rules regulating a lawyer's
ethical conduct with respect to jury and court contacts is as
important in the practice of the profession as knowing the
substantive law. Ignorance or non-observance of those rules
affects the reputation of the Bar and of the individual lawyer who
violates them.
237
In Kriston, the court referred to the procedures that are required as a
matter of attorney ethics by RPC 4-3.4(d)(4), 238 but made no reference to
Rule 1.321(h) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,239 which also outlines
required juror-contact procedures.240 The relationship between the ethics rule
and the rule of procedure was addressed, however, in a Third District Court of
Appeal case, Seymour v. Soloman.241 Following the trial in this case,
plaintiff's counsel contacted three jurors. At that time counsel was aware of
no grounds to challenge the verdict or to support a motion to interview the
jurors. From one of these contacts, counsel learned that one of the jurors had
known the defendant. Counsel moved for a new trial, and the court responded
by setting an evidentiary hearing to interview the juror.242 The appellate court
235. Id. at 347.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 348.
238. RPC 4-3.4(d)(4).
239. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.431(h) provides:
Interview of a Juror. A party who believes that grounds for legal challenge
to a verdict exists may move for an order permitting an interview of ajuror or
jurors to determine whether the verdict is subject to the challenge. The
motion shall be served within 10 days after rendition of the verdict unless
good cause is shown for the failure to make the motion within that time. The
motion shall state the name and address of each juror to be interviewed and
the grounds for challenge that the party believes may exist. After notice and
hearing, the trial judge shall enter an order denying the motion or permitting
the interview. If the interview is permitted, the court may prescribe the place,
manner, conditions, and scope of the interview.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(h).
240. Kriston, 688 So. 2d at 347.
241. 683 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
242. Id. at 168.
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quashed the trial court's order, noting that counsel had violated Florida Rule
Civil Procedure 1.43 1(h) by contacting jurors without filing a motion with the
court, without notice and hearing, and without leave of court. 43 In a footnote,
the court recognized that RPC 4-3.5(d) "governs the propriety of attorneys'
actions in relations to juror interviews. ' 244 Citing the preamble to the RPC, 45
however, the court stated that the ethics rules are "not intended to supplement
court procedural rules.
' 246
A trial judge's authority to disqualify an attorney from representing a
client in a particular case is an important aspect of our court system. This
authority allows the judge to prevent one party from being placed at an unfair
disadvantage in litigation due to reasons such as improper access to
confidential information, an attorney's failure to honor ethical obligations, or
even the "appearance of impropriety."2 47 Two cases at the appellate level
dealt with the issue of disqualification as a result of alleged access to
confidential information.
The Third District Court of Appeal addressed the question of how the
conflicts rules apply to a lawyer who may have been previously involved in a
matter in a nonlawyer capacity. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v.
Buenaagua248 concerned a former adjuster for a cruise line's insurance claims
manager who became a lawyer and opposed the cruise line in Jones Act
cases.249 The cruise line's motions to disqualify the lawyer in four unrelated
cases were denied. The appellate court denied certiorari, concluding that the
current matters were not "substantially related" to matters on which the
lawyer previously worked as an adjuster.2 50 The court noted the presence of
four significant factors: 1) four years had passed since the lawyer left the
claims manager; 2) the current matters arose after the lawyer left the claims
manager; 3) the claims manager and the cruise line were no longer associated;
and 4) the claims manager did not adjust the matters in question.25' The
243. Id.
244. Id. at 168 n. 1.
245. RPC, "PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESONSIBILITIES."
246. Seymour, 683 So. 2d at 168 n. I (citing Preamble to Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar).
247. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 1991).
Unlike the former Code of Professional Responsibility, Florida's current RPC no longer
contains a rule against the "appearance of impropriety." Id. Nevertheless, judges may use an
"appearance of impropriety" standard in ruling on motions to disqualify counsel. Id. at 634.
248. 685 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
249. Id. at 8.
250. Id. at 10.
251. Id. at 8-10. In the court's view, these factors distinguished this case from its prior
decision in Tuazon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 641 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
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cruise line failed to show that any information to which the lawyer, as
adjuster, had access gave him an unfair advantage in the present matters. 252
The court further noted that information relevant to each case (e.g.,
"shipboard conditions, cleaning practices, maintenance procedures") could be
obtained through discovery.253 Citing the comment to RPC 4-1.9,254 the court
concluded that a "changing of sides in the matter in question" by the lawyer
had not occurred.255 The court further stated that the fact that all Jones Act
cases are all similar to some degree was insufficient to warrant
disqualification of the lawyer.
25 6
Unfair access to confidential information as grounds for disqualification
in a joint representation situation was at issue in Double T Corp. v. Jalis
Development, Inc.25 7 Several co-defendants were jointly represented in the
defense of a civil matter. Plaintiffs counsel gained access to one co-
defendant's corporate files after that co-defendant filed for bankruptcy, and
the bankruptcy trustee waived that co-defendant's attorney-client privilege.
The remaining co-defendants moved to disqualify plaintiffs counsel, but the
trial court denied the motion.258 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed
and ordered disqualification.2 5 9  "As a result of the bankruptcy trustee's
1994) (finding plaintiff's attorney who previously worked as adjuster for defendant cruise line
disqualified on grounds that he had access to confidential information in that capacity).
252. Royal Caribbean, 685 So. 2d at 11.
253. Id. at 10.
254. Id. The comment to RPC 4-1.9, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; FORMER
CLIENT," provides in pertinent part:
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of rule 4-1.9(a) may depend on the facts
of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter
can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved
in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with
materially adverse interests clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer
who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded
from later representing another client in a wholly distinct problem of that type
even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the
prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military
lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military
jurisdiction. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved
in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a
changing of sides in the matter in question.
RPC 4-1.9 cmt.
255. Royal Caribbean, 685 So. 2d at 10 (citing RPC 4-1.9 cmt. (1992)).
256. Id. at 11.
257. 682 So. 2d 1160, 1160 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
258. Id. at 1161.
259. Id.
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waiver of the attorney-client privilege, [plaintiffs] counsel has received an
informational advantage over the defendants who agreed to joint
representation, as [the bankrupt's] corporate files include attorney-client
communications regarding the pending civil litigation."
260
Disqualification as a means of preventing a lawyer from acting in the
dual roles of advocate and witness at trial was the subject of several
cases. With limited exceptions, RPC 4-3.7 ethically precludes a lawyer from
representing a client at trial if that lawyer will be a "necessary witness on
behalf of the client., 261  Disqualification under this rule is not warranted
where the lawyer will not be a material witness. 26  In a domestic relations
case, Pascucci v. Pascucci,2 63 opposing counsel moved to disqualify the
wife's lawyer based on alleged communications with a psychologist who
treated the wife and children, claiming those discussions made the lawyer a
material witness.2 64 The trial court granted the motion, but the Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed the order.265 The record reflected no evidence that
the wife's lawyer would be a material witness.
Even if counsel had gained information, this would not make
counsel a material, necessary or essential witness because anything
he could conceivably testify to would be inadmissible hearsay.
Any possible argument that counsel could be a witness vanished
260. Id.
261. Rule 4-3.7, "LAWYER AS WITNESS," provides:
(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client
except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no
reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
(b) Other Members of Law Firm as Witnesses. A lawyer may act as
advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be
called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9.
RPC 4-3.7.
262. Id.
263. 679 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
264. Id. at 1312.
265. Id. at 1313.
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when the trial court denied former wife's motion for protective
order and permitted the deposition [of the psychologist]. 266
On a related point, the appellate court noted that the conflict of interest rule,
RPC 4-1.7(b) 267 "does not require an attorney to withdraw when the opposing
party has instituted collateral litigation against the attorney personally. ' 268
Two other cases concerning applicability of RPC 4-3.7 have helped clear
up uncertainty concerning the extent of the disqualification imposed under
this rule. The rule on its face states that a disqualified lawyer-witness cannot
"act as advocate at a trial.,269 It does not, however, refer to possible pre-trial
or post-trial representation. In Fleitman v. McPherson,2 0 the First District
Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court had erred in not disqualifying a
lawyer who was likely to be a "featured witness" at trial.27  Significantly, the
court went on to state that the lawyer "may participate in the representation up
until the trial and after the trial, but may not participate as an attorney at
trial., 272  The conclusion that RPC 4-3.7(a) does not bar pre-trial
representation was also reached in United States v. Abbell,273 which
concerned a criminal defendant's lawyer who was to be called as a
government witness at trial to testify regarding his client's co-defendant.
274
The court ruled that the lawyer was disqualified under RPC 4-3.7(a)275 from
representing his client at trial, but was not disqualified from pre-trial
representation.27 6
As in many areas of lawyering, delay in pursuing a motion to disqualify
opposing counsel can be fatal. A federal court in Florida denied a motion for
disqualification that was filed five months after suit was instituted and eight
months after the filing of a related case.27 7 The court in Concerned Parents of
Jordan ParM78 held that the untimeliness in the filing of the disqualification
motion acted as a waiver of the right to object.279
266. Id. at 1312.
267. RPC 4-1.7(b); see supra note 22.
268. Pascucci, 679 So. 2d at 1312.
269. RPC 4-3.7(a) (emphasis added); see supra note 261.
270. 691 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
271. Id. at38.
272. Id. (emphasis added).
273. 939 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
274. Id. at 862.
275. RPC 4-3.7(a); see supra note 261.
276. Abbell, 939 F. Supp. at 864.
277. Concerned Parents of Jordan Park v. Housing Auth. of St. Petersburg, 934 F. Supp.
406, 408 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
278. Id. at 406.
279. Id. at 408.
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The permissible scope of a lawyer's argument to a jury, and responses of
the court and The Florida Bar when those bounds are exceeded, were
addressed in a number of cases. District Courts of Appeal for each district,
except the second, published decisions in this area. In Winterberg v.
Johnson, 28 the First District Court of Appeal expressed its position that
argument that is unethical and improper under RPC 4-3.4(e)2  "does not
necessarily constitute fundamental or harmful error.' 282 Rather, the court will
focus on whether the misconduct could have been cured by a jury instruction
from the trial court, and whether the argument was so egregious as to preclude
the jury from fairly considering the case.283 The court noted that, while
interested in the conduct of attorneys, its primary consideration was not
attorney discipline, but the fairness of trial proceedings. 284 Similar decisions
were reached by the First District Court of Appeal in City of Jacksonville v.
Tresca285 and Hicks v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. 286
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Hampton v. State,87 concluded
that an improper argument that was not objected to did not require reversal. 288
The prosecution had agreed not to mention a certain tape to the jury. Despite
this agreement, when the prosecutor began his closing argument, he brought
up the tape. Defense counsel did not object, and this failure to object proved
costly when the appellate court declined to find fundamental error. 
89
Also addressed by the Third District Court of Appeal was improper
argument that was alleged to be "invited." 29° Repeated expressions of theprosecutor's personal opinion were condemned by the court in Fryer v.
280. 692 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
281. Rule 4-3.4(e), "FAIRNESS OF OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL," provides
that a lawyer may not
in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
RPC 4-3.4(e).
282. Winterberg, 692 So. 2d at 255.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. 692 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
286. 694 So. 2d 869, 870 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
287. 680 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
288. Id. at 585.
289. Id.
290. Fryer v. State, 693 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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State291 as "patently improper and violative of the rules of professional
conduct."292 Defense counsel objected to some of the statements. The court
reversed the conviction, ruling that an the prosecutor's responses to defense
counsel's "inviting" comments went far beyond merely "'righting the scale"'
and prejudiced the jury.293 A concurring opinion characterized the actions of
both counsel as a "monumental display of attorney misconduct."294
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam the trial court's
judgment in Donahue v. FPA Corp. 9 The concurring opinion in Donahue
expressed the view that an unobjected-to closing argument that violated RPC
4-3.4(e)296 was not necessarily fundamental error.297  The concurrence
distinguished the court's prior holding in Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc.298
The concurring opinion declared the author's "hope that publishing unethical
remarks and the name of the lawyer making them will serve as a deterrent." 299
In American Chambers Life Insurance Co. v. Hall,300 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal concluded that isolated "'send a message"' and "'conscience
of the community"' arguments, while clearly improper, are not always per se
harmful.30 1 Another improper argument case, Grushoff v. Denny's, Inc. 30 2
concerned a "golden rule" argument.30 3 The argument in question had been
objected to, and the objections were sustained. On the basis of the argument,
the trial court granted a new trial. The appellate court reversed, holding that
"golden rule" arguments were not per se reversible error but must be
evaluated under the same standard as other improper argument: whether the
subject argument was "highly prejudicial and inflammatory. ' 3 4 Here, the
argument fell short of this standard. °0
The voice of the Fifth District Court of Appeal was heard in the form of
a lengthy dissent in Schlotterlein v. State.? 6  The dissenting opinion
291. Id. at 1046.
292. Id. at 1047.
293. Id. at 1048.
294. Id. at 1049 (Sorondo, J., concurring specially).
295. 677 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
296. RPC 4-3.4(e); see supra note 281.
297. Donahue, 677 So. 2d at 883-84 (Klein, J., concurring specially).
298. Id. (citing Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
299. Donahue, 677 So. 2d at 883 (Klein, J., concurring specially).
300. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1381 (4th Dist. Ct. App. June 4, 1997).
301. Id. atD1381.
302. 693 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
303. Id. at 1069.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. 683 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Sharp, J., dissenting).
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characterized the prosecutor's closing argument as containing statements
bolstering the credibility of state's witnesses and vouching for their
veracity,7308 as well as expressions of personal opinion as to the guilt of the
accused. The dissent would have reversed the conviction on the grounds of
this improper argument, which the author believed violated RPC 4-3.4(e) "in
multiple regards., 30 9 It is interesting to note, despite the numerous reported
cases dealing with various aspects of improper and unprofessional argument,
there appear to have been no reported instances of disciplinary sanctions
being assessed against the perpetrators.
V. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THIRD PARTIES
A lawyer's ethical obligations extend beyond dealings with his or her
client. Florida Rules of Professional Conduct impose minimum requirements
in a lawyer's dealings with third parties. These duties include whether and
how an attorney can communicate with third parties, and honesty and fairness
in dealing with third parties and others. This section discusses cases which
have impacted these areas.
Perhaps the area of the most court activity has been the propriety of
lawyers' communications with others. The Supreme Court of Florida settled
the question of communications with the former employees of a defendant
corporation 310 in the case of H.B.A. Management, Inc. v. Estate of
Schwartz.31 1 The court found that under RPC 4-4.2, ex parte contact with
former employees of a defendant corporation is permissible. 1 2 The court
upheld the Fourth District Court of Appeal, and disapproved of the position
taken by the Second District Court of Appeal in Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp.
307. Id. at 568.
308. Id. at 571.
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., in support of the proposition that such conduct is permissible, Fla. Bar
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-14 (1989); Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc. v. Keiser, 611
So. 2d 1305, 1308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). But see, e.g., United States v. Florida Cities
Water Co., No. 93-281-CIV-FTM-21, 1995 WL 340980, *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 1995);
Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 657 (M.D. Fla. 1992),
aff'd, 43 F.3d 1439, 1440 (1 1th Cir. 1995); Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So. 2d
486, 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
311. 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997).
312. H.B.A. Management, 693 So. 2d at 544. Rule 4-4.2 provides in pertinent part: "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation
with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer." RPC 4-4.2.
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of America.31 3 Adopting the position taken by Florida Ethics Opinion 88-
14, s14 the court stated:
An employee's departure terminates the agency or respondeat
superior connection that had previously permitted that employee to
create liability for her employer or to bind or make admissions for
that employer. Hence, the underlying concerns and purpose of rule
4-4.2 is simply no longer served by restricting contacts with former
employees.315
Following the Schwartz case, the Second District Court of Appeal quashed a
trial court order which prohibited plaintiff's counsel from communicating
with former employees of a nursing center.316 Plaintiffs counsel wished to
contact former employees of a nursing home who, while employed there, had
cared for the now-deceased patient whose estate was suing the nursing
home.317 The court relied on the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in
Schwartz in quashing the lower court order and permitting such contact.
318
Regarding communication between a prosecutor and a criminal
defendant who was represented by counsel, the Supreme Court of Florida
found that the presence of the prosecutor at the jail while police investigators
spoke with the inmate was not improper in Rolling v. State of
Florida.319 Danny Rolling was accused of serial killings'and incarcerated in
the Alachua County jail awaiting trial. During the course of his
imprisonment, another inmate, Bobby Lewis, sought to obtain an advantage in
his own case by becoming an informant against Rolling. Lewis repeatedly
contacted investigators regarding information he claimed to have about the
murders, while investigators refused to offer him any benefit for revealing
such information. Lewis then enlisted the help of Rolling in his plan to obtain
a better deal for himself, in which Rolling, through Lewis, requested to speak
with homicide investigators. Upon being told by police investigators that his
lawyers would be opposed to such contact, Rolling terminated the interview.
Lewis continued to attempt to contact police to make a deal for himself.
Ultimately, Rolling requested another interview with the police, at which
313. Id. at 546 (citing Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
314. Fla. Bar of Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 88-14 (1989).
315. H.B.A. Management, 693 So. 2d at 546.
316. Henry v. Nat'l Health Care Affiliates, Inc., 696 So. 2d 1223, 1223 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. 695 So. 2d 278, 292 (Fla. 1997).
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Lewis would also be present to speak for Rolling. The prosecutor in the case
came to the jail to be present while investigators spoke with Rolling, so that
he would be available to answer questions posed by the investigators
interviewing Rolling. Rolling subsequently plead guilty to the murders and
was sentenced to death.320
Rolling appealed his sentence on several grounds, including that his
statements to investigators should be suppressed based on alleged violations
by the prosecutor of RPC 4-4.231 and 4-5.3.322 Rolling contended that the
prosecutor not only participated in the interview by being present, but also
directed the course of the interview, thereby violating RPC 4-4.2 and 4-
5.3. The trial court made a specific finding that the prosecutor did not violate
the rules:
As legal advisor to the law enforcement officers, he [Nilon] made
himself available to render such advice as was appropriate under
the circumstances. Mr. Nilon was careful to insure that he did not
participate in any of the interviews with the Defendant, but was
available to advise law enforcement officers should such advice be
sought. The fact that Mr. Nilon was in geographic proximity to the
site of the interview, rather than merely being available to render
320. Id. at 282.
321. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
322. Rule 4-5.3 states:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct
is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible
with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is
employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of
the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but
fails to take reasonable remedial action.
RPC 4-5.3.
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advice by telephone, does not rise to the level of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
323
The Supreme Court affirmed the court's denial of the motion to suppress
"[b]ecause the evidence in the record and inferences derived therefrom
support the trial court's finding that the prosecutor's presence at the prison to
render advice if needed did not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct."
32 4
It is important to note that the conduct complained of appeared in the
context of a motion to suppress evidence.325 The court upheld the trial court
on the motion to suppress by failing to disturb the lower court's finding.
326
Since there was evidence to support the lower court's finding that no violation
of the rules occurred, the Supreme Court of Florida refused to overturn the
trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.327 The court also emphasized
that the evidence did not support a conclusion that the prosecutor participated
in the interview between the police and the accused which was instigated at
the request of the accused.328 Attorneys should not assume that they can infer
from this case that it is permissible to participate in any way in discussions
between their clients or others and persons who have counsel.329
Additionally, attorneys should not assume that they may be present at
discussions between their clients or others and persons represented by
counsel, since the court specifically found that the prosecutor's role in this
instance was to "ensure that Rolling's constitutional rights were not violated
by any conduct of Task Force investigators." 330
The case of Jackson v. Motel 6 Multi-Purposes, Inc.331 determines the
permissible extent of communications with actual and potential members of a
class prior to class certification.332 Plaintiffs' attorneys had sought leave to
depart from rule 4.04(e),333 and be permitted to communicate with actual and
potential class members, which were potentially numerous. The magistrate
allowed such departure in an order which permitted the following: 1)
communication through an 800 number for persons to reach the plaintiffs
323. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 292.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 292.
329. Participation would include, e.g., drafting questions or documents for presentation
to the opposing party, and the like.
330. Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 292.
331. 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D500 (M.D. Feb. 24, 1997).
332. Id. at D501.
333. LocAL P, M.D. FLA. 4.04.
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attorneys; 2) publication of notices, response to requests for information by
parties or class members, except for management or supervisory employees;
and 3) letters through the mail so long as there was no solicitation to become
plaintiffs, and the communications identified the attorney, the litigation, and
the purpose of the communication.334 The order was appealed, and the court
found that the order was appropriate with certain modifications. 335 The court
added the following: 1) mailings could not be directed to persons with
managerial or supervisory positions in Motel 6; 2) plaintiffs' counsel could
not solicit for payment of fees or expenses; 3) no ex parte communication
could be made to persons with managerial and/or supervisory positions in
Motel 6; 4) ex parte communication must be preceded by identification of the
plaintiff or attorney, identification of the litigation and its status, identification
of the purpose of the communication to discuss potential discriminatory
practices of Motel 6, a statement that the person could refuse to participate in
the communication, and a statement that the allegations had not yet been
proven; and 5) the communications must comply with any applicable rules of
court, evidence, or The Florida Bar.336 Most significantly, for the purpose of
this article, is the statement that any communication must comply with Florida
Bar Rules.337 Potentially, in addition to the rules regulating communication
with persons represented by counsel 338 and persons not represented by
counsel, 339 the rules regulating attorney advertising may apply.340
Finally, regarding commercial communications by an attorney to
potential clients, Babkes v. Satz34 1 struck down a statute prohibiting the
commercial use of names and addresses of persons who have received traffic
tickets.342  Section 316.650(11) of the Florida Statutes provides that
information in traffic citations "shall not be used for commercial solicitation
334. Jackson, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D501.
335. Id. at D503.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
339. Rule 4-4.3 states the following:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
RPC 4-4.3.
340. See RPC 4-7.
341. 944 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
342. Id. at 914.
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purposes. 343 Florida attorney Babkes challenged the constitutionality of the
statute, stating that it restricted his First Amendment right to free speech. The
court, in using the Central Hudson344 four-pronged test, found that the speech
is commercial speech under the First Amendment and that the State of Florida
has a substantial interest in preserving privacy and restricting abuse of
solicitation.345 However, the State of Florida failed to prove that the statute
directly advances the government interest under the test. Further, the court
found that the State of Florida failed to show that "a 'more limited speech
regulation would be ineffective.' 347 The court then granted a permanent
injunction against enforcement of the statute.348
The court will scrutinize not only whether communications may be
made, but also the content of such communications. The court found in
Florida Bar v. Roth,349 that an attorney may not threaten criminal prosecution
to gain an advantage in a civil case.350 Roth, in negotiating a settlement in a
trust case, indicated that he could prosecute the opposing party's husband in a
molestation case based on an alleged incident many years ago as there is no
statute of limitations on child molestation cases. The court found that the
mere mention of the sexual molestation allegations in the conversation was a
threat for the purpose of settling the civil matter, in violation of RPC 4-4.4351
and 4-8.4(d),312 which warranted a public reprimand.353
A lawyer has an obligation of fair and honest dealings with third parties.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Florida Bar v. Bosse3 54 reprimanded an
attorney for avoiding his obligation to pay an expert witness fee.355 The
attorney had hired the expert for his defense in a prior grievance matter, in
343. FLA. STAT. § 316.650(11) (1995).
344. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
345. Babkes, 944 F. Supp. at 912.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 913 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980)).
348. Id. at 914.
349. 693 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1997).
350. Id. at 972.
351. Rule 4-4.4 provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or
knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person."
RPC 4-4.4.
352. The rule states that an attorney shall not "engage in conduct in connection with the
practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice." RPC 4-8.4(d).
353. Roth, 693 So. 2d at 971.
354. 689 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997).
355. Id. at 268.
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which the attorney was awarded costs against the Bar after winning the case.
The Bar sent a check for the costs to the attorney, which was deposited in his
personal joint checking account by his wife. Bosse neither paid the expert
witness with the funds, nor notified the expert that the funds had been
received. In defending his actions to the court, Bosse stated that the funds
had been deposited and spent, and that he therefore had not willfully failed to
pay the expert witness fee. However, the records indicated that Bosse had
sufficient funds in the account to pay the amount of the expert's fee during
the time period in which he claimed it was spent.356 The court found that he
violated Rule of Discipline 3-4.3 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar317
and RPC 4-8.4(c)358 in failing to use the cost award to pay the witness' fee
and in misrepresenting his finances to avoid payment of his debt.35 9
Lawyers also have obligations in dealing with potential creditors as
evidenced by Florida Bar v. Cramer.360  Cramer used the name of a third
person, who had a substantial net worth, on his application to a financial
institution for credit in purchasing computer equipment. Cramer had
previously been turned down for credit when applying in his own
name. Ultimately, Cramer stopped making payments on the leases. Cramer
raised as a defense that the third party knew that he was using his name and
that an officer of the financial institution ratified the use of the third party's
name. The court found that regardless of third party contact or authorization
of the fraud, Cramer was guilty of fraud and misrepresentation.361 The court
disbarred Cramer, taking into consideration his past discipline which also
included "subterfuge in money matters. 362
356. Id. at 269.
357. Rule of Discipline 3-4.3 provides that: "The commission by a lawyer of any act
that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice... may constitute a cause for discipline."
RULES OF DISCIPLINE 3-4.3.
358. Rule 4-8.4(c) provides that: "A lawyer shall not.., engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." RPC 4-8.4(c).
359. Bosse, 689 So. 2d at 269.
360. 678 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1996).
361. The court found that Cramer specifically violated the following rules:
3-4.3 (committing an act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice);
4-4.1(a) (making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person in
the course of representing a client); 4-8.4(b) (committing a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer); and 4-8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation).
Id. at 1281.
362. Cramer, 678 So. 2d at 1281.
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In, addition to fair dealing with an attorney's own witnesses or creditors,
an attorney also may owe an obligation of honesty to potential employers.
The Supreme Court of Florida reprimanded an attorney for an intentional
misrepresentation on an employment application in Florida Bar v.
Giant.363 The case stemmed from an earlier disciplinary case 364 in which
Glant, while employed at Central Florida Legal Services, sent a letter to
Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") enclosing an unfiled request for
modifying custody against the wishes of her client, whose husband Glant
thought should be investigated for child abuse. Giant was reprimanded and
placed on probation in that case.365 In the later case, Giant left Central Florida
Legal Services and applied for a position with HRS. In her application and
resume, Giant failed to disclose her prior employment with Central Florida
Legal Services. The application signed by Giant stated that it was "'true,
correct, and made in good faith.' 3 66 Additionally, at her hearing before the
referee "Giant admitted that her failure to disclose her employment with
Central Florida Legal Services was intentional. 367
The court upheld the referee's finding that an attorney "may be
disciplined for an intentional misrepresentation on an application for a
position as a lawyer" in violation of RPC 4-8.4(c) and ordered that she be
publicly reprimanded.368 Although it may surprise some that the court would
find a violation for the failure to include information on a job application, it
should be noted that the court emphasized in its opinion Giant's signature as
to the application's veracity, as well as her admission that the omission was
intentional.369
A lawyer, in matters not involving fraud or misrepresentation, may limit
his or her personal liability to third parties. The court found in Porlick,
Poliquin, Samara, Inc. v. Compton 370 that firms organized under the
Professional Service Corporation Act may limit the personal liability of their
members in discharging firm debts.371 Compton, a member of the firm,
signed an agreement as president of the firm with a consulting engineer to
investigate and possibly testify as an expert in a case. Porlick and his
363. 684 So. 2d 723, 725 (Fla. 1996).
364. Florida Bar v. GIant, 645 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1994). For discussion of this case, see
generally, Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional Responsibility Law in Florida: The Year in
Review, 1995, 20 NOVAL. REV. 223, 227 (1995).
365. Giant, 645 So. 2d at 964.
366. Giant, 684 So. 2d at 725.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. 683 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
371. Id. at 548.
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engineering firm sued Compton in his individual capacity, alleging that
Compton and the firm failed to pay the agreed fee for services performed and
that Compton was individually liable since he signed the contract. The law
firm had been organized under the Professional Service Corporation Act 372
and RPC 4-8.6(a).3 73  The Act provides that shareholders acting in their
capacity as shareholders have no personal liability outside the provision of
legal services. 374  The court concluded that the Act "relieves professional
service corporation shareholders of personal liability for the ordinary business
debts of the professional service corporation." 375  Compton's addition of
"Pres." after his name indicated that he was acting as a shareholder, thus
relieving him of responsibility for the debt.376
However, acting as a shareholder has both benefits and
detriments. Contingent fee contracts signed by a shareholder, even the sole
shareholder of a P.A., inure to the benefit of the P.A. as in the case of In Re
Nelson.377 Nelson, as a member of his P.A., signed a contingent fee contract
as a referring lawyer which provided for a division of fees between his P.A.
and another law firm. 37 8  Prior to the referral, Nelson's P.A. had done
372. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1995).
373. Rule 4-8.6(a) provides in part that: "Lawyers may practice law in the form of
professional service corporations, professional limited liability companies, or registered
limited liability partnerships organized or qualified under applicable law." RPC 4-8.6(a).
374. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1995).
375. Porlick, 683 So. 2d at 548-49.
376. Id. at 546-47.
377. 203 B.R. 756, 761 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
378. See RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(D), which states the following:
(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee within
subdivision (f)(4) shall be on the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the legal services on
behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the legal services
on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any fee in excess
of 25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in which 2 or more
lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active participation in the
providing of legal services. In such circumstances counsel shall apply for
circuit court authorization of the fee division in excess of 25%, based upon a
sworn petition signed by all counsel that shall disclose in detail those services
to be performed. The application for authorization of such a contract may be
filed as a separate proceeding before suit or simultaneously with the filing of
a complaint. Proceedings thereon may occur before service of process on any
party and this aspect of the file may be sealed. Authorization of such contract
shall not bar subsequent inquiry as to whether the fee actually claimed or
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significant work on the case. Before the conclusion of the case, Nelson P.A.
and Nelson personally filed for bankruptcy under Chapters 11 and 7. Nelson
was suspended shortly after the petitions were filed, then resigned in lieu of
disciplinary proceedings, and the P.A.'s bankruptcy was converted to a
Chapter 7. Subsequently, the contingent fee case was settled, and a district
court approved the fee division between Nelson P.A. and the other law firm,
which petitioned to determine to whom the fee should be paid.
379
The court rejected Nelson's argument that he had any personal interest in
the money, concluding that the contract was signed by him in his role as
shareholder in Nelson, P.A.380 The court also indicated that since Nelson was
suspended and then resigned, any fee was based on the value of legal services
performed prior to the suspension, rejecting Nelson's argument that he was
entitled to fees because he performed work on the case after the bankruptcy
was filed and after the suspension.381 The court therefore concluded that any
fee was the property of the Nelson P.A. bankruptcy estate and should properly
be paid to the estate.8 2
Regarding dealings with the IRS, attorneys may not deposit client refund
checks into their trust account.383 In Ollinger v. Internal Revenue Service,
384
charged is clearly excessive. An application under this subdivision shall
contain a certificate showing service on the client and The Florida Bar.
Counsel may proceed with representation of the client pending court
approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be applicable after
deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained especially for
appellate purposes.
RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(D). See also RPC 4-1.5(g), which provides that:
Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer;
or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation and
agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and the
basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
RPC 4-1.5(g).
379. Nelson, 203 B.R. at 758-60.
380. Id. at 762.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 764.
383. Ollinger v. Internal Revenue Serv., 78 A.F.T.R. 2d (R.I.A.) 96-6567 (M.D. Fla.
1996).
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an attorney appealed fines assessed against him by the IRS for such
conduct.385 With the client's consent, the attorney deposited two refund
checks into his trust account and disbursed the checks to the client and the
attorney. Federal law prohibits negotiation of any refund check to a tax payer
by a preparer of tax documents.8 6
Finally, an attorney may not assist in the unlicensed practice of
law.387 The court found in Florida Bar v. American Senior Citizens Alliance,
Inc.,388 that a corporation owned and managed by nonattorneys for the
purpose of selling legal documents was engaged in the unlicensed practice of
law.389 Specifically, the court found that nonlawyer employees gave legal
advice to buyers regarding the appropriateness of estate planning documents
which would be prepared by nonlawyer employees of the corporation then
reviewed by an employee who was an attorney.390 The nonlawyer determined
which type of estate planning the buyer should use and what documents were
required to fulfill the estate plan, while other nonlawyer employees drafted the
documents. Such conduct went well beyond "gathering [the] necessary
information" 391 required to complete estate documents which the court had
previously found to be permissible.3 92  The referee found that "a lawyer
participating in these same activities would be subject to sanction by The
Florida Bar," citing to RPC 4-5.5.393
V. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FLORIDA BAR
This section discusses the interaction of attorneys with The Florida Bar,
the disciplinary arm of the Supreme Court of Florida. Some notable
disciplinary cases not discussed in prior sections will be reviewed
here. Additionally, rule changes which are not specific to other sections will
be briefly discussed.
384. Id. at 96-6567.
385. Id.
386. 26 U.S.C. § 6695(f) (1994).
387. RPC 4-5.5(b) provides that: "A lawyer shall not assist a person who is not a
member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unlicensed practice of
law." RPC 4-5.5(b).
388. 689 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1997).
389. Id. at 256.
390. Id. at 257.
391. Id. at 258 (quoting Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of
Living Trusts, 613 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. 1992)).
392. See generally, Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of Living
Trusts, 613 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1992).
393. Id. at 257. See also RPC 4-5.5.
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The area in which the court continues to impose the most severe
discipline is that of false statements. The requirement of honesty is
particularly important in reinstatement proceedings, as evidenced by Florida
Bar v. Orta.394 Orta had been suspended for three years after being convicted
of income tax evasion. Orta applied for reinstatement, but did not disclose the
existence of foreign property when asked to by Florida Bar investigators. The
referee found that Orta did not disclose the property until he was exposed by
Florida Bar investigators and counsel. 395 The pattern of dishonesty while on
suspension for income tax evasion, another form of dishonesty, warranted
disbarment.396
Misrepresentation to a foreign disciplinary authority also warrants
disbarment, as demonstrated by Florida Bar v. Budnitz.39 7  Budnitz was
disbarred by New Hampshire after he testified to a grand jury that a document
had been notarized at his office on a particular date when, in fact, it had been
notarized at his home and backdated.3 98 In answering a query from the New
Hampshire Bar, he reiterated that the testimony was true, and was later
disbarred in New Hampshire. 99 The Supreme Court of Florida disbarred
Budnitz as well noting that, although he raised several procedural defects, he
neither denied the conduct or, in the alternative, expressed remorse for it.4"0
Perhaps because misrepresentation and dishonesty generally warrant the
harshest punishment, the court scrutinizes these cases carefully. The court
confirmed that "[i]n order to find that an attorney acted with dishonesty,
misrepresentation, deceit, or fraud, the Bar must show the necessary element
of intent" in Florida Bar v. Lanford.40' Similarly, the court refused to
overturn a referee's finding of rehabilitation in an attorney who had checks
returned for insufficient funds in her personal account during the period of her402
suspension in Florida Bar v. Hernandez-Yanks. While on suspension for
misappropriation of client funds and trust account violations, Hernandez-
Yanks had checks returned for insufficient funds in a joint account with her
husband. The payees were subsequently paid. The referee found that
Hernandez-Yanks lacked knowledge of the balance of her joint account at the403
time the checks were written and recommended reinstatement. Although
394. 689 So. 2d 270, 273 (Fla. 1997).
395. Id. at 272.
396. Id. at 271-72.
397. 690 So. 2d 1239, 1239 (Fla. 1997).
398. Id. at 1240.
399. Id. at 123940.
400. Id. at 1241.
401. 691 So. 2d 480, 480-81 (Fla. 1997).
402. 690 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 1997).
403. Id. at 1271.
1997]
264
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
the Bar disagreed with the referee, the court refused to "second-guess the
referee. ' 0 4 Perhaps Justice Wells had the better argument in his dissent, in
which he stated that the basis of the suspension in conjunction with the
bounced checks from her personal account indicated "that respondent, within
three months of the referee's report, was continuing the same conduct for
which she was suspended. I cannot excuse the continued writing of
overdrafts on the basis that she was unaware of the balance in the account.
V °A 5
While declining to discipline an attorney for conduct during his judicial
term, 40 6 the court publicly reprimanded an attorney for his behavior during the
conduct of the Judicial Qualifications Committee hearings.40 7 The court
found that Graham repeatedly objected to motions, intentionally delayed the
proceedings, and disregarded the instructions of the presiding chair, as well as
harassed another judge who was called as a witness in deposition. 408  The
court indicated that Graham's actions were mitigated by his prior removal
from the bench, his cooperation in the disciplinary process, and his good
intentions.40 9  Based on the violations of RPC 4-3.4(e),410 4-3.5(c), 4F, 4-
3.6(a),412 4-4.4 413 4-8.2(a),414 and 4-8.4(d),415 the court reprimanded Graham
as part of a consent judgment.
404. Id. at 1272.
405. Id. at 1273 (Wells, J., dissenting).
406. See Florida Bar v. Graham, 662 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1995) (dismissing several counts
against Graham regarding conduct which resulted in Graham's removal from the bench, but
for which the court declined to discipline Graham).
407. Id. at 1245.
408. Id. at 1243 n.2.
409. Id. at 1244.
410. Rule 4-3.4(e), provides:
A lawyer shall not ... in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying
as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or
innocence of an accused.
RPC 4-3.4(e).
411. Rule 4-3.5(c) states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct intended to disrupt
a tribunal." RPC 4-3.5(c).
412. Rule 4-3.6(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding due to its
creation of an imminent and substantial detrimental effect on that proceeding.
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The court also reiterated that it is impermissible to continue the practice
of law while on suspension in Florida Bar v. Rood.4 16 Rood, while on
suspension for two years "failed to notify all his clients of his suspension and.
. . continued to meet with, represent and advise clients, and continued to
receive and disburse client funds from his bank accounts.' 17 Based on this
evidence, the court disbarred Rood.418
However, the Supreme Court of Florida's direction of the profession is
not limited to discipline; the year saw several amendments to rules of note. In
the arena of lawyer advertising, the court raised the filing fee from $50 to
$100 for advertisements which are required to be filed with and reviewed by
the Standing Committee on Advertising.419 In the same case, the court
expanded the information which may be provided in advertisements that are
exempt from the filing requirement to include "the office location and parking
arrangements; disability accommodations; electronic mail addresses; a
lawyer's years of experience practicing law; official certification logos for the
fields of law in which a lawyer practices; and common salutary language such
RPC 4-3.6(a).
413. Rule 4-4.4 states that "[i]n representing a client; a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or
knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person."
RPC 4-4.4.
414. Rule 4-8.2(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or
integrity of a judge, mediator, arbitrator, adjudicatory officer, public legal
officer, juror or member of the venire, or candidate for election or
appointment to judicial or legal office.
RPC 4-8.2(a).
415. Rule 4-8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from:
[E]ngag[ing] in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or
through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against
litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis,
including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion,
national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age,
socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic.
RPC 4-8.4(d).
416. 678 So. 2d 1277, 1277 (Fla. 1996).
417. Id.
418. Id. at 1278.
419. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Rules 4-7.2 & 4-7.5, 690 So.
2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 1997).
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as 'best wishes,' 'good luck,' 'happy holidays,' and 'pleased to announce. 'A2°
The court also amended the Interest on Trust Accounts ("IOTA") Program
rules to allow voluntary IOTA sweep accounts,42' which would allow for
greater interest on the IOTA account.
Finally, the court denied a petition by The Florida Bar which would have
eliminated the pro bono reporting requirement and substituted a voluntary
report.423 In so doing, the court stated the following:
Lawyers have been granted a special boon by the State of Florida -
they in effect have a monopoly on the public justice system. In
return, lawyers are ethically bound to help the State's poor gain
access to that system. The mandatory reporting requirement is
essential to guaranteeing that lawyers do their part to provide equal
justice.424
Justices Harding and Wells each dissented in part; although they agreed with
the obligation the majority imposes on lawyers' services to the needy, they
425
noted the difficulty in enforcement for The Florida Bar. Justice Grimes
dissented entirely in the opinion; he approved the "aspirational goals ' '426 of
the rule, but found mandatory reporting to be "coercion 'A27  and
"counterproductive. 'A28
The Supreme Court of Florida also made significant changes to the rules
on bar admissions in Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating
420. Id. at 1256-57.
421. The court described sweep accounts as follows:
A sweep account is an existing cash management product used to generate
higher yields on checking accounts. At the end of each business day after all
deposits, checks, and charges have cleared against an account, the financial
institution electronically transfers the excess funds out of the account into a
higher yield investment. At the start of the next business day, the financial
institution electronically returns the excess funds to the account and posts the
interest earned.
Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Rule 5-1.1(e)--IOTA, 692 So. 2d 181,
182 n.I (Fla. 1997).
422. Id. at 182.
423. Amendments to Rule 4-6.1 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Pro Bono
Public Service, 696 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1997).
424. Id. at 735.
425. Id. at 737 (Harding, J., & Wells, J., dissenting).
426. Id. at 738 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
427. Id.
428. Amendments to Rule 4-6.1, 696 So. 2d at 738.
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to Admissions to the Bar.429 The changes reorganized and clarified the rules,
and codified some long standing policies of the Board of Bar Examiners. The
court considered comments filed by one Bar member who contested the rules
regarding formal hearings and appeals from the Board, indicating that they
have inadequate due process protections and provide an incomplete record for
the court's review.43U The court indicated that the Board, in practice, gives
such protections, but recommended that the Board review their rules to
consider codifying their current practices.431 The member also contested the
requirement of a fee to applicants for whom the Board requires a formal
hearing who are ultimately admitted to the Bar. The court adopted the rule
change requiring the fee of all applicants who undergo a formal hearing,
noting that the hearing was required whether the applicant was admitted or
not and that the costs associated with the hearings are fairly placed on those
whose applications required a greater expenditure of the Board's resources.432
VI. CONCLUSION
Cases, rules, and ethics opinions continue to define the role of lawyers in
dealings with their clients, the justice system, and society as a whole. Interest
in the area of professional responsibility has continued to expand in 1997.
Lawyers have become more concerned with the image of the profession, and
believe that ethics and professionalism must be focussed on to improve it.
This article has examined a wide spectrum of topics within ethics and
professionalism, of which lawyers should remain aware to practice
responsibly and attain the high standards imposed on them.
429. 695 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1997).
430. Id. at 313.
431. Id.
432. Id. at314.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers the decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period from July 1, 1996, through June 30,
1997, especially selected for this article as being of potential interest to the
real estate practitioner.
II. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Brevard County v. Canaveral Properties, Inc.' The attorneys' fees
awarded in this eminent domain case were calculated to include twenty
percent of the benefit to the landowner, which included severance
23damages. However on appeal, the severance damages were stricken.3 When
reconsidering the attorneys' fees, the trial court merely subtracted the benefit
and left the rest of the calculation intact.4 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
found that to be an unacceptable approach. The court pointed out that the
statute6 required the court to give the greatest weight to the benefit the
attorney achieved for the client, and that the calculation in this case was
"based on expert testimony which itself was predicated on the landowners'
very substantial recovery." 7 When the district court reduced the recovery, it
reduced the benefit achieved by the attorney.8 Consequently, the trial court
was required to completely recalculate the attorneys' fees based upon the
record.9 Furthermore, it ruled, no additional attorneys' fees should be
awarded for relitigating the attorneys' fee.1
0
1. 689 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
2. Id. at 1309.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1309-10.
6. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (1993).
7. Canaveral Properties, 689 So. 2d at 1309.
8. Id. at 1310.
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing Seminole County v. Butler, 676 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
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This case returned to the district court after the trial court awarded
$55,647.00 in appellate attorneys' fees.11 The County claimed the amount
was excessive and the district court agreed because it concluded that multiple
attorneys had performed duplicate tasks. 12 For example, four attorneys had
prepared for the oral argument and two had attended the argument even
though only one had actually presented the argument. Furthermore, the firm
had claimed over 402 hours were spent on the appeal, even though much of
the research should have already been performed for the trial. The fact that
four property owners were represented by the one law firm was considered,
but did not figure into the court's ultimate reasoning. Each owner could have
had its own counsel, but declined individual representation. The criterion for
measuring attorneys' fees was reasonableness. 13  Where the hours were
bloated, or a task was performed by more attorneys than were needed, the
public should not have to pay the excess.
14
Broward County v. LaPointe.15 The County made an offer to buy land
for $2,404,000 subject to the condition that if environmental contamination
was found, it could cancel the contract or adjust the price based on the cost of
the environmental clean up. When the landowners rejected the offer, the
County began a condemnation proceeding. In 1991, the County's expert
estimated the cost of additional testing and clean up at $1,147,267. The
parties entered an agreed order of taking to allow title to pass to the County
and proceeded to litigate the landowner's compensation. The case was
eventually settled and the settlement terms were incorporated into a stipulated
final judgment. 16
In addition to the award of $3,704,480 for the land taken, the settlement
provided that the landowner was entitled to: 1) back rent from a billboard
tenant; 2) the right to lease back part of the condemned land for billboards;
and 3) the agreement that if the County was ever required to perform an
environmental clean up of the taken land, it would install a system where it
could perform that clean up, not only for the taken land, but also for the
adjacent land still owned by the condemnee. The settlement also provided
that the court would retain jurisdiction over the agreement for the purpose of
11. Brevard County v. Canaveral Properties, 696 So. 2d 1244, 1244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
12. Id. at 1244-45.
13. Id. at 1245.
14. Id.
15. 685 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
16. Id. at 890-91.
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awarding attorneys' fees and costs "including all costs of environmental
contamination issues.
17
In figuring the attorneys' fees for the landowners' trial counsel, the
circuit court first figured that the firm "had reasonably spent 2,400 hours...
at a reasonable blended rate of $250 per hour."18 This produced a "lodestar"
amount of $600,000. Due to the fact that the contamination issues made the
case "'novel and complex,"' 19 the trial court also awarded a success bonus.
20
The court figured this amount by starting with the initial government offer of
$2,404,000 and subtracted its initial clean up estimate of $1,147,267 to
produce an adjusted offer of $1,256,753.21 It subtracted the adjusted offer
from the compensation award of $3,704,000 to produce a benefit achieved of
$2,447,267.22 The court added to this the monetary value of the other
settlement provisions, which it determined was $1,129,000, to produce a total
benefit value of $3,576,267.23 The success bonus of ten percent of that total
benefit, i.e., $357,626, was added to the lodestar amount to produce an
attorneys' fee of $957,626.24
The County objected to the method by which the success bonus was
calculated. The County claimed that its initial offer should not have been
reduced by its initial clean up estimate. Additionally, the County claimed that
the benefit should be mechanically calculated by subtracting the initial offer
from the final figure. In response, the district court pointed out that the initial
offer contained a clean up contingency that could have substantially reduced
the amount the landowners received.25 The landowners' counsel was
successful in eliminating that contingency, in effect shifting the burden of
environmental clean up to the County. It was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to consider that as a benefit achieved for the landowners or to
set the value at the County's own initial estimate.26 In addition, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to set a monetary figure for the value of
the other settlement provisions and to include that in the calculations.27 The
17. Id. at 891.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting the trial court).
20. LaPointe, 685 So. 2d at 891.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. LaPointe, 685 So. 2d at 892.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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court's valuation was within the range of expert testimony in the record.
28 On these issues, the trial court's decision was affirmed.29
A more difficult issue was whether the County should pay the attorneys'
fees of two law firms hired to represent the landowners in dealing with the
Department of Environmental Regulation. They did obtain a favorable
consent order which made possible the eventual settlement of the
condemnation case, but the court concluded that whether the County was
liable for their fees should be determined by the settlement agreement itself.
30
The agreement provided for payment of the landowners' "costs and
attorney's fees, including all costs of environmental contamination issues.'
a3
The court placed great importance on the fact that the settlement agreement
allowed for reimbursement of costs, not all costs and attorneys' fees of
environmental contamination issues.32 Invoking the plain meaning canon of
construction, although negative implication would have been more
convincing, the court decided that the agreement did not include paying
attorneys who handled related regulatory matters.33 The court ignored the
point that the very statute under which attorneys' fees and costs were
recoverable in condemnation cases included attorneys' fees within the term
"Cots." 3 4
City of Jacksonville v. Tresca.35  The City was involved in a
redevelopment project. It tried unsuccessfully to obtain an option to purchase
the land for $107,000. Later, when condemnation proceedings had begun, the
City deposited $50,000 into the registry of the court. The district court said
that this was "presumably the good-faith estimate of the property value based
on a valid appraisal," a point never disputed by the City.36  The jury
concluded that the proper amount of compensation for the landowner was
$182,000. 31 Attorneys' fees under section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes are
to be based "'solely on the benefits achieved for the client.' 38 Thus, "[biased
28. Id.
29. Id. at 892-93.
30. Lapointe, 685 So. 2d at 892.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 892-93.
33. Id. at 893.
34. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1989).
35. 692 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
36. Id. at 992.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 992-93 (qouting FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (1995)).
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on the $107,000 figure, the trial court awarded a fee in the amount of $24,750
(thirty-three percent of $182,000 minus $107,000)."" 9
The district court found that to be error.40 The statute defined benefit as
the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or
settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning
authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer
is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an
attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer
after the attorney is hired.4'
The "offer" contemplated by the statute was an offer to buy which, when
accepted by the landowner, would obligate the condemnor to buy at that
42price. But, a purchase option would not even have obligated the City to buy
the property.43 The proper measure of betterment would be to use the
$50,000 deposit as urged by the condemnee's attorneys. 44
Department of Environmental Protection v. Gibbins.45 The landowner's
neighbor operated a service station which discharged gasoline from
underground storage tanks. In order to define the extent of the resultant
contamination, the Department of Environmental Protection notified the
landowner that it wanted to drill a number of wells on the landowner's
property. The landowner resisted and demanded compensation, so the
Department served him with an administrative order for access. In response
to the landowner's demand for a formal hearing, the Department withdrew its
administrative action and filed a complaint in court for injunctive relief
against the landowner interfering with the installation of wells on his land.
The Department later decided that was unnecessary and moved for voluntary
dismissal, but the landowner filed a motion for attorney's fees on the theory
that he had defeated an attempt by the government to take his land. The
circuit court agreed and awarded substantial attorney's fees.
46
39. Tresca, 692 So. 2d at 992.
40. Id. at 993.
41. Id. (citing Fla. STAT. § 73.092(1)(a)).
42. Tresca, 692 So. 2d at 993.
43. Id. See generally, Ronald Benton Brown, An Examination of Real Estate Purchase
Options, 12 NOVA L. REv. 147, 147-54 (1987).
44. Tresca, 692 So. 2d at 993. It is not clear from the case whether the $50,000 was
considered the final written offer before the hiring of the attorney or the first written offer after
the hiring the of attorney.
45. 696 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
46. Id. at 888-89.
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The district court reversed.47  It reasoned that no condemnation
proceeding was ever begun so the landowner could not have succeeded in
defeating the condemnation attempt.4 As the statutes relied upon only
provide for attorney's fees in condemnation proceedings,49 there would be no
basis for awarding attorney's fees in this case.
5 0
Department of Transportation v. Winter Park Golf Club, Inc.51 The
Department of Transportation began a quick taking of an easement for
sidewalk construction. After the landowner marshalled evidence that the
taking would result in a significant reduction in the market value of its land
and significant severance damages, the Department decided to locate the
sidewalk elsewhere. The stipulated judgment terminating the taking action
provided that the Department would pay the landowner's reasonable costs and
attorney's fees. The trial court used a lodestar figure reached by multiplying
the number of hours by a reasonable hourly rate ($225 per hour). 2 This
amount was adjusted upward to reflect the benefit achieved for the landowner.
However, the trial court erred in one respect. It included in the calculation
the hours that the landowner's attorney spent litigating the attorney's fee.
53
The district court remanded the case for recalculation of the lodestar amount
which did not include fees for time spent litigating the attorney's fee. 4
Lee County v. Pierpont.55  The County did a "quick taking 56 of the
property and, accordingly, filed a good faith estimate of the property's
value. When the landowners filed an answer to the condemnation complaint
through an attorney, the County's attorney sent him a letter making an offer
for the property at twenty percent over the good faith estimate. That offer was
rejected, but the case was eventually settled. The only issue left was
attorney's fees.57
In 1994, the legislature amended the attorneys' fees provision in eminent
domain proceedings.58  Previously, the statute had provided that "the court
47. Id. at 890.
48. Id.
49. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091-.092 (1993).
50. Gibbins, 696 So. 2d at 890.
51. 687 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
52. Id. at 971.
53. Id. (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1993);
Seminole County v. Butler, 676 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
54. Id. at 971.
55. 693 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
56. See generally, Marc I. Sachs, Order of Taking, THE FLORIDA BAR CLE: FLORIDA
EemwNT DMAIN PRAcTCE AND PRocEDuRE Ch. 7 (4th ed. 1988).
57. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 995-96.
58. Id. at 995.
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shall give greatest weight to the benefits resulting to the client from the
services rendered." 59  This was amended to read, "the court, in eminent
domain proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits
achieved for the client."60 The statute went on to define benefits as
the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or
settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning
authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer
is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an
attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer
after the attorney is hired.61
Here, the trial court determined betterment by subtracting the good faith
estimate from the final settlement. 62 The Second District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court determination was incorrect and reversed.63
The court used the plain meaning approach to interpreting the new
64statute. The legislature had specified that the benefit was to be calculated
from the first written offer; however, it had not provided that the good faith
estimate could be used as an alternative figure. 65 In addition, the good faith
estimate was not a functional equivalent of a written offer because the
condemnee could not accept that figure creating an enforceable contract, and
the condemnor was in no way bound by that good faith estimate. 66
Judge Blue dissented on this point.67 First, he contends there is no clear
precedent that the condemnee cannot simply accept the good faith estimate. 68
The precedents only hold that the condemnor is not bound at trial by the prior
good faith estimate.69 He utilized a purpose approach to reach a contrary
conclusion. Figuring attorneys' fees from the good faith estimate would
"encourage condemning authorities to make realistic estimates" since a low
estimate might later result in higher attorneys' fees. 70 The majority's approach
would encourage condemning authorities not to make a written offer, but to
59. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (1993).
60. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 995 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (Supp. 1994)).
61. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1)(a) (Supp. 1994)).
62. Id. at 996.
63. Id. at 997.
64. Id. at 996-97.
65. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 996.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 997 (Blue, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 998.
70. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 998.
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use the estimate as the starting point in negotiations. 71 This would allow the
advantage of using a low estimate, the same way the initial offer is used, but
without the disadvantage of having attorneys' fees figured from that low
number.72 Since that approach could artificially shrink attorneys' fees in
condemnation cases, landowners might have greater difficulty in finding
competent counsel to handle these cases, thereby defeating the constitutional
right to compensation. 73 This author74 agrees with Judge Blue's approach.
The burden should be on the condemnor to make a timely written offer.
Where the condemnor has not done so, he should not be allowed to penalize
the victim of for the victim's tardiness.
The district court also rejected the landowners' claim that the county
attorney's letter was not a valid offer because it was made in violation of the
State of Florida's Sunshine Law.7 Essentially, their argument is that the
county attorney was vested with discretion about the amount of money to
offer and that before exercising that discretion, he was obliged to hold a pubic
meeting.76 Even if that was a valid argument, the landowners' would have no
standing to raise it on appeal, as it was not challenged at trial."
Regency Homes of Dade, Inc. v. McMillen.78 The homeowners brought
this action based on claims of breach of the construction contract, negligence,
and fraud. The contractor counterclaimed on numerous theories and sought
foreclosure of its construction lien. The homeowners prevailed on the merits,
and they sought attorney's fees based solely on the statutory provision
applicable to actions to enforce construction liens.79 They could not seek
attorney's fees for the other claims because the construction contract did not
provide for attorney's fees. The contractor appealed the attorney's fees award
because the court did not apportion the attorney's time and fees between the801
different claims.80 The district court affirmed. It reasoned that "the issues
involved in defending against the construction lien claim are intertwined with
the remaining issues in the case, and that the attorney's time cannot
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
75. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d at 997 (citing FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1993)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 689 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
79. Id. at 1204-05 (citing FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1995)).
80. Id. at 1205.
81. Id.
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reasonably be apportioned., 82  It distinguished an earlier case in which
apportionment was possible because the issues were distinct.8 3
Sanctuary of Boca, Inc. v. Careers USA, Inc.84 The landlord and tenant
got into a dispute over the proper amount of rent due under the lease. The
tenant brought and won a declaratory judgment action and sought attorneys'
fees under the lease which stated,"[i]n any litigation between the parties
hereto to enforce the terms and conditions of this Lease, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover all costs incurred in such action, including
attorneys' fees at all levels from the nonprevailing party."85 The trial court
denied attorneys' fees, reasoning that the action had not been brought "to
'enforce' the terms and conditions" but to interpret them. 6 The district court
rejected this logic and reversed.8 7 The court determined that the substance of
the landlord's defense was the equivalent of trying to enforce its interpretation
of the lease.88 If the landlord had failed to defend this action, it would have
been precluded from trying to enforce its claim in a later action. The court
also distinguished cases involving attorneys' fees provisions that applied in
the event of a breach.89 Since no breach had occurred in this case, the tenant
would not be in a position to claim attorneys' fees under such a provision.
However, that was not the provision in this lease. Noting that different results
have been reached in other districts, 90 the court certified the conflict to the
Supreme Court.91
Seminole County v. Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n.92 In
this eminent domain case, attorney's fees were awarded pursuant to section
82. Id.
83. McMillen, 689 So. 2d at 1205 (citing Metro-Centre Assocs. v. Environmental
Eng'rs, Inc., 522 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding apportionment was
possible because a counterclaim for goods and services was raised in response to an action to
enforce a mechanic's lien)).
84. 691 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
85. Id. at 598.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Sanctuary of Boca, 691 So. 2d at 598-99 (citing Casarella, Inc. v. Zaremba Coconut
Creek Parkway Corp., 595 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Fairways Royale Ass'n
v. Hasam Realty Corp., 428 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Chesterfield Co. v.
Rizzenheim, 350 So. 2d 15 (FIa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
90. Id. at 599. See Martin L. Robbins, M.D., P.A. v. I.R.E. Real Estate Fund, Ltd., 608
So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Ocala Warehouse Invs., Ltd. v. Bison Co., 416
So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
91. Sanctuary of Boca, 691 So. 2d at 599.
92. 691 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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73.092 of the Florida Statutes.93 The County appealed claiming that the
statute was "unconstitutional because it deprives trial courts of the ability to
determine a reasonable fee to a landowner based upon the criteria listed in
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe."94 This argument had already
been tried unsuccessfully with an earlier version of the statute95 and was
proved unsuccessful again because the Supreme Court of Florida had already
ruled that "the legislature can enact attorney's fees provisions which 'it deems
will result in a reasonable award."' 96
The County next tried the novel approach of claiming that the trial court
should not have admitted the County's written offer because section 90.408 of
the Florida Statutes prohibits introduction into evidence of an offer to settle
litigation.97 That section directly contradicts the mandate of section 73.092 of
the Florida Statutes because it provides that attorneys' fees shall be based on
the benefits achieved which are measured by the difference between the last
written offer and the final judgment or settlement.98 The court utilized two
canons of statutory interpretation to reject this argument.99 First, a later
enactment prevails over an earlier one where there is a direct conflict.0
Second, a specific statute prevails over a general one. 10 1 Section 73.092 is
specific in that it applies only to eminent domain proceedings, while section
90.408 is applicable to litigation in general.1
02
Seminole County v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.10 3 In this eminent domain
case, the trial court apparently based the award of attorneys' fees on the
following formula: One-third of the benefit (the amount paid for the property
less the County's original offer) times two, plus the lodestar (hourly rate),
93. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (Supp. 1994).
94. Coral Gables Fed Say., 691 So. 2d at 614 (citing Florida Patient's Compensation
Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)).
95. See Seminole County v. Delco Oil, Inc. 669 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Seminole County v. Clayton, 665 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(challenging FLA. STAT. § 73.02 (1993)).
96. Coral Gables Fed. Say., 691 So. 2d at 615 (quoting Shick v. Department of Agric.
& Consumer Servs., 599 So. 2d 641, 664 (Fla. 1992)).
97. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (1995).
98. Coral Gables Fed. Sav., 691 So. 2d at 615; see FLA. STAT § 73.092 (1995).
99. Coral Gables Fed Say., 691 So. 2d at 615 (citing Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659
So. 2d 1064, 1067 (Fla. 1995); People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County
of Leon, 583 So. 2d 1373, 1377 n.5 (Fla. 1991)).
100. Id. (citing Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064, 1067 (Fla. 1995)).
101. Id. (citing People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County of Leon,
583 So. 2d 1373, 1377 n.5 (Fla. 1991)).
102. See FA STAT. §§ 90.408, 73.092 (1995).
103. 688 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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divided by three. 0 4 While the trial court's method was based on a fourth
district case,105 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed.10 6  Two
subsequent fifth district cases 107 had established that the court should have
used the lodestar as the basis for the fee and then expressly set
forth the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation and
the reasonable hourly rate. The benefit obtained should have then
been used to adjust the lodestar up or down by a specific dollar
amount as opposed to a multiplier, to reflect the attorney's unusual
success or failure. 08
Department of Transportation v. ABS Properties Partnership.0 9 The
Department of Transportation ("DOT") began a condemnation proceeding
and made an initial written offer. Mediation produced a stipulated settlement
that was approved by both parties when DOT decided to indefinitely postpone
the project. DOT obtained a voluntary dismissal of the condemnation action.
The landowner filed a motion for attorney's fees. The trial court's award was
based on the difference between DOT's written offer and the agreed upon
price in the stipulation or the benefit achieved under section 73.092(1) of the
Florida Statutes."I 
0
DOT's position on appeal was that the "benefit achieved" subsection
should not be used when the benefit was never realized due to the case being
withdrawn. That presented a question of first impression."' The district
court agreed with DOT and reversed.1 2 The applicable method was in the
second subsection which governed attorney's fees "'incurred in defeating an
order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings,
when not otherwise provided for."'13 To the court, a voluntary dismissal
seemed to fit within that definition." 4 Under subsection two, the court would
have to consider a number of factors, such as: 1) novelty; 2) difficulty and
104. Id. at 373; see also Solid Waste Auth. v. Parker, 622 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
105. Solid Waste Auth., 622 So. 2d at 1010.
106. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 688 So. 2d at 373.
107. Seminole County v. Delco Oil, Inc., 669 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Seminole County v. Clayton, 665 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
108. Cumberland Farms Inc., 688 So. 2d at 373 (citations omitted).
109. 693 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
110. Id. at 703-04 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (1995)).
111. Id. at 704.
112. Id. at 705.
113. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2) (1995)).
114. ABS Properties Partnership, 693 So. 2d at 705.
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importance of the questions involved; 3) the skill employed by the attorney; 4)
the amount of money involved; 5) the responsibility born by the attorney; 6)
the time and labor required of the attorney to adequately represent the client in
relation to the benefits; and 7) the customary rate or fee for a comparable
case. 
115
This author1 16 prefers the trial court's conclusion. The condemnor's
change of heart should not affect the amount of attorney's fees for work that
has already been done, and the calculation in subsection two is needlessly
complicated when a simple measure is provided by subsection one, i.e., based
upon the benefits achieved. It seems obvious that subsection two should be
used when there is no logical way to use subsection one, but that is certainly
not the case here where an agreement had already been reached.
Ill. BROKERS
The Brokerage Relationship Disclosure Act 1 7 became effective on
October 1, 1997. It is the latest step in Florida's attempt to solve the
problems inherent in the relationships, agency or nonagency, that brokers may
have with buyers and sellers." 8 The legislature has now outlawed brokers
acting as dual agents, i.e., simultaneously acting in an agency relationship for
both the buyer and the seller." 9 However, it continues to allow brokers to be
transaction brokers who provide "limited representation to a buyer, a seller, or
both, in a real estate transaction, but does not represent either in a fiduciary
capacity or as a single agent.'' 120 The act further requires that the broker or
salesperson disclose to customers upon first contact, that they can only engage
that professional as a single agent or transaction broker.' 21 The statute defines
those relationships and specifies the duties of each type of broker. 22 For a
115. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2) (1995)).
116. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
117. FLA. STAT. §§ 475.2701-.2801 (1995), amended by 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-42. See
Ronald Benton Brown and Joseph M. Grohman, Goodbye Dual World: Real Estate
Brokerage Changes Again, But Not Enough, 71 FLA. B.J. 54 (Nov. 1997).
118. See Ronald Benton Brown & Joseph M. Grohman, Real Estate Brokers:
Shouldering New Burdens, 11 PROBATE & PROPERTY 14 (May/June 1997); Ronald Benton
Brown et al., Real Estate Brokerage: Recent Changes in Relationships and a Proposed Cure,
29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 25 (1995). See also Ronald Benton Brown & Thomas H. Thurlow,
Buyers Beware: Statutes Shield Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Who Do Not Disclose that
Properties are Psychologically Tainted, 49 OKLA. L. REv. 625 (1997).
119. FL,%. STAT. § 475.01(1)(j) (1995), amended by 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-42.
120. Id. § 475.01(1)(m).
121. Id. § 475.272(2).
122. Id. § 475.01(l)(m).
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residential sale, the disclosure requirements are now more extensive. Section
475.276 of the Florida Statutes now requires potential buyers and sellers to
be given a statutory notice of nonrepresentation at the first contact.
23
Additionally, section 475.278 of the Florida Statutes now provides what must
be in the disclosure forms describing the transaction or single agency
brokerage relationships. 124
Caserta v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation.25 The
Florida Real Estate Commission ("FREC") issued a final order revoking
Caserta's real estate license. 126 Caserta's counsel had filed a request for a
subject-matter index of the all agency orders imposing discipline since
January 1, 1975. FREC had responded by giving him a subject-matter index
starting at January 1, 1992. On appeal, Caserta claimed that reversal of the
order was required because the index FREC had provided was not sufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirements. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
disagreed and affirmed the order.
2 7
Section 120.53(2) of the Florida Statutes previously required that each
state agency make available to the public a subject-matter index of rules and
orders issued or adopted after January 1, 1975.28 However, the statute was
amended, 129 and the 1975 starting date does not appear in the revised
statute. The court concluded that the legislature, recognizing the
impossible burden that the 1975 starting date had imposed on many agencies,
intended the effective date of the amended statute to be the new starting date
of the required indices.1 31 Consequently, Caserta could not escape discipline
on that technicality.
Claycomb v. Combs. 32  Facing foreclosure, landowners listed two
properties with a broker. No sale was produced even though the listing
agreement was extended. The mortgagee foreclosed, took title, and then sold
one property to the broker's father and mother. The mother just happened to
be a real estate agent working for her son. The landowners (now former
landowners) brought an action to have a constructive trust imposed on the
123. Id. § 475.276(2).
124. FLA. STAT. § 475.278(2)(c) (1995), amended by 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-42.
125. 686 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
126. Id. at 651.
127. Id. at 652-53.
128. Id. at 652 (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2) (1991) (amended 1993)).
129. Id. (referring to FLA. STAT. § 120.53 (amended 1993)).
130. Caserta, 686 So. 2d at 652 (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.53 (amended 1993)).
131. Id. at 653.
132. 676 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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property. The trial judge entered judgment on the pleadings for the broker's
parents, but the district court reversed.
33
Imposition of a constructive trust is an equitable remedy for the breach of
a confidential relationship.13 4  Consequently, "to survive a motion for
judgment on the pleadings," the landowners' complaint would have to show
that landowners had a confidential relationship with the broker's
parents.135 The court found that the combination of facts was sufficient to
raise the inference that a confidential relationship might have existed.
36
However, the court held that the landowners had not alleged that the
foreclosure was in any way defective. 37 Therefore, their claim was that the
property had been purchased, or should have been purchased, on their behalf.
Before the landowners could prevail, they would have to tender to the parents
the price that they had paid for the land. While the court does not explain
further, this is merely an example of the old maxim, he who seeks equity must
do equity.
Cordis Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.138  A broker had the
commercial lease listing for Cordis Corporation's property. The broker
showed the property to Baxter, but Baxter's offer to lease a portion of the
property was rejected. Cordis later exercised its option to terminate the listing
agreement. Nine months later, Baxter approached Cordis through its own
broker, and a lease for the entire property was arranged. That lease contained
an indemnity clause that provided that each party to the lease promised "to
indemnify and hold the other party harmless from and against any claims by
any other broker, agent or other persons claiming a commission."'
39
The broker claimed that Cordis, after terminating the listing agreement,
had "orally agreed to pay the broker a commission if it produced a prospect
who purchased or leased" its property. 40  As a result, the broker had
continued to prospect for buyers and lessees, including maintaining contact
with Baxter. Consequently, after learning that Baxter had leased the property,
broker sued Cordis for a brokerage commission. Cordis then sought
indemnification from Baxter.14  The trial court entered a judgment on the
133. Id. at 524.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Claycomb, 676 So. 2d at 525.
138. 678 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
139. Id. at 848.
140. Id. at 847-48.
141. Id. at 848. Even though Cordis was ultimately held not liable for the broker's
commission, Cordis still sought indemnification for the costs and attorneys' fees. Id.
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pleadings in favor of Baxter and the district court affirmed. 142 The district
court reasoned this was simply a case of interpreting the indemnification
clause. 143 It noted that as a general proposition, an indemnity clause should
be construed against the indemnitor if it is an incident of a contract not
primarily concerned with indemnification, rather than an indemnification
promise by one in the insurance business. 144 Furthermore, an indemnity
clause will not be interpreted to provide a party indemnification for its own
wrongful acts unless that intent is clearly and unequivocally expressed. The
essence of the broker's claim was that Cordis had committed wrongful acts.
Specifically, Cordis represented either expressly or impliedly, that it would
pay a commission if the broker produced a tenant and accepted the benefits of
that performance. 145 Both rules of interpretation lead to the conclusion that
indemnification was not required. The court offered its opinion that the
clause was really intended to provide protection from a surprise demand by a
146broker that one party did not know had been involved with the other party.
Certainly, that was not the case here.
ERA Carico Real Estate Co. v. Manfredonia. 147 The broker had won an
action for a commission in county court, but on appeal to the circuit court that
was reversed. 148 The district court, in turn, reversed and ordered the county
court's judgment in favor of the broker reinstated. 149 The facts are that the
broker was the one who first brought the property to the attention of the
buyer. However, the buyer and seller negotiated directly. The circuit court
held that because the buyer and seller did not "intentionally" exclude the
broker from participating in the sale, the broker was precluded from
recovering a commission. 15  According to the district court, the
aforementioned holding was based upon a misreading of Sheldon Green &
Associates v. Rosinda Investments, N. V. 151 Since the broker was the one who
initially brought the parties together, he/she was the "procuring cause" and, as
such, was entitled to his/her commission.
152
142. Cordis Corp., 678 So. 2d at 847.
143. Id. at 848.
144. Id. (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id. (citation omitted).
147. 689 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
148. Id. at 1208.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1209 (citing Sheldon Green & Assocs. v. Rosinda Invs., N.V., 475 So. 2d
925 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
152. Manfredonia, 689 So. 2d at 1209.
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Gimelstob Realty v. Sechrest Co. 153  One broker sued another on a
variety of tort theories because some of his/her associates left to work for the
other firm. Both firms were members of the Realtor Association of Greater
Fort Lauderdale whose rules required "arbitration of disputes 'arising out of
the real estate business.', 154 Therefore, the trial court held that this claim was
subject to mandatory arbitration. 155  The fourth district, in a per curiam
opinion that did not provide a detailed analysis, agreed that "this dispute
between these realtors is within the meaning of that provision."'
156
Waterfront Properties, Inc. v. Coast to Coast Real Estate, Inc.157 The
majority of the panel issued a per curiam affirmance of the trial court's
decision, but Judge Gross filed a dissenting opinion. 158 The dissent reveals
that the listing broker continued to list the property in the multiple listing
service, and one of its employees gave a brochure of the property to the
selling broker after the listing had expired.159 The selling broker showed its
buyers the property, but when the buyers later met the seller, they were
informed that the property was not then listed with any broker. The buyers
then bought the property directly from the seller. Because neither broker had
been paid a commission, they both sued.
160
The trial court held that neither the seller nor the buyers were liable for a
commission, but the broker with the expired listing was liable to the selling
broker for the equivalent of a three percent commission.' 6 ' The dissent argues
that recovery could not be justified by any contract theory, including
promissory estoppel.162 This author 163 must disagree. Although promissory
estoppel is often invoked as a consideration substitute, "promissory estoppel
is an equitable principle that empowers a court to design a remedy avoiding
injustice and achieving corrective justice between the parties in commercial
transactions."'164 By listing the property in the multiple listing service or
153. 676 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
154. Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 679 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
158. Id. at 48 (Gross, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Waterfront Properties, Inc., 679 So. 2d at 49 (Gross, J., dissenting).
163. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
164. Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WiLiLAmr L. REv.
263, 363 (1966). See also id. at 360-67 (supplying a summary of the Florida law of
promissory estoppel); Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20
SaArTnrU. L. REv. 45 (1966).
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handing out the property brochure, a listing broker invites other members of
the multiple listing service to earn a share of the sales commission by
producing a buyer. A listing broker has, both expressly and by his/her
conduct, represented to the other brokers in the multiple listing service that
he/she is in the position to fulfill that promise. Once the selling broker has in
good faith relied to his/her detriment on that representation, the broker
without a listing, e.g., one whose listing has expired, should be estopped from
asserting that he/she did not receive the commission upon the sale. The
critical elements should be that the "listing" broker knew, or should have
known, that he/she did not have the power to perform that promise because
he/she did not have a current listing, and that a selling broker who went
through the effort of producing a buyer would suffer significant harm if there
was no commission to share. Conversely, the selling broker could not
reasonably be expected to inspect the listing agreement of each property
he/she plans to show because it would be impractical for a broker planning a
full day of showings to inspect all those documents, even if he/she were
available. The dissent argues that allowing the selling broker to recover "is to
base recovery on concepts of relative fault, a tort notion which was not
pled."'165 However, that misses the point that fault is also an important
concept in equity and that estoppel is an equitable doctrine.
PK Ventures, Inc. v. Raymond James & Associates,166 Wassail v.
Payne,167 and Woodson v. Martin.168 In Woodson, the buyer sued her real
estate agent claiming she had misrepresented the house as being in good
condition.1 69 In a very brief opinion, which did not include a recitation of the
facts, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the following certified
question:
IS THE BUYER OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PREVENTED
BY THE "ECONOMIC LOSS RULE" FROM RECOVERING
DAMAGES FOR FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT AGAINST
165. Waterfront Properties, Inc., 679 So. 2d at 48-49.
166. 690 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1997).
167. 682 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
168. 663 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), quashed by 685 So. 2d 1240 (Fla.
1996).
169. Id. at 1327. Note that the facts reported here do not seem to match the certified
question in Woodson, which assumes that the broker was the agent of the seller. Woodson v.
Martin, 685 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1996). However, it does not seem that this will have any
impact on use of this case as precedent.
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THE REAL ESTATE AGENT AND ITS INDIVIDUAL AGENT
REPRESENTING THE SELLERS?
170
The unanimous answer was negative, based upon the reasoning provided in
HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 171 which was decided at the
same time. HTP, Ltd. dealt with a claim for damages based on the allegation
that the party had been fraudulently induced to enter into a settlement
agreement. 172 The district court denied the damage claim reasoning it was
barred by the economic loss rule because it flowed from a contractual breach
and was solely for economic losses. 73 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected
this analysis. 74 It held that fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract was
an independent tort, separate and distinct from any breach of contract. 175 In
HTP, Ltd., the supreme court specifically rejected the logic of the Woodson
court, noting that Judge Altenbernd's dissent therein had been correct.
1 76
These precedents should make brokers and sellers worry that they might
be held accountable for the harm they could cause by misrepresenting
property. Note that this case does not make either a broker or a seller an
insurer of the property. The claimant must still prove the elements of
fraud. But, it might have some salutary results. A recent news story on the
effects of this case reported an interview with a broker who said that, "he has
already alerted his sales people that, 'You don't lie, no matter
what."",177 What a novel concept to introduce into real estate sales.
HTP, LTD. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A.178 was also the basis
for the decision in Wassail v. Payne.179 Wassail had considered buying a
particular property. He asked the owner and his broker whether the property
was subject to flooding. Allegedly, their response was a
misrepresentation. Wassail did not buy the property, but he eventually leased
it from the person who did buy it. When flooding occurred, Wassail sued the
seller and his broker alleging, inter alia, fraudulent and negligent
170. Woodson, 685 So. 2d. at 1241.
171. 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996).
172. Id. at 1238-39.
173. Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1329.
174. Woodson, 685 So. 2d at 1241.
175. HTP, Ltd., 685 So. 2d at 1239.
176. Id. (quoting Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (Altenbemd, J., dissenting)).
177. Terry Sheridan, New Legal Woes for Realty Agents, BRowARD DAILY Bus. REv.,
Oct. 31, 1996, at 1.
178. 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996).
179. 682 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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misrepresentation. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for the
defendants because the plaintiff was not in privity with them, but the First
District Court of Appeal reversed.1 80 Wassall's cause of action was not a
breach of contract. His action was in tort, and privity was not an element of
the tort. Consequently, if the seller and his broker made a misrepresentation
to Wassail that was the proximate cause of his harm, they could be held
liable."'
This trilogy was completed by PK Ventures, Inc. v. Raymond James &
Associates. 182 That case involved the sale of commercial real estate rather
than residential property. The Supreme Court of Florida specifically held that
it did not matter whether the property was residential or commercial when
damages were sought against a seller's broker for misrepresentation.
18 3
Woodson stood for the proposition that the economic loss rule could not be
used to bar recovery for the independent tort of misrepresentation by the
broker.18
4
IV. CONDOMINIUMS
Carlandia Corp. v. Obernauer18 5 The question before the court was
whether section 718.1255 of the Florida Statutes requires nonbinding
arbitration before suit can be filed for the stated causes of
action.1 6 Carlandia, as a unit owner, filed suit against the condominium
association and the board of directors alleging construction defects existed in
common areas subject to redress under warranty. The trial court granted the
association's and the board's motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to
conduct nonbinding arbitration prior to filing suit.
18 7
This Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed because the complaint
failed to reveal a "dispute" within section 718.1255(4)(a).188 The statutory
section mandates that the parties to a "dispute" submit to nonbinding
180. Id. at 681.
181. Id.
182. 690 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1997). To be consistent, the Supreme Court of Florida
subsequently quashed Linn-Well Dev. Corp. v. Preston & Farley, Inc., 666 So. 2d 558 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Linn-Well Dev. Corp. v. Preston & Farley, Inc., 696 So. 2d 693 (Fla.
1997).
183. PK Ventures, Inc., 690 So. 2d at 1296.
184. Woodson, 685 So. 2d at 1238.
185. 695 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
186. Id. at 409.
187. Id.
188. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4)(a) (1992).
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arbitration prior to court proceedings. 189 The statute also excludes any
disagreement that "'primarily involves... the interpretation or enforcement
of any warranty"' from the definition. 190 The statute expands the exclusion
"to include those legal theories where application of a warranty is a critical
element."1 9 The fourth district determined that this case falls within the
statutory exclusion because the determination of the association's statutory or
fiduciary liability first requires a finding that there were actionable warranty
violations on the common areas.
192
Section 718.1255(3) of the Florida Statutes is designed to protect unit
owners from the cost and time constraints involved when litigating with a
condominium association. 193  Arbitration was not mandated for all
condominium disputes.19 4 Statutory nonbinding arbitration is designed to deal
with day-to-day condominium disputes.195  However, construction defect
cases do not fit that category because of the factual and legal complexity
involved. 196
Cricket Club Condominium, Inc. v. Stevens.197 Stevens filed a suit
alleging misdeeds of the condominium association. The suit alleged all
condominium residents were damaged by misrepresentations made in letters
concerning the vote over a cable contract. The trial court certified the class
without holding an evidentiary hearing. 198
The Third District Court of Appeal only concerned itself with the trial
court's finding of adequacy of representation. 199 The third district concluded
that the adequacy requirement of the rule can not be satisfied if Stevens is
involved in other litigation against the Cricket Club.200 At the time of this
action, Stevens was involved in a counterclaim against the Cricket Club and
another unit owner for intentional infliction of emotional distress.20' If
Stevens were to represent the class in this dispute, the best interests of that
189. See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4) (1992).
190. Carlandia Corp., 695 So. 2d at 409 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1) (1992)).
191. Id. at 410.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Carlandia Corp., 695 So. 2d at 410.
196. Id.
197. 695 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
198. Id. at 827.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 827-28.
201. Id. at 827.
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class must be Stevens' sole concern. 20 2 The third district reversed the trial
court's determination of adequacy of representation. 20 3
Lambert v. Berkley South Condominium Ass'n.2°4 The question before
the Fourth District Court of Appeal was whether the Association, or the
individual owners of commercial units, should assume ownership and
maintenance responsibility for a hallway located on the first floor of the
condominium.20 5 The Association argued that the hallway could not be
considered a common element and was, therefore, not its responsibility
because the required approval of all record unit owners to change the
hallway's classification was not obtained. In response, Lambert contended
that the "governing documents were ambiguous" and that the trial court was
correct in considering the parties intent in determining that the hallway was
converted to a common element. 20
6
The fourth district determined the trial court improperly considered parol
evidence in determining that the hallway was a common element.207 It
reasoned that parol evidence should only be addressed when the document is
ambiguous on its face. 20 8 Ambiguity depends upon whether the document is
subject to multiple interpretations. However, simply because the document is
open to interpretation, does not mean the document is ambiguous. As long as
the language is clear, a court cannot begin to interpret the plain meaning of
the document.20 9
The condominium documents, taken as a whole, affirmatively state that
the hallway was owned by the commercial unit owners as tenants in common.
All units were labeled with the letter "C" to signify their unit, and the
hallway itself was numbered "C-45" which revealed that the hallway was the
last commercial unit.210 In examining the documents and analyzing their plain
meaning, it is obvious that no ambiguity existed. There is nothing in the
documents that say the hallway is a common element. Rather, all
documentary evidence showed that the hallway "' is owned in common by
each of the Commercial Condominium Unit Owners."' 21' Parol evidence
should not have been considered in this case since the document's language is
202. Cricket Club Condominium, Inc., 695 So. 2d at 827.
203. Id.
204. 680 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
205. Id. at 590.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Lambert, 680 So. 2d at 590.
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting amendment to governing condominium documents).
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facially clear. The trial court discovered ambiguity within the documents only
after considering the extrinsic evidence introduced.212
Finally, when a subsequent amendment is made to the document which
did not address the hallway, it cannot be assumed that the hallway would be
considered a common element.13 Section 718.110(4) of the Florida Statutes
requires that all record unit owners must approve an amendment to the
documents. 1 4 When the effort to amend is unsuccessful because not all unit
owners approved it, the hallway can not be eliminated as a private unit and
converted to a common element.
215
Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc.2 16 In this case the
Supreme Court of Florida answered the following question certified by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal:
WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 718.203(2),
FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP. 1992), IMPOSE ON A
CONTRACTOR AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR
THE INTENDED USE AND PURPOSE WHERE THE
CONTRACTOR WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS SUGGESTS AND SUPPLIES A
MANUFACTURED ITEM SUCH AS INDIVIDUAL AIR
CONDITIONING UNITS TO A DEVELOPER FOR USE IN A
BUILDING PROJECT, WHERE SUCH ITEMS LATER PROVE
NOT TO BE FIT FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE FOR WHICH
THEY WERE SUPPLIED?
217
The supreme court held that the warranty of fitness was not applicable, but
under the provisions of section 718.203(2) the contractor does not warrant
those items for a "specific purpose."
218
Leisure Resorts was the developer of a twenty-two story
condominium. Each unit was designed to include its own individual air
conditioning unit with a condenser on the balcony; however, the design had a
problem. Rooney was the air conditioning subcontractor and suggested the
use of Tappan units. Tappan had represented that its units would work
properly under the planned design. However, they did not work properly and
212. Id.
213. Id. at 591.
214. Lambert, 680 So. 2d at 591 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1995)).
215. Id.
216. 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995).
217. Id. at 912.
218. Id.
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several unit owners brought a class action against Leisure Resorts alleging a
variety of construction defects. Leisure sought indemnity from Rooney, after
settling with the unit owners, alleging breach of warranty among other claims.
The trial court held that pursuant to section 713.203(2), manufactured items
for which there was a manufacturer's warranty were not within the scope of
the definition of "materials supplied" as set forth in the statute, and that the
subcontractor made no warranty of fitness.219 The Supreme Court of Florida
held that manufactured items are "materials" within the statute, and thus, a
warranty by the subcontractor attached.220
However, the supreme court noted a distinction between the scope of the
"developer's warranty mandated by section 718.203(1) and the contractor's
warranty mandated under section 718.203(2). ''22l The developer warrants
merchantability and fitness "for the purposes or uses intended., 222  The
contractor, on the other hand, only warrants fitness "as to the work performed
or material supplied," with no reference to fitness for intended purpose.23
The supreme court remanded to the Fourth District Court of Appeal to
decide: 1) whether the units were merely unfit for the specific purpose, in
which case the contractor would not be liable; or 2) whether the units were
unfit for ordinary purposes (unmerchantable), in which case the contractor
would be liable.2 
4
National Title Insurance Co. v. Lakeshore 1 Condominium
Ass'n.225 National was the owner of the first mortgage on two of the
condominiums at Lakeshore 1 Condominium. 226 Association was obligated to
purchase insurance "'for the benefit of the Association, the Unit Owners and
their respective mortgagees"' to cover building and insurable
improvements.227 The mortgagees had no control over matters of insurance or
reconstruction.228
As a result of Hurricane Andrew, Lakeshore 1 Condominium sustained
damage which forced unit owners out of their homes. The Condominium
insurer paid Association money for the damages and Association executed a
contract with the construction company to make needed repairs. National's
219. Id. at 913.
220. Id. at 914.
221. Leisure Resorts, Inc., 654 So. 2d at 914.
222. Id. (emphasis removed).
223. Id. (emphasis removed).
224. Id. at 915.
225. 691 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
226. Id. at 1105.
227. Id. (quoting the Declaration of Condominium 14.1 (emphasis removed)).
228. Id.
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mortgag6rs defaulted, and National foreclosed. Thereafter, National had
acquired title to the damaged units and filed suit against Association seeking
damages for dissipation of proceeds that National claimed an interest in. The
trial court granted Association summary judgment and National appealed.229
The Third District Court of Appeal recognized that the first issue that
had to be addressed was "whether the Association owed National a duty of
reasonable care in managing the insurance proceeds."2'30 The third district
held that Association owed National, a mortgagee, such a
duty. 31 Association was managing insurance proceeds on behalf of the
owners and mortgagees pursuant to the Declaration of Condominium, of
Lakeshore 1.232
The second issue was whether National was a member of the group to
which Association owed a duty.2 33 The court believed Association did owe a
duty to National. 34 The terms of the Declaration of Condominium reflected
that the unit owners' rights were subject to mortgagee's interest.23 5 The
insurance that the Association secured was to protect unit owners' and
mortgagees' interests in the insured's property. National did have "an interest
in the insurance proceeds," and "invasion of that interest was actionable."
236
RIS Investment Group, Inc. v. Department of Business & Professional
Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums & Mobile
Homes.237 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed an order requiring
RIS to remit assessments to Indian Springs due on units owned from the date
of recording of declaration through the date of unit sales and imposing civil
penalty.23 8  RIS was the developer of Briarwood Condominium. The
Department issued a notice to show cause to RIS alleging that RIS, while
controlling the association, failed to pay assessments due on developer owned
units in violation of sections 718.116(l)(a) and 718.116(9)(a) of the Florida
229. Id. at 1106.
230. National Title Ins. Co., 691 So. 2d at 1106.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1107.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. National Title Ins. Co., 691 So. 2d at 1107.
236. Id.
237. 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), opinion clarified, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D721
(4th Dist. Ct. App. March 19, 1997), review denied, 698 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1997).
238. Id. at 357.
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Statutes.239 After a hearing, the Department determined that RIS was liable
for assessments from the date the declaration was recorded.240
The fourth district disagreed with the Department's conclusion. 241 The
Department claimed that RIS was required to pay the assessments because of
a provision in the RIS Declaration of Condominium.242 The fourth district
recognized that the Department failed to consider the definition of "unit" in
the Condominium Act.243 Section 718.103(24) of the Florida Statutes defines
"unit" as "part of condominium property which is subject to exclusive
ownership."" "A unit may be in improvements, land, or land and
improvements together, as specified in the declaration."2 45  The fourth
district's revious opinion in Welleby Condominium Ass'n One v. William
Lyon Co. 46 was controlling.247 In Welleby, the developer prevailed because
the land in question was neither "condominium units" as described in the
Declaration of Condominium nor defined by the statute.24 8
The writer of the Declaration of Condominium for RIS could have
defined a condominium unit in various ways. Although the definition of
"condominium parcel" in Welleby was clearly defined, the definition of "unit"
in this case was not.249 However, it could still be discerned from the
definition here that the term "unit" was not meant to encompass raw land.250
Section 3.2 of the Declaration discusses the boundaries of a unit as
"unfinished surface of the ceilings and floors, perimeter walls and any interior
walls that are shown within the maximum limits of each unit on the plot
plan. 251  This section indicates the intent not to include land within the
definition of a unit.252 Therefore, the court reversed the order requiring RIS to
remit assessments.
253
239. Id. at 357-58.
240. Id. at 358.
241. Id.
242. RISInv. Group, 695 So. 2d at 358.
243. Id.
244. FLA. STAT. § 718.03(24) (1995).
245. Id.
246. 522 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
247. RISInv. Group, 695 So. 2d at 358.
248. Id. at 358-59 (citing Welleby Condominium Ass'n One, Inc. v. William Lyon Co.,
522 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
249. Id. at 359.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. RIS Inv. Group, 695 So. 2d at 359.
253. Id. at 360.
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V. CONSTRUCTION
Godwin v. United Southern Bank.254 Landowners were unhappy with the
performance of their home construction contractor. Allegedly, the
construction lender released the "final draw," i.e., the last installment of the
construction loan, to the contractor without the landowner's
endorsement. This was after the lender's construction inspector would not
approve the final draw due to construction defects. As a result, the
landowners sued their construction lender on a variety of theories. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed
on all counts except the count claiming a breach of the construction loan . 5
The loan agreement provided that "construction shall not be deemed
complete for purposes of final disbursement unless and until Lender shall
have received all of the following: .... Acceptance of the completed
improvements by Lender and Borrower., 256 The fifth district concluded that
the factual allegations were sufficient to allege that the final disbursement had257
been made without acceptance by either. Judge Dauksch dissented,
pointing out that an additional provision of the contract appeared to give the
lender total control over the decision to make any payments to the
contractor.25 8  The dissent failed to explain the theory of contract
interpretation and apparently chose to ignore the rules of construction that a
contract should be interpreted against its drafter, most likely the lender, and
that no part of a contract should be interpreted so as to make another part
meaningless.259 The dissent's interpretation would certainly make the
provision on final disbursement, which the majority relied upon, totally
meaningless.
Island House Developers, Inc. v. AMAC Construction, Inc.260  In a
dispute over a construction contract, the issue raised was whether the general
contractor had a valid license. The trial court granted the contractor's motion
to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract.
261
However, under Florida law, the construction contract, including the
arbitration clause, could not be enforced by an unlicensed contractor.262
254. 688 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
255. Id. at 374.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Godwin, 688 So. 2d at 374-75 (Duksch, J., dissenting).
259. Id.
260. 686 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
261. Id.
262. See FLA. STAT. § 489.128 (1995).
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Consequently, the motion should not have been ruled upon until the court had
determined that there was a valid and enforceable contract.
2 63
Mercedes Homes, Inc. v. Osborne.264 The owners and builder entered
into a contract for the construction of a home in Hillsborough County. Before
the owners were to take possession, the parties entered into a presettlement
agreement which provided that the builder would replace certain ceramic tile.
When disagreements arose between the parties, the owners filed suit. The
complaint contained three counts based on the following: 1) the builder
breached its express one-year warranty by failing to correct the defective
ceramic tile; 2) the builder had breached the pre-settlement agreement to
replace the tile; and 3) the builder had negligently failed to obtain the
extended third party warranty for which the owners had previously paid. The
contract provided that venue for any action "'arising herein or related
hereto",'2 ,5 would be in Brevard County, but the complaint was filed in
Hillsborough County. The builder's motion challenging the venue was
denied, and the builder appealed. 66
The Second District Court of Appeal noted that "parties to an agreement
may provide therein where an action must be brought to enforce it."'267 The
trial court accepted the landowner's argument that the second count arose out
of the presettlement agreement, rather than the construction contract
containing the venue provision.268 Thus, the second count had proper venue
in Hillsborough County. Applying section 47.041 of the Florida Statutes
would allow the other counts to stay in Hillsborough County along with count
two. 26 9 The second district rejected this logic and reversed. 270 It concluded
that the venue provision had not been eliminated by the subsequent
presettlement agreement, i.e., it was not a novation.27 1 Furthermore, the venue
provision included an action to enforce the presettlement agreement because
that was a modification of the rights and responsibilities of the parties under
that contract.272 Since all three counts were within the scope of the valid
263. Island House Developers, Inc., 686 So. 2d at 1377.
264. 687 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
265. Id. at 840 (quoting the contract).
266. Id. at 841.
267. Id. (citing Southeastern Office Supply & Furniture Co. v. Barley, 427 So. 2d 1139
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
268. Id.
269. Osborne, 687 So. 2d at 841 (citing FLA. STAT. § 47.041 (1993)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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venue agreement, the second district never reached the question regarding the
effect of section 47.041.73
VI. CONTRACTS
Holiday Pines Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Rowen 27 4 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal "reverse[d] the final judgment in favor of the owners
in this action by a homeowners association to enforce restrictive
covenants." 275 The fourth district, in reversing final judgment, concluded that
the voluntary homeowners "association lacked standing to bring the
action.' 276 The association must either be "the assignee of the developer's
right to enforce the restrictive covenants or the direct successor of the
developer's interest" in order to have the requisite standing.277 Neither is true
in this case. In addition, there were no provisions allowing the association to
seek judicial enforcement of the covenants. 8
Oceania Joint Venture v. Trillium, Inc. 2 79 The issue before the court was
"whether, under the mortgage contingency in the purchase contract, Meretsky
was entitled to return of the deposit."280 Meretsky entered into a contract and
placed a deposit to purchase a unit at the Oceania III Condominium. A
separate document executed granted Meretsky the right to take title in the
name of a corporation if he was a principal of the corporation. The seller was
obligated to inform Meretsky when the condominium neared completion
while Meretsky, in turn, was obligated to make a mortgage application. The
agreement to purchase was contingent on Meretsky obtaining a mortgage for
the price of the unit less the deposit amount. If Meretsky could not obtain the
mortgage, the seller had to grant the loan itself or allow Meretsky to rescind
on his purchase agreement and receive back his $55,400 deposit.2 1
When it was time for Meretsky to obtain the mortgage, he informed the
Great Western Bank that he wanted to take title to the condominium unit. The
unit would be the only asset of Meretsky's corporation. Great Western was
willing to grant Meretsky an individual loan, but not the type of corporate
273. Id.
274. 679 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
275. Id. at 825.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing Palm Point Property Owners' Ass'n v. Pisarski, 626 So. 2d 195 (Fla.
1993)).
278. Id. at 824.
279. 681 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
280. Id. at 882.
281. Id.
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loan he desired. However, Flagler Federal Savings and Loan would grant the
loan only if Meretsky gave a personal guarantee. Meretsky failed to secure a
loan from any of the institutions he questioned. Needless to say, the seller
claimed that Meretsky failed to satisfy his obligations under the mortgage
contingency, explaining that Meretsky's only options were to forfeit the
deposit or proceed to closing on the condominium unit.
282
The seller then proceeded to set a closing date at which Meretsky would
not close, thus, the seller kept the $55,400 deposit. Consequently, Meretsky
brought suit for the return of the deposit. The trial court found for Meretsky,
agreeing that Meretsky complied with the mortgage contingency. 28 3  The
Third District Court of Appeal reversed the final judgment and remanded for
further proceedings.284 The court reasoned that once Meretsky failed to
supply the personal guarantee which Flagler Federal required to secure the
corporate mortgage loan, he failed to comply with the contingency
agreement.285
Rubell v. Finkelstein.8 6 The question before Third District Court of
Appeal was whether the contract agreement for the sale and purchase of real
property merged into the deed. 87 Rubell, "Buyer," entered into a contract
that was for the sale and purchase of real property that was encumbered by
existing leases. Finkelstein, "Seller," was to furnish Buyer with copies of
those existing leases. After Buyer received the copies, he then had the option
to accept or terminate the contract. The contract also stated that Buyer had to
approve any new lease into which Seller wished to enter prior to the closing
date. Seller executed a new lease without obtaining Buyer's approval. After
Seller and Buyer closed on the property, Buyer sought a release from the
unauthorized lease and filed suit to recover damages.288
The third district reversed the final judgment entered in favor of
Seller.289  As a general rule, "the acceptance of a deed tendered in
performance of a contract to convey land merges or extinguishes the
preliminary agreements and understandings contained within the contract."
290
282. Id. at 883.
283. Id.
284. Oceania Joint Venture, 681 So. 2d at 885.
285. Id. at 883.
286. 679 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
287. Id. at 889.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 890.
290. Id. at 889 (citations omitted).
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However, this accepted rule does not apply to provisions of the sale contract
not intended to be extinguished or merged into the deed.29'
In this case, the contract between Buyer and Seller contained a provision
which stated that Seller must reveal all leases.292 Those leases revealed must
be the only agreements or understandings pertaining to the property. The
contract also expressly provided that "'representations and warranties made
by the Seller ... shall survive closing.,,293 Since the new lease breached the
contract between Seller and Buyer, the trial court erred in applying the merger
294
rule in this situation.
Whitehurst v. Camp.295 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's finding that the statutory rate computed by the state comptroller
should be applied when awarding post-judgment interest.296 Whitehurst
appealed the lower court's final summary judgment which foreclosed upon
deeded property.297 The property at issue was real and personal property over
which the Camps and Whitehursts entered into a deed agreement. The
agreement provided that the Camps would pay the Whitehursts $450,000
"'with interest at the rate of 10 per centum (10%) per annum payable on the
whole sum remaining from time to time unpaid.', 298 The agreement
contained no provision governing the payment of interest on any judgment
entered pursuant to the agreement. 99
Section 55.03(1) of the Florida Statutes allows the parties to set the rate
of post-judgment interest by contract. 300 However, the agreement here only
set the rate of interest for the debt and did not govern the rate of post-
judgment interest. The parties must expressly state in the contract that the
decided interest rate is meant to govern post-judgment interest as well. If not
expressly stated, upon entry of a judgment, the lender can no longer charge
the interest designated by contract but is obligated to charge the amount
specified by statute.30' Since the terms of the agreement here between
291. Rubell, 679 So. 2d at 889 (citations omitted).
292. Id. at 890.
293. Id. (quoting the contract).
294. Id.
295. 677 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), review granted, 687 So. 2d 1308
(Fla.), approved in part, 699 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1997).
296. Id. at 1362.
297. Id.
298. Id. (quoting the agreement).
299. Id.
300. Whitehurst, 677 So. 2d at 1362.
301. Id. at 1363. See Sciandra v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 638 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Altenbernd, J., concurring).
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Whitehurst and Camp were not specific to address post-judgment interest, the
eight percent statutory rate should apply.
302
VII. COVENANTS, DEEDS, AND RESTRICTIONS
Mann v. Mann.03 The question before this court was "whether the deed
at issue effectively transferred a joint interest in the home to Former Husband
and Former Wife. '304  The First District Court of Appeal reversed and
remanded the trial court's decision that the parties owned the home as tenants
in common.
30 5
In 1989, Former Husband and his first wife, who is not the Former Wife
in this litigation, deeded property to Former Husband's mother. The mother
never recorded. In 1993, Former Wife altered the deed by "whiting out" the
Former Husband's mother's name as grantee and replacing it with the parties'
names. The Former Wife alleged that the changes to the deed were made with
the consent of Former Husband, his mother, and his sister. On the other hand,
Former Husband claimed that the changes to the deed were made without his
consent. Former Husband alleged that Former Wife's intent was to obtain a
joint interest in the property.30 6 Under either version of the story, the altered
deed did not convey any joint interest in the property to the parties
represented in this action.30 7 Presently, the title to the property may belong to
Former Husband's mother, who was not a party of the divorce proceedings;
thus, the property does not fall under the court's jurisdiction.30 8
Stev-Mar, Inc. v. Matvejs.31  The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed an adverse summary final judgment in favor of Matvejs. 310 Matvejs
divided her piece of property in two, whereby she had her home on one half
and listed the vacant half for sale as a homesite. Real estate agents placed an
ad to sell the vacant property. Stev-Mar was interested in buying the land for
a retirement home. The agent told Stev-Mar that the property was zoned and
platted for a single family home. Consequently, Stev-Mar entered into a
contract to buy the land. Although Stev-Mar was to take title subject to
302. Whitehurst, 677 So. 2d at 1363.
303. 677 So. 2d 62 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
304. Id. at 62.
305. Id. at 63.
306. Id. at 62-63.
307. Id. at 63.
308. Mann, 677 So. 2d at 63.
309. 678 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996), review denied sub nom. Carico Real
Estate Co. v. Stev-Mar, Inc., 686 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1996).
310. Id. at 835.
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certain restrictions, nothing in the contract prevented the "'use of [r]eal
[p]roperty for residential purposes."' 31' In addition, Stev-Mar's attorney
verified that the area zoning permitted the building of a single family
residence.312
When the seller delivered the general warranty deed to Stev-Mar, the
deed did not have the required disclosure statement which advises the buyer
that "'under the Monroe County Land Development Regulations the division
of land into parcels of land [which] are not approved as platted lots under the
regulations confers no right to develop a parcel of land for any purpose."'
313
Later on, Stev-Mar discovered that the property was not properly replatted or
subdivided and could not be legally used for its desired purpose.314 Stev-Mar
brought suit against the owner, real estate agent, and real estate agency for
intentional fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 315 The trial court held for
Matvejs, stating that Stev-Mar hired an attorney to investigate the property
and did not rely on the representations of Matvejs.316
The third district reversed the trial court's decision.317 The court relied
on the decision in Besett v. Basnett.318 In Basnett, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that a recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may rely on the
truth of such representation, even though its falsity could have been
discovered through investigation, unless he knows, or it is obvious to him,
that the representation is false.319 In this case, the seller misrepresented the
land as properly platted for use as a homesite. Stev-Mar entered a contract
based on that misrepresentation. In addition, Stev-Mar's attorney was
negligent in his investigation of the land because he failed to investigate
beyond zoning. The attorney never discovered that the property had not been
replatted.320
The question is whether Matvejs avoids liability just because Stev-Mar's
attorney conducted a negligent investigation. The district court recoguized
that even though Stev-Mar's attorney was negligent, the seller, real estate
agent, and real estate agency cannot avoid the intentional fraud charge.
321
311. Id. at 835-36 (quoting the contract).
312. Id. at 836.
313. Id. (quoting the contract).
314. Matvejs, 678 So. 2d at 836.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 839.
318. Id. at 837 (citing Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1980)).
319. Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995, 998 (Fla. 1980).
320. Matvejs, 678 So. 2d at 837.
321. Id.
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"'[T]he law should not permit an inattentive person to suffer loss at the hands
of a misrepresenter.'
322
VII. EASEMENTS
Nerbonne, N. V v. Florida Power Corp.323 The issue before the Fifth
District Court of Appeal was:
Whether Orange County's grant of a permit to Florida Power
Corporation in 1991 to construct a power line over an easement
deeded to the County in 1952 and the subsequent erection of the
power line exceeded the scope of the grant of easement to the
324County and, thus, constituted a taking of Nerbonne's property.
The "Right-of-Way Agreement" in question provided that in exchange for one
dollar, the Florida Power Corporation would be given "'a right-of-way for
public road purposes and full authority to enter upon, . . . TO HAVE AND
TO HOLD the said easement. '"' 3
25
Florida has not directly decided this issue, but the majority of courts in
other jurisdictions have concluded that the construction of a power line, which
did not interfere with highway travel, was a proper use of a highway
easement.326 It "is not regarded as imposing an additional burden or servitude
on the underlying estate." 327 When looking to other cases such as Fisher v.
Golden Valley Electric Ass'n,328 the reasoning appeared consistent with
Florida cases that have considered the scope of a public road right-of-way. 329
Since the document failed to exclude public utilities from the easement, the
court construed the grant of a right-of-way to include such utilities.330
State Department of Transportation v. B & C Foods, Inc.331 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision ordering the City
of Fort Lauderdale to reconvey an easement to McDonald's Corporation
322. Id. at 837-38 (citing Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995, 998 (Fla. 1980)).
323. 692 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
324. Id. at 928.
325. Id. (quoting the agreement).
326. Id. at 929 (citations omitted).
327. Id. (citations omitted).
328. 658 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1983).
329. Nerbonne, 692 So. 2d at 930 (citing Dickson v. St. Lucie County, 67 So. 2d 662,
665 (Fla. 1953)).
330. Id.
331. 687 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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according to section 255.22 of the Florida Statutes.332 The language in the
1979 easement stated that the easement was for "'right[-]of[-]way
purposes.0'3 33 This purpose was for a "'specified purpose or use"' which was
intended to be addressed under subsection (3) of the Florida Statutes.334 Fort
Lauderdale did not use or identify the easement in a comprehensive plan of its
own within ten years of the conveyance date. 35 Since subsection (1) required
the transferee to identify the property as such in the comprehensive plan, the
Department of Transportation could not rely on Broward County's
comprehensive plan as a way around subsection (3).336
IX. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Condemnation
Broward County v. LaPointe.337 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
ruled that where a researcher had been hired as both an expert witness and as
a litigation consultant, it was error to award an expert witness fee for all of the
researcher's time.338 "On remand, the trial court must determine what portion
of [his] fee can be allocated to the formation of an expert opinion which
related to the valuation of the property. ' 339 The condemnor can be required to
pay only that portion of his bill.
Department of Transportation v. Springs Land Investments, Ltd.40 To
effectuate its comprehensive plan, the city was planning on down-zoning an
area that included this owner's land. Since that "would have significantly
reduced the property's market value," the landowner took the steps necessary
to have the commercial zoning vest so it would survive a general re-zoning of
the area, primarily by hiring an engineering firm to acquire the city's
preliminary site plan approval for a shopping center.341 Then, the Department
of Transportation began this condemnation proceeding which was eventually
332. Id. at 5. See FLA. STAT. § 255.22(l) (1994).
333. B & CFoods, Inc., 687 So. 2d at 5.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. 685 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). For more discussion of this case,
see also the Attorneys' Fees section of this survey.
338. Id. at 893.
339. Id.
340. 695 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
341. Id. at 416.
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settled. Subsequently, when the condemnee filed a motion to tax costs, it
included the engineering firm's fees.342
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that those fees should not have
been allowed.343 Section 73.091 of the Florida Statutes provides for "all
reasonable costs" of the condemnation proceeding. 344 Here, however, the fees
were incurred to maintain the value of the property by avoiding down-zoning,
not to litigate the condemnation. It would seem like double compensation if
this landowner was compensated for the land with the commercial zoning in
order to pay for both the land with the more valuable zoning and to pay the
fees to get that zoning.
Garber v. State Department of Transportation.345 Following a stipulated
judgment, the trial court entered an order on attorneys' fees and costs
pursuant to section 73.091 of the Florida Statutes.346 However, the trial court
denied expert witness fees for the condemnee's marketing expert who was a
real estate broker engaged "to help assess the impact a loss of parking places
would have on the property's continued viability as the location of three
physicians' practices. 347 The First District Court of Appeal ruled "that the
trial court erred in categorically rejecting" an expert witness fee for the
marketing expert.348 Neither the plain language of the statute nor the decision
in State Department of Transportation v. Woods349 precluded expert witness
fees for a marketing expert. 31 The latter denied fees for an expert that the
fourth district concluded had assisted the condemnee's lawyer in the litigation
rather than act as an expert witness.351 However, this trial court had made no
similar finding of facts that this expert was not hired "as a witness to render or
assist in rendering an opinion on just valuation and to testify, as needed. 352 If
this person had done what the condemnee claimed, then an expert witness fee
would have been appropriate. Furthermore, it must not be duplicative, and it
must be necessary to the presentation of the condemnee's case.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 415.
344. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1993).
345. 687 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
346. Id. at 3.
347. Id. at 4.
348. Id.
349. 633 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
350. Garber, 687 So. 2d at 4.
351. Id. (citing Department of Transp. v. Woods, 633 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
352. Id.
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M & C Associates v. State Department of Transportation.35 3 Mediation
produced a settlement agreement that was incorporated into a stipulated final
judgment. One provision was "that the trial court would 'reserve jurisdiction
to assess any damage"' caused to the landowner's pool by the Department's
construction.354 However, the trial court later denied the landowner's motion
to enforce this provision "on the basis that construction damages are not
recoverable in an eminent domain proceeding. '3 55  The second district
reversed, noting that "[t]here is no requirement that the terms of a settlement
agreement be confined to issues cognizable in the litigation giving rise to the
dispute." 356 The court held that the rights and obligations of the parties
merged into the settlement agreement.35 7 Consequently, the agreement was
binding on the parties and the trial court.358 From the limited facts given, it
appears that the Department's conduct was outrageous, but the opinion is a
monument of judicial restraint, simply stating the law and the results without
casting aspersions on the Department's actions.
Murray v. Department of Transportation.59  The Department of
Transportation took sixteen parking spaces from a restaurant parking lot. The
restaurateur sought both business and severance damages under the statute in
addition to compensation for the land. The issue on appeal centered on proof
of the business damages. The trial court admitted the testimony of the
restaurateur's expert, which stated:
[He had] calculated a projected loss of sales resulting from the lost
parking spaces and deducted from that sales amount the business
costs which, in his opinion, would have been attributed to
production of those sales had the sales not been lost. The expert
then capitalized the recurring shortfall and concluded that the
capitalized amount would be the loss to the ongoing business. 360
The first district reversed, ruling that the expert's testimony was inadmissible
as a matter of law because it did not deduct a percentage of all fixed costs
353. 682 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
354. Id. at 640.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. M& CAssocs., 682 So. 2d at 640.
359. 687 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1997).
360. Id. at 825.
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from the sales amount.361 The first district then certified two questions.362The first was whether:
IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN CASE IN WHICH AN
ESTABLISHED BUSINESS IS NOT TOTALLY DESTROYED
BY A TAKING, DOES SECTION 73.071(3)(B), FLORIDA
STATUTES [(1991)], CONTEMPLATE CALCULATION OF
BUSINESS DAMAGES BY ANY MEANS OTHER THAN A
LOST PROFIT ANALYSIS?
3 63
The Supreme Court of Florida declined to answer this question, reasoning that
all the experts in this case had used a lost profit analysis.364 However, the
Supreme Court of Florida directed its attention to the second certified
question which was:
IN THE INSTANT CASE IS THE EXPERT'S BUSINESS
DAMAGE CALCULATION A LOST PROFIT ANALYSIS
REQUIRING THE DEDUCTION OF FIXED EXPENSES, SUCH
AS SALARIES, INTEREST, DEPRECIATION, AND
UTILITIES, OR AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS,
COGNIZABLE UNDER SECTION 73.071(3)(b) [FLORIDA
STATUTES (1991)], BASED ON DEDUCTION OF CERTAIN
VARIABLE EXPENSES AND THE EXCLUSION OF FIXED
EXPENSES FROM THE ANALYSIS? 365
The supreme court answered that "a business-loss calculation based on certain
variable expenses and excluding some fixed expenses can be cognizable
under section 73.071(3)(b), depending upon the factual circumstances of a
particular case., 36 6 The unanimous opinion written by Justice Wells noted
that business damages are related to lost profits, but they are not limited to lost
profits.367 The supreme court rejected a "mechanically applied, one-size-fits-
all formula."368 It would have been error not to deduct managerial salaries in
the amount deducted from sales in a case where the business had closed as a
361. State Dep't of Transp. v. Murray, 670 So. 2d 977, 980 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1996), quashed by Murray v. State Dep't of Transp., 687 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1997).
362. Id. at 980.
363. Id.
364. Murray, 687 So. 2d at 826.
365. Id. at 825-26.
366. Id. at 826.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 827.
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result of the taking.369 However, in this case the business did not close. In the
case at hand, it was a question of fact as to which fixed expenses should be
included in the calculation because it was not certain that managerial expenses
would be reduced by the decreased trade that the restaurant would suffer from
the loss of parking spaces. Both sides had presented expert testimony on that
issue. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this
testimony.
37 °
Trinity Temple Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Orange County.371 Part
of the church's property was taken, and the church sought, inter alia, statutory
business damages.372 The courts did not hesitate to grant severance damages,
but the trial court rejected the business damage claim, and the fifth district
agreed. 373  First, the court concluded that a tax-exempt church was not a
business within the meaning of the statute.374 The court noted that the statute
is to be "strictly construed. 3 75 The dictionary definition of a business is one
that involved an "activity engaged in for a gain or livelihood, 376 but, the
statute providing the church tax-exempt status requires that the church be
used "predominately for a . . . religious ...purpose."377 The court also
rejected the church's equal protection argument by primarily relying on the
difficulty in calculating business damages for something that was not a
business and already was getting preferential tax treatment.78
Trump Enterprises, Inc. v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. 37 9 The lease for an
unimproved outparcel in a shopping center did not contain a condemnation
clause. A restaurant was built on the parcel, and thereafter, almost thirty-five
percent of the parcel was taken for road widening. Although the lessee
presented unrebutted expert testimony as to the value of the leasehold taken,
the trial court held that the lessee was not entitled to a portion of the
condemnation award.380 It reasoned that the lessee had suffered no harm
because the land taken was part of the grassy strip running along the road.38,
369. Murray, 687 So. 2d at 827 (distinguishing Department of Transp. v. Manoli, 645
So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
370. Id.
371. 681 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
372. Id. at 766. See also FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1995).
373. Trinity Temple, 681 So. 2d at 766.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 198 (6th ed. 1990)).
377. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 196.196(1) (1995)).
378. Trinity Temple, 681 So. 2d at 766.
379. 682 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
380. Id. at 168.
381. Id. at 170.
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Therefore, the restaurant building was not disturbed because it had lost no
parking spaces and its business was not affected. 8 2 The Fourth District Court
of Appeal disagreed and reversed.8 3
The right to compensation for a governmental taking is not a matter of
damages in the contract or tort sense. A leasehold is an interest in land for
purposes of taking jurisprudence. When a fee simple subject to a lease is
taken, the lessee is entitled to share in the condemnation award as
compensation for the interest lost. The lessee's share should be proportionate
to the value of the leasehold in relation to the value of the fee simple taken.
Consequently, this lessee's share in the condemnation award should be the
decrease in the value of its leasehold, which its expert had figured from the
proportionate loss of area minus the value of the landlord's reversion.38 4
The lack of a condemnation clause in the lease did not defeat the lessee's
right to compensation. Quite the contrary, when a lease is silent about
condemnation, the lessee is entitled to compensation for its lost leasehold
interest. The court pointed out in dicta that condemnation clauses limiting a
tenant's right to compensation for a governmental taking are disfavored and
should, therefore, be construed, whenever possible, not to defeat a tenant's
right to compensation.385
B. Inverse Condemnation
Department of Environmental Protection v. Gibbins.386  The
landowner's neighbor operated a service station which discharged gasoline
from underground storage tanks. To define the extent of the contamination,
the Department of Environmental Protection notified the landowner that it
wanted to drill several wells on the landowner's property. The landowner
resisted, demanding compensation; thus, the Department served him with an
administrative order for access. After the landowner responded with a
demand for a formal hearing, the Department withdrew its administrative
action and filed a complaint seeking an injunction against the landowner for
interfering with the installation of wells on his land. The Department then
decided that was unnecessary and moved for voluntary dismissal; however,
the landowner filed a motion for attorney's fees on the theory that he had
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Trump, 682 So. 2d at 170.
385. Id. (relying on Mullis v. Division of Admin., 390 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980)).
386. 696 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. of App. 1997).
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defeated an attempt by the government to take his land. The trial court agreed
and awarded substantial attorney's fees.387
The fifth district reversed.388 Its analysis does not address whether the
Department's conduct amounted to an "inverse condemnation" or whether
attorney's fees can be awarded in an inverse condemnation case, although the
court disagreed with the landowner's contention that the "DEP's action,
whether deliberate or inadvertent, was highly intrusive behavior, and hence a
taking. 3 89 Rather, the fifth district reasoned that because no condemnation
proceeding had begun, the landowner could not have succeeded in defeating a
condemnation attempt.390 As the statutes relied upon only provide for
attorney's fees in condemnation proceedings, 391 there would be no basis for
awarding attorney's fees in this case.
3 92
Diamond K Corp. v. Leon County.393 A creek crossed a comer of
Diamond K's property. The County dredged a channel in the creek for
mosquito control. The County approved development and the installation of
culverts under the nearby state road to allow for the increased flow of water in
the creek. Cumulatively, these culverts caused the creek to widen and, in a
heavy rainstorm, the water would back up and not drain properly. The
landowner brought suit claiming inverse condemnation, but lost at the trial
level.394 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed because the record did
not contain evidence of a permanent deprivation of the beneficial use of the
land, and suggested that the landowner should have brought an action for
damages against any third party responsible for increasing the surface water
flow across its land.395
Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach.396 Landowners owned two lots, with the
house on one lot overlapping onto the second lot. In order to obtain a
building permit for the second lot, the owners sought to reconfigure the two
lots to eliminate any overlap. The City's Department of Planning and Zoning
approved the requested reconfiguration and then issued the building permit,
which was reversed by the Board of Adjustment.397 The property owners
387. Id. at 888-89.
388. Id. at 890.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091-.092 (1993).
392. Gibbins, 696 So. 2d at 890.
393. 677 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
394. Id. at 91.
395. Id.
396. 678 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1996).
397. Id. at 1366.
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finally got their approval after a successful appeal to the trial court's appellate
division. They then sued for losses allegedly incurred as a result of the Board
of Adjustment's erroneous reversal on the theories of inverse condemnation
and violation of their due process rights.398 The trial court granted the City's
motion for summary judgment and the landowners appealed.
The third district rejected the taking claim because the record reflected
that, despite the denial of the permit application, the landowners still occupied
and even improved the existing house.400 Consequently, they were not
deprived of "'substantially all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."'40' 1 The third district rejected the property owners' substantive due
process claim.402 The decision of the Board of Adjustment was executive, not
legislative in nature.40 3 Noting that "'[t]he notion that the Constitution gives a
property owner a substantive right to a correct decision from a government
official . . . is novel indeed,,4 04 the court pointed out that an executive act
would violate substantive due process only if the right affected was "'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."'40 5 But none of the fundamental rights of
these property owners had been infringed. Their interest in the
reconfiguration approval and building permit issued by the Department of
Planning and Zoning was not a fundamental right. Moreover, it was a right
that was restored when relief was sought following the appeals process. In
sum, the court declined to find that property owners who successfully appeal
denials of building permits and the like are, without more, entitled to recover
from the government for their resulting losses.406
Nerbonne, N.V. v. Florida Power Corp.4°7 A landowner granted the
County a right-of-way for public road purposes. Subsequently, the County
granted the power company a permit to construct power lines along that right-
of-way. The servient landowner claimed that the County had exceeded the
398. Id. A violation of their civil rights would be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Jacobi, 678 So. 2d at 1366 (citation omitted).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1367.
404. Id. at 1367-68 (quoting Boatman v. Town of Oakland, 76 F.3d 341, 346 (11th Cir.
1996)).
405. Id. at 1367 (quoting C.B. By and Through Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 387
(I th Cir. 1996)).
406. Jacobi, 678 So. 2d at 1367.
407. 692 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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scope of the easement and demanded compensation. This action based upon
inverse condemnation followed.4"'
The fifth district found that this was a case of first impression in
Florida. °9 It reviewed decisions from other states and found decisions in
Alaska410 and Minnesota411 particularly persuasive for the proposition that a
right-of-way easement includes compatible uses by which energy or
412information might be transmitted. The court stated that "[i]f the grantor
had intended in 1952 to exclude public utilities from the easement, it would
have been possible to do so. Since the document is silent, we construe the
grant of right-of-way for public road purposes to include public utilities.'A
13
Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investors Ltd.4  Palm Beach County
acquired title to a residential mobile home lot by eminent domain. The
mobile home lot was subject to a declaration of covenants that obligated the
lot owners to pay a monthly recreation fee and required the Club to operate a
golf course and country club for the use of the lot owners. The Club brought
this suit claiming that it had suffered the loss of a property right in that the
condemnation of the lot had deprived it of the income to which it was entitled.
The trial court agreed, holding that a taking of property had occurred and
reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation due. 5 The
County appealed the taking determination, but the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed.416
The fourth district distinguished this case from Board of Public
Instruction of Dade County v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands,417 North Dade
Water Co. v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 418 and Division of
Administration, Department of Transportation v. Ely.41 9 The critical point
seemed to be that the Club was still required to operate the golf course and
country club facilities for the other owners, but without the support of the
408. Id. at 928.
409. Id. at 929.
410. Fisher v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n, 658 P. 2d 127 (Alaska 1983).
411. Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 63 N.W. Il1 (Minn. 1895).
412. Nerbonne, 692 So. 2d at 929 (citation omitted).
413. Id. at 930.
414. 692 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. 81 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 1955) (holding that mutual restrictions within a
subdivision did not create property rights).
418. 114 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), dismissed, 120 So. 2d 621 (Fla.
1960) (holding that an exclusive contract to sell water to subdivision was not a property right).
419. 351 So. 2d 66, 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (concluding that a contract to sell
gas to mobile home park residents was not a property right).
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income stream from the condemned lot. The trial court concluded that this
amounted to a taking and that "[t]he trial court's determination on liability in
an inverse condemnation suit is presumed correct and its findings will not be
disturbed on appeal if supported by competent, substantial evidence. ' 420 The
fourth district also rejected the County's claim that public policy would be
violated by making the County pay for the Club's lost income because the
public policy is to compensate owners whose property is taken.42' The fourth
district subsequently granted the motion to certify the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida as being of great public importance:
WHETHER THE RIGHT OF A PRIVATE COUNTRY CLUB TO
RECEIVE A STREAM OF INCOME FROM A MONTHLY
RECREATION FEE ASSESSED AGAINST THE OWNER OF A
RESIDENTIAL MOBILE HOME LOT CONSTITUTES A
PROPERTY RIGHT COMPENSABLE UPON INVERSE
CONDEMNATION BY THE COUNTY FOR USE OF THAT
LOT IN A PUBLIC ROAD WIDENING PROJECT? 4
22
XI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Ober v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.2 1 The fifth
district held that Ober was entitled to reimbursement for the clean-up of
storage tanks and contaminated soil on Ober's property.424 Ober owned
property that was leased and used as an AAMCO transmission shop. During
inspection of the property, the Environmental Control Division determined
the site, containing underground storage tanks and an oil/water separator, was
contaminated. Ober employed an environmental contractor to remedy the
situation, and once this was completed, the contractor filed a closure report.
Ober later applied for entry into the Abandoned Tank Restoration Program
pursuant to section 376.305(7) of the Florida Statutes, providing for
"financial assistance to a clean site contaminated by petroleum or petroleum
products." 425 The Department of Environmental Regulation later told Ober
420. Cove Club, 692 So. 2d at 999.
421. Id. at 1000.
422. Id.
423. 688 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
424. Id. at 436.
425. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 376.305(7) (1995)).
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that the contamination at his site was eligible for reimbursement under the
statute.
426
When Ober filed for reimbursement of the $46,765.24, the Department
of Environmental Protection ("DEP") denied the request, concluding that the
costs accrued were due to surface spillage of contaminants not covered by the
statute. Further, the DEP found that that the source of contamination was
"improper disposal and storage methods; and that the underground storage
system was not the source of contamination of the facility.' , 27 Ober filed a
petition for an administrative hearing. The hearing officer found the
contamination to be the result of discharge of petroleum products specified
under section 376.301 of the Florida Statutes.
428
The issue before the court was whether the waste oil and transmission
fluid (which the hearing officer found to be the source of the contamination)
were "petroleum products" as defined by section 376.301 of the Florida
Statutes.429 The court rejected the Department's argument that distinguished
between "waste oil" and "used oil" because it overlooked the fact that the
intent of the statute was to reimburse property owners for remedying
contaminated sites.430 The court looked to rule 62-770.200(12) of the Florida
Administrative Code where it defined used oil.431 It recognized the rule had
no definition of waste oil even though the hearing officer and Ober's witness
at the hearing used the terms "used oil and waste oil interchangeably.
'
,
3 2
Since there was evidence that lubricants described as waste oil or transmission
fluid, which contaminated the soil from underground tanks were used in
Florida as fuel, "the conclusion of the hearing officer that these lubricants
were liquid fuel commodities made from petroleum and thus 'petroleum
products' . . . should have been sustained. ' ' 33 Thus, Ober should have been
reimbursed.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection v. Fleet Credit
Corp.43 4 The fourth district reversed summary judgment granted in favor of
Fleet Credit on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired before
Florida's Department of Environmental Protection filed the action. 435 The
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Ober, 688 So. 2d at 436-37.
429. Id. at 437.
430. Id. at 438.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Ober, 688 So. 2d at 438.
434. 691 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
435. Id. at 514.
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court reasoned that summary judgment was inappropriate because "the statute
of limitations begins to run when the last element of a cause of action
accrues. '436  "Florida's environmental resource and recovery management
statutes are remedial in nature" and have the purpose to clean up unused
waste disposal sites to protect the public health and safety.437 It was irrelevant
when Fleet abandoned the property because the ongoing contamination
constituted continuing disruption. 438  In conclusion, when there is a
continuing invasion of rights with regard to environmental concerns, the
statute of limitations does not run until the wrongful invasion terminates.'t 9
XII. EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Lee County v. Fort Myers Airways, Inc. 440 Arbitrators decided that both
the landlord, Lee County, and the tenant, Fort Myers Airways, had breached
the lease and both were entitled to damages.44' The trial court confirmed the
decision and also ordered the landlord to maintain the buildings structurally as
required by the lease.442 The maintenance order was reversed by the Second
District Court of Appeal, which reasoned that the order was a mandatory
injunction.443 According to the second district, "mandatory injunctions are
looked upon with disfavor and should be granted sparingly and cautiously."
444
Injunctions should be granted only upon a showing of "(1) a clear legal right,
(2) the inadequacy of a remedy at law, and (3) that irreparable injury will
occur if such relief is not granted."" 5 Unfortunately, the trial court had not
made a finding that the prerequisites were satisfied.446 Furthermore, an
injunction should not be issued where it would produce hardship
disproportionate to the one the injunction would prevent; however, the trial
court made no finding concerning relative hardship to the parties.447 These
defects in the judgment mandated reversal.448
436. Id.
437. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 403.702 (1995).
438. Fleet, 691 So. 2d at 514.
439. Id.
440. 688 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
441. Id. at 390.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Lee, 688 So. 2d at 390.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id.
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Chief Judge Threadgill dissented regarding the injunction.4 49  He
recharacterized the order as granting specific performance and found ample
authority in section 44.104(11) of the Florida Statutes for the trial court to
grant specific performance based on the arbitrators' award without making
further findings.450 He also urged deference to the opinion of the trial judge,
noting that the litigation had been in progress for eight years.
451
Licea v. Anllo.a52 The buyer brought suit for specific performance of a
real estate sales contract and filed a notice of lis pendens. In response, the
seller filed a motion asking for either discharge of the lis pendens or that the
buyer be required to post a bond. Over the buyer's objection that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary, the trial court heard the matter on its
motion calendar and set bond for $350,000.413 The Third District Court of
Appeal reversed.454
A bond is needed for a notice of lis pendens only if the property owner is
likely to suffer and demonstrates loss or damage if the notice later proves
unjustified. If a bond is appropriate, its amount must bear a "reasonable
relationship" to that potential loss or damage.45 5 A court could only make the
finding that harm or damage is likely and determine the reasonable amount of
the bond after an evidentiary hearing.456
Morton v. Cord Realty, Inc.457 As part of the settlement of complex
litigation, a development company transferred the development property to its
president and then ceased doing business. The broker, seeking to recover
sales commissions from the development company, filed supplementary
proceedings under section 56.29(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes to set aside the458 459
transfer. The trial court voided the transfer and the case was appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court erred in relying
entirely upon section 56.29 because that only provided the procedural
mechanism for setting aside a fraudulent transfer and not the substantive
law.460 That is now found in chapter 726 of the Florida Statutes, Fraudulent
449. Id. at 391 (Threadgill, C.J., dissenting).
450. Lee, 688 So. 2d at 391.
451. Id.
452. 691 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
453. Id. at 30.
454. Id.
455. Id. (citation omitted).
456. Id.
457. 677 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
458. Id. at 1323. See FLA. STAT. § 56.29(6)(a) (1993).
459. Morton, 677 So. 2d at 1324.
460. Id.
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461Transfers. Consequently, the case had to be reversed and remanded for
retrial.46
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AAA Asphalt, Inc.463 Subcontractors sought
equitable relief against the landowner under section 713.31 of the Florida
Statutes, which provided for such relief "'[w]hen the owner or any lienor
shall, by fraud or collusion, deprive or attempt to deprive any [construction]
lienor of benefits or rights to which such lienor is entitled.... ."A' The trial
court granted summary judgment to the subcontractors and the landowner
appealed.4 65 The question was what the legislature meant by "fraud. ,4 66 The
trial court concluded its meaning encompassed constructive fraud, committed
by "negligently failing to determine the invalidity of the [contractor's]
payment bond, 'A67 but the First District Court of Appeal disagreed. 68
The district court noted that fraud, for the purposes of this section, had
not been defined by statute or by any case.4 69 However, in other construction
cases involving the term "fraud," courts had interpreted the term as involving
intentional conduct.470 Moreover, the term "fraudulent lien" within the same
section had been interpreted to mean a lien for an amount that had been
willfully exaggerated.4  The court reasoned that fraud as used in this chapter
should be interpreted consistently. 72 Consequently, equitable relief was
available only if the landowner had the intent to defraud. Therefore, the trial
court's finding that the landowner was negligent did not satisfy that
requirement.473
461. See FLA. STAT. § 56.29(6)(a) (1993).
462. Morton, 677 So. 2d at 1324.
463. 677 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
464. Id. at 94 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.31 (1993)).
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Wal-Mart, 677 So. 2d at 94.
469. Id.
470. Id. See First Interstate Dev. Corp. v. Ablanedo, 511 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1987);
Taylor v. Kenco Chemical & Mfg. Corp., 465 So. 2d 581, 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
471. Wal-Mart, 677 So. 2d at 94 (citing Vinci Dev. Co. v. Connell, 509 So. 2d 1128,
1132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
472. Id.
473. Id.
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XOII. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
381651 Alberta, LTD. v. 279298 Alberta, LTD.474 The issue before this
court was "whether 27 Alberta's action to set aside the conveyances is one at
law or equity given the fact that 27 Alberta seeks also that the proceeds from
the sale of the property be applied to satisfy the money judgment?' 75 27
Alberta, a Canadian corporation, received a $2,375,811.17 judgment against
Adams, an individual 76  Adams' personal property, including two
condominiums was held by Eljada Holdings Family Trust Corporation. 477
"After the entry of the judgment Eljada transferred the mortgages on the
condominiums to Adams' brother's company, 381651 Alberta, Ltd., ("38
Alberta"), allegedly as security for a loan.' 78
"Therefore, 27 Alberta filed suit against Adams, Eljada, and 38 Alberta
seeking an order setting aside the transfers as fraudulent conveyances and
mandating the sale of the real property to satisfy the judgment."479 The trial
court denied 3 8 Alberta's request for a jury trial and later found that Adams
"evaded personal liability by titling.., personal assets" in Eljada's name.4 80
The trial court determined that the mortgages were fraudulent conveyances
and set them aside.48 l The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the final
judgment, but wrote an opinion to address the jury trial issue.482
The right to a jury trial applies only to legal causes of action,483 and
actions seeking monetary judgments are traditionally ones at law.484 The
fourth district distinguished other federal decisions to review this
case. However, it noted that in Mission Bay Campland, Inc. v. Sumner,48 5 the
district court held "'[b]ecause the equitable remedy of annulment for a
fraudulent transfer of assets was sought, there was no federal constitutional
474. 675 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
475. Id. at 1387.
476. Id. at 1386.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. 38 Alberta, 675 So. 2d at 1386.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 1387.
483. Id. (citing King Mountain Condominium Ass'n v. Gundlach, 425 So. 2d 569 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
484. 38 Alberta, 675 So. 2d at 1387 (relying on Hutchens v. Maxicenters, U.S.A., 541
So. 2d 618, 623 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
485. 72 F.R.D. 464 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
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right to a jury trial. ''A86 This case parallels the situation in Alberta. 27
Alberta had an equitable claim against Adams' assets.487 "[A]n action to set
aside the fraudulent conveyance of Adams' real property is equitable in nature
since it does not result in a general adjudication of title to the property. 'As
Section 56.29 of the Florida Statutes states one cannot give, transfer, convey,
or assign anything to hinder or defraud creditors. 489 The fourth district found
that Alberta should be handled like the Mission Bay and Allied cases.490
Therefore, because 27 Alberta's pursuance of Adams' property is equitable in
nature, there is no right to ajury trial.49'
XIV. HOMEOWNERS' AssocIATIoNs
Sanzare v. Varesi.492 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed final
summary judgment in favor of Varesi and the Coconut Key Homeowners
Association ("Association"). The fourth district remanded the case to resolve
genuine issues of material fact concerning the Association's knowledge of the
presence and vicious propensities of a tenant's dog.
493
While Sanzare walked his dog on a nondedicated street running through
a "common area!' owned by the Association, he was bitten by a dog owned by
two people leasing a residence within the community. Sanzare filed a
negligence action against the Association. In turn, the Association moved for
summary judgment arguing it owed no duty to Sanzare. The Association
claimed that "liability for the dog-bite incident could be extended only to the
owner of the dog or the landlord of the property where the dog was kept.
' ' 94
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Association.495 The district court reversed the trial court's holding, noting
that genuine issues of material fact remain to be addressed.496 A landowner
may be liable for injuries resulting from an attack of a tenant's dog, if the
landowner knows of the animal's vicious propensity and has the ability to
486. 38 Alberta, 675 So. 2d at 1387 (quoting Mission Bay Campland, Inc. v. Sumner
Fin. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 464 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (citation omitted)).
487. Id. at 1388.
488. Id.
489. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(6)(b) (1993).
490. 38 Alberta, 675 So. 2d at 1388.
491. Id.
492. 681 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
493. Id. at 786.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id.
[Vol 22:269
318
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman
control the animal's presence. 97 The district court recognized factual issues
remain as to whether the Association had knowledge of the animal's presence
and vicious propensities, as well as the Association's ability to control the
dog's presence. 49 8
Westwood Community Two Ass' v. Lewis.499  In this case the
homeowners filed suit to enforce sections 760.20-.37 of the Florida Statutes,
the familial status provisions of the Florida Fair Housing Act.500 The
homeowners association appealed adverse summary judgment in favor of the
appellees, homeowners in Westwood community.50 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's holding, reasoning that the
association was without the authority to exempt itself from the above statutory
provisions .502 The association was enjoined from representing the community
as "housing for older persons" where one must be fifty-five years of age or
older to reside.0 3
In 1989, the sixteen-year-old age requirement set forth in the Westwood
declaration of restrictions was nullified by an amendment to the Fair Housing
Act504 This amendment was intended to prevent the Westwood community
from discriminating based on familial status. As a result, the Westwood
homeowners association amended its bylaws to fit within the "housing for
older persons" exemption to familial status. 5  Paragraph fifteen of the
Westwood declaration of restrictions stated that "covenants, restrictions,
reservations[,J and servitudes" run with the land and bind those claiming
ownership or use of land until March 1, 2022.506 The association's bylaws
provided for amendments, but the bylaws stated that "'[n]o amendment shall
be made which is in conflict with the Declaration of Restrictions.'
50 7
However, "Westwood's declaration of restrictions did not reserve to the
association the right to amend the covenants or provide for amendment of the
covenants by a vote of lot owners. 50 8 When it amended its bylaws, the
497. Sanzare, 681 So. 2d at 786 (citing Vasques v. Lopez, 509 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
498. Id.
499. 687 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
500. Id. at 297.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Lewis, 687 So. 2d at 297.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id.
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association exercised authority it did not have.50 9 The association could not
amend its declaration of restrictions just because the Fair Housing Act voided
the sixteen-year-old age restriction.510
XV. HOMESTEAD
Crain v. Putnam.511 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that
the elderly owner of a home was still entitled to homestead exemption even
though she was placed in a nursing home.512 Crain was placed in a nursing
home after suffering extensive brain damage in 1992. In 1994, her son, the
appellant, applied for tax exemption for the property pursuant to section
196.101 of the Florida Statutes, entitled "[e]xemption for totally and
permanently disabled persons. 513 Even though Crain satisfied the statutory
provisions and qualified for the exemption, both the property appraiser and
the trial court denied tax exemption because Crain failed to reside on the
property. 14 The question before the fourth district was "whether the property
was being 'used' within the meaning of section 196.101 (1) or (2). ' '515
The court found no cases on point with regard to Article VII of the
Florida Constitution, which addresses homestead exemption from forced sale
and limits on devise. However, the court considered several cases that
addressed the homestead exemption in Article X, section 4, which exempts
homesteads from forced sale and limits their devise. No cases were found on
point with regard to Article VII of the Florida Constitution. Although the two
homestead provisions found in the Florida Constitution are separate and
distinct, the court articulated no reason why Mrs. Crain could not keep her
homestead exemption under Article VII when she would retain it under
Article X.516 The court reversed and remanded for entry in favor of the
appellant, concluding that physical presence was not a requirement to receive
homestead exemption.1 7
509. Lewis, 687 So. 2d at 297.
510. Id. at 298.
511. 687 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
512. Id. at 1325.
513. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 196.101 (1993).
514. Crain, 687 So. 2d at 1326.
515. Id. at 1325-26.
516. Id. at 1326.
517. Id.
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Snyder v. Davis.5 18 This case came before the Supreme Court of Florida
under the following certified question:
WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 4, OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION EXEMPTS FROM FORCED SALE A DEVISE
OF A HOMESTEAD BY A DECEDENT NOT SURVIVED BY A
SPOUSE OR MINOR CHILD TO A LINEAL DESCENDANT
WHO IS NOT AN HEIR UNDER THE DEFINITION IN
SECTION 731.201(18), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993).519
The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative and
quashed the district court's decision.5 20 Betty Snyder died testate in 1995 and
was survived by her only son Milo Snyder and his daughter, the appellee,
Kelli Snyder. Betty Snyder, in her last will and testament, devised her
residual estate, including her homestead to Kelli Snyder.521
Kelli Snyder petitioned the probate court seeking a determination that
Betty Snyder's homestead passed to her free and clear of claims of creditors
because Kelli was recognized as an "heir" under the intestate
statute. Alternatively, Kent W. Davis, the personal representative of the
decedent's estate, and the appellant in this cause of action, sought to sell the
homestead property to satisfy creditor's claims and other expenses. Mr. Davis
argued that under section 732.103 of the Florida Statutes, Milo Snyder was
the sole heir to the decedent's estate. Therefore, because the estate was
devised to the granddaughter and not to the heir, Mr. Davis contended that the
property was not exempt from forced sale to satisfy such claims and
expenses. The trial court granted Kelli Snyder's petition.522 The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order and remanded for
further proceedings.
523
Article X, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution states that a homestead
is "exempt from forced sale . . . except for the payment of taxes and
assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or
repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor
518. 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997). Although the Supreme Court of Florida did not render
this decision until after June 30, 1997, (the last date that this survey period covers), the
authors included it to avoid confusing the reader.
519. Id. at 1000.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Davis v. Snyder, 681 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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performed on the realty., 524 At issue was whether Kelli Snyder "is an heir as
contemplated by [A]rticle X, section 4, of the Florida Constitution and as
defined in sections 731.201(18) and 732.103."525
Under 731.201(18), "heirs" are defined as "those persons, including
surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to
the property of a decedent., 526 In contrast to the Second District Court of
Appeal's reasoning in the common law understanding of what might
constitute an "heir," the Supreme Court of Florida concurred with the First
District Court of Appeal in Walker v. Mickler527 and applied a broader
definition to the term "heirs" to include "any of the class of potential heirs
under the intestacy statute., 528 The Supreme Court of Florida emphasized
that: 1) the homestead provision's purpose is to protect and maintain the
family homestead; and 2) the testator is the one who would be in the best
position to know which family member would most likely need the homestead
or would most likely be in a position to maintain its position.529
Farrior v. Estate of Farrior5 30 The issue before the court was whether
the devised homestead was exempt from the apportionment of estate taxes
under section 733.817(d) of the Florida Statutes.' This court looked to the
Second District Court of Appeal decision in Davis v. Snyder,532 which held
that where a decedent was not survived by a spouse or minor children and the
homestead was properly devised, the devisee takes the decedent's former
homestead subject to claims of the decedent's creditors.533 Here, the decedent
was survived by three grandchildren and two adult children.534 Accordingly,
this court affirmed the trial court's order holding Jay Farrior, appellant and
grandson of decedent, "liable for apportionment of estate taxes on property
devised to him by his grandfather and which property was [his] decedent
grandfather's primary residence and homestead. 535  However, that decision
has since been quashed by the Supreme Court of Florida.536
524. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)).
525. Id. at 1192.
526. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(18) (1993).
527. 687 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
528. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1004.
529. Id. at 1005.
530. 694 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
531. Id. at 804. See FLA. STAT. § 733.817(d) (1995).
532. Davis, 681 So. 2d at 1191.
533. Id.
534. Farrior, 694 So. 2d at 804.
535. Id.
536. See Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1000.
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State Agency for Health Care Administration v. Conner.5 37 The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's determination that Madalyn
Skiles' interest in a house devised to her by the decedent was entitled to the
Florida Constitution homestead exemption from forced sale.538 Madalyn
Hinterleiter, decedent, devised a life estate in her home to Myron Conner, a
friend. The remainder of the estate and the home were left to Skiles. The
issue here centered on Hinterleiter's being survived by her granddaughter,
Skiles, and by also by a daughter.
539
Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution provides a homestead
exemption from forced sale which "inure[s] to the surviving spouse or heirs of
the owner."540 The trial court ruled that Skiles was entitled to homestead
exemption, but there was no authority on point at the time. 541 Subsequently,
the Second District Court of Appeal decided Davis v. Snyder.542 The Davis
court said devised property was not entitled to homestead exemption from
forced sale based upon the definition of heirs located in the Probate Code.
54 3
The Davis case prompted the court to certify the following question of great
public importance:
WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 4, OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION EXEMPTS FROM FORCED SALE A DEVISE
OF A HOMESTEAD BY A DECEDENT NOT SURVIVED BY A
SPOUSE OR MINOR CHILD TO A LINEAL DESCENDENT
WHO IS NOT AN HEIR UNDER THE DEFINITION IN
SECTION 731.201(18), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993)? 544
This court recognized that the Davis case governed the case at bar and
reversed the trial court's order.545 In addition, the court also certified the
question above as one of great public importance.546 As noted above,
however, the Supreme Court of Florida has since quashed the Second District
Court of Appeal's decision in Davis.
547
537. 692 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
538. Id. at 235.
539. Id.
540. Id. See FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 4.
541. Conner, 692 So. 2d at 235.
542. Davis, 681 So. 2d at 1191.
543. Id. at 1193. See FLA. STAT. §§ 731.201(18), 731.103 (1993).
544. Davis, 681 So. 2d at 1193.
545. Conner, 692 So. 2d at 236.
546. Id.
547. Davis, 681 So. 2d at 1191.
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Knadle v. Estate of Knadle.548 The First District Court of Appeal
certified the following question as one of public importance:
DOES SECTION 4(b), ARTICLE X OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION PROTECT THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE
OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY WHERE DECEDENT'S WILL
DIRECTS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO SELL
THE PROPERTY AND PLACE THE PROCEEDS INTO THE
RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE FOR DISTRIBUTION TO
DECEDENT'S ADULT CHILDREN?
549
On November 14, 1994, the decedent, Evangeline Stewart Knadle, died
testate and was survived by two adult children. Her "estate included personal
assets and real property declared as her homestead., 550 The decedent's will
contained a provision addressing the homestead property and what should be
done with it. Most importantly, the provision expressed the decedent's wish
that her personal representative sell the homestead and add the net proceeds to
the rest of the estate. Arbor Health Care filed a claim against the decedent's
estate seeking payment of past bills. Michael Knadle, the son and personal
representative of decedent, filed a petition to determine homestead real estate
asserting it was entitled to exemption.55'
The lower court held that homestead property was an asset of the estate,
vulnerable to creditors, because decedent devised the property by will making
it a gift to her children. 2 Michael Knadle appealed to the First District Court
of Appeal.5 53 The decedent's will specifically directed that her homestead be
sold and the proceeds placed in the residue for distribution with the other
assets:554 Because the decedent devised her homestead as she did under these
circumstances, the court reasoned that the property lost its homestead status
and creditors, such as Arbor Health Care, could assert their claims.555
Rutherford v. Gascon.556 The question before the Second District Court
of Appeal was whether Mrs. Smith waived her homestead rights by entering
into a settlement agreement with Don Gascon wherein she agreed to hold only
548. 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
549. Id. at 633.
550. Id. at 632.
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Knadle, 686 So. 2d at 632.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. 679 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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a life estate in the disputed property." Mr. and Mrs. Robert Smith resided at
a condominium, owned by Mr. Smith, which was located in St. Petersburg,
Florida. After they were married, Mr. Smith executed a will which gave his
wife, Mrs. Smith, the right to live in the condominium as long as she wished.
However, in the event she died or chose not to reside there, Mr. Smith gave
and devised the condominium to his nephew, Don Gascon 8
After a dispute arose between Mrs. Smith and Gascon concerning Mrs.
Smith's rights to probate assets under her deceased husband's will, a
settlement agreement followed where Mrs. Smith signed a document waiving
her elective share in the probate estate and accepting a life estate in the
property.559 After Mrs. Smith died, her estate representative filed a petition to
have the condominium declared homestead property. The trial court denied
this petition, reasoning that Mrs. Smith waived homestead rights when she
entered the settlement agreement with Gascon and accepted a life estate.
560
The second district reversed on the grounds that the settlement
agreement neither displayed an intent by Mrs. Smith to waive homestead
rights nor showed that Mrs. Smith had knowledge that she relinquished a
homestead interest.Y Evidence offered revealed that Mrs. Smith was in fact
unaware that a fee simple interest in the homestead vested in her immediately
upon her husband's death.562 Therefore, in order to find that Mrs. Smith had
waived homestead protection, there must have been evidence showing she
intended to do so.
5 63
Tramel v. Stewart.564 Chief Justice Kogan and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Grimes, and Harding concurred in this per curiam opinion.565 Justice Anstead
566 567dissented with an opinion,566 and Justice Wells concurred with an opinion.
The court reviewed the following certified question:
WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 4, FLA. CONST.,
PROHIBITS CIVIL FORFEITURE OF HOMESTEAD
557. Id. at 330.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Rutherford, 679 So. 2d at 330-31.
562. Id. at 331 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c); FLA. STAT. § 732.4015 (1993); In re
Estate of Finch, 401 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1981) ("[H{omestead may not be devised by will to
pass less than a fee simple interest where testator dies leaving a surviving spouse.").
563. Id.
564. 697 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1997).
565. Id. at 825.
566. Id. (Anstead, J., dissenting).
567. Id. (Wells, J., concurring).
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PROPERTY PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 932.701-.702, FLA.
STAT., WHEN THE PROCEEDS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY ARE
INVESTED IN OR USED TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY?
68
Forfeiture procedures were initiated against Stewart for selling and growing
marijuana on the premises of their home. Stewart claimed the real property
was homestead property that was not forfeitable. Nevertheless, the trial court
entered judgment forfeiting all personal and real property.569  The First
District Court of Appeal reversed the ruling as to the homestead forfeiture and
certified the above question to the Supreme Court of Florida. 70
The Supreme Court of Florida looked to Article X, section 4 of the
Florida Constitution which construed homestead as exempt from forced
sale.5 71 The supreme court has previously held that Article X, section 4
prohibited civil or criminal forfeiture of homestead used in the course of
racketeering activity in violation of Florida's Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Act.572 The court agreed with the district court's holding that the
state did not have a right to the forfeiture of a homestead on the basis of an
equitable lien.573 Based on the constitution, the court could not find that a
forfeiture of homestead could be predicated on the Forfeiture Act.
574
Before the Forfeiture Act could provide a basis for the forfeiture of
homestead property, the constitution's homestead exemption must be liberally
construed to permit a forfeiture for a violation of the Forfeiture Act.575 The
court recognized that Article X, section 4 did not provide an exception for the
forfeiture of homestead property for a violation of the Forfeiture Act.
5 76
Although acquiring homestead through felonious activity is wrong, permitting
forfeiture on this basis would require a constitutional revision.577 Therefore,
the Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
affirmative and agreed with the district court's reversal with respect to the
forfeiture of homestead property.
5 78
568. Id.
569. Tramel, 697 So. 2d at 821.
570. Id.
571. Id. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
572. Tramel, 697 So. 2d at 823. See Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla.
1992).
573. Tramel, 697 So. 2d at 824.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Tramel, 697 So. 2d at 824.
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Walker v. Mickler.579 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the
decision that the decedent's grandson, Bayle, was entitled to protection under
Article X, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution from the estate's creditors
when a remainder interest was devised to him.580  Article X, section 4(b)
provides that exemptions and protections established for homestead "'shall
inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner."'5 8 ' Heirs are "those who
may under the law of the state inherit from the owner of the homestead.58 2
Bayle, as grandson, was a lineal descendant of the decedent and qualified as a
person entitled to receive under intestacy and for Article X purposes. 3
The First District Court of Appeal found the reasoning in Bartelt v.
Bartelt persuasive. 4 The Bartelt court found it insignificant that the son and
daughter would have taken equally under intestacy, but that the daughter was
omitted from the will.58 5 The Bartelt court, as the court here, concluded the
sequence and share of inheritance as established under the intestacy statutes
did not necessarily determine entitlement to homestead exemption. 6
Although the decision here was contrary to the Second District Court of
Appeal's decision in Davis, this court recognized that the opinion was
contrary to the goal of homestead exemption against forced sale.58 7 This
direction was supported by the Supreme Court of Florida in Snyder.58  The
constitution is silent as to the drafters' intent with regard to creditors' rights to
homestead, but Article V, section 4(b) as amended in 1984, reflected the
intent that homestead exemption inure to whomever gets the property.5 89 This
court reasoned it is clear that the intent of homestead exemption is to protect
the decedent's homestead from his creditors for the benefit of his heirs.590 It
should make no difference if the person chosen to receive property under the
579. 687 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997), affid, 699 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1997).
In Snyder v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the decision in Walker was
in conflict with that given by the Second District Court of Appeal in Davis v. Snyder. Snyder,
699 So. 2d at 1000.
580. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1328.
581. Id. at 1329 (quoting FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 4)).
582. Id. (citing State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Trammell, 508 So. 2d
422 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct App. 1987)).
583. Id. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.103(1), 732.401(1) (1993).
584. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1329. See Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991).
585. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1329.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 1330.
588. Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1997).
589. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1330.
590. Id.
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will would not be the closest consanguine heir.591 The person is still one
entitled to take by intestate succession.5 92 In addition, the constitution could
not intend that creditors gain a windfall by allowing them to take homestead
by forced sale because the beneficiary under the decedent's will was not the
closest consanguine heir. To deny Bayle the property would go against
constitutional intent.593 Therefore, this court affirmed the lower court's
decision and recognized conflict with the Davis court.
59 4
XVI. INSURANCE
Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sheaffer.595  The
Sheaffers sought recovery under their homeowners insurance policy for
damages caused by hurricanes Erin and Opal. This court reversed the trial
court decision and agreed with the insurance company that the appraisal
provision in the policy required arbitration, which was a condition precedent
to the Sheaffers maintaining an action on the policy.
596
The Sheaffers' damaged roof was made of unique ceramic tiles that
could no longer be matched. The insurance policy covered losses "at
replacement cost without deduction for depreciation. 59 7  The Sheaffers
wanted the insurance company to pay for replacement of the entire roof to
return it to its condition and value before the hurricane. The insurance
company refused, and stated that the roof could be repaired by replacing the
damaged or missing tiles with other tiles not consistent with the ones already
there.5 98 The trial court denied the insurance company's motion to dismiss
concluding that the dispute between the parties involved an issue of coverage
under the policy.
599
This court concluded that the issue was not coverage but rather the
amount of the loss. 600 The court relied on J.J.F. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,60 1 which stated that "'[w]here the amount owed
on a claim, arguably within the policy coverage, is dependent on the
591. Id.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 1331.
594. Walker, 687 So. 2d at 1331.
595. 687 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
596. Id. at 1332.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Sheaffer, 687 So.2d at 1332.
601. 634 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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resolution of disputed issues of fact and the application of policy language to
those facts ...the extent of the claim does not constitute a "coverage"
question.' 60 2 Once it is determined that the claim is covered by the policy,
"'whether the claimant is actually entitled under the facts of the case to be
paid on a claim and, if so, the precise amount to which the claimant is
entitled, is a question reserved for the arbitrator."'60 3  Since the insurance
company agreed that damage to Sheaffers' home was a covered claim, the
only question was the scope of the required repair and the amount of loss.
604
New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Podhurst, Orseck,
Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A.605 This case was originally
a suit against the insurer, Affiliated FM Insurance Co., for property damage
coverage due to Hurricane Andrew. P.P. Partners, Ltd. and Parkhill Partners,
Ltd., the owners of two shopping centers insured by Affiliated, brought suit
against the Insurer for payment of damages. The owners later retained the
Podhurst law firm which requested it be paid on a contingent fee basis. New
England Mutual held mortgages on the two shopping centers and was given
the right to direct how the insurance proceeds were to be used. When the law
firm obtained the insurance money, the checks were made jointly to the
owners and to New England, the lender. Therefore, both the lender and the
owners had to agree to disburse the funds.
606
The lender refused to disperse money to satisfy the law firm's contingent
share.60 7 The lender stated that its interest in the insurance proceeds had
priority over the attorney's fee claims. The law firm filed a motion to impose
an attorney's charging lien on the proceeds and to get a disbursement order to
release the funds from the escrow account. The trial court ruled in favor of
the firm and entered orders for disbursement.
60 8
The question the Third District Court of Appeal determined was what
rule of priority governs competing claims to first in time insurance
proceeds.609 The lender's lien arose from the mortgage. The firm's claim
arose later in time. 61  The general rule of priority is first in time, first in
602. Sheaffer, 687 So. 2d at 1334 (quoting J.J.F. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 634 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
603. Id. (quoting J.J.F. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 634 So. 2d
1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
604. Id.
605. 690 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
606. Id. at 1354-55.
607. Id. at 1355.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 1356.
610. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d at 1356.
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right.61 Here, the lender was a loss payee on the insurance policy. So, the
firm was chargeable with notice of the lender's earlier in time claim to the
proceeds.612  The owner's agreement to pay the contingent fee was not
binding on the lender.613 If the law firm wanted to receive priority over the
lender, the firm would have to secure the lender's consent.
614
The owners, pursuant to the mortgages, must maintain the property and
have the burden to make post hurricane repairs, including steps to pursue
insurance proceeds.61 To shift priorities, the court reasoned, would allow
owners' contingent fee agreement to by-pass the lenders first in time lien
without securing the lender's consent.6 ' In addition, under section 627.428
of the Florida Statutes, "an insured who successfully obtain[ed] judgment
against its insurer in an insurance lawsuit is entitled to recover attorney's fees
from the insurer. 617 Therefore, the court reversed.618
Secured Realty Investment Fund, LTD, II v. Highlands Insurance CO.
6 19
The question before the court was "'whether the mortgagee may recover
insurance proceeds under a policy containing a New York Standard Mortgage
clause after the mortgage debt has been fully satisfied by foreclosure or
otherwise."
620
On October 17, 1991, the Garcias entered into a mortgage and security
agreement with Century Investment Company.621 The mortgage encumbered
two properties, one in Key Largo, the other in Dade County.622 Century
assigned the interest on the note and mortgage to Secured Realty, who later
became the sole mortgagee. 62 The Garcias had an insurance policy issued by
Highlands to cover the Key Largo investment.624 When the Garcias defaulted
on payment, Secured Realty initiated foreclosure proceedings. At the
foreclosure sale, Secured Realty took title to both the Key Largo and Dade
611. Id.
612. Id. at 1357.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d at 1357.
616. Id.
617. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 627.428 (1995).
618. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d at 1358.
619. 678 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
620. Id. at 855 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 279 So. 2d 460, 462
(Ala. 1973)).
621. Id. at 853.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Secured Realty Inv. Fund, 678 So. 2d at 853.
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properties. 625 When the Key Largo property was later discovered to be
damaged, Secured Realty notified Highlands of the damage in order to make a
claim under the policy initially secured by the Garcias.626 In early July, 1993,
Secured Realty sold both properties. Later in the month, Highlands offered
$45,000 for the damage to Key Largo and Secured rejected the offer and filed
a complaint.
627
The trial court agreed with Highland that Secured did not have an
insurable interest in the Key Largo property at the time the damage
occurred. 628 When Secured took title of the properties, the fair market value
exceeded the redemption amount.629 Since the debt was satisfied, Secured
Realty could no longer be considered the mortgagee.
630
The Third District Court of Appeal was forced to construe the mortgage
loss payable clause contained within the insurance policy issued by Highlands
to the Garcias.31 The court found the clause to be a New York Standard
632Mortgage clause. This type of clause provides that the loss is payable and
the owner/mortgagor's acts or neglect would not invalidate the insurance as
long as the lienholder/mortgagee shall pay the premium if the
owner/mortgagor fails to do so.
633
The general rule established by Wilborn recognized that the "'loss payee
clause affords protection to the mortgagee as his interest may appear before or
after foreclosure or other methods of change of ownership or title or other
mediums of increased ownership of the mortgage property and the insurance
follows the property.' 63 4  The exception to this rule states that "'if the
mortgage indebtedness is fully satisfied after loss by foreclosure or otherwise,
then the insurance company is no longer liable to the mortgagee.' 63 5 The
third district held that Secured Realty retained an insurable interest in the Key
Largo property after it acquired title to it by foreclosure. 63 6 The third district
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. Id.
629. Secured Realty Inv. Fund, 678 So. 2d at 853.
630. Id. at 853-54.
631. Id. at 854.
632. ld. at 855.
633. Id. at 854.
634. Secured Realty Inv. Fund, 678 So. 2d at 855-56 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Wilbom, 279 So. 2d 460, 465 (Ala. 1973)).
635. Id. at 856 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 279 So. 2d 460, 465
(Ala. 1973)).
636. Id.
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reversed the lower court holding because Secured Realty had an insurable
interest at the time of the Ioss.
637
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Licea.6 38 Justice Harding wrote the
court's opinion with which Justices Overton, Shaw, Grimes, Wells, and
Anstead concurred.639 The Supreme Court of Florida held that an insurance
appraisal clause was not void for lack of mutuality because of a retained rights
clause.640
Licea's home was damaged by Hurricane Andrew. When a dispute arose
as to the amount of damage, the insurance policy stated that State Farm and
Licea were each to select an appraiser and the appraisers chosen would then
pick an impartial umpire. If the appointed appraisers could not make the
selection, the court would be advised to pick one. This is exactly what
happened here. Because the chosen appraisers could not reach an agreement,
State Farm petitioned the court to appoint an umpire.
641
In addition, a clause in the policy stated that an appraisal of damage did
not waive any rights of the parties involved.642 The Liceas argued that
because of this clause, State Farm reserved its rights. So, the parties were not
equally bound by the appraisal.643 As such, the Liceas contended the
appraisal clause should be declared void for lack of mutuality.644 The trial
court denied State Farm's request for an umpire and the Third District Court
of Appeal affirmed.645
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the Third District Court of
Appeal's decision and relied on the rationale set forth in the dissent in
American Reliance Insurance Co. v. Village Homes at Country Walk.646 The
Country Walk dissent set forth the rule that "'by participating in an arbitration
proceeding to determine the amount of loss suffered by an insured the insurer
637. Id.
638. 685 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1996).
639. See generally id.
640. Id. at 1286.
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Licea, 685 So. 2d at 1286.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 1288 (relying on American Reliance Ins. Co. v. Village Homes at Country
Walk, 632 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Cope, J., dissenting), overruled by
Paradise Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Reinsurance Corp., 685 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
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is in no way deprived of the right to later contest the existence of insurance
coverage for that loss.
'
,
647
If a court decides coverage exists, the dollar value agreed upon under the
appraisal process will be binding on the parties6 48  When appraisal is
necessary, the insurer can only try to assert there is no coverage under the
policy for the loss, or there has been a violation of the usual policy conditions
such as fraud, lack of notice, or failure to cooperate. 49 The appraisal clause
in this case required an assessment of the amount of loss. As such, the clause
would not be void for lack of mutuality.650
XVII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Badaraco v. Suncoast Towers V Associates.651 The tenant brought an
action for damages against the landlord who was in the process of renovating
a rental building so it could be converted into a condominium. The tenant
based his cause of action on section 83.67 of the Florida Statutes, which
prohibited landlords from terminating or interrupting utility services and
provided that a violator would be liable for the greater of three months rent or
actual and consequential damages.65 2 The circuit court dismissed the
complaint and the third district affirmed.53
Judge Gersten started by noting that the critical factor in statutory
interpretation is determining the legislative intent.654 He then invoked the
golden rule exception to the plain meaning approach to statutory
interpretation, i.e., the statute should not be given a literal reading because
that would produce an absurd or unreasonable conclusion.55 He reasoned
that the legislature could not have intended a minimum three month rent
penalty for a landlord who was performing necessary maintenance.65 6 His
review of the legislative history, including the legislative staff analysis and
staff summaries, revealed that the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute
647. Id. at 1286 (quoting State Farm Casualty Co. v. Licea, 649 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)); see Country Walk, 632 So. 2d at 108-09 (Cope, J., dissenting).
648. Licea, 685 So. 2d at 1287-88.
649. Id. at 1288.
650. Id.
651. 676 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
652. Id. at 503. See FLA. STAT. § 83.67 (1995).
653. Badaraco, 676 So. 2d at 503.
654. Id. (relying on State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981)).
655. Id. See Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1993); State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d
820 (Fla. 1981).
656. Badaraco, 676 So. 2d at 503.
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was to prevent landlords from using utility shutoffs to coerce tenants to
vacate.65 7 Here, the tenant admitted that the landlord had no such motive.658
This outcome troubles this author.659 The opinion is logical, but the facts
suggest that the landlord might have been violating the rights of his tenants to
have utility service for the sole purpose of making these units more saleable.
Landlords ignoring the rights of tenants for their own gain is the sort of evil
that the legislature sought to prohibit, even if it is not the particular landlord
misconduct that the legislature had in mind at the moment of enactment. It is
suggested that the purpose to the statutory interpretation approach would lead
to a better conclusion. The modem residential tenant has a critical need for
and right to utility service. Reasonable interruptions for the performance of
maintenance are inevitable, and it is unlikely that the legislature intended to
penalize such interruptions, but the interruption here does not seem to have
occurred as part of maintenance. The brief statement of facts suggests that the
interruptions were caused by the landlord changing the property so he could
sell it after the lease ended. A tenant would not ordinarily be expected to
tolerate the landlord renovating his unit for a prospective sale. Why should
the current tenant bear the burden of loss of utility services during the term of
the lease because the landlord has plans for the property after the lease
expires? Certainly the legislature could not have intended to allow this. To
the degree that this landlord was interrupting the tenants' utility service, not
for maintenance but to prepare it for sale, the landlord should be held liable.
The complaint should not have been dismissed.
Brandt v. Dade Dental Center, Inc.660 The commercial lease provided
that the tenant would be responsible for paying fifteen percent of any increase
over the base year in the real estate taxes and insurance premiums. When the
tenant discovered that it occupied only 2.4 percent of the building, the tenant
refused to pay. The trial court refused to enforce this clause, holding it to be
unconscionable and "monstrously harsh."66 ' The fact that the landlord would
have been able to make a profit from a tax or premium increase by similarly
overcharging all the tenants was used by the circuit court to confirm its
conclusion. 662 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed based on its
finding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support judgment,
noting that the clause required the tenant to pay over six times its pro rata
657. Id. at 503 n.1.
658. Id. at 503.
659. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
660. 680 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
661. Id. at 1064.
662. Id.
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share. 6 The third district seemed to place particular importance on the fact
that the tenant had thought that it was being charged its share of the increases
and was surprised to discover that the clause required it to pay such a
disproportionate amount.
664
This author6 65 finds this an odd case to invoke the doctrine of
unconscionability. The tenant was a dental office, so the case did not deal
with an uneducated or unable tenant. Nor was it a tenant who did not have
access to adequate legal representation. The crux of the decision seems to be
that the clause implicitly misrepresented the facts to the tenant, i.e., that the
share of the increase it would have to bear was proportional to the share of the
land that it had leased. The landlord misrepresented the crucial fact, so the
666
court penalized him by denying him the increase. It seems that the better
solution would be reformation, i.e., reform the clause to reflect the proper
percentage. The trial court may not have felt it had that option because it was
not the relief requested, and the district court, faced with the same poor
choices, chose to affirm as the lesser of two evils. This illustrates the old
adage, "hard cases make bad law."
Land O'Sun Realty Ltd. v. REWJB Gas Investments.667 The parties were
involved in twenty-two commercial leases utilizing a common lease
document. This case involved the interpretation of two clauses in that lease.
Paragraph three provided that the total of the initial term plus all renewal
terms would be twenty-seven years. Paragraph four, however, provided:
"[n]otwithstanding any conflicting or inconsistent provisions ... including
specifically paragraph 3 hereof, the term of each of the Leases and all renewal
terms shall automatically terminate at the date that is eighteen months after the
date of this Amendment. 668 The issue was which controlled, the twenty-
seven year or the eighteen month maximum.669 The jury decided in favor of
the longer period and the landlord appealed.670
The district court found that the terms were in irreconcilable conflict,
making it impossible to answer the question without resort to parol
evidence. 671 It pointed out that reading paragraph four to control paragraph
three would render three meaningless, violating the rule of construction that
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
666. See generally Brandt, 680 So. 2d 1064.
667. 685 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
668. Id. at 871.
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id. at 871-72.
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an interpretation should not render any part of the contract
superfluous.672 The court should have also pointed out that the converse was
also true, i.e., reading paragraph three to control paragraph four would render
four meaningless. That was the irreconcilable conflict. Having established
that the trial court properly admitted parol evidence, the only remaining task
for the appellate court was to determine that the decision was supported by
sufficient evidence, even though the testimony of the parties was "as
hopelessly in conflict as the written agreement."
673
Judge Jorgenson dissented, emphasizing the word "notwithstanding" in
paragraph four of the amendment of the lease.674 He reasoned that paragraph
four expressly provided how to deal with the apparent conflict between the
paragraphs eliminating any conflict in their application.675 Consequently, he
would have held that the admission of parol evidence was unjustified.676
Mayor's Jewelers, Inc. v. State of California Public Employees'
Retirement System. 677 The commercial lease for space in this mall provided
that the tenant would keep the business open on all business days of the
calendar year. The tenant, however, gave notice that it intended to break the
lease and vacate. The landlord sued to temporarily enjoin the tenant from
breaking the lease and to force the tenant to perform as required by the open-
for-business covenant. The circuit court granted a temporary injunction, but
the fourth district reversed.678
The district court decided that the case was not governed by Lincoln
Tower Corp. v. Richter's Jewelry Co.67 9 because it did not involve a tenant
680
who wanted to vacate.6 0 Consequently, the case was one of first impression
in Florida.681 The court noted that injunctions should not be granted when
that would involve the court in the business of supervising future
performance. 682  In this case, the temporary injunction (and subsequent
672. Land O'Sun Realty, 685 So. 2d at 871.
673. Id. at 872 n.3.
674. Id. at 873 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
675. Id.
676. Id.
677. 685 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
678. Id. at 904.
679. 12 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1943) (holding that a tenant could be enjoined from breaching
the lease by failing to remain open year-round).
680. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc., 685 So. 2d at 905.
681. Id.
682. Id.
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specific performance order) would, in effect, force the court to supervise the
operation of the mall, so the relief should be denied.68
Also, injunctions and specific performance, as forms of equitable relief,
should not be granted where there is an adequate remedy at law. In this case,
the landlord's harm would be purely economic, making an action for damages
for breach of the lease an adequate remedy. However, the court declined to
reach any conclusion on this issue because it had already decided the case on
the first issue.684
Judge Farmer provided a wonderfully written special concurrence.685 In
essence, he found that the lease had a liquidated damages clause that provided
the landlord with an adequate remedy at law, thereby depriving the landlord
of an essential ingredient of a claim for equitable relief. He explained that
the cumulative remedies clause allowed the landlord to seek both eviction and
damages rather than allowing it equitable relief to which it would not
otherwise be entitled.68 7 Furthermore, he pointed out that mandatory
injunctions, i.e., injunctions requiring the party to act in a certain way, are
generally disfavored, particularly where the contract involves personal
services and stated, "[i]n my opinion, requiring a tenant by specific
performance to occupy leased premises for the full term... is much akin to
requiring an employee to serve out his contractual term of employment.,
688
Finally, Judge Farmer questioned the intervention of equity on behalf of
a party who was ignoring economic reality.689 This was an older mall which
had passed its prime. Most of the tenants, including the anchors, had moved
out. To require an upscale jeweler to remain open in that setting made no
sense.690 "[W]hat purpose," Judge Farmer asked rhetorically, "is served by
the intervention of equity, other than to support the unproductive economic
decisions of the landlord?"'6 9
683. Id.
684. Id. at 908 (Farmer, J., concurring).
685. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc., 685 So. 2d at 906 (Farmer, J., concurring).
686. Id. at 907.
687. Id.
688. Id. at 910.
689. Id. at 911.
690. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc., 685 So. 2d at 910-11.
691. Id at911.
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XVII. LIENS
Grant v. Wester.692 The issue before the court was whether Mr. Grant
was entitled to attorneys' fees under his claim that he had a right to foreclose
a mechanic's lien.693 Grant contracted with the Westers to build a home on
Westers' land. When most of the work was completed on May 11, 1992,
Westers gave Grant a list of items still needed to be finished or corrected in
the home.694 On May 15, 1992, the Westers moved into the home and a
certificate of occupancy was issued. In addition, all items on the Westers' list
had been remedied.695
Afterwards, Wester told Grant he would not make full payment until
Grant added a hot water recovery unit to the air conditioning system and until
he covered the foundation of the house with stucco. 6 9 6 Grant complied and
charged accordingly for the new requests. When Grant asked to be
compensated for his work, Mrs. Wester added two more items to the list of
corrections. Grant obliged and once again requested payment. The Westers
refused. Grant then delivered an affidavit to the Westers stating that all
lienors under the contract had been paid in full. Grant recorded a notice of
claim of lien stating the unpaid balance.
697
Grant filed a complaint seeking enforcement of a mechanic's lien under
section 713.01 of the Florida Statutes and also seeking attorneys' fees under
section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes.698 In addition, Grant stated a claim for
breach of contract. 69 9 Although Grant prevailed on the breach of contract
claim, the court determined that Grant should not get attorneys' fees because
he did not prove count one of the complaint to enforce the lien.700
As Grant appealed count one, he filed notice of lis pendens to protect the
asserted lien and to collect money from the judgment as to the other count for
breach of contract.701 The sheriff levied Westers' goods pursuant to court
order to collect Grant's judgment money. Wester filed an emergency motion
to set aside the lis pendens and writ of execution.702 At the emergency
692. 679 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
693. Id. at 1306.
694. Id. at 1303.
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Grant, 679 So. 2d at 1303.
698. Id. (relying on FLA. STAT. § 713.01, -.29 (1991)).
699. Id.
700. Id. at 1304.
701. Id.
702. Grant, 679 So. 2d at 1304.
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hearing, the trial court ordered the Westers to pay the balance of the
judgment.7 3 After payment was made pursuant to court order, the trial court
also ordered that no interest would accrue after the money was deposited.0
The First District Court of Appeal noted that Grant received some money
under the judgment.70 5 The general rule is that "'one cannot ordinarily accept
a benefit under a judgment or decree and then appeal from it, when the effect
of his appeal may be to annul the decree as a whole."' 706 "[C]ase law reveals
that there are two exceptions to this stated rule: 1) where the relief denied is
separate and severable from the relief granted; or 2) where the appellant is
entitled in any event to at least the amount received., 70 7 There is also a
general rule that "'where a judgment is appealed on the ground that the
damages awarded [were] inadequate, acceptance of payment of the amount of
the unsatisfactory judgment does not, standing alone, amount to an accord and
satisfaction of the entire claim."'
70 8
The question presented here as to attorneys' fees falls within one of
the stated exceptions. Just because Grant collected judgment money, he
is not precluded from bringing an appeal to recover attorneys' fees. 709
"'Where a contractor complies with all provisions of Chapter 713, Florida
Statutes, and has substantially performed the contract, he is entitled to a
mechanic's lien."', 710  Since the trial court awarded money reflecting a
finding that Grant completed 97.7 percent of his obligation, that
percentage constituted substantial performance. 711  As such, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal stated it was error not to allow foreclosure of
Grant's mechanic's lien.71
When a mechanic's lien is foreclosed, the prevailing party recovers
attorneys' fees. However, "'to be a prevailing party entitled to the award of
attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, a litigant must have recovered an
amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Id. at 1305.
706. Id. (quoting Capital Fin. Corp. v. Oliver, 156 So. 736, 737 (Fla. 1934)).
707. Grant, 679 So. 2d at 1305 (quoting McMullen v. Fort Pierce Fin. & Constr. Co.,
146 So. 567 (Fla. 1933)).
708. Id. at 1306 (quoting United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312 (1960)).
709. Id.
710. Id. at 1307 (quoting Viking Communities Corp. v. Peeler Constr. Co., 367 So. 2d
737, 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted)).
711. Id. at 1308.
712. Grant, 679 So. 2d at 1308.
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claim.', 713  Wester argued that Grant tried to settle by offering
payment. The offer must have been timely and adequate in amount to
preclude an award for attorneys' fees.714  The court recognized that the
issues of adequacy and timeliness were never addressed because the lower
court denied foreclosure on the lien.7 15 As such, the court reversed the
judgment because it denied foreclosure of the lien and remanded for the
award of attorneys' fees, if the lower court decided Wester did not make a
timely, adequate offer to settle.716
Herpel, Inc. v. Straub Capital Corp.717 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed the lower court decision and held that the lien was timely
recorded as required by section 713.08(5) of the Florida Statutes.7 '8 Herpel,
by contract, was required to make a mantel for a new residence owned by
Blossom Estate. 719 The contract was only for materials. After the mantel was
delivered and installed, George Straub, the owner's authorized agent, was not
satisfied with its appearance. Herpel's workers removed the mantel for
refinishing and later reinstalled it.
720
Herpel filed a claim of lien 113 days after the original delivery but within
ninety days of the date of redelivery.2  Section 713.08(5) of the Florida
Statutes states that "' [t]he claim of lien may be recorded at any time during
the progress of the work or thereafter but not later than 90 days after the final
furnishing of the labor or services or materials by the lienor."', 722 The trial
court determined that the claim of lien was not timely filed.723
This court reversed the trial court decision.724 The fourth district
recognized that the cases the trial court relied on were not sufficient because
they did not address the "final furnishing" of purchased materials.725 The trial
court stated:
[T]he majority rule is that, after the installation of fixtures or
equipment in a building, later services in the nature of correction or
713. Id. (quoting C.U. Assoc. v. R.B. Grove, 472 So. 2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 1985)).
714. Id.
715. Id.
716. Id.
717. 682 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
718. Id. at 661.
719. Id. at 661-62.
720. Id. at 662.
721. Id.
722. Herpel, 682 So. 2d at 662 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.08(5) (1993)).
723. Id.
724. Id. at 663.
725. Id. at 662.
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repair are not regarded as a part of the installation so as to make the
time within which to file under a mechanic's lien based on the
original installation run from the time of performance of such later
services. This rule is followed in Florida. . . . Therefore, this
warranty work was not the final furnishing of labor or materials.726
In addition, the court applied the test used in Century Trust Co. of
Baltimore v. Allison Realty Co. 27 "The test to be applied is whether the work
was done in good faith, within a reasonable time, in pursuance of the terms of
the contract, and whether it was necessary to a 'finished job.' 728 "[W]ork
done in fulfillment of the contract is contemplated by the contract and extends
the time for filing, since the contract is not complete until the work is
done." 729 Corrective or repair work does not extend the time for filing the
claim of lien because the contract is already complete. 73 0 Here, the contract
was for materials only so the rationale cited from the cases above should be
applied.73 1
The fourth district held that the final furnishing of the materials occurred
when the mantel was reinstalled.732 The additional work after the initial
installation was only to complete the job as set out in the contract.733 As such,
the lien was properly recorded within the ninety days required by the
statute.
7 3 4
Personal Representative of Estate of Jacobson v. Attorneys' Title
Insurance Fund, Inc.73 5 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
lower court's decision, since the lien was not valid due to the Monroe County
Code Enforcement Board's failure to comply with statutory formalities.
736
The property in question was sold three times after the lien was recorded.737
The last owner, Maggie Kaspersetz, discovered the lien after she purchased
the property and received a warranty deed from Attorneys' Title Insurance
726. Id. (citing Viking Builders, Inc. v. Felices, 391 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980)).
727. Herpel, 682 So. 2d at 663 (relying on Century Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Allison
Realty Co., 141 So. 612 (Fla. 1932)).
728. Id.
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Id.
732. Herpel, 682 So. 2d at 663.
733. Id.
734. Id.
735. 685 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
736. Id. at 20.
737. Id.
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Fund. Attorneys' Title Insurance paid the lien and then sued Jacobson, as
subrogee.738 The trial court found for Attorneys' Title Insurance who also
gained attorneys' fees at a later hearing.
739
The third district reversed, reasoning that a lien is not acquired unless
notice requirements are strictly complied with.740 Section 162.12(1) of the
Florida Statutes "requires that the alleged violator be sent notice by certified
mail, by hand delivery, or by leaving the notice at the violator's place of
residence. '741 In this case, notice was only sent by regular mail.742
"In addition, section 162.09(3), Florida Statutes (1989) states that, if the
lien is to be recorded in the public records, a certified copy of the order
imposing the fine must be recorded. 743 Since the county failed to give notice
of record pursuant to statutory authority, the requirements for obtaining the
lien were not met.744 As such, the court declared the lien invalid.745
Kerrigan v. Mosher.746 The Kerrigans appealed an order denying their
motion to set aside the judicial sale of their homestead in connection with
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien held by Mosher.747 Mosher, being the sole
bidder at a foreclosure sale, purchased the Kerrigans home for $100. The
home had a fair market value between $300,000 and $360,000 and was
burdened by an $87,000 mortgage. The Kerrigans believed their attorney
would represent their interests at the sale. Unfortunately, the appointed
attorney did not attend the sale, nor did he try to redeem the property for the
Kerrigans.748
The First District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's holding.
749
The foreclosure sale should have been set aside because of irregularity in the
750
sale process. Price is not enough to set aside the sale; however, the bid was
grossly inadequate as a result of the attorney's misrepresentation.751 As such,
the sale should have been set aside and a new sale ordered.
738. Id.
739. Id.
740. Jacobson, 685 So. 2d at 20.
741. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 162.12(1) (1989)).
742. Id.
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Jacobson, 685 So. 2d at 20.
746. 679 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
747. Id. at 874-75.
748. Id. at 875.
749. Id.
750. Id.
751. Kerrigan, 679 So. 2d at 875.
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XIX. MECHANICS' LIENS
Craftsman Contractors, Inc. v. Brown.752 The First District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's order finding that Craftsman's lien was
unenforceable because it failed to properly list all lienors who had not been
paid in full on its final contractor's affidavit.753 Craftsman's final affidavit
stated that "all lienors, subcontractors, and materialmen" were paid in full.754
However, even though subcontractor McElhany Electric was unpaid and not
in the affidavit, Craftsman argued that section 713.06(3)(d)1) of the Florida
Statutes only required the final affidavit to list lienors. In addition, it
argued that McElhany Electric could not be a lienor since it failed to file
notice to the owner as required by section 713.06(2)(a).75 6
The court recognized that one may be a lienor under chapter 713 of the
Florida Statutes without giving notice.75  Chapter 713 should not be
narrowly construed. The court held that McElhany's failure to file notice to
the owner did not remove it from the definition of "lienor" under chapter
713.06(3)(d)(1). 758
Current Control, Inc. v. Bankers Insurance Co.759 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the issuance of the writ of prohibition granted by
the lower court.760 Current Control filed a complaint to enforce a claim of lien
which was transferred to a bond provided by Bankers Insurance Company.761
Bankers' motion to dismiss, on the basis that the county court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, was denied. Bankers then sought and obtained a writ of
prohibition from the circuit court on the same ground.762
The action before the Fifth District Court of Appeal was one brought on
a bond issued pursuant to section 713.24 of the Florida Statutes. The essence
of subsection three states that "[a]ny party having an interest in such security
or the property from which the lien was transferred may at any time, and any
number of times, file a complaint in chancery in the circuit court of the county
752. 695 So. 2d 750 (Fa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
753. Id. at 751.
754. Id.
755. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) (1993).
756. Craftsman Contractors, 695 So. 2d at 751. See also FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a)
(1993).
757. Craftsman Contractors, 695 So. 2d at 751.
758. Id.
759. 679 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
760. Id. at 79.
761. Id. at 78.
762. Id.
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where such security is deposited. 763 The fifth district distinguished this case
as being distinct from Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enterprises, Inc., which the
appellant raised.7 4 In Alexdex, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that since
a lien foreclosure action is one in equity, the circuit and county courts have
concurrent jurisdiction for such matters, within set monetary limits. 7 65 In
Current Control, Inc., the action involved a mechanic's lien claim transferred
to a surety bond. This action is statutory in nature. The specific statute
delineates that actions should be filed in circuit court regardless of the amount
involved. As such, the writ of prohibition should be affirmed.766
XX. MOBILE HoME PARKS
Meadow Groves Management, Inc. v. McKnight.767 The lessee of a
space in a mobile home park failed to pay the rent. The park sued, obtained a
judgment for possession of the space, got a writ of possession, and had the
sheriff remove the tenant and his goods. However, the tenant's mobile home
was left in the space. The park then advertised the mobile home for sale,
relying on the statutory summary procedure provided in section 718.78 of the
Florida Statutes.768 The former lessee brought this action to enjoin the sale.
The trial court granted the injunction because it concluded that the mobile
home was exempt property because it was a homestead under section 222.05
of the Florida Statutes.769 The Fifth District, sitting en banc, affirmed but for
a different reason.770
The majority opinion, written by Chief Judge Peterson, held that the
mobile home park had no right to use that statutory summary
procedure. 771 The scope of section 713.78, which is entitled "Liens for
recovering, towing or storing vehicles," is provided by subsection two. 772 It
provides a lien for "a person regularly engaged in the business of transporting
763. Id.
764. Current Control, 679 So. 2d at 78. See Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enter., Inc., 641
So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
765. Alexdex Corp., 641 So. 2d at 862.
766. Current Control, 679 So. 2d at 79.
767. 689 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
768. Id. at 316. See FLA. STAT. § 718.78 (1993).
769. Meadow Groves, 689 So. 2d at 316 (relying on FLA. STAT. § 222.05 (1993)).
770. Id.
771. Id.
772. FLA. STAT. § 713.78 (1993).
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vehicles by wrecker, tow truck, or car carrier."773 The mobile home park did
not fit that definition.
The court then pointed out that the homestead exemption from forced
sale was only available to a lessee of a mobile home lot if the mobile home
was on land that "he may lawfully possess, by lease or otherwise."774 Since
this tenant had been evicted, he could not lawfully possess the land under his
mobile home. Thus, he lost his homestead exemption. The tenant claimed,
however, that the park prevented him from removing his mobile home while
he still had the right to lawfully possess the land. The district court found
nothing in the record to support that claim, but ruled that, on remand, the trial
court could consider evidence that the park had interfered with his right to
remove his mobile home.775
Both Judge Sharp and Judge Thompson expressed dissent from the
homestead part of the opinion.776 The mobile home was homestead before the
park obtained its judgment for back rent.777 Both argued that homestead
rights to a mobile home should not be cut off by the eviction.77 That would
conflict with and undermine the purpose of homestead, i.e., protecting the
homesteader's home, regardless of its form. Even though the park did not get
the homesteader's home this time, it would only be a matter of time before
clever claimants used this ruling to circumvent mobile home owners'
homestead rights.
XXI. MORTGAGES
BancFlorida v. Hayward.779 Justice Grimes wrote the court's opinion
with which Justices Overton, Shaw, Harding, Wells, and Anstead
concurred. Before the court was a certified question of great public
importance:
WHERE A LENDER REQUIRES A PRE-QUALIFIED
CONTRACT PURCHASER BEFORE IT WILL LEND ON THE
CONSTRUCTION LOAN WHICH CREATES A PURCHASE
MONEY MORTGAGE, DOES THE CONTRACT
PURCHASER'S PRIOR EQUITABLE LIEN AGAINST THE
773. Meadow Groves, 689 So. 2d at 316 (citing FLA. STAT. § 713.78(2) (1993)).
774. Id. at 317 (citing FLA. STAT. § 222.05 (1993)).
775. Id.
776. Id. (Thompson, Sharp, JJ., dissenting).
777. Id. at 319 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
778. Meadow Groves, 689 So. 2d at 319 (Thompson, Sharp, JJ., dissenting).
779. 689 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1997).
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PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGOR HAVE PRIORITY OVER
THE LENDER'S SUBSEQUENT PURCHASE MONEY
MORTGAGE?
780
Shores Contractors developed lots and constructed single family homes in
subdivisions owned by American Newlands. Shores had an option to acquire
individual lots from American. Shores arranged for BancFlorida to provide
funds to acquire lots and construct homes on those lots. When the
developments failed and the homes were incomplete, Shores filed suit against
the bank claiming a breach on the construction loan agreements caused the
failure. The bank sought foreclosure of mortgages on the lots. The contract
purchasers claimed equitable liens on the lots, and the bank claimed
superiority of its mortgages. Final summary judgment of foreclosure was
entered, and the bank foreclosed on the lots then purchased them at judicial
sale.78 The bank later sold them to a third party.782
"The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the contract
purchasers, holding that they held equitable liens on the lots which were
entitled to priority over the bank's mortgages., 73 Although the Third District
Court of Appeal held the bank mortgages were purchase money mortgages, it
affirmed the judgment in favor of the contract purchasers.7 84 The Supreme
Court of Florida agreed that the bank's mortgages were purchase money
mortgages. 85
It is well settled that where the proceeds of a third party mortgage loan
are used to purchase property, the mortgage of that property is a purchase
786money mortgage. Most importantly, purchase money mortgages take
priority over other claims or liens that attach to property through the
mortgagor.78 7 As such, "the court below erred in holding that the claims of
contract purchasers were superior to the bank's purchase money
mortgages."
788
780. Id. at 1052.
781. Id. at 1052-53.
782. Id. at 1053.
783. Id.
784. BancFlorida, 689 So. 2d at 1053.
785. Id.
786. Id. at 1053 (citing Cheves- v. First Nat'l Bank, 83 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1920);
Sarmiento v. Stockton, Whatley, Davin & Co., 399 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981)).
787. Id. at 1054.
788. Id.
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The court pointed out that it could not "answer the certified question as
worded because it presupposes that the contract purchasers had a prior
equitable lien on the lots." 89 Since the developer only held an option to
purchase at the time the agreements were executed, this option created neither
an equitable interest nor an equitable remedy under Florida law.790 The
developer had no property interest to which an equitable lien could attach.79'
The court held that "the bank's mortgages on the twenty-two lots have priority
over the claims of the contract purchasers but only to the extent that the
bank's funds were used to purchase the lots.
' 792
Beach v. Great Western Bank.793 Judges Overton, Grimes, Harding,
Wells, and Anstead concurred and Judge Shaw recused in this per curiam
opinion. Before the court was the following certified question:
UNDER FLORIDA LAW, MAY AN ACTION FOR
STATUTORY RIGHT OF RESCISSION PURSUANT TO THE
TRUTH IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C.A. SECTION 1635, BE
REVIVED AS A DEFENSE IN RECOUPMENT BEYOND THE
THREE-YEAR LIMIT ON THE RIGHT OF RECISSION SET
FORTH IN SECTION 1635(F)? 794
The Beaches got a bank mortgage for home construction reflecting a thirty
year payout. After the Beaches moved into their home, they made two
payments and received another loan from Great Western Bank. They used the
proceeds from that subsequent loan to pay off the initial bank mortgage. The
Beaches defaulted on their mortgage and Great Western Bank sought to
foreclose.795
The Beaches raised affirmative defenses in response to the foreclosure
action based on their right to rescind because of overstatements made by
Great Western Bank on disclosure documents and Truth in Lending Act
796
damage claims.797 The trial court found Great Western Bank overstated the
789. BancFlorida, 689 So. 2d at 1054.
790. Id.
791. Id.
792. Id. at 1055.
793. 692 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1997), cert. granted in part by sub nom. Beach v. Ocwen Fed.
Bank, 66 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1997).
794. Id. at 147.
795. Id. See Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 989 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
796. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67 (1994).
797. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 147.
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Beaches monthly mortgage payment and finance charge.798 The trial court
also found the loan was an exempt transaction not subject to rescission, and
held in Great Western Bank's favor on that issue because the Beaches did not
assert rescission rights within three years of closing.799 The Beaches were
awarded damages as per the Truth in Lending Act because of the
overstatements. 800 The damages were then set off against the balance Great
Western still needed to receive.80'
On appeal, the fourth district found rescission was not a defense for
recoupment because recoupment was primarily an equitable remedy to
prevent unjust enrichment. 80 2 "The district court affirmed the trial court's
final judgment, holding that under Florida law the statutory right of rescission
in TILA ("the Truth in Lending Act") expires three years after the
transaction's closing date and may not be revived as a defense in recoupment
in a creditor's foreclosure action."
80 3
The above mentioned certified question was before the Supreme Court of
Florida. The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to ensure a "'meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use
of credit.' 8 4 The consumer has the absolute right to rescind the secured
transaction within three business days following closing and up to three years
from the same closing date if the creditor failed to make all material
disclosures. 0 5 If a borrower rescinds, he is not liable for any finance charges
and a security interest given by the borrower becomes void.0 6
The Truth in Lending Act also allows for damages. Section 1640(e)
"'does not bar a person from asserting a violation.., in an action to collect
the debt.., as a matter of defense by recoupment or set-off in such action,
except as otherwise provided by State law."' 80 7 This savings clause is only
recognized in this particular section and is not found in section 1635,
expiration of the statutory right of rescission. 8  The court recognized that an
analysis of a Truth in Lending Act issue should include Part 226 of Title 12 of
798. Id. at 147-48.
799. Id. at 148.
800. Id.
801. Id.
802. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 148.
803. Id.
804. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1994)).
805. Id. (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1994)).
806. Id.
807. Beach, 692 So. 2d. at 149 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1994)).
808. Id.
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the Code of Federal Regulations,"9 otherwise known as Regulation Z, and
the official commentary both address the right to rescission.810  In Florida
courts, "'[i]t is well established that the defense of recoupment may be
asserted defensively when the underlying claim is barred by the statute of
limitations.' 81' The court addressed the cases relied on by the Beaches and
deemed them to be inapplicable in the case at bar.812 None of those cases
dealt with the situation where a statute treated a right and its remedy
simultaneously.
813
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the Fourth District Court of
Appeal that the real danger is that borrowers "'could take advantage of the
remedy throughout the entire life of the secured transaction, rendering
statutory limitation meaningless."'8 14  The three-year right of rescission
expired in 1989, the Beaches defaulted in 1991, and the foreclosure was
sought by Great Western in 1992.1 The Beaches had control over Great
Western's ability to foreclose by making monthly payments. The remedy in
the form of damages was extraneous to foreclosure. The savings clause in
section 1640 saved the damages remedy beyond the one-year statute of
limitations as a "defense by recoupment or setoff."816
Section 1635(f) provided that the right and the remedy expire three years
after the closing date.817 This clause did not have such a savings clause
regarding the right of rescission.818 As a general rule, when Congress leaves
out particular language in a statutory provision, and such language is provided
for in another section of the same statute, it is presumed that Congress
intended to omit that language from the provision. 9 Section 1635(f)
expresses the Congressional intent to omit the statutory right of rescission
820three years after the transaction.
809. Id. See 12 C.F.R. § 266.23(a)(3) (1996).
810. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 149 (discussing Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S.
205, 219 (1981)).
811. Id. at 150 (quoting Willoughby v. Dowda & Fields, Chartered, 643 So. 2d 1098,
1099 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
812. Id.
813. Id.
814. Id. at 152 (quoting Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 991 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
815. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152.
816. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1994).
817. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152.
818. Id.
819. Id. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
820. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152.
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The court recognized the controlling case here was Bowery v. Babbit821
which stated "'when the right and the remedy are created by the same statute,
the limitations of the remedy are treated as limitations of the right."'' 822 As
such, the court held that under Florida law "an action for statutory right of
rescission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635 may not be revived as a defense in
recoupment beyond the three-year expiration period contained in section
1635(fJ. ' 8
23
Bee Bee Medical Center, Inc. v. Strategic Consulting & Managing,
Inc. 24 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order
setting aside the clerk's certificate of redemption after Bee Bee paid the
judgment amount before attorneys' fees and costs had been assessed.8 25 A
final judgment of foreclosure was issued to Strategic whereby they were
entitled to $125,000 plus interest.826 However, Bee Bee paid the ordered
amount before attorneys' fees and costs were calculated. The court clerk
issued a certificate of redemption on Bee Bee's behalf. 7 Strategic filed an
emergency motion asserting that Bee Bee did not pay the full amount owed
because attorneys' fees and costs were not assessed. The trial court granted
Strategic's motion and set aside the clerk's certificate of redemption.
828
The question before the district court of appeal was whether Bee Bee, as
mortgagor, properly exercised their right of redemption. The district court
held that Bee Bee paid the $125,000 plus interest ordered by the judgment
and therefore, properly exercised their right to redemption under section
45.0315 of the Florida Statutes.8 29 The statute states that "a mortgagor may
exercise redemption rights at any time before the clerk's filing of a certificate
of sale 'by paying the amount of moneys specified in the judgment, order, or
decree of foreclosure.' '830  The second district recognized that Bee Bee
should not be prevented from exercising redemption rights just because
Strategic failed to enter attorneys' fees and costs in its judgment.8 3'
821. 128 So. 801 (Fla. 1930).
822. Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152 (quoting Bowery v. Babbit, 128 So. 801, 806 (Fla.
1930)).
823. Id. at 153.
824. 677 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
825. Id. at 84.
826. Id.
827. Id.
828. Id.
829. Bee Bee, 677 So. 2d at 85.
830. Id. at 84-85 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 45.0315 (1993)).
831. Id. at85.
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Estepa v. Jordan.32 The Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida
reversed summary judgment granted in favor of Jordan because the record
was insufficient to establish the amount of the deficiency following a
mortgage foreclosure suit. 33 On March 31, 1995, the trial court entered
judgment of foreclosure after Jordan filed a foreclosure suit against Estepa
seeking payment of a promissory note, foreclosure and sale of real estate,
attorneys' fees, and deficiency judgment.8 34 Jordan bought the property at a
foreclosure sale on May 11, 1995, and later filed a motion for deficiency
judgment. Estepa's attorney moved for a continuance on October 20, 1995,
because he was unable to reach Estepa about the suit. Estepa filed an
objection to the entry ofjudgment on the ground that they were not personally
served with notice. The trial court recognized that Estepa did not need to be
served with process personally because service of notice on Estepa's attorney
was adequate.83 5 It was also found that a deficiency existed "between the fair
market value of the property on the date of the foreclosure sale and the
balance of the mortgage debt owed." '836
The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that new service of process
was not needed. 3 The law of mortgage foreclosure in Florida contemplates
that a deficiency judgment may be needed in a foreclosure suit and that the
deficiency proceeding should be a part of the original foreclosure suit.838 The
party seeking the deficiency judgment has the burden of proving that the fair
market value of the property foreclosed upon was less than the total mortgage
debt owed. 39
In addition, the fifth district concluded that the evidence was insufficient
to establish the amount of the deficiency.8 0 The appraisal value was given
twenty-seven days after the foreclosure date when the fair market value must
be established on the date of the foreclosure sale. 41 Since the fifth district
reversed the deficiency judgment, it was determined that the trial court erred
in awarding Jordan interest on the full amount of the judgment through the
832. 678 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
833. Id. at 877.
834. Id.
835. Id.
836. Id. at 878.
837. Estepa, 678 So. 2d at 878.
838. Id.
839. Id.
840. Id.
841. Id.
1997].
351
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
date of the deficiency judgment.8 42 The secured party was not entitled to the
interest on the entire foreclosure after the foreclosure sale took place.
8 43
Goldfarb v. Daitch.84 Goldfarb appealed the trial court order that
granted Daitch's "Verified Emergency Motion to Vacate Order of
Disbursement of Funds" filed pursuant to rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure.8 45  Federal National Mortgage Association sought to
foreclose the mortgage on Daitch's residence after Daitch defaulted. Final
judgment was entered against Daitch, and a foreclosure sale date was
arranged.846 Caro Investments, Inc. ("Caro") was the highest bidder for the
property and Caro requested the court to assign the bid to Claire
Blanken. Goldfarb filed a motion on behalf of Daitch seeking disbursement
of surplus funds in the court's registry. Argo Mortgage Corporation ("Argo")
filed its own motion for disbursement. 47 The trial court entered its order
granting disbursement and the clerk issued a certificate of disbursement for
payment to the Federal National Mortgage Association. 848 The trial court then
issued an amended disbursement order providing disbursement to Argo, as the
second mortgage holder.
8 49
A representative for Daitch filed a "Verified Emergency Motion to
Vacate Order of Disbursement of Funds." The motion alleged Daitch was
unaware of Goldfarb's motion to disburse and that Goldfarb had
misrepresented Daitch. The trial court ruled as to the motion and found that
Goldfarb "'had no authority to represent' Daitch 'and obtain surplus funds on
her behalf.' ' 850 In addition, the trial court established "'there existed no valid
attorney/client relationship by and between' Goldfarb and Daitch."851 The
orders to disburse the funds were vacated.852
Goldfarb appealed on the ground that the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction in entering the order to vacate disbursement."' The Fifth District
Court of Appeal recognized that the law granted the trial court inherent power
842. Estepa, 678 So. 2d at 878.
843. Id.
844. 696 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
845. Id. at 1200.
846. Id.
847. Id.
848. Id.
849. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1200.
850. Id. at 1203 (quoting the trial judge's order).
851. Id.
852. Id.
853. Id.
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to vacate its own previous orders. 4 Daitch correctly filed her motion under
rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to raise the issue of
fraud perpetrated in obtaining earlier orders. 855 The trial court recognized that
Daitch's grant of a limited power of attorney to B.G. Gross and/or Jaime
Gross was void, but that did not operate to prevent the court from considering
Goldfarb's authority.85 6 The trial court may vacate orders entered at the
attorney's wishes when the attorney purports to represent a party without the
authority to do so.8
5 7
Kasket v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.8  Resolution Trust Corp.
("RTC") sought foreclosure on Kasket's home and Kasket filed affirmative
defenses and alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act ('TILA") seeking
rescission of the mortgage and damages.859 The trial court found Kasket
could not bring affirmative defenses and counterclaims.8 60  The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision regarding the
rescission issue, but reversed its decision to bar the affirmative defenses
seeking damages.8 6'
Kasket entered a mortgage with Carteret Savings, which was later taken
over by RTC. Then, RTC sought to foreclose on the mortgage after Kasket
defaulted on his payments. Kasket filed affirmative defenses and
counterclaims based on section 1640 of TILA. In the meantime, Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corp. ("Chase") bought the mortgage and note from
RTC. Eventually, the trial court concluded that Chase had the right to
foreclose.
8 62
The fourth district stayed the proceedings to wait for the Supreme Court
of Florida's ruling in Beach v. Great Western Bank.63 The supreme court in
Beach held that rescission as a remedy under section 1635 of TILA could not
be brought as an affirmative defense in the nature of recoupment after three
years expired from the initial date of the transaction.864 Since Kasket allowed
the three-year period to run, the fourth district focused its attention only on the
854. Goldfarb, 696 So. 2d at 1203.
855. Id. at 1204.
856. Id.
857. Id.
858. 695 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
859. Id. at 432-33.
860. Id. at 433.
861. Id.
862. Id.
863. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 433. See Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146 (Fla.
1997).
864. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 433. See Beach, 692 So. 2d at 146.
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claim for damages under TILA section 1640.865 Section 1640 provides that a
creditor who fails to comply with the statutory disclosure requirements is
liable to his/her debtor for actual damages as well as penalty damages.
8 66
Section 1640(e) sets forth a one-year statute of limitations, but permits
borrowers to claim recoupment for section 1640 damages as an affirmative
defense to a creditor's action to collect the debt.867 In addition, recovery by
recoupment is allowable in Florida even though the limitations period has run
if the "party pleads it in defense of an action brought by the opposing party in
connection with the same transaction. 8 68 Although Kasket could not assert
his damage claim, he could still assert his recoupment claim. However,
section 1640 constitutes a civil penalty.8 69  Under section 1612(b),
government agencies are exempt from any civil or criminal penalty under
TLA.870 As such, section 1640 damages could not be imposed on RTC. 7'
The question before the fourth district was whether that exemption can
also be asserted by Chase as an assignee of RTC. 72 The fourth district
recognized that the rationale of In re Pinder would control.8 73 That rationale
suggested that a non-governmental assignee of a mortgage given to a debtor
874by a federal agency was liable for a recoupment penalty under TWA.
Section 1641 of TILA defines the liability of assignees and provides no
exception from liability for voluntary assignees of governmental agencies. 5
However, no exemption was asserted here because the assignment from
Carteret Savings to RTC was involuntary.
8 76
Chase argued it had the right to assert all of RTC's defenses based upon
the doctrine that prevents asserting of side agreements to defeat the interest of
877the RTC where those agreements are not in the records of the institution.However, the fourth district court recognized that RTC or its assignees
865. Kasket, 695 So.2d 433.
866. Id. at 434.
867. Id.
868. Id.
869. Id. at 435. See Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
870. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 435.
871. Id.
872. Id.
873. Id. See also Pinder v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 83 B.R. 905 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988).
874. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 435.
875. Id. at 435.
876. Id.
877. Id. See also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447
(1942).
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"needed only to review the truth in lending documents in the records of
Carteret to determine whether they complied with TILA. 878 Mistakes in the
TILA statements come from the face of the institution documents themselves.
If Congress intended for RTC and its assignees to be exempt from liability for
any error in financial documents, it could have provided such an exemption in
the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act. 8 7  RTC
was only exempted from agreements not found in the records of the
institution.
In conclusion, the court held that Chase could be liable for section 1640
damages if Kasket proves Truth in Lending Act violations apparent on the
face of the loan documents.880  The fourth district reversed and remanded
because it determined there were several issues which required findings of
fact based on the evidence by the trial court.881
Lee v. Gadasa Corp.882 The First District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's decision because the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.883 The trial court took judicial notice of a ruling in
another mortgage foreclosure case against Brock with a different plaintiff.
8 8 4
The trial court in that matter had applied collateral estoppel to resolve the
validity of a power of attorney used by Brock's wife to secure mortgages.88 5
According to the trial court, the doctrine of collateral estoppel could apply
without identifying the parties8 8 6 The first district disagreed.8 7 In Zeidwig v.
Ward,8 88 the use of defensive collateral estoppel was approved to prevent a
criminal defendant, as the plaintiff, from relitigating the same issue which had
already been addressed in court.889 The first district distinguished Zeidwig
from the case at bar and held there was not a comparable relationship among
parties in the two suits. 890 As such, the narrow exception in Zeidwig did not
apply.891 In Florida, the rule has been that unless both parties were bound by
878. Kasket, 695 So. 2d at 435.
879. Id.
880. Id.
881. Id. at 436.
882. 680 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
883. Id. at 1108.
884. Id. Lee was the personal representative of the estate of H. Julian Brock which was
the estate in question. Id. at 1107.
885. Id.
886. Lee, 680 So. 2d at 1108.
887. Id. at 1109.
888. 548 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989).
889. Lee, 680 So. 2d at 1108 (citing Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209, 209 (Fla. 1989)).
890. Id. at 1108-09.
891. Id.
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the prior judgment, neither can use the judgment as an estoppel against the
other in a later proceeding.
892
National Enterprises, Inc. v. Martin.893 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court.8 94
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") filed an amended
motion for deficiency judgment. Subsequently, National Enterprises, Inc.
("National") moved to substitute itself as the party in the case on the basis that
National purchased FDIC's interest in that matter. National wanted to be able
to introduce evidence concerning the transfer of the asset from FDIC to
National. National's asset manager testified that he had no recollection of any
assignment of an ownership interest in the note and mortgage and that he
inventoried FDIC's documents evidencing indebtedness. 8 95
The trial court granted appellee's motion for an involuntary dismissal
because National had failed to prove it owned the asset by producing a written
assignment of the transfer or sale of the asset from the FDIC. 896 National filed
a motion for rehearing attaching as an exhibit an assignment from the FDIC of
its interest in the final summary judgment of foreclosure. The trial court
failed to grant the motion.897
National did not address Boulevard National Bank of Miami v. Air
Metals Industries, Inc. at trial which stated that "'[f]ormal requisites of such
an assignment are not prescribed by statute and it may be accomplished by
parol, by instrument in writing, or other mode, such as delivery of evidences
of the debt, as may demonstrate an intent to transfer and an acceptance of
it.' ' 898 The fourth district held the trial court did not err in granting
involuntary dismissal but it abused its discretion in denying National's motion
for rehearing.899 According to rule 1.530(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, "[o]n a motion for a rehearing of matters heard without a jury,
including summary judgments, the court may open the judgment if one has
been entered, take additional testimony, and enter a new judgment." 900 The
892. Id.
893. 679 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
894. Id. at 332.
895. Id.
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. National Enters., Inc., 679 So. 2d at 332 (quoting Boulevard Nat'l Bank of Miami
v. Air Metals Indus., Inc., 176 So. 2d 94, 97-98 (Fla. 1965)).
899. Id. at 333.
900. Id. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a).
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written assignment attached as an exhibit at trial established National's
ownership by assignment of final summary judgment of foreclosure. 901
Nerbonne, N.V. v. Lake Bryan International Properties.902 Nerbonne
appealed the dismissal of an entry of a final judgment of foreclosure in a
mortgage foreclosure brought by Lake Bryan International
Properties. Nerbonne also appealed the dismissal of its counterclaim and the
striking of its affirmative defenses. Nerbonne claimed that Robert Figueredo
formed Nerbonne to purchase a tract of land as an investment, and induced
individuals to purchase capital stock of that corporation. The stock-offering
memorandum listed the purchase price of the land but failed to disclose that
Figueredo, K. Dwight Waters, and their corporation, Euro American
Investment Corp., had conspired to purchase the land for a lesser amount and
agreed to split the undisclosed profits when the land was resold.9" 3
Nerbonne paid a portion of the purchase price by a $2,550,000 mortgage
to Lake Bryan which was, allegedly, a Waters entity incorporated to assist in
the conspiracy.90 4 Lake Bryan was to assist in the resale of the land by getting
the purchase money mortgage, collecting payments, and assigning individual
interests in the mortgage to third parties.905 In 1986, Lake Bryan and
Nerbonne were involved in a foreclosure of the same mortgage.90 6 The
judgment in that foreclosure was vacated and was followed by a judgment
that reinstated and modified the mortgage. 0 7 At the time the modified
mortgage was reinstated, Figueredo and his corporation were in control of
Nerbonne and Waters was in control of Lake Bryan. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Lake Bryan on the grounds that Nerbonne's action
was barred by the statute of limitations and by res judicata because of the
1986 judgment.0 8
The fifth district agreed with Lake Bryan's contention that it had no duty
to disclose to Nerbonne if it made a substantial profit upon the purchase of
real estate by Nerbonne.909 However, in the case at bar, Nerbonne alleged that
Figueredo conspired with Waters against Nerbonne, that Figueredo provided
funds for Waters to facilitate the purchase of land at a cheaper price, and then
901. National Enters., Inc., 679 So. 2d at 333.
902. 689 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
903. Id. at 324.
904. Id.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. Nerbonne, 689 So. 2d at 324.
908. Id.
909. Id. at 325.
1997].
357
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
afterwards the same land was sold to Nerbonne at a higher price. 910 In
addition, Waters and Nerbonne calculated how the fraudulent profit would be
distributed between them. It was Figueredo's duty to act in good faith and
purchase the land for Nerbonne's benefit.911 Parties involved with
Figueredo's plan to defraud the corporation, Nerbonne, are liable to the
principal Nerbonne for the loss.
912
The fifth district disagreed with Lake Bryan's contention that Nerbonne
was estopped from disavowing the acts of Figueredo and the indebtedness of
the mortgage because Nerbonne wanted to keep the remainder of the land and
recover the difference between the price paid by Waters, and the price paid by
Nerbonne. 913 If Lake Bryan was involved with Figueredo's conspiracy,
Nerbonne should only have paid $2.4 million, the price at which Figueredo,
as promoter, purchased the land for Nerbonne's benefit.
914
Nerbonne raised an affirmative defense to the mortgage foreclosure and
counterclaim against Lake Bryan based on fraud, but it was countered by a
defense of res judicata on Lake Bryan's behalf.915 The res judicata defense
was grounded upon the 1987 mortgage foreclosure by Lake Bryan. The trial
judge's order stated that the previously entered final judgment be set aside as
null and void, that some of the terms of the manner of repayment be modified,
and that otherwise, the mortgage would remain as is and fully enforceable.
916
The district court recognized that the order contained no language
waiving any defenses that may have been available to Nerbonne, the
mortgagor. The mortgage foreclosure proceeding leading to final judgment
had no effect on defenses because the later order canceled the final
judgment.918  In conclusion, this court vacated the final judgment of
foreclosure, the summary judgment on Nerbonne's counterclaim to Lake
Bryan, and the order striking the raised affirmative defenses.
919
Saidi v. Wasko.920  The court reversed the order dismissing Saidi's
objections to a judicial sale of foreclosed property because Saidi timely sought
to exercise his right of redemption and was unable to do so because of the trial
910. Id.
911. Id.
912. Nerbonne, 689 So. 2d at 325.
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. Id. at 326.
916. Id.
917. Nerbonne, 689 So. 2d at 326.
918. Id.
919. Id. at 327.
920. 687 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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court's order.921 On October 31, 1995, final judgment in favor of the Waskos
provided that if $97,166.60 was not paid, the property would be sold at a
judicial sale.922 Saidi was unsuccessful in his attempt to have the judicial sale
postponed. As such, the property was sold to the Waskos and Saidi filed an
objection to the sale and a motion to exercise right of redemption. This
motion was denied.92
The fifth district recognized the right of redemption as an equitable right
that the mortgagor has to reclaim his estate by paying the amount owed plus
interest and costs. 924 Additionally, the fifth district felt that the law governing
the right of redemption should be strictly construed.925 Section 45.0315 of the
Florida Statutes provides that a mortgagor could exercise redemption rights
any time before certificate of title was issued.926
In this case, the final judgment of foreclosure contained a provision
addressing redemption rights. 927  The provision stated: "[o]n filing the
certificate of title Defendants and all persons claiming under or against
Defendants since the filing of the notice of lis pendens shall be foreclosed of
all estate or claim in the property and the purchaser at the sale shall be let into
possession of the property."928 According to this provision, the mortgagor's
estate is terminated upon filing of the certificate of title.
The fifth district concluded that the provision in the final judgment of
foreclosure had the effect of postponing the termination of Saidi's right of
redemption until the certificate of title was filed. 929 Since a mortgagor did not
need the trial court's permission to exercise the right of redemption, the fifth
district decided that on remand, the trial court should order that Saidi have a
period of time to exercise the right.
930
XXII. OPTIONS AND RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL
Fallschase Development Corp. v. Blakey.931 A 1975 contract of sale
included the following terms: "4. Should the Seller later determine to sell all
921. Id. at 11.
922. Id.
923. Id.
924. Id.
925. Saidi, 687 So. 2d at 11.
926. Id.
927. Id.
928. Id. at 11-12.
929. Id. at 12.
930. Saidi, 687 So. 2d at 12.
931. 696 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1997]
359
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
of the property retained by her as above-described, then the Buyer shall have
first right of refusal to purchase said property... 6. This agreement shall be
binding upon the parties hereto, their heirs, successors and assigns.,
932
Paragraph four created a right of first refusal. In 1995, the buyer's successor
brought an action to declare that the right of first refusal was void. Buyer's
successor had two theories: 1) the right of first refusal violated the rule
against perpetuities; and 2) the right of first refusal was personal to the
original buyer and, consequently, ended with her death in 1983. The trial
court rejected the latter, concluding, that paragraph six would give the right an
unlimited duration.933 The First District Court of Appeal summarily agreed,934
so the decision focused on the rule against perpetuities question.
Under traditional analysis, the rule against perpetuities was applied to
void rights of first refusal, 935 although there are problems with that analysis.
936
However, Florida's rule against perpetuities was amended in 1976 and
1988.937 Under the 1976 amendment, the rule would not apply to rights of
first refusal.938 In 1988, Florida adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities which included, inter alia,939 a provision allowing the court to
"reform the disposition in the manner that the most closely approximates the
transferor's manifested plan of distribution,"940 even if the nonvested interest
had been created before adoption of the uniform act.
941
932. Id. at 835.
933. Id. at 834.
934. Id. at 834-35.
935. See Ronald Benton Brown, An Examination of Real Estate Purchase Options, 12
NOVA L. REv. 147, 172-80 (1987) (explaining that a right of first refusal is a purchase option
that is subject to a condition precedent). See also id. at 192-96 (explaining the application of
the rule against perpetuities and the rule against restraints on alienation to options, including
rights of first refusal).
936. Id. at 193 (pointing out that the rule against perpetuities did not traditionally apply
to future interests retained by a grantor, such as the seller here, and the propensity for courts to
avoid applying the rule to options). See also id. at 195-96 (pointing out that the policy behind
the rule does not favor its application to options and that options should properly be tested by
the rule against restraints on alienation as occurred in Inglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610
(Fla. 1980)).
937. See FLA. STAT. § 689.22 (1977); see also FLA. STAT. § 689.225 (1995).
938. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)(7) (1977).
939. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities also provided an alternative 90
year wait-and-see provision and limited the application of the rule to gratuitous transfers.
FLA. STAT. § 689.225(l)(a)(2) (amended 1990). If the Uniform version of the rule had
applied, under either of these provisions, the right of first refusal could not have been
adjudged void ab initio as occurred here. Id.
940. Id. § 689.225(6)(c).
941. Id.
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The first district found that the right of first refusal had become void
immediately in 1975 under the traditional rule.942 Consequently, the title,
unencumbered by the right of first refusal, had vested in the buyer at that
time. The later amendments, if applied retroactively, would disturb the
buyer's vested rights, and the Supreme Court of Florida recently held
that "'[e]ven when the Legislature does expressly state that a statute is to
have retroactive application, this Court has refused to apply a statute
retroactively if the statute impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or
imposes new penalties.' 943 Judge Wolf, however, dissented on this point
noting, "I am... unaware of a vested right to have a court strike down an
obligation voluntarily undertaken as part of an enforceable written legal
agreement."
944
The court decided to certify the question presented as being of great
public importance and formulated it as follows:
WHETHER SECTION 689.225(6)(C), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS
A REMEDIAL PROVISION WHICH MAY BE APPLIED
RETROSPECTIVELY TO REFORM A FIRST REFUSAL
RIGHT TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY, SO AS TO BRING
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE
COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. 945
XXIII. PUBLIC LAND USE CONTROLS
Martin County v. Yusem.
946
CAN A REZONING DECISION WHICH HAS LIMITED
IMPACT UNDER SNYDER, BUT DOES REQUIRE AN
AMENDMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE
PLAN, STILL BE A QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISION SUBJECT
TO STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW?947
942. Fallschase Dev. Corp. v. Blakey, 696 So. 2d 833, 834 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1997), caused dismissed by Charlesworth v. Mack, No. 91-194, (Fla. Aug. 22, 1997).
943. Id. at 836 (quoting State Farm v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995)).
944. Id. at 838.
945. Id. at 837.
946. 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
947. Martin County v. Yusem, 664 So. 2d 976, 982 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), affd
in part and quashed in part, 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
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No! The Supreme Court of Florida responded to calls for clarification 948 by
directly answering the certified question in the negative.949 Both the method
of judicial review and standard to be applied by the reviewing court depend
on whether the governmental decision was classified as judicial or legislative
in nature. Following Snyder95° and Puma,951 courts,952 including the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in this case, had applied a functional test to
determine whether a decision to amend a comprehensive plan was judicial or
legislative. However, the supreme court has now clearly stated that
"amendments to a comprehensive land use plan which was adopted pursuant
to chapter 163, Florida Statutes, are legislative decisions subject to the 'fairly
debatable' standard of review.' 953 Furthermore, "[t]his conclusion is not
affected by the fact that the amendments to comprehensive land use plans are
being sought as part of a rezoning application in respect to only one piece of
property." 54 The holding was based upon the type of information that should
be considered in a decision to amend the comprehensive plan and the
statutory process mandated. Henceforth, the method of obtaining review of
an amendment to the comprehensive plan and the standard to be applied by
the reviewing court will no longer be in doubt. It will no longer be necessary
to do a functional analysis to determine if a particular amendment was
legislative or judicial in nature, even though that method of analysis remains
in effect for determining the method and standard of review for rezoning
decisions. In the future, parties aggrieved by amendments to a comprehensive
plan "will know to file such challenges as original actions in the circuit
court." 9 55
Beach v. Village of North Palm Beach City Council.956  Hoping to
construct a large store, the developer sought a certificate of appropriateness
from the village's planning commission. It issued the preliminary approval on
February 14, 1995, and the final certificate of appropriateness was issued on
May 10, 1995. To comply with the requirements of section 163.3215(4) of
948. See e.g., Ronald Benton Brown & Joseph M. Grohman, Property Law: 1996
Florida Survey, 21 NoVA L. REv. 279, 338 (1996).
949. Martin County, 690 So. 2d at 1289.
950. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
951. City of Melbourne v. Puma, 630 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1994).
952. E.g., Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd., 676 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1553 (1997).
953. Martin County, 690 So. 2d at 1289.
954. Id. at 1293.
955. Id. at 1295.
956. 682 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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the Florida Statutes,95 7 opponents of the development filed a verified
complaint challenging the decision to issue the certificate with the
village. When relief was denied, the opponents began this court challenge,
but the trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that the verified
complaint had been filed with the village too late.
958
The statute required that, "[t]he verified complaint shall be filed no later
than 30 days after the alleged inconsistent action has been taken., 959 It had
been filed with the village on June 9, 1995. This was within thirty days of the
issuance of the final certificate of appropriateness, but far more than thirty
days after the preliminary approval. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
decided that the "alleged inconsistent action" was the issuance of the final
certificate.960 The procedure set out in the North Palm Beach Code required
two steps: a preliminary approval and a final approval. 961 The fifth district
reasoned that the approval was the development order which had the effect of
allowing the development to proceed and a development permit to be issued.
The fourth district distinguished an earlier rezoning case in which a two step
process was not involved.962 Judge Stone wrote a dissenting opinion.963 The
North Palm Beach Code provided: "'[s]uch [preliminary] approval will be
irrevocable and makes the issuance of the certificate of appropriateness
mandatory upon application, unless the final presentation does not comply in
all respects with the preliminary presentation upon which the preliminary
approval was based."' 964
Thus, the process was not really a two stage decision-making process,
and the "inconsistent action" taken was the issuance of the preliminary
approval. For this reason, the instant case is indistinguishable from the earlier
rezoning decision. 965 In addition, Judge Stone disagreed with the conclusion
that the issuance of the certificate of appropriateness constituted a
development order.
966
957. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(4) (1993).
958. Beach, 682 So. 2d at 165.
959. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(4) (1993)).
960. Id.
961. Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Seminole County Bd. of County Commiss'rs, 623
So. 2d 593 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
962. Id.
963. Beach, 682 So. 2d at 165 (Stone, J., dissenting).
964. Id. at 164 n.1 (quoting NORTH PALM BEACII, FLA. CODE § 6-56 (1996)).
965. Board of Trustees v. Seminole County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 623 So. 2d 593
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
966. Beach, 682 So. 2d at 166 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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Chung v. Sarasota County.967 When the county rejected the landowner's
rezoning petition, he filed suit. The parties reached a settlement under which
the county was required to rezone the property subject to certain stipulations
and conditions. A neighboring property owner and a homeowners'
association intervened and objected to the settlement. After rehearing, the
circuit court vacated the settlement. 968  The Second District of Appeal
affirmed the decision based on its conclusion that the settlement constituted
contract zoning.
969
Contract zoning is zoning by agreement rather than by legislative process
which complies with statutory and constitutional requirements. Because the
government has no power to dispense with these requirements, contract
zoning is ultra vires, i.e., beyond the legitimate powers of the government.
The second district reasoned that the settlement in this case did not comply
with the notice and hearing requirements of rezoning.970  Any subsequent
hearing would have been a sham because the city was already required to
rezone the property. Consequently, the settlement was invalid.971 The second
district noted that this conclusion was supported by analogy to suits
commenced under section 163.3215(1)972 because local governments must
have a public hearing on any proposed settlement.
973
The second district, however, noted that the fourth district's decision in
Molina v. Tradewinds Development Corp.974 and the third district's decision
in Zoning Board of Monroe County v. Hood9 75 upheld similar settlements,
although neither discussed contract zoning. Furthermore, it expressed
concern about "impairing a local government's ability to settle litigation."
976
Therefore, it certified the following question as being of great public
importance:
WHETHER A COUNTY OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN
ENTER INTO A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN ZONING
967. 686 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
968. Id. at 1359.
969. Id.
970. Id. at 1360.
971. Id.
972. Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1360 (citing FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(7) (1995) (allowing
aggrieved parties to bring suit to prevent local governmental action that is inconsistent with
the comprehensive plan)).
973. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(1) (1995).
974. 526 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
975. 484 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
976. Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1360.
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LITIGATION WITHOUT FIRST ADHERING TO THE DUE
PROCESS AND STATUTORY/ORDINANCE REQUIREMENTS
FOR ENACTING THE ZONING CHANGES CONTEMPLATED
BY THE AGREEMENT? 977
City Environmental Services Landfill, Inc. v. Holmes County.978 The
landowner acquired property on which was the site of the former county
landfill. By contract, the landowner assumed responsibility for closing the old
landfill in return for the right to operate a landfill at that site if the
environmental approvals could be obtained. The county's comprehensive
plan did not have a category for landfills. When the landowner applied for a
development permit to operate a regional landfill, it was informed that it
would need to obtain an amendment to the comprehensive plan to create 4.
landfill category. The proposed amendments were rejected by the planning
commission and the board of county commissioners who expressly treated the
decision making as legislative in nature. The landowner filed this petition for
a writ of certiorari, brought suit in circuit court for a declaration that it did not
need to amend the plan, and also filed suit in federal court on a claim that an
ordinance that prohibited solid waste being brought in from outside the
county would be unconstitutional. 979 Although the landowner won the federal
suit, it lost the certiorari action and brought a petition for a writ of certiorari in
the district court for review.
980
The First District Court of Appeal denied the petition for a writ of
certiorari, leaving in effect the circuit court's denial of certiorari. The court
noted that in dealing with a certiorari petition "[a]t the district court level, the
inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process
and whether the circuit court applied the correct law."98' As to the correct
law,
[t]he resolution of this case hinges on whether the board of county
commissioners' denial of petitioner's proposed amendments to the
comprehensive land use plan was a legislative action (reviewable in
a de novo hearing in a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief under
the very broad "fairly debatable" standard) or a quasi-judicial
977. Id. at 1361.
978. 677 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct App. 1996).
979. Id. at 1328-3 1.
980. Id. at 1331.
981. Id. at 1332.
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action (reviewable by certiorari under the "competent substantial
evidence" standard).982
The first district simply stated that "[t]he case law indicates that the board's
action in this case was legislative, and that the circuit court therefore properly
denied the petition .,983 The decision seems based on the circuit court's
conclusion that, the proposed amendment to the comprehensive plan is
drafted in such a way that, if adopted, it is conceivable that landfills could be
situated at any location permitted by state environmental agencies. Such an
amendment clearly contemplates a legislative policy-making function of
Holmes County because, if approved, it would not only transfer much of the
county's authority to determine the location of landfill sites to state regulatory
agencies, but would also impact the general population of Holmes County by
potentially allowing numerous landfill sites to be placed through the
environmental landscape of Holmes County.984
Das v. Osceola County.985 The landowners were the defendants in a
condemnation proceeding brought by Central Florida Petroleum Corporation
("CFP") to acquire a permanent easement for a liquefied petroleum pipeline.
The landowners filed a cross claim against the county seeking a writ of
mandamus to enforce its comprehensive plan. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal determined that "the gravamen of [the landowners'] claim is that
Osceola County has not carried out its duty to conduct a public consistency
review of the pipeline project and issue a valid development order granting or
denying CFP permission to construct the pipeline. 986
The circuit court had dismissed the mandamus action with prejudice on
the theory that the court lacked jurisdiction.98 7 It reasoned that the sole
method of challenging the pipeline project as being inconsistent with the
comprehensive plan was under section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes, and
that the landowners had failed to pursue that remedy within the specified time
period.988 The fifth district reversed because that section was predicated upon
affected landowners getting notice of possible governmental action that would
affect their land.989 In this case, the county gave neither notice to affected
landowners that it was going to consider whether the pipeline was consistent
982. Id. at 1332-33.
983. Holmes County, 677 So. 2d at 1333.
984. Id.
985. 685 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
986. Id. at 993.
987. Id. at 992.
988. Id.
989. Id. at 994.
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with the comprehensive plan, nor notice of the decision once it had been
made. The landowners first learned of it in the condemnation proceeding. In
essence, the fifth district declared that they should not be barred from
challenging a decision affecting their land when they had no reasonable
opportunity to learn that the decision had been made.990 The fifth district
concluded that "[a] county should, at the least, issue an order or permit of
public record before the rights of the public to file a consistency challenge are
foreclosed by the expiration of time.
'991
Debes v. City of Key West.992 The landowner sought the redesignation of
her land from Medium Density Residential to Commercial General on the
Future Land Use Map so that she could build a shopping center. The land
was located in the center of an area designated commercial on the map and
both the city planner and the planning board approved of the
change. However, the city commission repeatedly refused. The commission
relied upon concern for an increase in traffic and the desire to generate
affordable housing. The Third District Court of Appeal, finding the
commission's refusal arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable as a matter
of law, reversed. 993
It concluded that the increase in traffic would not justify denying a
commercial use because every commercial use necessarily generates an
increase in traffic. 994 Thus, being able to rely upon that would, in effect, give
the commission free reign to deny any commercial designation. Furthermore,
limiting the use of the property to affordable housing would be to ignore
proper land use concepts in the decision-making process. The third district
concluded that this was the inverse of spot zoning, with all of spot zoning
ills. 99
5
Hernando County v. Leisure Hills, Inc.9 96 Having obtained conditional
plat approval from the county's planning and zoning commission, the
developer spent more than $500,000 to develop the subdivision. But when it
sought final plat approval, the county commission decided that supplying
positive drainage for the house on each two and one-half acre lot would no
longer be enough. It was now requiring positive drainage for the entire lot.
990. Das, 685 So. 2d at 994.
991. Id.
992. 690 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
993. Id. at 701.
994. Id.
995. Id. at 702.
996. 689 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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Consequently, the developer's plat was rejected. The developer sought
equitable relief based on the theory of estoppe.
997
Noting, "[i]t is clear from the record that the [c]ommission was looking
for a way to deny the plat . . . [,],,118 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
"agree[d] with the trial court that equitable estoppel was proved." '999 It then
dealt with the county's effort to invoke Board of County Commissioners of
Brevard County v. Snyder °°° as a basis for finding that the court had no
jurisdiction to hear claims for equitable relief 1001 The fifth district seemed to
avoid applying Snyder by pointing out that Snyder was decided years after this
action was filed and the county had not raised their jurisdictional argument at
that time. 100 2 However, in the decision denying the motion for rehearing, the
court stated that this was merely its "observation" and not the basis for its
decision.10
0 3
The fifth district also concluded that the commission's action was, in
essence, a legislative act adopting a new policy on drainage because it would
apply to all plats which would come before the commission, not just this
developer's plat.100 4 Since Snyder stands for the proposition that review of a
quasi-judicial decision must be by certiorari, l '00 it follows that Snyder would
not bar equitable relief from this quasi-legislative decision.
The district court also found that there was also no logical reason to limit
review to a certiorari petition.100 6  The case for estoppel might include
testimony about assurances that the developer had relied upon. Such
testimony would not necessarily be reflected by the commission
record. Consequently, "[a]n independent, de novo hearing was required."'
007
Kahana v. City of Tampa 008 The property in question was zoned YC-l,
indicating that it was "in the central commercial core of the district."'1009 In
order to sell alcoholic beverages, the owner had to petition to rezone the
specific lot for that purpose. However, that rezoning would simply add that
997. Id. at 1104.
998. Id.
999. Id.
1000. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
1001. Leisure Hills, 689 So. 2d at 1104.
1002. Id.
1003. Id. at 1105.
1004. Id. at 1104.
1005. See Ronald Benton Brown and Joseph M. Grohman, Property Law: 1994 Survey
of Florida Law, 19 NovA L. REv. 215, 304-06 (1994).
1006. Leisure Hills, 689 So. 2d at 1104.
1007. Id. at 1105.
1008. 683 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1009. Id. at 619.
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use to the land's YC-1 designation. At the hearing on rezoning, the
parishioners of a nearby church displayed their opposition and the rezoning
was denied. The landowners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
circuit court. The trial court concluded that the council's action was
legislative and not reviewable by certiorari, so it dismissed the petition.
1010
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed.1011
The second district held that the circuit court had misconstrued the test
for determining whether zoning activity was legislative or quasi-judicial. 10 12
Legislative action is the formulation of a general rule of policy. Such a policy
would, naturally, affect many people. In contrast, quasi-judicial activity
"merely applies an existing general rule of policy to a specific parcel., 10 13
Because "[t]here [wa]s nothing in [the] sparse record establishing the City
Council formulated any general rule of policy when it voted to deny [the
rezoning] petition. .. [,],1014 the trial court's decision was quashed and the
case was remanded. The fifth district had not decided that the rezoning was
legislative or quasi-judicial, but only that the trial court had no basis for
deciding that it was legislative. 015
Mandelstam v. City of South Miami.0 16 Landowners filed suit against
the city and its vice mayor alleging that the delays they had endured in finally
getting approval for their gymnastics school, following protracted litigation
and administrative proceedings, constituted inverse condemnation and the
denial of due process. The Third District Court of Appeal quoted from a
recent third district decision, stated "'there is no guarantee that regulatory
bodies will not become embroiled in disputed [sic] with property owners in
which the owners ultimately will prevail."", 10 17 Furthermore, the court stated
"there is no concomitant guarantee that property owners may recover for harm
,,1018
caused by these disputes. Due process requires that the city employ fair
procedures, not that it must always make the correct decision.' 9 The fact
that the final approval took so long was not enough to justify a finding of
1010. Id.
1011. Id. at 619-20.
1012. Id.
1013. Kahana, 683 So. 2d at 620 (interpreting Board of County Commiss'rs of Brevard
County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993)).
1014. Id.
1015. Id.
1016. 685 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1017. Id. at 869 (quoting Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach, 678 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1996)).
1018. Id.
1019. Id.
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liability. 10 20 Moreover, the vice mayor was entitled to qualified immunity
because there was no allegation that she had acted with malice or contrary to
clearly established law.
10 2
'
Monroe County v. Whispering Pines Associates.1022 A mobile home
park covered three lots. Mobile homes were permitted on two of the lots, but
prohibited by the zoning on the third lot. The owner obtained permits to place
three mobile homes on lots where they were allowed by the zoning, but the
mobile homes were actually placed on the lot where they were prohibited.
This was an unpleasant surprise for the subsequent purchaser of the park
because when the building officials discovered it, they revoked the building
permits and gave the park owner ninety days to remove the homes. It did not
comply, so this code enforcement proceeding was initiated.
102 3
The Monroe County Code Enforcement Board gave the park owner
seven months to remove the mobile homes or obtain a variance, and set the
fine for noncompliance at $100 per day. The owner appealed to the circuit
court which remanded the case with the direction to join the mobile home
owner.10 24  The Third District Court of Appeal, however, reinstated the
Monroe County Code Enforcement Board's order. 0 21 The third district found
that the current owner can be cited for code violations even though the
improper use was actually begun by the prior owner.1026 The current owner is
the only one to have the power to bring the property into compliance. Thus, it
concluded, "code violations 'run with the land 102 and the current owner
could be fined for failing to bring the property into compliance where it had
been given time to comply or get a variance.1 2 8
Sunshine Key Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Monroe County.029 The
Monroe County Code specified land use districts that were designated for
recreational vehicles. The county's director of planning decided that the
county code did not allow "park models,"' '° i.e., expandable recreationalvehicles over eight feet wide that were designed and built to be permanent
1020. Id. at 869-70.
1021. Mandelstam, 685 So. 2d at 870.
1022. 697 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1023. Id. at 874-75.
1024. Id. at 875.
1025. Id.
1026. Id.
1027. Whispering Pines, 697 So. 2d at 875.
1028. Id.
1029. 684 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1030. Id. at 877.
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residences. 0 31 When the county tried to enforce that interpretation, this
recreational vehicle park filed an unsuccessful administrative appeal to the
County Planning Commission. Subsequently, the park unsuccessfully sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, in the circuit court.1032
Finally, in the Third District Court of Appeal, they succeeded.
0 33
The third district noted that the essence of the park's argument was that
the eight-foot maximum width was arbitrary. 10 34 As a constitutional claim,
apparently a due process violation, it was not barred by administrative res
judicata. 0 35 The next step in the analysis was that recreational vehicles,
unlike mobile homes, were designed for tenancies of less than six months and
were "highway ready."' 0 36 Both parties conceded at oral argument that "the
[RV] industry is moving towards wider vehicles.' 0 37  Furthermore, in all
other attributes, these trailers met the criteria for recreational
vehicles. Therefore, the third district concluded the eight-foot maximum
width was arbitrary and unenforceable.1
0 38
XXIV. Remedies
Nystrom v. Cabada.10 39 Nystrom, who was not a licensed contractor,
built his own house in Naples. After living in the house for about one year,
he sold it to Cabada for $126,000. Cabada then sued after she experienced
problems with walls cracking and doors sticking. Engineers inspected the
property and reported it to be hazardous. Cabaca alleged "breach of implied
warranty, fraud, rescission of contract, breach of contract, negligence, and
intentional violation of the Collier County Building Code.', 10 40 The trial court
gave her the option to rescind the purchase and obtain her payment of
$126,000, or to take $126,000 in damages and keep the property. 04 ' Of
course, she kept the property, chose the judgment, and continued to live in the
house. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed on the issue of liability,
1031. See MONROE COUNTY FLA. CODE § 9.5-4. See also Sunshine Key, 684 So. 2d at
877 n.1.
1032. Sunshine Key, 684 So. 2d at 877.
1033. Id. at 878.
1034. Id.
1035. Id.
1036. Id. at 877 n.1. See also MONROE COuNTY FLA. CODE § 9.5-4.
1037. Sunshine Key, 684 So. 2d at 878.
1038. Id.
1039. 652 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
1040. Id. at 1267.
1041. Id. at 1268.
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holding that the Nystroms had a duty to disclose both the defects and the fact
that the house was built by an unlicensed contractor.10 42 The second district
reversed on the issue of damages holding that Cabada should not have been
given the option of obtaining a money judgment for the full purchase price of
the property and keeping the property. 0 43 The second district remanded for a
new trial on the issue of damages. 1
044
XXV. Sales
Gilchrist Timber Co. v. IT Rayonier, Inc.10 45 The seller of a 22,000
acre tract provided the buyer with a year-old appraisal. Unfortunately, the
zoning shown on the appraisal was inaccurate. After "unsuccessfully" trying
to get the zoning changed, the buyer filed suit in federal district
court.104 6 When the case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, it certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida:
WHETHER A PARTY TO A TRANSACTION WHO
TRANSMITS FALSE INFORMATION WHICH THAT PARTY
DID NOT KNOW WAS FALSE, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION WHEN THE
RECIPIENT OF THE INFORMATION RELIED ON THE
INFORMATION'S TRUTHFULNESS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT AN INVESTIGATION BY THE RECIPIENT WOULD
HAVE REVEALED THE FALSITY OF THE
INFORMATION.
1047
To simplify matters, this question could be broken into two parts. First,
could this seller be held liable for the misinformation in the appraisal which it
gave the buyer when there was no evidence of fraudulent intent? Yes, was
the court's answer. 104 8 It relied upon section 552 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts for the proposition that a person "in the course of his business,
profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in
1042. Id.
1043. Id.
1044. Nystrom, 652 So. 2d at 1268.
1045. 696 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1997).
1046. Id. at 336.
1047. Id. at 335.
1048. Id. at 337.
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their business transactions, is subject to liability ... if he fails to exercise
reasonable care." 1049 However, the question has a second part: Does the
buyer have a right to rely upon that information when a reasonable person
would have sought independent verification? Where the misrepresentation
was negligent rather than intentional, the answer was in the negative. 0 50 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that liability only extends to a person
who justifiably relies on that information, 10 51 and the court expressly adopted
the position as expressed in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 0 52 Consequently, this seller should be held liable only if the seller
failed to exercise reasonable care in giving the appraisal to the buyer and if
the buyer was justified in relying on that appraisal without further checking.
The court further noted that Florida uses comparative fault to apportion
damages in negligence cases.10 3 Since the seller in this case was accused of
negligently supplying incorrect information to the buyer, comparative fault
should be applied. In this case, the buyer might have been negligent in failing
to communicate the purpose for which it was acquiring the property or in
failing to verify the zoning. Thus, the negligent seller may ultimately be
liable for little or nothing if the buyer was also negligent.
Decker v. Strom & Strom Realtors, Inc.10 54 The buyers apparently had a
bad credit history so the only loan the broker could locate was at an interest
rate above the current market. When the buyers realized how high the
payments would be, they refused to close. The sale was subject to financing
under the standard Sarasota County Board of Realtors and the Sarasota
County Bar Association purchase contract that had been used; however, that
clause was silent as to interest rates. The Second District Court of Appeal
reluctantly held that the buyers had breached the contract. 0 55 It is unclear
whether this court was saying that the clause should be interpreted to allow
buyers to cancel if unable to find reasonable financing, or that buyers could
not cancel unless they were unable to find any financing. The Second District
Court of Appeal only stated that this financing was reasonable in light of the
buyers' credit history.1 56 However, the court noted that the buyers would
1049. Id.
1050. Gilchrist, 696 So. 2d at 339.
1051. See id. (distinguishing Lynch v. Fanning, 440 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1983)).
1052. Id.
1053. Id. at 338 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1995)).
1054. 695 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1055. Id. at 803.
1056. Id.
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have been better off using the standard Florida Bar contract because it has a
space for the buyer to specify a maximum acceptable interest rate.
10 57
Miami Child's World, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach.' 58 The purchase and
sale contract had a clause providing that time was of the essence, but it also
provided for a three-month extension if the buyer paid an extension fee. The
buyer paid the fee and got the extension. At the end of the three months, the
buyer was still not ready to close and asked for an eighteen-month extension.
The seller agreed only to a four-month extension. As the deadline neared, the
buyer asked the seller to extend for another year. The seller responded by
giving a three-week extension. When the buyer again could not meet the
deadline, the seller gave notice of termination, but the buyer then claimed that
the seller had waived the "time is of the essence" clause.
°59
The trial court rejected that claim and the district court of appeal
affirmed1060 Noting that the only basis for the buyer's waiver argument was
the sellers "patience and forbearance evidenced by its repeated granting of
extensions,"'0 61 the court held that, "[a]s a matter of law, the [seller's]
repeated extensions of the closing date did not amount to a waiver of the 'time
is of the essence' clause."'0 62 Clearly, the court was correct. Waiver is an
intentional or voluntary act. The seller's conduct here did not evidence an
intent to relinquish tight control over the time for performance.
Licea v. Anllo10 63 The buyer brought this suit for specific performance
of a real estate sales contract and filed a notice of lis pendens. In response,
the seller filed a motion to discharge the lis pendens or, in the alternative,
require the buyer to post a bond. Over the buyer's objection, the court set the
hearing on its motion calendar and then set the bond without an evidentiary
hearing.1064 The district court of appeal held that to be reversible error.
The court reasoned that the property owner could prevail in its motion
for the setting of a bond only if it could show: "(1) that the notice of lis
pendens, if unjustified, will likely result in loss or damage, and (2) the amount
of the damages which will likely result."'10 65 The first element would be to
determine if a bond was required. The second element would be to determine
the proper amount of the bond. The property owner could not make the
1057. Id.
1058. 688 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1059. Id. at 943.
1060. Id.
1061. Id.
1062. Id.
1063. 691 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1064. Id. at 30.
1065. Id.
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required showing without evidence; therefore, the trial court should not have
set the bond without an evidentiary hearing.1"66
XXVI. Taxes
Alachua County v. Adams.10 67 At issue was the "validity of a special act
permitting Alachua County to use tax revenues raised under a general law for
a purpose not enumerated in ... that general law."10 68 Section 212.055(2) of
the Florida Statutes, a general law, "authorizes Florida counties to levy an
infrastructure surtax and use the proceeds" for enumerated purposes. 10 69 The
"proceeds ... nor any interest accrued thereto shall be used for operational
expenses of any infrastructure." 1'07 In addition, chapter 94-487, Laws of
Florida, expanded section 212.055(2) "to allow Alachua County and its
municipalities to use the surtax revenues 'for operation and maintenance of
parks and recreation programs and facilities established with proceeds of the
surtax.""2
071
Alachua County and its municipalities entered an agreement under the
two statutes to "provide for the dedication of the use of Surtax proceeds by
the County and all municipalities within the County . . . provision and
operation of recreation programs in the implementation of a countywide
recreation partnership.' 01 72 Adams, as a taxpayer, sought an injunction and
claimed chapter 94-487 was unconstitutional. 0 73 The lower court agreed and
Alachua County appealed. 10 74
Alachua County relied upon Rowe v. Pinellas Sports Authority.10 75 In
Rowe, the county was pursuing the purpose of building a stadium specifically
authorized by general law. 10 76 The court recognized that the same situation
was not occurring here. 10 77 Alachua County was attempting, under chapter
1066. Id.
1067. 677 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1068. Id. at 397.
1069. Id.
1070. Id.
1071. Id.
1072. Adams, 677 So. 2d at 397.
1073. Id.
1074. Id.
1075. 461 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1984).
1076. Adams, 677 So. 2d at 397. See also Rowe v. Pinellas Sports Auth., 461 So. 2d
72, 74 (Fla. 1984).
1077. Adams, 677 So. 2d at 398.
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94-487, to use tax revenues for the specific objective of maintaining an
infrastructure which was not authorized by general law.1
078
When a taxing statute specifically sets out the ultimate use for revenues
collected pursuant to the statute, a change in the use must be considered a
change in the tax. 0 79 Appellants also contend there was a distinction between
the power to tax and the power to spend and that only the power to tax must
be authorized by general law.10 80  The court held this distinction to be
unpersuasive. 10 8' The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court
and held chapter 94-487 to be an unconstitutional special act.
108 2
Appleby v. Nolte. 10 83 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a
final judgment entered in favor of the Indian River County Property
Appraiser. 10 8 4 The appellants contested the assessed value of their homes for
ad valorem tax purposes. 0 85 They were residents and equity members entitled
to full golf privileges of John's Island Club, a Florida corporation. 1086 Full
golf members, as with the other equity members with lesser privileges, would
receive a proportionate share of property and assets at the club's dissolution
after outstanding debts were satisfied. When the property was appraised, the
appraiser considered the type of membership when determining appraisal
value. 0 87  Individuals owning homes with full golf memberships were
assessed forty percent higher than all other residents having lesser club
privileges. At trial, appellants argued that increasing the value assessment of
their homes based on the full golf membership was an inappropriate ad
valorem tax on intangible property. 10 88 The trial court disagreed and held that
the ability to obtain the full golf membership added value to the property
which was "reflected in the sales price."'1 8
9
Appellants brought the same issue before the Fourth District Court of
Appeal. The Florida Constitution prohibited "counties from levying ad
valorem taxes on intangible personal property."'10 90 Section 192.001(1 1)(b) of
1078. Id. at 398.
1079. Id.
1080. Id.
1081. Id.
1082. Adams, 677 So. 2d at 398.
1083. 682 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1084. Id. at 1140.
1085. Id.
1086. Id.
1087. Id. at 1141.
1088. Appleby, 682 So. 2d at 1141.
1089. Id.
1090. Id. See also FLA. CONST. art VII, § 9(a) (1968).
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the Florida Statutes defined intangible personal property as "'money, all
evidences of debt owed to the taxpayer, all evidences of ownership in a
corporation or other business organization having multiple owners."'
109
'
Likewise "'[m]embership [c]ertificates' fit the above definition." 092  The
appraiser had based his assessment "partially on the value of the real property,
and partially on evidence of ownership in a corporation" which violated
article VII, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. 0 93 An ad valorem tax can
not be based on the fact that appellants possessed scarce full golf
memberships.
10 94
In addition, the appraiser based the assessments on who owned the
property. If the golf member owned a residential unit, the assessment would
be one amount. However, a member who does not golf, owning the same
unit, would be assessed a lower amount. 10 95 The Supreme Court of Florida
has previously held this was not a valid criterion for valuing roperty. 1096
Canaveral Port Authority v. Department of Revenue. I°97 Justice Wells
wrote the court's opinion with Chief Justice Kogan, and Justices Grimes and
Harding concurring, and with Justice Overton dissenting with an opinion with
which Justices Shaw and Anstead concurred. 0 98 The case at bar conflicted
with the opinion in Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority v. Mikos.0 99
Canaveral challenged Brevard County's authority to assess ad valorem
taxes pursuant to section 196.199(4) of the Florida Statutes "on the fee
interest of real property owned by Canaveral and leased to private entities
engaged in nongovernmental activities."' 100 Canaveral contended it was not
subject to taxation "because it was a political subdivision" or otherwise,
"exempt from taxation pursuant to" section 315.11 of the Florida Statutes.1101
The trial court found, in accord with the Sarasota-Manatee court, that
Canaveral was a political subdivision and was immune from ad valorem
taxation." 02 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed and the Supreme
1091. Appleby, 677 So. 2d at 1142 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 192.001(11) (1993)).
1092. Id. at 1142.
1093. Id.
1094. Id.
1095. Id.
1096. Appleby, 677 So. 2d at 1142. See also Interlachen Lake Estates, Inc. v. Snyder,
304 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1973).
1097. 690 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 1996).
1098. Id. at 1230.
1099. Id. at 1227. See also Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth. v. Mikos, 605 So. 2d 132
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
1100. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1227. See also FLA. STAT. § 196.199(4) (1991).
1101. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1227. See also FLA. STAT. § 315.11 (1991).
1102. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1227.
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Court of Florida agreed that Canaveral's fee simple interest in property was
not immune from taxation."
10 3
Immunity from taxation must be kept within limited bounds.11 04  As
such, only the state and those entities expressly recognized in the Florida
Constitution as performing a function of the state comprised "the state" for
purposes of tax immunity. 1105 Since Canaveral did not meet the level as to be
declared "the state," Canaveral must be taxed.
1 0 6
The court in Sarasota-Manatee held that immunity from taxes was based
upon whether an entity was more like a county than a municipality.! 10 7 This
court rejected that view.1108 Immunity does not flow from a judicial
determination that the entity is like a county. 1109 This court also rejected the
Sarasota decision that the Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority was a
"political subdivision" as declared by the legistaure. 1110 The Sarasota-
Manatee court recognized that the Florida Constitution did not allow the
legislature to decide which entities were immune from ad valorem
taxation. 1 1
Since Canaveral was not immune from taxation, Canaveral also argued
in the alternative that it was exempt from ad valorem taxation under section
315.11 of the Florida Statutes.1 2  Section 315.11 provided a statutory
exemption from taxes for port authorities and their properties.1113 Canaveral
contended that sections 196.001 and 196.199 of the Florida Statutes
superseded section 315.11 and made Canaveral's leased property taxable to
the extent the property was not subject to governmental use.1 14 Section
196.001 of the Florida Statutes states that all property is subject to taxation
unless expressly exempted."15 Section 196.001 establishes exemptions that
apply to Canaveral property leased to non-governmental agencies.' 16
1103. Id.
1104. Id.
1105. Id. at 1228.
1106. Id.
1107. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1228. See also Sarasota-Manatee, 605 So. 2d 132, 133
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
1108. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1228.
1109. Id.
1110. Id. See also Sarasota-Manatee, 605 So. 2d at 133.
1111. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1228.
1112. Id.
1113. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 315.11 (1991).
1114. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1229.
1115. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1991).
1116. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1229. See also FLA. STAT. § 196.199 (1991).
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The Supreme Court of Florida recognized that by the term "authorities"
used in sections 196.001 and 196.199(a)(4), "the legislature intended to
provide only a limited exemption for fee interests in port authority
property."'11 7 This court construed section 315.11 of the Florida Statutes
with sections 196.001 and 196.199 and held that "section 315.11 provide[d]
an exemption only when port authority property [was] being used for a
purpose which [was] specifically set forth in section 196.199(2) and (4). '1"8
As long as the property was being used for some other purpose not set out in
the statute, the fee interest would be taxable."
1 19
In conclusion, "the fee interest in the property at issue [was] not exempt
from... taxation because the property [was] leased to a nongovernmental
entity for a nongovernmental [purpose]. 11 20 In addition, property could only
be taxed on its total appraised value.1 21 The leased property was not to be
taxed twice by assessing both the leasehold and the fee in a way that the value
of the leasehold included the fee, or that the value of the fee, included the
leasehold. The two must be taxed separately.
Subsequently, Chief Justice Kogan and Justices Grimes, Harding, and
Wells concurred as to the petitioner's motion for rehearing and Justices
Overton, Shaw, and Anstead dissented."22 Chief Justice Kogan and Justices
Overton, Shaw, Grimes, Harding, Wells, and Anstead concurred as to the
respondent's motion for clarification! n1 3  Motions for rehearing and
clarification filed on behalf of both parties were considered and denied. 12 4
Florida Department ofRevenue v. Pirtle Construction Co. 112 This court
reversed the trial court's decision and construed section 199.185(1)(d) of the
Florida Statutes to mean Pirtle's receivables were not exempt from intangible
tax.1126 Pirtle, a general contractor, established construction contracts with the
school board for the 1988 and 1991 tax periods. Pirtle claimed exempt
intangibles as accounts receivable on his books and records. Later, Pirtle
applied to the Department of Revenue for a refund of the intangible taxes
1117. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1229.
1118. Id.
1119. Id.
1120. Id. at 1229-30.
1121. Id. at 1230.
1122. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1230.
1123. Id.
1124. Id.
1125. 690 So. 2d 709 (FMa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1126. Id. at 710. See also FLA. STAT. § 199.185(1)(d) (1991).
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paid, and the Department declined. The Circuit Court ruled in Pirtle's
favor.11
27
Pirtle relied on section 199.185(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes which
stated, "'(1) The following intangible personal property shall be exempt from
the annual and nonrecurring taxes imposed by this chapter:... (d) Notes,
bonds, and other obligations issued by the State of Florida. .... 8 Pirtle
contended the accounts receivables are "other obligations" that are
exempt. The court recognized that the construction of the words "other
obligations issued" was warranted. 1129 The court looked to legislative intent
and turned to "the doctrine of ejusdem generis," a "tenet of statutory
construction that helps discern legislative intent." 130  In addition, the court
stated that "where the enumeration of specific things is followed by a more
general word or phrase, the general phrase is construed to refer to a thing of
the same nature as the preceding specific things."
'
"
131
Therefore, "because the general language 'and other obligations'
follow[ed] the specific enumeration of the words 'note' and 'bond,' the
principle of ejusdem generis" allowed the court to properly interpret the1132 ,
statute. Also, "[t]he Legislature could not have intended 'other obligations
issued' . . . to include accounts receivable arising from a government contract
because those accounts receivable are not of the same nature of notes and
bonds.""1 33 Once the government issues notes or bonds, full faith and credit is
pledged for later payment. 134  This is not the case when a construction
contract is entered. 
135
The court compared the language here to the statutory language
appearing in Smith v. Davis.113 6 In Smith, "'all stocks, bonds, Treasury notes,
and other obligations of the United States"' were exempt.1 37  The Smith
court applied ejusdern generis and held "other obligations" referred only to
obligations or securities of the same type as those specifically enumerated
1127. Pirtle, 690 So. 2d at 710.
1128. Id. at 711 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 199.195(1)(d) (1991)).
1129. Id.
1130. Id.
1131. Id. (citing Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, Inc., 94 So. 2d 597, 599-600 (Fla.
1957)).
1132. Pirtle, 690 So. 2d at 711.
1133. Id. at 712.
1134. Id.
1135. Id.
1136. Id. See also Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 116 (1944).
1137. Pirtle, 690 So. 2d at 712 (quoting Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 116 (1944)).
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such as stocks, bonds, and Treasury notes. 13 8 Legislative intent was to limit
exemptions only to government obligations needed to secure credit to carry on
necessary government functions.1 139 Since the language was nearly identical
to that in the Smith case, the result should be the same here." 40 The court
reversed and remanded.
14 1
Leon County Educational Facilities Authority v. Bert Hartsfield.1142
Justice Grimes wrote the court's opinion and Chief Justice Kogan and Justices
Overton, Shaw, Harding, Wells, and Anstead concurred. 1143  Leon 2ounty
Educational Facilities Authority was organized to own, lease, and finance
higher educational facilities."144 Authority entered into a lease with SRH, Inc.
where SRH would acquire, construct and equip the dormitory and food
service project and then lease it to Authority in exchange for rent. Authority
was responsible for maintenance, insurance, and any taxes assessed against
the property."1 45 Although the project received a tax exemption in 1992, it
was denied exemption in 1993.'46 Authority and SRH sued the appraiser for
declaratory relief and the trial court found in favor of the property
appraiser.1
47
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed based on sections 196.192
and 196.199 of the Florida Statutes."148 Authority was not entitled to a tax
exemption because SRH held legal title to the project. 1149  This court
recognized the concept of equitable ownership in ad valorem taxation and
pointed out cases illustrating such." 50 The court stated that "the doctrine...
should be applied evenhandedly regardless of whether a tax is being imposed
or an exemption being claimed." 1151 The court pointed out the issue as
turning on whether the Authority has equitable ownership of the project. 1152
The court believed "the project [was] exempt from taxation because the
1138. Smith, 323 U.S. at 117.
1139. Pirtle, 690 So. 2d at 712.
1140. Id.
1141. Id.
1142. 698 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1997).
1143. Id. at 530.
1144. Id. at 527.
1145. Id.
1146. Id.
1147. Leon, 698 So. 2d at 527.
1148. Id.
1149. Id. at 528.
1150. Id. at 528-29. See Bancroft Inv. Corp. v. City of Jacksonville, 27 So. 2d 162 (Fla.
1946); Hialeah, Inc. v. Dade County, 490 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
1151. Leon, 698 So. 2d at 529.
1152. Id.
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Authority [was] the equitable owner."'1 153  Section 243.33 of the Florida
Statutes was written with the intent to exempt a project operated and
maintained by an authority under taxation provisions. 1154  The legislature
would not intend property being used by the Authority to be denied a tax
exemption because it did not hold legal title."" SRH held legal title to
facilitate financing for the project, not to make profit. It was insignificant that
the Authority did not automatically gain legal title at the leasehold's end.'156
The amendment to section 196.192(1) of the Florida Statutes which
added the words "'owned by an exempt entity' did not prevent the Authority,
as equitable owner, from obtaining a tax exemption. 157 Section 196.011(1)
also did not prevent a tax exemption for the project. 158 This section supports
a conclusion that the owner of property for the purpose of obtaining a tax
exemption could be one who has been determined to be an equitable
owner.1 59 The facts of this case forced the court to hold that the project was
not subject to ad valorem taxation because the Authority held all the benefits
and burdens of ownership.
1 160
Palmer Trinity Private School v. Robbins.1 161 Palmer Trinity appealed an
order granting final summary judgment in favor of Robbins, the property
appraiser of Dade County. 16 2  In 1988, Palmer Trinity applied for an
educational tax exemption from ad valorem taxes for the private
school. 163 After the application was denied, Palmer petitioned the Property
Appraisal Adjustment Board who approved the exemption at the special
master's recommendation. 64 On August 25, 1989, the property appraiser
filed suit challenging the exemption, but the circuit court later said no
exemption would apply. 165 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
circuit court's decision and found that the private school was qualified to
receive the educational exemption1
66
1153. Id.
1154. Id.
1155. Id.
1156. Leon, 698 So. 2d at 529.
1157. Id. at 530 (quoting FLA. STAT. §196.192(1) (1988)).
1158. Id.
1159. Id.
1160. Id.
1161. 681 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1162. Id. at 809.
1163. Id.
1164. Id.
1165. Id.
1166. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 809.
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Section 196.011 of the Florida Statutes required the property appraiser
to mail a renewal application for exemption on or before February 1 "'once an
original application for tax exemption had been granted.', 1167 The appraiser
failed to send a renewal application to Palmer for 1989 because the appraiser
believed the renewal application was only for those granted a tax exemption
in the previous year and not to those whose exemption was still in litigation at
the appeal level. 1168  The appraiser did mail notice of the proposed tax
assessment to Palmer and later mailed the actual bill.
1169
While litigating, Palmer sold the property to the Board of Trustees of the
State of Florida.1 170 Palmer agreed to pay the 1989 ad valorem taxes to
release the tax lien." 71 Palmer, not receiving a refund for the 1989 taxes,
brought suit challenging the assessment of ad valorem taxes for the 1989
year. 172 The circuit court held it did not have jurisdiction because Palmer had
not filed the action contesting assessment within sixty days from the date the
assessment was certified for collection. 1173 Section 194.171(2) of the Florida
Statutes provided that:
No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days
from the date the assessment being contested is certified for
collection under section 193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date
a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the property
adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not
received final action by the property appraisal adjustment board
prior to extension of the roll under section 197.323.1174
Palmer wanted the court to follow Chihocky v. Crapo 1175 and hold that
the failure to send an exemption renewal application was equal to the failure
of the property appraiser to publish notice of the certification of the tax roll as
required by statute.'176 Therefore, the sixty-day period should be tolled. 7 7
The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed." 78 In Chihocky, the appraiser
1167. Id. at 810 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 196.011(6) (1995)).
1168. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 810.
1169. Id.
1170. Id.
1171. Id.
1172. Id.
1173. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 810.
1174. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 194.171(2) (1988)).
1175. 632 So. 2d230 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1176. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 810.
1177. Id. See also Chihocky v. Crapo, 632 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1178. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 810.
1997]
383
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
failed to comply with statutory notice.'17 9 Chihocky was never extended to
cases where the taxpayer received actual notice of the date of the certification
of the tax roll.180
Here, the failure to send the renewal application did not affect Palmer's
ability to challenge the denial of the exemption because it had actual notice of
the date of the certification of the tax roll.1181 The action to challenge the tax
assessment took place two and a half years later.1182 The Property Appraisal
Adjustment Board's final decision in the 1988 litigation was in July, 1989,
and the property appraiser appealed on August 25, 1989.1183 When the sixty-
day period expired on December 18, 1989, Palmer must have known it was
not certain the exemption would be approved.118 4 The statute of nonclaim
was strictly enforced, and as such, no exception would be made in this
case.
185
Tamar 7600, Inc. v. Orange County."186 The Fifth District Court of
Appeal reversed the dismissal of the entire case and directed the lower court
to permit Tamar to amend the complaint to allege claims such as those set
forth in Counts Il-VI, and X. 1 8 7  This case involved Orange County's
assignment of a one percent tourist tax pursuant to Florida's Local Option
Tourist Development Act.' 188 The statute authorized the county to impose
taxes on short term rentals of living quarters within the county for certain
purposes unless an exemption applied. 189 The tourist tax was enacted to get
funds for the construction of a baseball stadium. 1190 The letter of intent
executed obligated Orange County and the City to work with baseball owners
in an attempt to bring major league baseball to the Orlando area. 1191 If the
attempt was successful, Orange County and the City were to enter a baseball
stadium lease within the parameters of a "Summary of Expected Lease
Terms."
1 192
1179. Id.
1180. Id.
1181. Id.
1182. Id.
1183. Palmer, 681 So. 2d at 811.
1184. Id.
1185. Id.
1186. 686 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1187. Id. at 793.
1188. Id. at 790. See also FLA. STAT. § 125.0104(3)(1) (1993).
1189. Tamar, 686 So. 2d at 790 (citing FLA. STAT. § 125.0104(3)(1) (1993)).
1190. Id.
1191. Id.
1192. Id. at 791.
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The "Summary of Expected Lease Terms" required Orange County to
construct the stadium while baseball owners would retain revenues from the
ballpark.1193 However, the owners were to assume all responsibility for
facility operations. In addition, when the lease was up, the baseball owners
had a first option to purchase the ballpark. The County's Board of
Commissioners approved a "Revised Summary of Expected Lease Terms"
which kept the earlier terms and amended them.1 194 The Board adopted the
resolution imposing the tourist tax and adopted a Budget Resolution which
stated how tax revenue would be spent. Tamar filed suit challenging the
legality of the tourist tax. The lower court granted Orange County's motion to
dismiss.1195 Hotel Group filed a motion to amend the amended complaint
1 96
This court recognized the lower court's refusal to allow any amendment
and the dismissal of the entire suit was erroneous in light of Tamar's raising
the issue concerning the county's power to assess tax and then accrue the
money to fund a project not permitted under section 125.0104(3)(1) of the
Florida Statutes.1 97 The court concluded that the county could not assess and
accrue tax money for the purpose of spending it on a ballpark under a specific
agreement and then dictate that the taxpayer had no right to challenge the
matter.! 198 If the county embarked on the enterprise, there must be a present
right to challenge its legality since the legality would affect the existence of
the tax.199
TEDC/Shell City, Inc. v. Robbins.1200  The Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed final summary judgment denying the taxpayers ad valorem
tax exemption. 1201  Tacolcy acquired property from Dade County and
accepted a restrictive deed obligating it to build low income housing
controlled by rental regulatory agreements. The agreements mandated that
Tacolcy would operate the buildings as low income housing for thirty years.
If the deed restriction was violated, the property reverted to Dade County.120 2
The taxpayers filed an application for a 1991 ad valorem tax charitable
exemption. The application was denied and taxpayers appealed to the Dade
County Value Adjustment Board ("VAB") which granted the
1193. Id.
1194. Tamar, 686 So. 2d at 791.
1195. Id.
1196. Id. at 792.
1197. Id. at 793.
1198. Id.
1199. Tamar, 686 So. 2d at 793.
1200. 690 So. 2d 1323 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1201. Id. at 1323.
1202. Id.
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petition. 1203 The property appraiser appealed. The next year, taxpayers again
sought a charitable exemption for ad valorem tax, and it was again denied by
the property appraiser. However, the VAB granted a seventy-five percent
exemption for the 1992 tax year. The property appraiser appealed and the two
appeals from the 1991 and 1992 actions were consolidated. 1204
The issue before this court was "[w]hether a federal income tax credit
inuring to a taxpayer is a benefit that disqualifies a taxpayer from exempt
entity status under section 196.195(3), Florida Statutes (1991), and therefore
disqualifies the taxpayer from receiving an ad valorem tax charitable
exemption. ' ' 1205 This court held the entity receiving such a credit did not
qualify for exempt entity status. 120 6 In addition, to receive ad valorem tax
exemption, the property must be "'owned by an exempt entity and used
exclusively for exempt purposes." ' 1207  Section 196.195 of the Florida
Statutes gives criteria to determine whether an entity is a nonprofit venture
eligible for exemption. 12  Here, the question centered on the requirement
that taxpayers 'affirmatively show that no part of the subject property, or the
proceeds of the sale, lease, or other disposition thereof, will inure to the
benefit of its members, directors, or officers or any person or firm operating
for profit or for a nonexempt purpose."
1209
"The plain language of section 196.195(3) require[d] an exemption
applicant to demonstrate that the entity ... [was] not receiving any benefits
from the property."' 1210 Even though the taxpayers did not realize profits from
the property, the receipt of a federal income tax credit on behalf of the
partners was a benefit as based on its plain and ordinary meaning. 121 Since
the taxpayers were receiving a benefit in the form of an income tax credit,
they were not exempt entities allowed to qualify for the exemption from ad
valorem taxation.1212
Terra Mar Capital, Inc. v. Auxier. 213 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's setting aside of a tax deed because proper
1203. Id. at 1324.
1204. Id.
1205. Robbins, 690 So. 2d at 1324.
1206. Id.
1207. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 196.192(1) (1991)).
1208. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 196.195 (1991).
1209. Robbins, 690 So. 2d at 1324 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 196.195(3) (1991)).
1210. Id. at 1325.
1211. Id.
1212. Id.
1213. 694 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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notice was not received. 2 1 4  An executors deed was recorded showing
ownership of property by Janice Fay Underdown Auxier, Patricia Ann
Underdown Smith, and Charlotte Underdown (deceased). The property was
subject to a lease term of ninety-nine years and was used as a parking lot. 215
Section 197.522(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes requires notice be given to
an owner.1 6 In turn, section 197.502(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes states
notice must be sent to "'[a]ny legal title holder of record if the address of the
owner appears on the record of conveyance of the lands to the owner."
' 217
Here, appellees were not given proper notice because the recorded deed gave
the full names of the three owners individually with their mailing addresses,
while the notice was mailed to a Fort Lauderdale address to the name
"Underdown Smith & Auxier."'1211 Since it was likely that all owners did not
reside at the same address, notice must be given to each owner. No notice
was given in this case.
219
Washington Square Corp. v. Wright. 220  The First District Court of
Appeal affirmed the circuit court's final order of dismissal because the failure
to pay ad valorem taxes in succeeding years extinguished the right to maintain
a contest, unless the taxpayer sought timely review of every assessment as to
which taxes were not paid in full. 22 ' Washington Square Corporation
("Corporation") owned real property in Washington County. The Corporation
petitioned Washington's Property Appraisal Adjustment Board seeking
review and adjustment of the ad valorem tax assessment received for the 1993
year. After the Board denied review, the Corporation paid the amount owed
and filed a complaint seeking an adjustment of the appraisal attaching the
receipt of the paid tax amount to the complaint. The Corporation also paid
the assessments for the years 1994 and 1995 which were less than the 1993
year that was petitioned.
The issue before the court was "what the statute require[d] to prevent
dismissal of a judicial challenge to an assessment when duly initiated court
proceedings have not concluded by the time taxes fall due in subsequent
year(s)."'1 3 Section 194.171 of the Florida Statutes provides that no tax
1214. Id. at 779.
1215. Id.
1216. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 197.522(1)(a) (1993).
1217. Auxier, 694 So. 2d at 780 (citing FLA. STAT. § 197.502(4)(a) (1993)).
1218. Id.
1219. Id.
1220. 687 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1221. Id. at 1374.
1222. Id. at 1374-75.
1223. Id. at 1375.
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assessment can be contested unless all the taxes due in the subsequent years
after the action is brought are timely paid.
22 4
The circuit court concluded that the Corporation's failure to pay ad
valorem taxes in full for the 1994 and 1995 taxable years required dismissal
of its complaint challenging the 1993 Board's assessment. This court
recognized that the Corporation, after it paid in good faith estimates of the
1994 and 1995 tax assessments, could obtain judicial review of them by filing
suits within the time period allowed. 22 6 However, the time expired. Thus,
"'[n]o action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after [sixty] days
from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection"'
unless the petition is pending before the Board when the assessment is
certified for collection.
Once the time to bring the contest had passed, the tax assessments for the
1994 and 1995 years were no longer subject to adjustment. 228  The full
amount was owed. Since judicial review for the 1994 and 1995 years were
not timely sought and the full amount was not paid, the Corporation's
complaint challenging the 1993 assessment must be dismissed.1
229
Westring v. Florida.230 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of the action on the ground that Westring did not file
for a refund of a documentary stamp tax paid at the time a quitclaim deed
conveying title to the home was executed.'2 ' In 1994, Westring and his wife
at the time executed a quitclaim deed conveying title to their home from the
entireties back to Westring individually (provided by marital settlement
agreement). 23 2  Westring paid a documentary stamp tax even though no
money changed hands and the outstanding mortgage was not affected.
Westring sued individually and as the representative of a class of similar
taxpayers. Westring sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a refund of
the tax. contending that it was invalidly imposed. 23 3 The certified question is
whether a plaintiff challenging the validity of a specific tax must first request
a refund before a court can exercise jurisdiction over the action.1234
1224. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 194.171 (1995).
1225. Wright, 687 So. 2d at 1375.
1226. Id.
1227. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 194.171(2) (1993)).
1228. Id.
1229. Id.
1230. 682 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1231. Id. at 171-72.
1232. Id. at 171.
1233. Id. at 172.
1234. Id.
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Westring is required to file a claim for a refund of the tax pursuant to
section 215.26 of the Florida Statutes before seeking jurisdiction of the
circuit court.12 35 The nature of nonclaim statutes is to preclude a right of
action unless and until the claim is filed within the time period designated by
statute.1236 Since Westring was still within the three-year-statutory nonclaim
period specified by section 215.26 of the Florida Statutes, the district court
dismissed Westring's complaint without prejudice so that Westring could
apply for a refund in accordance with the statute.
23 7
XXVII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of cases and legislation presents selected materials
of significance to real estate professionals. Although there seems to be no
consistent pattern to the case law and legislative development, the survey is
useful in maintaining contact with the progression of real property law.
1235. Westring, 682 So. 2d at 172. See also FLA. STAT. § 215.26 (1993).
1236. Westring, 682 So. 2d at 172.
1237. Id.
1997]
389
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
First Principles for Constitution Revision
The Honorable Daniel Webster*
Donald L. Bell'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 391
II. LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS REVISION COMMISSIONS ..................... 393
I1. INFLUENCES, ORIGINS, AND PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING
FLORIDA'S CONSTITUTION ........................................................... 396
A. Early Constitional Theory and Practice ................................ 396
B. Constitutional Developments in the States ............................ 398
C. The Development of Constitutional Law in Florida .............. 404
IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION ............ 408
A. Protecting Against Tyranny: The Separation of Powers ....... 410
B. The Legislative Branch .......................................................... 413
C. The Executive Branch ............................................................ 416
D. The Judicial Branch ............................................................... 420
E. Local Government .................................................................. 424
F. The Boundary Between State and National Government ...... 425
V. THE NATURE OF RIGHTS ............................... 427
A. The Right to Equal Protection of the Laws ............................ 431
B. Rights in Property .................................................................. 434
VI. OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION ................... 435
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 436
I. INTRODUCTION
Alexis de Tocqueville, the great social observer and political scientist,
arrived in the United States in 183 1,1 only three years after Andrew Jackson,
the populist former military Governor of Florida, was elected President of
* Speaker, Florida House of Representatives, 1996-98; B.S., 1971 Georgia Tech.,
Electrical Engineering. Speaker Webster is also one of the public officers responsible for
making appointments to the Constitution Revision Commission.
** General Counsel, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee, FL; B.S., 1975, Florida
State University; M.S., 1979, Florida State University; J.D., 1989, Florida State University.
Mr. Bell is also a former Florida State University College of Law faculty member.
1. I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERUCA (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A.
Knopf 1945) at epilogue (1835).
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the United States.2  Tocqueville found a nation of people "seeking with
almost equal eagerness material wealth and moral satisfaction; heaven in the
world beyond, and well-being and liberty in this one." 3 This was the nature
of the people who only a few years later adopted Florida's first constitution.4
Floridians today still seek those things our predecessors pursued with such
vigor: freedom of conscience, financial security, and liberty.
In an effort to assure the continued protection of these values, the
framers of the 1838 Florida Constitution included a strong entreaty to those
who read it a century and a half later. They noted that "frequent recurrence
to fundamental principles, is absolutely necessary, to preserve the blessings
of liberty."5 Like the framers of other state constitutions, the framers of
Florida's original constitution understood that over time all human
institutions, including constitutions, are subject to potentially harmful
changes, misunderstandings, and misinterpretations. They believed that it
was necessary to periodically revisit the reasons for creating a constitution in
order to assure its continued vitality.6  As Florida pursues the task of
2. See ALLEN MORRIs, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1995-1996, at 323 (1994). After he
became President of the United States, Jackson continued to directly influence the philosophy
of government in Florida through, among other things, the placement of his friends as state
officers. Id. at 324-27. For example, Jackson played a prominent role in advancing the
political careers of all five of the men who served as Territorial Governors of Florida. Id.
William Pope DuVal, the first territorial Governor of Florida, was reappointed to that office
by Jackson, and Florida's second Territorial Governor, John Henry Eaton, was a prominent
member of Jackson's Cabinet. Id. at 324. Territorial Governor Richard Keith Call was a
soldier under Jackson and was a close enough friend to have been married in Jackson's home.
Id. at 325-26. Florida's fourth Territorial Governor, Robert Raymond Reid, who was serving
as Territorial Governor when the Florida Constitution of 1838 was created, got his start in
Florida politics when President Jackson appointed him United States Judge of East Florida.
MORRIS, supra at 326. Even Florida's sixth Territorial Governor, John Branch, who did not
take office until 1844, had previously served as Jackson's Secretary of the Navy. Id. at 327.
3. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 45.
4. Tocqueville's arrival in this country in 1831 preceded the drafting of Florida's first
constitution by only seven years. Id. at epilogue. See generally FLA. CONST. of 1838.
5. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I § 26. This provision was adopted directly from language
contained in article I, § 15 of the Virginia Constitution. George Mason has been credited with
authoring the original provision. See Brian Snure, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental
Principles: Individual Rights, Free Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67
WASH. L. Rnv. 669, 676 (1992). Different versions were subsequently incorporated into the
constitutions of at least 11 different states. See Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of
Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1803, 1811 (1992). See also Snure, supra, at 676
nn.50-54.
6. With regard to a similar "frequent recurrence" provision in the North Carolina
Constitution, Bilionis quotes William Hooper, a North Carolina delegate to the Continental
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considering revisions to its constitution, this article is intended to discuss the
fundamental principles that led to the creation of the Florida Constitution. It
also discusses some of the major features of the Florida Constitution and
suggests that its provisions should be examined from a functional
perspective to determine whether they adequately serve appropriate
constitutional purposes.
II. LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS REVISION COMMISSIONS
The only previous Constitution Revision Commission that has met
pursuant to article XI of the Florida Constitution convened in 1978. While
the 1978 Commission did not produce amendments acceptable to the public,
its review of the constitution was still of some value.8  The 1978
Commission raised public consciousness with regard to the role of our
constitution and its contents. 9 By proposing certain amendments, it also
brought particular issues to the forefront of the state's public policy agenda
Congress in Philadelphia, as having said: "'[i]t is necessary that recurrence should often be
had to original principles to prevent those evils which in a course of years must creep in and
vitiate every human institution and by insensible gradations at length steal upon the
Understanding as part of the original system."' Bilionis, supra note 5, at 1811 n. 27 (quoting
10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 862, 867 (William L. Saunders ed., Raleigh,
N.C., J. Daniels, 1890)). Mr. Hooper seems to have believed that returning to fundamental
principles would involve some weeding out of inappropriate provisions that had crept into the
constitution over the years. Id. In a similar vein, shortly after the 1838 Florida Constitution
was adopted, President William Henry Harrison said:
The spirit of liberty is the sovereign balm for every injury which our
institutions may receive. On the contrary, no care that can be used in the
construction of our Government, no division of powers, no distribution of
checks in its several departments, will prove effectual to keep us a free people
if this spirit is suffered to decay; and decay it will without constant nurture.
Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States (1989), William Henry Harrison:
Inaugural Address (visited July 7, 1997) <http://www.cc.columbia.edu/acis/bartleby/
inaugura/pres26.html>.
7. See TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REERENCE GUIDE
15 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1991).
8. While the public rejected the 1978 Commission's proposals, it later rejected a
proposed amendment that would have abolished the Constitution Revision Commission. Id.
See also HJR 50 (1979) (amending article XI, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, to
eliminate the Constitution Revision Commission).
9. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 15-16.
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where they would remain for many years to come.'0 If the current revision
process produces similar results, it will have served a useful purpose.
The 1965 Constitution Revision Commission, which created our current
constitution, the Constitution of 1968, was formed through a different
process than either the 1978 Commission or the current 1997-98
Commission. 11  The 1965 Commission also differed from the 1978
Commission in that it did not pursue changes in public policy as a primary
objective. Perhaps for that reason, the 1965 Commission was the more
successful of the two.
12
Those involved in the revision process of the mid-1960s had a general
understanding that "the rightful place of the states in the federal system had
been overwhelmed by central federal power."'13  The Commission that
produced the Florida Constitution of 1968 sought to address that concern. It
also focused on eliminating extraneous provisions thereby returning the
constitution to its fundamental purposes. The Commission succeeded in
substantially reducing the size of the Florida Constitution 5 and in
eliminating "much of the obsolete and redundant language."'
6
10. See iL (discussing a number of amendments originally proposed by the 1978
Commission that were rejected by the public, only to later be approved upon submission to the
voters by the Legislature). Even so, the 1978 Commission might have been more successful if
it had focused more on fundamentals and less on discussing sweeping changes in public
policy.
11. See id. at 11-15. The 1965 Commission was created by the Legislature; the 1978
and 1997-98 Revision Commissions resulted from a recommendation made by the 1965
Commission that was adopted into the Florida Constitution of 1968. See id. at 15-16. While
the proposed amendments produced by the 1978 Commission were submitted directly to the
voters, the proposed amendments produced by the Commission of 1965 were submitted to the
Legislature. The Legislature then substantially revised the proposals during four special
sessions. The end product of those efforts was our current constitution, the Florida
Constitution of 1968. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 680.
12. See generally D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing the results achieved by
the 1965 and 1978 revision commissions). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, many other
factors contributed to a favorable climate for changes in public policy and in the state
constitution. The public was grappling with the civil rights movement, political issues
involving elections and voting rights, military matters relating to the Vietnam War, and
criminal law issues such as search and seizure and the death penalty. Many of these issues
rose to a level of federal constitutional significance and the public interest in constitutional
law was considerably heightened. By 1978, public concern over many of these issues was less
intense.
13. See id. at 11.
14. See id. at 13.
15. See id. at 12. Frequent statements to the effect that the 1968 revision reduced the
size of the Florida Constitution by half are somewhat misleading. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra
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Perhaps the current Constitution Revision Commission would be wise
to pursue these same objectives on a more modest scale. The Florida
Constitution continues to serve as a vehicle for some "largely meaningless
but politically popular verbiage. ' 17 Accordingly, there are still opportunities
for positive improvements to the constitution by pursuing the reductionist
course that began with the creation of the 1968 Constitution.18
Because the Florida Constitution has a strong foundation and generally
serves the people well, wholesale revision is probably not advisable.' 9
Nonetheless, the revision process offers us, as a society, an opportunity to
review the reasons why we have a constitution and to -consider whether
specific provisions of our constitution are serving their intended purposes.
That review may, after all, reveal ways in which the constitution can be
improved. To the extent that revision is necessary at all, the objective in
revising or amending the constitution should be to adjust the constitution's
contents back to its basic purposes, thereby restoring its power to inspire the
people and the government.
note 7, at 12. In fact, substantial portions of the Florida Constitution of 1885 were kept in
force by including them in history notes and incorporating them by reference into the 1968
Constitution. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) (incorporating by reference the Dade
County Home Rule provisions of the Constitution of 1885). The 1997-98 Revision
Commission should consider advancing the reductionist intent of the 1968 Commission by
proposing amendments that would eliminate the need for these extensive and unwieldy
historical notes.
16. D'ALMBERTE, supra note 7, at 13.
17. Id at 16. -
18. See id at 12 (discussing reductions in the Florida Constitution of 1968).
19. The need for stability in the social order and in the law demands that a constitution
be changed infrequently and no more than is necessary to accomplish particular purposes. It
has been noted that "stability in constitutional law promotes the formation and maintenance of
a social consensus on basic values. It does so by encouraging [legislators] and courts to
articulate basic values and to provide moral leadership for society." Michael G. Colantuono,
The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and
Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1509 (1987). Because it has the "potential to
promote a consensus on social valuesi,]" stability in constitutional law "contributes to social
cooperation and peace." Id at 1510. Tocqueville noted with some dismay that "[a]lmost all
the American constitutions have been amended within thirty years." I TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 1, at 267. He found that "the circumstances which contribute most powerfully to
democratic instability, and which admit of the free application of caprice to the most important
objects, are here in full operation." I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 267.
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III. INFLUENCES, ORIGINS, AND PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FLORIDA'S
CONSTITUTION
No revision of the Florida Constitution should be undertaken without
first attempting to understand its nature and the purposes it serves. That
understanding must come primarily from an examination of the history of
constitutional government. Reviewing history will also provide some
perspective with regard to the things that a constitution can and cannot
accomplish. 1
In reviewing our history, it is not difficult to see the effects of
constitutional law. As Tocquevile said: "America is the only country in
which it has been possible to witness the natural and tranquil growth of
society, and where the influence exercised on the future condition of states
by their origin is clearly distinguishable."2 Having achieved a reasonable
level of success at self-government, Floridians should not ignore the
principles that contributed to that success.
A. Early Constitional Theory and Practice
The seeds of modem constitutions can be found in documents as old as
23the Magna Carta. However, it was in the latter part of the eighteenth
20. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open
Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REv. 1279, 1282 (1995) (noting that
"principled debate over a constitutional provision's application to contemporary
circumstances can begin only after grappling with its historical antecedents"). This does not
imply that we are forever bound by "original intent" or to the current contents of the
constitution. The people are free to amend the constitution at any time. See discussion infra
note 78 (discussing the different methods by which the Florida Constitution can be amended).
21. Like James Madison, we must support our constitution "as well in its limitations as
in its authorities." Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States (1989), James
Madison: First Inaugural Address (visited July 7, 1997)
http://www.ce.columbiaedu/acis/bartleby/inauuural/presl 8.html.
22. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 28. While he admired the system of government
and the people of this country, Tocqueville did not always like what he found here. He
abhorred the institution of slavery and his thoughts about slavery caused him to express his
admiration for our social system with some reservations. For example, he commented: "I am
far from supposing that the American laws are pre-eminently good in themselves: I do not
hold them to be applicable to all democratic nations; and several of them seem to me to be
dangerous, even in the United States." Id. at 322.
23. Indeed, the origin of at least one provision of the Florida Constitution, the guarantee
of "access to courts" contained in article I, § 21, has been traced directly to a similar provision
in the Magna Carta. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 32. As Professor Robert Williams
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century that Europeans began to fully articulate the key elements of
constitutional theory, such that they could be harmonized into a body of
law.24 A common understanding developed that when individuals came
together to form governments, they had certain inherent rights that must
survive the creation of government.25 These rights could be apprehended
through an understanding of morality,26 reason, and logic, and they could not
be divested. 7  Indeed, governmental infringements of fundamental
individual liberties were seen as the potential source for a multitude of
threatening conditions. 28 Government had come to be seen as a consensualcreation of those who sought to be governed.29 It was considered that
commented to the organizational session of the 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission:
"[T]he roots of this Commission reach deeply into history.... ." JOURNAL OF THE 1997-1998
CoNsTrrUON REVISION COMMISSION 14, 15 (June 17, 1997) (remarks by Robert F Williams).
While the United States Constitution has no "access to courts" provision, a provision similar
to the one in the Florida Constitution can be found in the constitutions of 39 states. See
Hoffman, supra note 20, at 1279 (citing David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 1197,1201 &n.25 (1992)).
24. See, e.g., Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP.
L. REv. 989, 990 (1996) (discussing the contributions of philosophers Charles Montesquieu,
Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, and common law scholars Edward Coke, Henry
deBracton, and William Blackstone to the formation of early constitutions).
25. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 54 (Thomas P. Pearson
ed., 1952) (1690).
26. Tocqueville simultaneously explained the moral foundation of American law and
distinguished it from the recently demised French aristocracy: "To the European, a public
officer represents a superior force; to an American, he represents a right. In America, then, it
may be said that no one renders obedience to man, but to justice and to law." I TOCQUEViLLE,
supra note 1, at 98.
27. See id. at 81-82; see also VA. CONST. art. I, § I (stating that "all men.., have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity").
28. Interference with any one individual's inherent right to freedom of conscience, for
example, poses a threat to the rights of all individuals in the society. This in turn poses a
threat to the society itself. Carried to the extreme, deprivation of liberty can threaten a
government's continued existence. See, e.g., DANIEL WEBSTER, The Reply to Hayne, in THE
GREAT SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 227, 256 (Edwin P. Whipple ed., Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1993) (1870) (explaining that "the people may... throw off any government
when it becomes oppressive and intlerable...").
29. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 54 ("men being, as has been said, by nature all free,
equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political
power of another without his own consent'). See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just [P]owers
from the [C]onsent of the [G]overned....").
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people, as the creators of government, held all political power .30 They could
bestow power on political figures, or withhold power and reserve it for
individuals in society as the people deemed appropriate.
Notwithstanding the significance of revolutionary thinking, the
translation of constitutional theory into practice did not result from the
peaceful contemplation of scholars. Government is believed to have arisen
from the desire to fully exploit freedom32 and the necessity of securing self-
protection against others. "Constitutional government," however, arose
much more recently to provide people with protection against other forms of
government. As we approach the revision process, we must remember that
constitutions resulted from governmental oppression.34  Oppressive
government turned the public mind away from obedience to the laws of
kings and toward the laws of reason. Our first responsibility is to assure
that our constitution continues to protect against tyranny.
B. Constitutional Developments in the States
For practical reasons, constitutional theory could not immediately be
put into full practice in Europe. Perhaps because there was a less existing
government to supplant, and the tyrannical monarchies were more remote,
30. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1. While the principle espoused in article I, section 1,
predates any constitution, the language of this provision was undoubtedly adopted from one of
the earlier constitutions of the other states where similar provisions abounded. See, e.g., VA.
CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
3 1. See Holland, supra note 24, at 993 (noting that "[t]he people possessing this plenary
bundle of specific powers were free to confer them on different governments and different
branches of the same government as they deemed best."). Europeans had this discovery thrust
upon them by the French and American revolutions.
32. As previously noted, constitutional law is predicated upon belief that all individuals
possess certain rights which cannot be divested by government. See I TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 1, at 56. People join together under the umbrella of government so that they may better
enjoy those rights. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 54-55.
33. Locke speculated that primitive cultures had no need of constitutional law until
someone among them rose to a position of tyranny. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 124. Mill
proposed that the only justifications for government interference with individual freedom were
"self- protection" and to "prevent harm to others." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13
(Currin V. Shields ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1956) (1859).
34. It was the imposition of government against their will that caused people to develop
systems of self-governance for their own protection. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 114.
35. See id.
36. See Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States
Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REv. 891, 892 (1990) (noting that the colonists were
"[p]olitically... far removed from England" ... and "used to a significant measure of self-
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the principles of free self-governance found more fertile soil on this
continent.
As Tocqueville noted:
The general principles which are the groundwork of modem
constitutions, principles which, in the seventeenth century, were
imperfectly known in Europe, and not completely triumphant even
in Great Britain, were all recognized and established by the laws of
New England: the intervention of the people in public affairs, the
free voting of taxes, the responsibility of the agents of power,
personal liberty, and trial by jury were all positively established
without discussion.
37
Because of continued oppression, the founders of our national
government ultimately declared and sustained independence for the thirteen
individual colonies that then existed.38 However, it was eleven years later, in
1787, before the states joined together under the common bond of a single
national constitution. 39 Before the Federal Constitution was adopted, all of
government"). Notwithstanding ultimate English oversight, "colonial Legislatures
substantially enacted most laws and adopted policies for the colonies." See id.
37. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 41.
38. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). This document
begins:
We hold these [T]ruths to be self-evident, that all [Mien are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure
these [R]ights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
[Plowers from the [C]onsent of the [G]ovemed.
Id.
39. See Clinton, supra note 36, at 891. For the first five years of independence, there
was no national document to bind the colonies together. Id. In 1781, the original colonies
agreed to adopt the Articles of Confederation which, in reality, operated more like a treaty
between the states than a constitution. Id. at 891 n.1. However, many of the states specifically
conditioned their ratification of the Constitution on the ultimate adoption of a bill of rights by
Congress. See id at 911-12. Because of the inadequacies in the Articles of Confederation,
the states reconvened in a second constitutional congress in 1787 which ultimately led to the
adoption of the current United States Constitution in 1789. See generally id at 891.Others
feared that enumerating certain rights would lead to the conclusion that others did not exist.
To allay those fears, Congress also adopted the Ninth Amendment which provides that "'[tihe
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."' Clinton, supra note 36, at 911-12 (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. IX). Still others feared that an enumeration of rights in a Federal Constitution might
somehow be construed to supplant the states as the primary guarantors of individual liberties.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 at 510-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
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the thirteen states had adopted state constitutions.40 Tocqueville noted that
"[t]he form of the Federal government of the United States was the last to be
adopted; and it is in fact nothing more than a summary of those republican
principles which were current in the whole community before it existed, and
independently of its existence.'Al
The state constitutions were entirely unique in the history of
government.42 In addition to the fundamental proposition that all political
power is derived from the people, the state constitutions recognized, and for
the first time resolved, certain problems inherent in the very idea of
government-problems that could threaten the continued existence of self-
government if left uncontrolled.
First, the states recognized that consolidations of power are dangerous
to the public interest.43 Having escaped one king, the people of the thirteen
(discussing the reasons why the Constitution did not contain a bill of rights). To resolve this
concern and others, a Tenth Amendment was adopted which provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
40. See Holland, supra note 24, at 990. In response to a resolution passed by the
Continental Congress in May of 1776, and the signing of the Declaration of Independence, all
of the former colonies established new constitutional governments, and eight had drafted new
constitutions before the end of that year. See id. at 989-90.
41. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 61; see also Holland, supra note 24, at 991-92
(noting that the framers of the United States Constitution had participated in writing and had
lived under 18 state constitutions before they began their work on the Federal Constitution);
James G. Exum, Jr., Rediscovering State Constitutions, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1741, 1741-42 (1992)
(noting that the framers of the Federal Constitution "drew heavily on the experience of
delegates to state constitutional conventions"). Indeed, the foundation for the federal
Constitution was the so-called "Virginia Plan" presented to the Second Continental Congress
on May 29, 1878, as an alternative to amending the Articles of Confederation. See Clinton,
supra note 36, at 898. It incorporated a governmental structure that already existed in many
of the states, which was based on the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, and others. See id. at
911. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (comparing provisions of many
state constitutions with those of the new Federal Constitution).
42. See Holland, supra note 24, at 992 (noting that dividing sovereign power was a
novel idea).
43. Without regard to the form of government (or organization) being discussed, there is
a tendency for power to consolidate or centralize over time in the hands of a single individual
or just a few individuals. While all of the early state constitutions guarded against
consolidation of power in the hands of government officials, it was years later before any steps
were taken to curb corporate power. Pennsylvania considered adopting a provision into its
first constitution that provided "'[t]hat an enormous Proportion of Property vested in a few
individuals is dangerous to the Rights, and destructive of the Common Happiness of Mankind;
and therefore every free State hath a Right by its Laws to discourage the Possession of such
Property."' Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade:
[Vol. 22:391
399
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
1997] Webster IBell 401
colonies were not anxious to find themselves under the control of another.
44
The consolidation and centralization of power outside the hands of the
people to be governed is the essence of tyranny and was the first problem the
framers of state constitutions had to overcome.45 They attacked this problem
in three ways: 1) by distributing the key powers of government among
three different branches, each having some power to control the other two;
2) by further distributing the powers given to government among numerous
offices, thereby liniting any one office's ability to exercise unrestrained
power over the people;4 and 3) by creating constitutions that passed only a
Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and its Influences on American Constitutionalism,
62 TEMP. L. REv. 541, 557 (1989) (quoting ERc FONER, TOM PAiNE AND REVOLUTIONARY
AmERiCA 133 (1976)). However, that proposal was rejected. It was during the Jacksonian era
that states began to introduce constitutional restrictions on the powers of corporations and
banks like those found in the 1838 Florida Constitution, which provided "[tihat perpetuities
and monopolies, are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be allowed." FLA.
CONsT. of 1838 art. I, § 24 (1838). Even stronger more detailed restrictions on corporate
power and influence were adopted into state constitutions during the late 1800s, immediately
prior to and after the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1994). See,
e.g., Snure, supra note 5, at 672-73, 682 (discussing numerous specific restrictions on
monopoly power that were included in the state of Washington's Constitution of 1889).
Avoiding concentrations of power continues to be one of the primary purposes of
constitutional law, the decisions of which continually assert that "rights protection cannot be
entrusted to a monopoly guardian." John Kincaid, Foreward The New Federalism Context
of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 944 (1995).
44. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 24, at 991 (explaining that the newly independent
states were fearfiul of any "central government, particularly one with substantial powers").
45. It was theoretically possible for people to join together and voluntarily place all
political power in the hands of a single individual, or small group of individuals. "[Tihe
United States Constitution does not require a state to separate the exercise of its own
sovereign power horizontally: among an executive, a Legislature, and ajudiciary." Id. at 995
(emphasis added). It is possible, for example, for a state to create a democratic monarchy in
which the people elect a queen and pass all of their powers over to her. However, the framers
of the state constitutions universally chose not to follow that model. To do so would have
been inconsistent with their heritage. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at xix-xxii (discussing
Locke's thought that absolute monarchy is "inconsistent with civil society").
46. The key powers of government include the power to make laws, the power to
execute the laws, and the power to pass judgment on the laws. -See generally, LOCKE, supra
note 25. Article 11 of each of the Florida Constitutions since the Constitution of 1838 has
explicitly provided for the separation of these powers. See FLA. CONST. of 1838 art. If (1839);
FLA. CO NST. of 1861 art. 11 (1861), FLA. CONST. of 1865 art. 11 (1865); FLA. CONST. of 1868
art. 11 (1868); FLA. CoNsT. of 1885 art. If (1885); FLA CONST. art. II, § 3 (1968).
47. For example, the powers of judges are limited in numerous ways. They have no
power to take action at all until some party properly invokes their jurisdiction, which is limited
by the constitution and by general law. See FLA. CONST. art. V (establishing certain courts and
the boundaries of their jurisdiction, directing the Legislature to establish still other courts, and
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portion of the peoples' inherent powers to the states, reserving certain
powers to individuals in the form of rights.48 Some, but not all, of these
49
rights were enumerated in the state constitutions. Ultimately, the addition
of a national constitution was intended to add another layer of protection
against the exercise of tyrannical power.5°
The framers of the state constitutions also recognized that by placing
the power to make governmental decisions in the hands of a majority of the
people, the remaining "political minorities" might suffer injustices. 1 As a
practical matter, it was also unwieldy to expect all individuals to share in
every decision by voting. Thus, to protect against "the tyranny of the
majority, ', 52 and to aid the practical administration of government, the states
authorizing the Legislature to take certain actions with regard to the courts and their
jurisdiction). The decisions of trial judges are normally subject to appeal by disappointed
litigants, and the power of appellate judges is limited to ruling on cases appealed from lower
courts. See id. at §§ 3-5. Appellate judges also normally sit in panels and in order to rule they
must secure the agreement of a majority of the other judges sitting on a panel with them. See
also FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 3(a) (mandating that of the seven justices of the supreme court, five
constitute a quorum and the concurrence of four justices is necessary for a decision); FLA.
CONST. artV, § 4(a) (providing that in each district court of appeal, three judges consider each
case and the concurrence of two is necessary for a decision). See, e.g., FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN.
2.030(a)(1) (establishing panel, quorum, and majority vote requirements for the Supreme
Court of Florida). Similarly, no individual can exercise the power to make laws. Lawmakers
must secure the agreement of a majority of the other legislators who sit in the Legislature with
them before they can exercise any power at all. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
48. The constitutions of all 50 states contain a declaration of rights, bill of rights, or
some other enumeration of individual rights.
49. Article I, section 1 of the Florida Constitution contains an "unenumerated rights
lause" similar to the one found in the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Most other state constitutions contain similar provisions. See generally Louis Karl Bonham,
Unenumerated Rights Clauses in State Constitutions, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (1985).
50. As James Madison said: "[A] double security arises to the rights of the people
[because] [t]he different governments will control each other ... ." TIM FEDERALIST No. 51 at
323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
51. The term "political minorities" must be distinguished from the currently popular
usage of the word "minorities." A group of people in disagreement with the majority on any
issue is a political minority group. A political minority, or majority, can be widely diverse in
all other respects so long as its members share a common view on some political issue. The
greatest strength-and weakness-of a properly functioning democracy is that while the
composition of the political majority shifts and changes as frequently as the issues being
considered, most of the people are in the political majority most of the time. The result is, as
Tocqueville observed, that in the United States, all parties are willing to recognize the rights
of the majority, because they all hope at some time to be able to exercise them to their own
advantage. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 264-80.
52. See I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 254-70 (explaining the view that in a
democracy the omnipotence of the majority poses the greatest threat to the people).
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established systems of representational government. Instead of voting
directly on issues, citizens voted to select individuals from amongst
themselves who would then be given specific, limited powers, through the
constitution, to act on behalf of the whole body of people they represent.!3
Our Federal Constitution, like the state constitutions before it,54 was
based on the principles of what has come to be known as "republican
democracy. 5  As previously noted, the people were very jealous of their
independence and they did not desire to come under the rule of a central
government.5w Nonetheless, they saw the necessity of joining the states
together for certain limited purposes. 57 The theory underlying the nation-
state relationship was that state officials derived their authority directly from
the people via the state constitutions. 8 That authority included the ability to
53. After describing the dangers that result from absolute majority rule, Tocqueville
went on to describe the solution:
If, on the other hand, a legislative power could be so constituted as to
represent the majority without necessarily being the slave of its passions, an
executive so as to retain a proper share of authority [independent of the
people], and a judiciary so as to remain independent of the other two powers,
a government would be formed which would still be democratic while
incurring scarcely any risk of tyranny.
I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 272.
54. Many features of the Federal Constitution were modeled after the earlier
constitutions of other states. See Holland, supra note 24, at 995; Williams, supra note 43, at
541. See generally TE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (drawing comparisons
between the United States Constitution and the state constitutions).
55. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government ... ."). Today when we refer to "republican
democracy, " it is generally understood that we are describing self-government by the people
through the election of representatives who are subject to constitutional controls. See In re
Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment
Session; Constitutionality Vel Non., 414 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1982) (distinguishing between
democracy and republican democracy). However, this understanding has not always been so
clear. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (discussing the many different
forms of government to which the term republic had been applied). It has been said about our
nation's founders that "'[o]nly one thing was certain, Americans believed that republicanism
meant an absence of an aristocracy and a monarchy. Beyond this, agreement vanished ....
Williams, supra note 43, at 550 (quoting Robert Shaihope, Toward a Republican Syntheses:
The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM.
& MARY Q. 49, 72 (1972)).
56. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
57. See WEBSTER, supra note 28, at 220 (discussing the limits imposed on the federal
government by the United States Constitution).
58. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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join together with other states to form a federation or confederation under
the banner of a single constitution.
59
However, the states could grant the federal government no greater
power than they received from their own people, and most of that power
could not be conveyed.60 Thus, the power of the federal government was
intended to be sharply limited to certain specific functions.6' A large portion
of the Federal Constitution is dedicated to defining and establishing
boundaries between the federal and state authorities, thereby limiting the
62federal government's authority to act in contradiction of state power.
C. The Development of Constitutional Law in Florida
63Florida is a comparative newcomer to statehood, and the drafters of
our first state constitution in 183864 undoubtedly relied heavily on the
59. The question of whether the federal government derived its authority directly from
the people or from the states for the benefit of the people has been a point of contention since
the early days of our republic. In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404-05 (1819), the
United States Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he government of the Union ... is,
emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates
from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for
their benefit." Id. In response to that decision, a critic writing under the pseudonym
"Amphictyon" wrote: "The Constitution is not binding on any state, even the smallest,
without its own free and voluntary consent .... The respective states, then in their sovereign
capacity, did delegate the Federal Government its powers, and in so doing were parties to the
compact." SouRcEs AND DOCUMENTs ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788
AND THE FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 309 (Samuel E. Morrison ed., 2d ed
1965).
60. See infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of
nondelegation).
61. "The powers delegated... to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." THE FEDERALIST
No. 45 at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
62. See Holland, supra note 24, at 997. Many provisions of the Federal Constitution
were included specifically to insure the independence of the states, and of course, the entire
Bill of Rights was intended to limit the federal government's power over the people. Other
amendments further define the federal-state relationship. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. II.
63. Florida became a unified entity in 1822 when East Florida and West Florida were
combined into a single territory and did not become a state until 1845. See MORRIS, supra
note 2, at 325. The federal government had established specific requirements that had to be
met before a territory could be admitted to statehood, one of which was a requirement that the
territory have a constitution establishing a Republican form of government.
64. The 1838 Florida Constitution was adopted in 1839 by a margin of only 104 votes.
See CHARLTON W. TEBEAu, A HISTORY OF FLORIDA 126 (1971).
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constitutions of the states that preceded Florida in becoming a part of the
federal republic. More importantly, these early drafters relied on the same
66principles on which those predecessor constitutions were based . They also
relied, to a significant extent, on contemporary writings of the times about
the nature of constitutions and on the fundamental elements of republicanism
and democracy. 67 In addition, they relied to some degree on the Federal
Constitution.
Over the years, the Florida Constitution has been revised numerous
times. The first major revision occurred in 1861, when Florida seceded from
the Union. 9 In 1865, the state created a new post-war constitution that was
intended to help Florida gain readmission to the Union. However, owing to
65. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
66. See TEBEAU, supra note 64, at 126.
67. Some major works produced immediately prior to, or during, the framing of
Florida's first constitution included Tocqueville's Democracy in America, first published in
the United States in 1835. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1. Justice Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution was widely read and relied on by legal scholars, as was Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Law of England. The framers of the 1838 constitution were also
undoubtedly influenced by Jacksonian Democracy. This is evident both in the history of the
1838 convention and in the constitution itself. For example, the populists who swept Andrew
Jackson into the White House feared the banking industry and its influence on government.
See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in II MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 576-89 (Richardson ed., 1897) (explaining that in his opinion "the existing [Bank
of the United States] [was] unauthorized by the constitution, subversive of the rights of the
states, and dangerous to the liberties of the people"). After taking office, Jackson abolished
the central bank. See id. Historical accounts of Florida's 1838 constitutional convention
relate that the convention continued for three times as long as originally planned because the
delegates were deadlocked over banking provisions. See TEBEAU, supra note 64, at 128.
While its other provisions speak forcefully about freedom and liberty, the delegates gave the
Legislature extensive power to regulate banks and corporations and even went so far as to
forbid bankers from holding statewide office or serving in the Legislature. See Holland, supra
note 24, at 1000.
The state constitutions that were written during the presidency of Andrew
Jackson... were often interested in popular sovereignty. Thus, the state constitutions of that
time were often rights-conscious documents. Nearly all Jacksonian era state constitutions
added or expanded Declarations of Rights and.., placed them at the beginning of the
document [as was the case with Florida's constitution of 1838].
Id (citing James A. Henretta, Foreward: Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 819, 819-839 (1991)) (citations omitted).
68. The best evidence we have of direct reliance on the federal document is in the
constitutions themselves. Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Florida Constitution of 1838, for
example, are virtually identical to similar provisions in the Federal Constitution.
69. For a discussion of the 1861 Florida secession convention, see RALPH A. WOOSTER,
THE SECESSION CONVENTIONS OF THE SOUTH 6 (1962).
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the enactment of the Federal Reconstruction Acts70 and continued military
occupation, the 1865 constitution was never fully effective.7'
In 1867, the federal government compelled a state constitutional
convention. 72  Because of its compulsory nature and other circumstances
surrounding its enactment, the constitution produced by that convention-
the 1868 constitution-was never treated by the people of Florida as a
source of real authority.73 After the end of Reconstruction, the 1868
constitution was ultimately abandoned, and the 1885 constitution was
adopted to take its place.
74
70. See Reconstruction Acts, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867); ch.
30, 15 Stat. 14 (1867); ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41 (1868); ch. 3, 16 Stat. 59 (1868).
71. See TEBEAU, supra note 64, at 247 (noting that the federal military presence
continued in Florida after 1865).
72. The first Reconstruction Act divided the South into five military districts and placed
Florida, as well as the other secessionist states, under formal military rule. See Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). Military rule did not cause dramatic changes in Florida,
since the state had been under military occupation since the end of the war anyway. The
second, or supplemental, Reconstruction Act established procedures for conducting state
conventions to establish new state constitutions that would satisfy certain requirements
established by the federal government in the Act. See WILLIAM WATSON DAVIS, THE CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN FLORIDA 446-47 (1964).
73. The 1867 convention was in itself highly controversial. See Richard L. Hume,
Membership of the Florida Constitutional Convention of 1868: A Case Study of Republican
Factionalism in the Reconstruction South, 51 Fla. Hist. Q. (1972). There were serious doubts
about the credentials and authority of its participants. See DAVIS, supra note 72, at 491-516.
In addition to the fact that the state was still under military rule, the voting districts were
heavily gerrymandered to favor Republican candidates, and the referendum on the new
constitution appears to have been further marred by widespread voter fraud. See R.L. Peek,
Lawlessness and the Restoration of Order in Florida, 1868-1871, at 53-60 (1964)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida) (on file with the University of Florida).
One of the more extreme examples of the confusion that reigned in Florida during the years
after the adoption of the Constitution of 1867 culminated in Governor Reed being forced to
seek an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court of Florida to determine whether the
Legislature had been successful in impeaching and removing him from office. See DAVIS,
supra note 72, at 544-56. The court determined that Reed had not been removed from office,
in part, because four members of Legislature that were necessary to achieve a quorum had
accepted appointments to state office from Reed prior to the vote on his impeachment. Id.
Reed had declared their legislative seats vacant prior to the impeachment vote; thus, the
impeachment vote failed for lack of a quorum. Id. Before these issues were resolved,
however, Lieutenant Governor Gleason, with the cooperation of Secretary of State Alden, had
declared himself to be Governor. ld. Ultimately, Gleason was removed from office as the
result of an action in quo warranto filed by Reed; Secretary of State Alden was impeached.
Id.
74. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 8-9.
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Although frequently amended," the 1885 constitution continued in
force until it was replaced by the 1968 constitution. Florida's government
continues to operate under the authority of the 1968 constitution. As
previously noted, the 1968 constitution removed much extraneous political
material from the 1885 constitution, with the intent to improve the
constitution's ability to serve its basic purposes.76
As was the case with the constitution of 1838, the 1968 constitution is
a distinctly populist document that now includes five different methods of
amendment,8 and an explicit statement that all political power originates
with the people.79 It also contains an explicit separation of powers clause,0
sharp limits on the creation of laws by the legislative branch,8' some unique
82 8local government provisions, and a strong system of checks and balances.8 3Finally, it contains the written embodiment of certain rights its authors
75. For a general discussion of the amendments to the 1885 and 1968 constitutions, see
id. at 9-11. The complete text of each of the amendments to Florida's constitution, including
the Constitution of 1885, can be found at the World Wide Web cite of the Constitution
Revision Commission. See Revision Commission (visited July 7, 1997)
<http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/>.
76. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 13.
77. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing populist influences on the
Florida Constitution of 1838).
78. See FLA. CONST. art. XI. California has recently established a Constitution Revision
Commission by statute. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8275 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). Florida,
meanwhile, is the only state that has an independent, constitutionally-established Constitution
Revision Commission. Florida also has a constitutionally established Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission, which has the power to make proposals relating to tax and budget
issues. In addition to these two commissions, Florida also allows amendment through citizen
initiative, legislative proposal, and constitutional convention. See FLA. CONST. art. XI.
79. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
80. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
81. Besides the usual majority vote and quorum requirements, the Florida Constitution
contains limitations on "special" and "local" legislation, id at art. III, § 11, as well as on
"appropriations bills." Id at art. III, §§ 12, 19. It also requires that bills be read three times,
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7, that the title of a bill describe its contents, id. at § 6, and that every
bill be limited to one subject. Id These types of provisions were commonly included in state
constitutions to limit the distribution of special privileges by the Legislature and to prevent
surreptitious legislative action. See Holland, supra note 24, at 1001.
82. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII.
83. See id at art. II, § 3; art. III, §§ 3(c)(1), 8, 16(c), (e), (f), 17. D'Alemberte attributes
our strong system of checks and balances to a conscious effort on the part of those who
created the 1885 constitution-from which many of the current constitution's checks and
balances are derived-to cure the governmental abuses that occurred during the
Reconstruction era. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 8-9.
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84considered inalienable. As will be discussed, it also contains other
significant provisions that limit governmental power over the people.
IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
Over the years, scholars and courts have employed a wide range of
methods for analyzing constitutions. Some principal methods include:
deriving the meaning of the constitution from the pure and literal meaning of
its text ("textualist"), 5 finding meaning in the intent of the framers
("originalist"), 86 and treating the constitution as a living document that must
be interpreted to conform to the immediate needs of modem society
("interpretivist"). 7 However, for the purposes of this article the constitution
84. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
85. The text of any constitution must, of course, be given great weight. Any analysis
should begin with the literal meaning of the constitution's text, and, where the text is
completely unambiguous, we should adhere to its plain language in determining what its
creators intended. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 374 So. 2d 959 (Fla.
1979) (construing the Florida Constitution by applying the plain ordinary meaning of the
language it contains).
86. Where ambiguity exists, or where it has been injected by those who execute the laws
or by judicial decision, we should look for clarification in the origins of our constitution and
the reasoning of those who created it. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547
(1969) (relying heavily on the constitutional debates at the 1787 Philadelphia convention);
Bailey v. Ponce de Leon Port Auth., 398 So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1981) (noting that in
construing state constitution courts must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers);
Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1978) (court must interpret state constitution in a
way that will best fulfill the intent of the framers).
87. An early example of the interpretivist philosophy can be seen in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland, in which John Marshall wrote that "a
constitution [is] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis
omitted). Thomas Jefferson responded to the decision in M'Culloch with the comment that
"the judiciary of the United States is the subtle core of sappers and miners constantly working
underground to undermine the foundations of our federal constitution." THE PORTABLE
JEFFERSON 994-95 (Peterson ed. 1975). Yet, allowing room for some interpretation may
reduce the extent to which we feel compelled to include large bodies of otherwise unnecessary
material in our constitutions. As Governor Coke of Texas once said: "It will be found
universally true that those State constitutions which contain the smallest number of provisions,
[and] which adhere most closely to fundamental declarations ... have been the wisest and
most enduring." John Walker Mauer, State Constitutions in a Time of Crisis: The Case of the
Texas Constitution of 1876, 68 TEX. L. REv 1615, 1634 (1990) (quoting S.J. 555, 14th Leg.,
Ist Sess. (Tex. 1874)). However, not every problem has an answer in the constitution, and it
should not be interpreted to provide answers to problems that are not constitutional in nature.
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is not being applied to a specific set of facts. Rather, under consideration is
whether the constitution's provisions are serving the purposes for which they
were intended.8
A constitution may properly be regarded as a document in which the
people set forth the structure of the government, including any powers they
wish to convey to the government from themselves, and including any
instructions they wish to include about how those powers are to be
distributed, retained, altered, or removed.8 9  It may also include an
enumeration of rights, but that is not strictly necessary because individual
rights are considered inherent in the individuals for whom the government
was created. 90 Given these factors, and the purpose of this article which is to
The answers to most legal problems-and to social problems that can be addressed by law-
can be found in the common and statutory law. See Holland, supra note 24, at 1000-01
(discussing that most of what we conceive to be rights can be found in the "common law").
See also Akhil Reed Amar, Forward: Lord Camden Meets Federalism-using State
Constitutions to Counter FederalAbuses, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 845, 849-58 (1996) (explaining by
hypothetical that violations of the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
searches could often be more successfully redressed under the state trespass laws). But see
Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REv 215, 216-29 (1992)
(discussing the unfortunate extent to which state courts merely parrot federal judicial opinions
in applying state constitutions). Linde notes that "[o]nce the United States Supreme Court
used the label 'privacy' for claims of personal relationships and autonomy, any mention of
'privacy' in a state constitution became talismanic, regardless of its origins, context, or evident
purposes ..... Id. at 224 n.58. Where no answers can be found in the common or statutory
law, solutions can be created through the democratic processes authorized under the
constitution.
88. A constitution serves as the bedrock upon which the remainder of the positive law of
a particular jurisdiction (in this case Florida) is built. If restricted to appropriate constitutional
purposes, it should serve as one of the great forces for stability in the law and in society. To
the extent that a constitution strays from those purposes, the government and the people are
less well-served and their respective interests may be endangered. Of course, the difficulty
lies in agreeing upon the things that are "constitutional" in nature. For example, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida, Gerald Kogan, a member of the 1997-98 Constitution
Revision Commission, suggested that a ban on certain kinds of fishing nets does not belong in
the Florida Constitution. JOURNAL OF THE 1997-1998 CONSTITUTION REvISION COMMSSiON,
No. 2 (June 17, 1997). However, those who disagree with Justice Kogan correctly noted that
the citizens' initiative to ban fishing nets resulted from the Legislature's failure to pass a bill
directed to the issue. See, e.g., David Cox, Constitution panel hears net-ban debate, TAMPA
TRMUNE, July 23, 1997, at A19; Citizens Should Be Able To Petition For Change. How?,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, July 27, 1997, at B19.
89. See James M. Carson, The Constitution and the New Deal, Address Before the
Birmingham Forum (Dec. 16, 1935), for an excellent description of constitutions as charters
or contracts between citizens and government.
90. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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consider first "principles," the authors rely primarily on what can be fairly
described as a "functional analysis" of Florida's Constitution.
A. Protecting Against Tyranny: The Separation of Powers
"In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."9'
Tyranny arises most easily when all power is concentrated in the hands of a
single person or in the hands of just a few. A constitution that divides power
in numerous ways and in numerous directions will best serve the
constitutional function of protecting against tyranny. 92  Accordingly, the
Florida Constitution, the United States Constitution, and the constitutions
of the remaining forty-nine states divide government into three branches:
the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary.
Dividing government powers on paper, however, does no good, if the
divisions are not respected in practice. The federal government and the
states vary in the extent to which they allow one branch of government to
engage in the essential functions of another. About his vision for the federal
system, Madison commented:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
91. THE FEDERALISTNO. 51 at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
92. Tyranny can arise in other ways as well, such as from bureaucracy. Indeed, once a
bureaucratic tyranny has arised it may be more difficult to eliminate than a tyranny of any
other kind.
93. Morley stated:
It may be said that the federal form was historically ordained, by the fact that
the original thirteen colonies were separately established and had by the time
of the Revolution developed widely differing political and social customs.
Only a system which protected those diversities could combine these varying
units in a general unity. But behind the determination to keep the rights of
the several States inviolate was the even deeper determination to protect the
citizens of these states from centralized governmental oppression.
MORLEY, supra note 93, at 10.
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of the people. The different governments will control each other,
at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
94
Thus, the framers of the Federal Constitution intended to create a
system incorporating strong divisions of power. However, through judicial
acquiescence and the constant pressure the branches of government exert on
95 96each other95 those divisions have largely given way.
The Florida Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, contains an
explicit separation of powers requirement.97 The purpose of this provision
was to limit the extent to which any branch of government may perform
functions assigned by the constitution to another branch.98  Florida courts
have indicated that Florida's separation of powers requirement is stronger
than the federal requirement because it is explicit.
99
Under Florida's doctrine against encroachment, no branch of
government may encroach on the powers delegated to another branch by the
94. TiE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison, in using the term "departments" was referring here to the three branches of
government that exist in both the state and national governments. See id.; MORLEY, supra
note 91, at 232 n.1.
95. Constitutional republics are deliberately structured in a manner that results in some
friction between the branches. As James Madison noted: "Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition .... It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices [checks and
balances] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?" THm FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). However, just as competitors in the private
sector sometimes enter into tacit agreements not to compete, the branches of government may
each sometimes quietly acquiese to encroachments on authority by the other two branches.
With regard to the federal-state relationship it has been noted that "vigorous state
constitutionalism is imperative because it perpetuates the scheme of dispersal of powers
envisioned by the framers." Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 421, 433 (1996). For the same reasons, it is equally
important to maintain the checks and balances that exist within a state's government. See
infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the valuable competitive elements of
constituitional government).
96. The United States Supreme Court has not entered a decision finding an unlawful
delegation of the lawmaking power since 1935. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
433 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935).
Indeed, the Court has only rarely upheld any separation of powers principle. But see,
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983).
97. See FLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
98. See, e.g., Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So. 2d 280, 284 (Fla. 1953).
99. See, e.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978).
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constitution.100 For example, the Legislature cannot reserve to itself the right
to execute the laws it creates because the power to execute the laws is
reserved to the executive branch.10 1 Similarly, an officer of the executive
branch cannot engage in lawmaking-a function that, because of its supreme
nature, is reserved exclusively to the legislative branch'02 -adjudicate the
rights or claims of an individual, a function reserved to the judicial branch.103
A concordant policy, the doctrine of non-delegation, was intended to
prevent the Legislature from delegating its lawmaking power to either of the
other two branches of government. While it could, and should, be given
stronger effect, the courts have at least found that the doctrine forbids the
Legislature from delegating its core functions without any guidance or limits
as to how those functions are to be exercised. 1 4  The doctrine against
encroachment and the doctrine of non-delegation are valuable policies
derived from hundreds of years of wisdom. While these doctrines can
provide the people with a high level of protection against tyranny, the
division of powers is not as strong as it once was. We have not been careful
in guarding against a merger of the functions of government in the hands of a106
single branch. Accordingly, the Revision Commission should consider
100. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
101. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 82 ("[B]ecause it may be too great a temptation to
human frailty... for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in
their hands the power to execute them...
102. See FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 7.
103. See id at art. V, § 1.
104. See, e.g., Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
105. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 82 (asserting that "the legislative neither must nor can
transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people
have").
106. For example, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (The Administrative Procedures Act),
allows agencies of the executive branch to engage in lawmaking by establishing rules that
govern the behavior of businesses and individuals. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (Supp. 1996). After
creating their own rules, agencies execute the rules and even conduct adjudicatory
proceedings with regard to those who claim to be adversely affected by the agencies' actions.
Id. Thus, it is not atypical for a single individual-an agency head-to make laws, enforce the
same laws, and adjudicate rights under those laws. Id. Florida appellate courts have allowed
this melding of constitutional functions because the agencies rules and actions are subject to
review in the courts. However, when an aggrieved individual proceeds in the courts against
an agency's actions undertaken pursuant to Chapter 120, the agency's interpretations of both
rules and statutes, and its findings of fact are generally presumed to be correct. See, e.g.,
Ameristeel Corp. v. Clark, et. al., 691 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1997) (finding that a party challenging
an order of the Public Service Commission must overcome presumptions as to the
Commission's jurisdiction, reasonableness of the order, and deference owed to the agency's
interpretation of the statute it is charged with enforcing); Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa
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whether the separation of powers under the Florida Constitution, and its
related doctrines, can be strengthened.
B. The Legislative Branch
John Locke saw the establishment of legislative power as the first and
foremost of all positive laws. He called the law-making function the
"supreme power of the commonwealth"'0 7 because it is the responsibility of
the legislative branch to make laws that will govern all, including the
executive and the judiciary.! Accordingly, he believed that some sharp
controls on the legislative power were necessary.'0 9 The first of these
controls is, of course, the people themselves, who protect against the rise of
tyranny through their ability to remove legislators from office by the power
of their votes.110 A second control on the Legislature is the fact that the
lawmaking power is never concentrated in the hands of a single person or of
a small group of people. In Florida, the constitution divides the Legislature
between two separate houses-the House of Representatives, with one-
hundred and twenty members, and the Senate, with forty members.' Both
houses must agree, by a majority vote of its respective members, before a
law can be created, amended, or repealed."12  Still a third control on the
Legislature, suggested by Locke and applied successfully in Florida, is the
Political Comn., 625 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1993) (finding that the judgment of officials carrying
out the elections process shall be presumed to be correct and reasonable); Xerox Corp. v.
Blake, 415 So. 2d 1308, 1311 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), decision quashed by 447 So. 2d
1348 (Fla. 1984) (finding that tax assessment is presumed to be correct and any person
challenging an assessment must present proof which excludes every hypothesis of legal
assessment).
107. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 75. However, he also noted that in areas governed by
a legislative power that is not constantly in session, and in which the executive power is
vested in a single individual who also has a share of the legislative power, that person might
also be called "supreme." Id. at 85. Thus, under Locke's analysis, Florida retains supreme
power in its elected representatives only by preventing its Governor from exercising any
legislative power. This is perhaps why the framers of the Florida Constitution included an
explicit prohibition against delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. See supra
notes 101-08.
108. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 85-86.
109. See id. at 84-91.
110. See id at 84; see also FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 13.
111. The constitution requires that there be between 30 and 40 senatorial districts and
80 and 120 representative districts. See FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 16. The exact number of
districts is established by the Legislature, and as previously noted, there are currently 40
Senate Districts and 120 House Districts.
112. Id. at art. III, § 7. A two-thirds vote is required to override a law vetoed by the
Governor. Id. at § 8.
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part-time Legislature." 3 Locke correctly noted that there is not a constant
need for new laws. 114 Accordingly, it is best that legislators meet on a part-
time basis and then return home to live under the laws they have
created." 5 Finally, the Legislature is controlled by the executive veto
power.116 Any law created by the Florida Legislature is subject to veto by
the Governor.
Florida's Constitution also has a significant set of rules that the
Legislature must follow in creating laws, including restrictions on the kinds
of laws it can make.' The Florida Constitution may be considered superior
to some others, in part, because of these rules. For example, the "single
subject rules" 1 9 found in the Florida Constitution have caused our state to
develop a body of statutory law and an appropriations process that are far
more clear and well-reasoned than those produced under the Federal
Constitution. 120 The great significance of these seemingly modest provisions
lies in the fact that they are the only constraints, outside the Federal
Constitution,'12 on the Legislature's ability to make any laws it chooses. The
people can only be secure in granting the Legislature such broad power to
113. Id. at art. III, § 3.
114. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 86.
115. "Constant, frequent meetings of the legislative, and long continuations of their
assemblies without necessary occasion, could not but be burdensome to the people and must
necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniences ..... Id, at 88.
116. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8.
117. The ability to override the Governor's veto with a two-thirds vote of each house of
the Legislature establishes a constitutional control over the executive's veto power that
prevents the Governor from gaining control over the Legislature through its use. See id. at §
8(c).
118. Id. at art. III, § 11 (prohibiting certain special and local laws.).
119. Id. at art. III, § 6 (governing general acts of the Legislature and appropriations
bills, respectively).
120. The absence of similar rules in the United States Constitution leaves Congress free
to engage in "logrolling," a practice that involves combining unpopular legislation with
popular legislation to assure that the unpopular legislation will become law.
121. U.S. CONST. art. VI (supremacy clause).
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make laws, so long as there is a guiding foundation of moral law122 contained
in the constitution, to which all other law is subservient.
23
One would also hope that in making legislative decisions, the
Legislature would avoid creating laws that are sharply opposed to natural
human interests or behaviors. Anticipating Lyndon Johnson's selection of
the term "Great Society" to describe his unfortunate social agenda, Adam
Smith once said:
[Man] seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members
of the great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the
pieces upon a chessboard; he does not consider that the pieces
upon the chessboard have no other principle of motion than that
which the hand. impresses upon them; but that, in the great
chessboard of human society, every single piece has a principle of
motion of its own, altogether different from that which the
Legislature may wish to impress upon it. If those two principles
coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society
will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy
and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will go
122. As Justice Douglas said about rights, "the law must have a broad base in morality,
to protect man, his individuality and his conscience, against direct and indirect interference by
government." WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE (Alma Reese Candi ed.,
1958). Without moral foundation the law would be arbitrary, and over time it would not be
respected by those who are subjected to its power. Hence, without a moral basis for law, the
government would ultimately lose its ability to motivate the people except through coercive
means.
123. Murder, for example, is not wrong because it is illegal; it is illegal because it is
wrong. The law against murder has a moral foundation in the constitution which is established
for the benefit and protection of the lives, liberty, and property of those who live under it.
Tocqueville's discussion of this country's laws in 1831 reflects an understanding that a
society's laws can do little more than reflect the values of the people in that society. See
generally, I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 321-22. That linkage between the law and morality
persists in the public consienceness and is frequently reflected in public commentary. See,
e.g., CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS AcT 227 (1985). The authors quote the speech given by President
Lyndon Johnson upon signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in which he stated with regard
to racial injustice: "Our Constitution, the foundation of our Republic, forbids it. Morality
forbids it. And the law I will sign... forbids it." Commenting on the Civil Rights Act,
Johnson said: "Its purpose is to promote a more abiding commitment to freedom, a more
constant pursuit of justice, and a deeper respect for human dignity. We will achieve these
goals because most Americans are law-abiding citizens who want to do what is right."). Id. at
227-28.
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on miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest
degree of disorder.1
24
Where the law allows them to do so, bureaucrats and other authorities
will impose unreasonable expectations on an unwilling populace. 125 This is
one of the principle reasons why our foundational legal document should be
applied to limit the exercise of legislative power by executive branch
officials.
126
C. The Executive Branch
The executive branch is responsible for executing the laws the
legislative branch creates. 12  While there is, as Locke suggested, an area of
executive "prerogative" that arises from the Legislature's inability to foresee
all circumstances in which immediate action might be required, 128 the
executive risks being discredited whenever it acts without explicit legislative
authorization. Consequently, it is constrained to act only in those ways
unlikely to create public controversy.
129
In establishing the executive branch of government, the Florida
Constitution goes further than most other constitutions to protect the public
from tyranny by assigning certain duties and responsibilities to particular
officers and agencies of the government. 30 Unlike the constitutions of some
124. ADAM SMITH, THBE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENT 233-34 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Mafie eds., Oxford 1976) (1759).
125. See generally id.
126. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrines of
unlawful delegation and encroachment).
127. FLA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
128. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 92. Locke, however, contended that there might be some
instances in which the executive has the prerogative to act even against the law. See id. at 93-
94.
129. See id. at 94 (noting that prerogative is always largest in the hands of the wisest
and best princes, because it may always be quickly restrained if exercised against the public's
will).
130. See FLA. CONST. art. IV. One positive effect of these distributions of power is to
establish numerous opportunities for citizen input and numerous ways by which citizens can
redress their grievances. One arguably negative consequence is that there may be some
duplication of government services with an attendant duplication of expense and
inconvenience to those involved in the process. However, it is as true of the Florida
Constitution as it is of the United States Constitution that while it imposes burdens that may
seem "clumsy, inefficient, [and] even unworkable .... There is no support in the
Constitution ... for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in
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other states, the Florida Constitution does not vest all executive power in the
state's Governor. It establishes the Governor as the state's chief executive
officer,13 1 but then proceeds to divide the executive power among a wide
range of other executive officers and agencies.
132
Florida's Constitution is particularly unique in that it has an elected
Cabinet consisting of six officers. 133 Not unexpectedly, it has been a source
of vexation to many governors, including the current one, that the Office of
Governor must share its power with members of the cabinet who may be
political opponents.134  However, establishing some competition at the
complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided ...." INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
131. FLA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
132. Id. at §§ 4,6,9.
133. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a). The offices of Secretary of State and
Treasurer/Comptroller were originally established in the Florida Constitution of 1838. FLA.
CONST. of 1838, art. III, §§ 14, 23. Like all of the state's justices and judges, these executive
branch officials were elected by a majority vote of both houses of the Legislature. See id. at
art. V, § 11 (providing for justices and judges to be elected by the state Legislature). Id. at art.
III, § 14 (establishing office of Secretary of State and providing for election by the
Legislature); id. at art. III, § 23 (creating and providing for election by the Legislature of a
"Treasurer and Comptroller of Public Accounts"). This first constitutionally authorized
Legislature was quite powerful in relation to the other two branches of government. In
addition to its power to make all judicial appointments, and the power to appoint key
executive branch officers, the Florida Constitution of 1838 vested sole authority to amend or
revise the constitution in the hands of the Legislature. Id at art. XIV, §§ 1, 2. While the
Governor was given veto power over legislation, the veto could be overridden by a simple
majority confirming the Legislature's will. FA CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 16.
The Constitution of 1868 provided for the Governor to appoint and be "assisted" by a
nine-member Cabinet of "administrative officers" consisting of a Secretary of State, Attorney
General, Comptroller, Treasurer, Surveyor General, Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Adjutant General, and Commissioner of Immigration. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 17.
However, this expansion of the Governor's powers lasted only briefly. The Legislature
amended the constitution in 1870 to once again provide for the popular election of Cabinet
officers. See Amendments to the Constitution of 1868, General Assembly of 1870 (Article III,
Cabinet Elections) (adopted February 12, 1870). Under the Constitution of 1868, the
Governor and Cabinet served on a "Board of Commissioners of State Institutions," which,
much like the modem Florida Cabinet, was assigned particular responsiblities by the
Legislature. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 20. The Constitution of 1885 reduced the number
of executive branch officers to seven, including the Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney
General, Comptroller, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Commissioner of
Agriculture, and continued to provide for them to be elected rather than appointed. FIA
CONST. of 1885, art. IV, § 20.
134. In the economic arena, it is commonly understood that competition drives down
prices and produces higher levels of value for consumers. The early framers of constitutional
government understood that in a divided government there would be competition among the
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highest levels of executive decision making sometimes causes an
extraordinary level of inquiry and public debate to surround thosedecisions. 135
In those areas of policy that require them to work with the cabinet,
Florida's governors are undoubtedly more restrained and less capricious in
making decisions.136  This provides some worthwhile protection for the
people. While some Cabinet reform may be appropriately considered by the
Revision Commission, 137 the elimination of the elected Cabinet would not
different divisions, and their comments reflect that understanding. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
No. 73 at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that in a divided
government, no branch of government "[must] be left to the mercy of the other."). Id. at 442.
Each branch "ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defense." Id.
Madison described the purpose of presidential veto power in similar competitive language
stating that "[tihe primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the executive
is to enable him to defend himself." THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
135. A recent example of the extent to which the Cabinet can focus public attention on
an issue involved a decision over whether to allow Florida Power and Light Company to burn
a controversial fuel called "Orimulsion" at one of its power generating facilities. Individuals,
environmental groups, and others offered testimony that consumed several days, generating
hundreds of press reports. See, e.g., Orimulsion Hearings Delayed Until Jan. 15, ST.
PETERSBURG TmiEs, October 22, 197, at F26; FPL Being Too Slick on Orimulsion Details,
PALM BEACH POST, October 17, 1997, at G27; Robert P. King, Tar Fuel's Next Stop:
Indiantown?, PALM BEACH POST, October 14, 1997, at E26; David Cox, Cabinet May Seek
Delay in Hearing on Orimulsion, TAMPA TRIB., October 10, 1997, at C26; Jeremy Wallace,
FPL Files Timeline for Fuel Hearing, BRADENTON HERALD, October 4, 1997, at D26; Jeremy
Wallace, Orimulsion Hearing Set, BRADENTON HERALD, October 4, 1997, at B26; Alan Judd,
FPL's Case on Fuel Sticky, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., June 15, 1997, at A26.
136. A common complaint about Florida's elected Cabinet is that the agencies placed
under Cabinet supervision lack accountability because they do not answer to a single
individual. However, the vast majority of the Cabinet's responsibilities were established by the
Legislature-not the constitution. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 20.24(1) (1995) (placing the
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles under the control of the Cabinet); id. at §
20.21(1) (1995) (placing the Florida Department of Revenue under the control of the
Cabinet); id. at § 20.201(1) (1995) (placing the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
under the control of the Cabinet). The Legislature is free to reassign the Cabinet's current
duties to the Governor, or to individual Cabinet officers, or to the extent that the Legislature
believes the agencies under the Cabinet lack accountability it can impose additional controls.
Thus, it does not appear that constitutional amendments are necessary to resolve this issue.
137. The Legislature has not always considered whether the functions it assigned to the
Cabinet were of an executive, legislative, or judicial nature. While it is within the executive
branch, the Cabinet now exercises some power associated with each of the three branches of
government. The Commission should consider alleviating this condition.
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serve any useful purpose. It would limit public debate and increase the
Governor's power at the expense of the people.
138
The division of executive and legislative branch power does not stop
with the cabinet. The Florida Constitution creates a multitude of
constitutional agencies, offices, and commissions. These offices and
agencies vary in the extent to which they are subject to the Governor's139
power and some agencies even have a measure of independence fromlegislative oversight.'4 These additional distributions of power were
138. The strength of the Office of Florida's Governor is commonly underestimated. The
office, as it is currently comprised, is really quite strong, both in comparison to the office as it
was comprised under earlier Florida constitutions, see supra note 133, and in comparison to
the Office of Governor as it is comprised in other states. With the adoption of legislative and
Cabinet term limits, see FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2, 4, the Governor's position vis-a-vis the
Legislature and the Cabinet has been strengthened. The Governor is the state's chief budget
officer and shares that power with no other state official. Morris, supra note 2, at 13. The
Governor's budget powers, and the ability to control programs, have been further expanded
through an amendment to the constitution that gives the executive line item veto power. FLA.
CONST. art. III § 8. And, while the Governor does not appoint Cabinet officers he or she does
appoint the member of over 438 state boards, and makes more than 4000 appointments during
his or her term of office. Morris, supra note 2 at 18-19. Moreover, history shows that a
Governor's greatest power is the opportunity as the state's chief executive officer to lead by
establishing values and standards - leading by moral suasion and example rather than by edict.
See id.
139. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a)(2) (15 of the 37 members of the Constitution
Revision Commission are appointed by the Governor. The Governor also designates the
chairman); id. at art. II, § 8(f) (providing for an independent Commission on Ethics); FLA.
STAT. § 112.321(1) (1995) (five of the nine members of the Commission on Ethics are
appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 9
(all five members of the Game and Freshwater Fish Commission are appointed by the
Governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate); id. at art. V, § 12(a)(3) (five of the 15
members of the Judicial Qualifications Commission are appointed by the Governor); id. at art.
V, § 11 (d) (providing for a judicial nominating commission to be established by general law);
FLA. STAT. § 43.29(1)(b) (1995) (three of the nine members of the judicial nominating
commission are appointed by the Governor); FLA. CONST. -art. IV, § 12 (providing that the
Legislature may establish a Department of Elderly Affairs); FLA. STAT. § 20.41(1) (1995) (the
head of the Department of Elderly Affairs is appointed by the Governor, subject to
confirmation by the Senate); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 11 (providing that the Legislature may
establish a Department of Veteran Affairs); FLA. STAT. § 20.37(1) (1995) (the head of the
Department of Veteran Affairs is the Governor and the Cabinet. The executive director of the
department is appointed by the Governor with the approval of three members of the Cabinet
and subject to confirmation by the Senate).
140. Constitutional commissions and agencies include the following: the Constitution
Revision Commission itself, FLA. CoNST. art. XI, § 2, the Taxation and Budget Reform
Commission, id. at art. XI, § 6; the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission, id. at art.
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intended to protect the people from tyranny. However, where any of these
offices is not subject to an adequate system of checks and balances, they can
become tyrannies within their area of authority. It may also be true that
some agencies and offices have outlived their usefulness. It would behoove
the Revision Commission to examine each of these agencies and offices
carefully to consider whether they are subject to adequate controls in the
form of checks and balances, whether they have continuing vitality, and
whether they serve a constitutional purpose.
4 2
D. The Judicial Branch
Even when ruled by a king, "[b]etwixt subject and subject . . . there
must be measures, laws, and judges . . . . The third branch of
government, the judiciary, which has been called the least dangerous
branch,144 was developed in society to substitute for two powers that people
had in nature. 45 The first is the power to do whatever one sees fit to assure
self preservation. 146 The second is the power to punish those who attempt to
IV, § 9; the Commission on Ethics, id. at art. II, § 8(f); the Judicial Nominating and
Qualifications Commissions, id. at art. V, §§ I l(d), 12(a); the Department of Elderly Affairs,
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 12; and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Id. at art. IV, § 11.
Constitutional officers include the following: Governor, id. at art. IV, § 1; Lieutenant
Governor, id. at art. IV, § 2; Cabinet officers, id at art. IV, § 4; the members of the
Legislature, FLA. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; the judiciary, id. at art. V, § 1; the clerks of the circuit
courts, id. at art. V, § 16; supervisor of elections, id. at art. VIII, § 1(d); state attorneys, id. at
art. V, § 17; and public defenders, FLA. CONST. art. V, § 18; property appraisers, id. at art.
VIII, § 1(d); constitutionally elected sheriffs, and tax collectors. Id. While they are not
constitutionally required under all circumstances, the constitution authorizes the creation of
county commissioners, id. at art. VIII, § 1(e), and all 67 counties have done so.
141. To employ a simple example, if property appraisers were given unlimited power to
appraise property without constitutional or statutory guidance, and without any controls by
other agencies, officers, or courts, they would have tyrannical power within the area of
authority given to them by the constitution. Even this modest power could be expanded to
great lengths if not subject to adequate checks and balances. While the authors use the Office
of Property Appraiser in this example, the authors do not intend to disparage property
appraisers, or suggest that this particular office should be abolished or altered. The authors'
purpose is to suggest that the Revision Commission examine constitutional offices to assure
that they are subject to adequate checks and balances.
142. Some agencies and officers could, perhaps, be as effective if they were created by
statute.
143. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 52.
144. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
145. See LocKE, supra note 25, at 72.
146. Id.
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infringe the right of self preservation. 47 Upon joining society, a person
gives up both of these rights, but in exchange receives the support of the
civil authorities to accomplish these matters on his behalf.14
In western society, these objectives are accomplished through the law
of torts, the criminal law, and the laws of free economy that allow parties to
apportion rights, duties, and privileges amongst themselves with the support
of the government. 49 If these remedies ceased to be available the people
would resort to self-help, as if in nature. Furthermore, since as Locke noted,
"[t]he great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their
properties in peace and safety. . . ."150 there would be no reason for people to
continue under the laws of a society if these interests were not protected.
151
Article V of the Florida Constitution establishes a system of courts and
judges consistent with the fundamental purpose of the judiciary by
establishing that all judicial officers of the state shall be "conservators of the
peace.""152 As Tocqueville explained:
The great end ofjustice is to substitute the notion of right or that of
violence .... The moral force which courts of justice possess
renders the use of physical force very rare and is frequently
substituted for it; but if force proves to be indispensable, its power
is doubled by its association with the idea of law.
153
Thus, the principal function of the judiciary is public and private dispute
resolution. 15 The courts have the power under article V to review the
constitutionality of legislative acts. But, like the other branches of
government, the courts are confined to the exercise of those powers assigned
to them under the constitution. The courts must take care that, in rendering
their opinions, they do not go beyond the Legislature's intent, thereby
147. Id Having given up the authority to protect their own interests through force,
individuals may now rely on the government to act on their behalf Id
148. See id
149. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 72-73.
150. Id. at 75.
151. See id
152. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 19.
153. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 145.
154. See generally id. (noting that the judiciary is an alternative to violent dispute
resolution).
155. See FLA. CONST. art. V (explicitly providing for the supreme court to review
decisions of the district and circuit courts affecting the constitutionality of statutes, thereby
implicitly establishing the power of "judicial review" in the lower courts). Id. at art. V, §
3(b)(3).
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creating new laws of their own156 Similarly, it is beyond the power of the
courts to execute the laws.
157
Florida's judicial officers have enormous independence. Appellate
judges, including the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida, do not stand
for popular election as do the officers of the executive and legislative
branches. 58 Instead, they are initially appointed and must stand for a merit
retention election every six years thereafter.159 If a majority of the electors
casting ballots do not vote for retention, the Governor must appoint a
replacement.160 The practical effect of merit retention elections has been to
give judges permanent tenure, subject only to the requirement that they retire
at age seventy.' 61 Because this is the case, some have expressed concern that
Florida's judges are too far removed from the public will. 162
Judes, like all other public officers, derive their power from the
people." ' If the judiciary is not subject to adequate checks and balances,
judges, like other public officers, can exert tyrannical power over the
people. 64 Unlike officers of the executive and legislative branches who are
directly responsible to a majority of the voters, judges should be free from
day-to-day political pressures. One of the principal functions of the courts is
to protect political minorities from "the tyranny of the majority."'165
156. See generally THE FEDERALISTNO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
157. See generally id. (noting that the judiciary is the least dangerous branch because
they have neither the power of the sword nor the purse).
158. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
159. See id.
160. See id. atart. V, § 11(a).
161. See id. at art. V, § 8. No Florida judge has ever failed to survive a merit retention
election.
162. The most striking expression of public concern over perceived judicial activism in
Florida occurred when voters amended article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution (search
and seizure) to eliminate what they perceived to be an overly-broad judicial interpretation of
the "exclusionary rule." See D'ALE~mERTE, supra note 7, at 28; see FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 12
(requiring that interpretations of the Florida Constitution conform to the opinions of the
United States Supreme Court). Proponents of the citizen initiative can point to that incident as
an example of the need to maintain the right of citizen initiative to insure that state officials do
not stray too far from the public will. See also supra note 7 and accompanying text
(discussing citizen initiatives as a means of overcoming legislative gridlock). Many
conservative analysts will find this an inappropriate delegation of state power to federal
authorities.
163. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
164. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 46, 47, 48 (James Madison) (suggesting that
when any branch is not limited by the system of checks and balances tyranny may result).
165. See MORLEY, supra note 93, at 27 ("'general government' must be given sufficient
power to safeguard 'the rights of the minority,' ... 'in all cases where a majority are united by
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However, the judiciary should not be so far removed from public control that
judges can afford to consistently ignore the public will. Because of the
concerns that have arisen in this area, the Revision Commission should
consider whether the judiciary is subject to adequate checks and balances.
The Commission might also wish to consider whether it is appropriate to
maintain a mandatory retirement age for judges. 166  If adequate external
controls are lacking, then the Revision Commission should recommend
changes to the voters. When considering revisions that would affect the
judiciary, one point deserves consideration. It is clear that the Florida
Constitution contains some provisions that lend themselves to expansive
judicial interpretation. 167 Ourjudiciary would be more restrained if we had a
a common interest or passion') (quoting I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
134-35 (Max Ferland ed., Yale University Press (1937)). Tocqueville, who made many
accurate predictions about the future of our country, remarked that "it may be foreseen that
faith in public opinion will become for them a species of religion, and the majority its
ministering prophet." I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 11. In making this statement, he
foresaw the current era of political correctness, which in modem society is the greatest tyranny
that the people impose on themselves. Even in 1831, Tocqueville found that "[i]n the United
States the majority undertakes to supply a multitude of ready-made opinions for the use of
individuals, who are thus relieved from the necessity of forming opinions of their own." I
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 10. Based on his experiences in this country, he concluded:
When an opinion has taken root amongst a democratic people and established
itself in the minds of the bulk of the community, it afterwards persists by
itself and is maintained without effort, because no one attacks it. Those who
at first rejected it as false ultimately receive it as the general impression, and
those who still dispute it in their hearts conceal their dissent; they are careful
not to engage in a dangerous and useless conflict.
Id at 261. Tocqueville further explained:
Time, events, or the unaided individual action of the mind will sometimes
undermine or destroy an opinion, without any outward sign of the change. It
has not been openly assailed, no conspiracy has been formed to make war on
it, but its followers one by one noiselessly secede; day by day a few of them
abandon it, until at last it is only professed by a minority. In this state it will
still continue to prevail. As its enemies remain mute or only interchange their
thoughts by stealth, they are themselves unaware for a long period that a great
revolution has actually been effected; and in this state of uncertainty they take
no steps; they observe one another and are silent. The majority have ceased
to believe what they believed before, but they still affect to believe, and this
empty phantom of public opinion is strong enough to chill innovators and to
keep them silent and at a respectful distance.
Id at 261-62.
166. FLA. CoNsT. art V, § 8.
167. See discussion infra notes 234-238 and accompanying text
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more restrained constitution. Thus, the Revision Commission should
consider making changes that move the constitution in a direction more
conducive to judicial restraint.
E. Local Government
Just as there are some tasks of government that can best be
accomplished at a national or state level, there are also tasks that can most
beneficially be performed at the local level. 16  In considering revisions to
the Florida Constitution, the Revision Commission should consider whether
there are additional functions and responsibilities that can be delegated to
local governments.
Only a few thousand people voted on the adoption of Florida's first
constitution in 1838. The state's population was, of course, much less than
today. State government was much closer to the people and it represented
much less of an intrusion into citizens' daily lives.169  Indeed, in many
respects, the state government of 1838 was a local government. The change
in the nature of the relationship between individuals and state government
that has developed over the intervening years-simply through growth-
represents an enormous loss of value to the people. Democracy works best
in small units. A democracy composed of only six individuals is far more
likely to satisfy its constituents' concerns than a democracy of six
thousand. 0 Thus, it is appropriate that Florida has chosen to authorize the
transfer of a significant portion of the people's political power to counties
and municipalities through our state constitution. However, as previously
168. Accordingly, one of the "important thrusts" of the local government article of the
1968 Constitution was to expand local government power by removing the Legislature's
power to make local government decisions and turning that power over to local officials.
D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 123.
169. In 1831, Tocqueville noted:
N[othing] is more striking to a European traveler in the United States than the
absence of what we term the government, or the administration. Written laws
exist in America, and one sees the daily execution of them; but although
everything moves regularly, the mover can nowhere be discovered. The hand
that directs the social machine is invisible.
1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 72-73.
170. See I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 40. Tocqueville noted with some admiration
that in America "the township was organized before the county' the county before the state,
the state before the union." Id. at 42.
171. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 7, at 121-33 (discussing the prominent role of local
governments under the Florida Constitution). See also, MORLEY, supra note 91, at 5. It was
Morley's belief that "[t]he essence of federalism is reservation of control over local affairs to
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noted, the state has grown tremendously, and there has been a significant
consolidation of power at the state level. Many people have lost faith in
government simply because it seems so remote. Because of their relatively
smaller size and the smaller number of people they must serve, the units of
local government are better equipped to serve their constituents, in most
respects, than the state.
172
In examining the provisions of our constitution, the constitution
revision commission should generally avoid imposing any new limits on the
authority of our local institutions and should consider ways in which those
institutions can be strengthened. Where appropriate, the commission should
consider transferring power from the state to local authorities where it is
more easily controlled by the people themselves. This would help to restore
both the perception and the reality of the people's control over the
government they have created.
F. The Boundary Between State and National Government
Upon joining the Union, the State of Florida became a part of a
federalist system of government established more than 200 years ago. 173 Our
state constitution, together with its national counterpart, establishes a
separate sphere of influence for our state's laws as opposed to the laws of
the federal government. 174 Together, these two documents establish what is
properly understood as the "Federal Government."
When Tocqueville visited the United States in 1831, he found "twenty-
four small sovereign nations, whose agglomeration constitutes the body of
the Union.' 175 He described the relationship between the federal government
the localities themselves, the argument for which becomes stronger if the federation embraces
a large area, with strong climatic or cultural differences among the various states therein."
172. See I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 100. ("I [have] heard a thousand different
causes assigned for the evils of the state, but the local system was never mentioned among
them. I heard citizens attribute the power and prosperity of their country to a multitude of
reasons, but they all placed the advantages of local institutions in the foremost rank.").
173. See generally THE FEDERAST No. 39 (James Madison) (discussing the differences
between a national and a federal government). Federal governments consist of a joining
between the national government and the state governments. Id.
174. See generally Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts
andState Power, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1485, 1495 (1987). The courts have long ago concluded
that federal and state constitutions leave some areas in which both the federal and state
governments can act. However, this reasoning is contrary to the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution, which leaves no aspect of the power given by the
people to the government undistributed. U.S. CONsT. amends. IX-X.
175. I TOCQUEVLLE, supra note 1, at 61.
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and the states as "completely separate and almost independent."' 76  The
federal government being "circumscribed within certain limits and only
exercising an exceptional authority over the general interests of the
country." Conversely, "fulfilling the ordinary duties and responding to the
daily and indefinite calls of a community" fell to the states."'
The level of state independence Toequeville saw in this country soon
disappeared in the aftermath of the Civil War. The constitutional
relationship between the branches of government was formally altered by the
adoption of the post-Civil War amendments to the Federal Constitution.
79
However, the courts have subsequently agreed that in adopting those
amendments, the states did not intend to completely eliminate their separate
and independent nature. While the dividing lines between state and national
government have been blurred, we still have a strong federalist system of
government that continues to grow stronger.18 0  That system forms an
important part of the division of power that was intended to exist under the
original state and national constitutions. The Federal Constitution was
created not just to authorize the creation of a federal government, but for the
benefit and protection of the states as independent legal entities.' 8' It
contains numerous provisions protecting the states from federal
encroachment.1 2 There are also several constitutional doctrines that havedeveloped over the years to protect a separate sphere of influence for the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. ("The Federal government ... is the exception; the government of the states is
the rule.").
179. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
180. See generally Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution
Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 421 (1996) (discussing the continuing evolution of
federalist concepts).
181. See generally THE FEDERALISTNO. 37 (James Madison) (explaining that federalism
fosters stability for the federal government as well as the states).
182.
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at
all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and
these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The
people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallably make it
preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the
other as the instrument of redress.
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1494 (1987)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
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states, including the "Erie doctrine," 18 3 the "adequate state grounds
doctrine,",8 and the doctrine that allows the states to grant citizens greater
rights under state law than exist under federal law. 185 There is, and should
be, a constant tension over the proper boundary line between federal and
state authority. As with economic competition in the private sector, this
competitive aspect of our system of government is beneficial to the people
and, wherever it appears to be endangered, the Revision Commission should
consider whether steps can be taken to assure its preservation.
186
V. THE NATURE OF RIGHTS
In addition to providing an organizational framework that protects the
citizenry from governmental abuses, the Florida Constitution, like other
constitutions, establishes the relationship between government and the
people by enumerating certain rights. 1 7 These rights, as well as others, are
183. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (establishing that "Itihere
is no federal general common law" and thereby limiting the ability of federal courts to "create"
new law without a specific basis of authority such as state law, the United States Constitution,
or federal statutes).
184. The original formulation of the adequate state grounds doctrine provided that
where a state court entered a decision based on an "adequate state ground," such as a state
constitution or state statute, federal courts would not intervene to disturb the decision. Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945). While its use has slowed the past few years, in the early
1980s the United States Supreme Court turned this doctrine on its head and used it as a device
to assume jurisdiction over state court decisions based on state law. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983). Until the Court returns to its early formulation of the
doctrine it will be of no use in defining the boundary between federal and state governments.
185. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977).
186. See D'ALEAMBERTE, supra note 7, at 15 (discussing the 1968 Commission's concern
over federal intrusion on state authority).
187. See discussion supra note 25 and accompanying text. These rights are inherent in
the individual. Constitutions do not create rights in any classic sense. Explicit identification
of specific rights in constitutions is intended to assure that those rights will not be infringed.
Governments have provided for the enumeration of rights in their constitutions because
assurance of those rights is important to the continuation of democratic governments. As
Tocqueville noted, "[i]f ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event may be
attributed to the omnipotence of the majority, which may at some future time urge the
minorities to desperation and oblige them to have recourse to physical force." I TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 1, at 279. The minorities referred to here are, of course, political minorities. See
supra note 51.
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said to be retained by the people, and are required to be kept free from state
interference.18'
The scope of this article does not allow for a complete exploration of
every "right" that one might envision. As previously discussed, there are
certain fundamental rights that are inherent in all people.1i 9 However, the
term "right" has not been limited to its constitutional usage. It has often
been used interchangeably with the word "entitlement" to describe both
tangible and intangible goods and services to which individuals or groups
believe they have some legal claim.190  Accordingly, it is perhaps more
useful when considering revisions to the constitution to engage in a
discussion of the nature of rights and the significance of rights in our society.
John Locke asked the rhetorical question: "I[f man] in the state of
nature be so free ... [in] his own person and possessions ... why will he...
subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?" 19' Not
surprisingly, Locke also supplied the answer to his question and in that
answer we can perceive the boundaries of rights:
[I]n the state of nature he has such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is
very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others...
the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe,
very insecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition which,
however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not
without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society
with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call
by the general name 'property."192
As seen in Locke's statement, the concept of rights in society involves
something of a trade-off. While the members of a society continue to
possess all rights, they agree to accept limits on the exercise of certain rights,
188. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
189. See discussion supra note 25 and accompanying text.
190. A useful way of examining rights to determine if they are inherent is to consider
whether they can be lost. Truly inherent rights can never be lost. For example, the right of
free speech can be dishonored or ignored, but it still exists within the individual. An
expansive right to health care, at public expense, or public education would be a right that is
dependent upon the cooperation of others for its implementation. It is not inherent in the
individual and, unless enforced by the society, it ceases to exist. By interpreting the
constitution to include disguised wealth transfers, we impair its moral basis thereby weakening
the authority with which it speaks to other issues of a truly constitutional nature.
191. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 70.
192. Id. at 70-71.
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in exchange for the right to partake of and enhance certain others. As one
commentator has noted:
[S]ociety must have rules, and... those rules inevitably encroach
on personality. If the warden permits me to play solitaire in my
prison cell I am at liberty to cheat all I want; nobody else is
affected thereby. But if my freedom is somewhat enlarged, to
permit me to play bridge with three fellow-prisoners, I must
observe the rules of the game, arbitrary though they may seem to
me. For the freedom of a social game I have surrendered the
liberty I had at solitaire.
1 93
Outside of society, people have absolute freedom to do as they please.
Upon joining society they give up some portion of their freedom in exchange
for the ability to exercise particular rights to a greater extent than would be
possible outside society1 94  Tocqueville correctly noted that "[t]he
Revolution of the United States was the result of a mature and reflecting
preference for freedom, and not of a vague or ill-defined craving for
independence."' 195 It resulted from a "love of order and law."'196 If we seek
to understand the nature of rights we must first understand that the concept
of rights within society developed to facilitate the security of those who
sought to be governed. 97 While rights are individual in nature and society's
recognition of inherent rights will protect political minorities, a society will
not tolerate the exploitation of these rights for the purpose of avoiding
justice or engaging in extensive wealth transfers at the majority's expense. 99
193. MORLEY, supra note 91, at 37-38. The rights that individuals forego are not
extinguished but are transferred to the society in the form of powers to be exercised on the
individual's behalf. For example, the power to punish those who infringe our property rights.
194. See generally LOCKE, supra note 25.
195. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 73. See also MORLEY, supra note 90, at 34.
Morley was of the opinion that "[w]hat we really mean by individualism is the latitude of a
person to choose for himself among the many fruits of a civilization in which he actually
participates. It is not merely unfair but also impossible to cut oneself off from the
disagreeable results of collective action, while continuing to benefit substantially from those
regarded as pleasurable." Id.
196. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 73.
197. See MORLEY, supra note 91, at 27-28.
198. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURsE 14 (1991) (explaining that insistence on translating every interest into a right
"promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might
lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground").
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It is also commonly understood that:
Since people, in a competitive or any other society, are by no
means always just to each other, some regulation by the state ... is
unavoidable .... [But] the greatest injustice of all is done when
the umpire forgets that he too is bound by the rules, and begins to
make them as between contestants in behalf of his own
prejudices. 19
9
In addressing this concern, Locke described four restrictions on
governmental power that, in his view, arose from the proposition that all
governmental power was derived from the individuals who composed
society.200 The first restriction was that "[government] is not, nor can
possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. 20'
Elsewhere, he described this restriction to mean that governments "are to
govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases,
but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the
countryman at plough. 20 2  This restriction on government has been
embodied in constitutional law under the broad heading of "equal protection
of the laws. 20 3
Next, Locke said that "these laws also ought to be designed for no other
end ultimately but the good of the people.",2  Locke was referring to the
necessity that laws be for the ultimate good of all people and not just for the
benefit of a select few. This restriction on governmental power is related to
the concept of equal protection of the laws and is also reflected in the so-
called "public purpose doctrine."
205
199. MORLEY, supra note 91, at 13.
200. See LOCKE, supra note 25, at 76-82. Under Locke's approach, government can
receive no greater power than it is given by the people, and there are moral limits on the
exercise of those powers. Accordingly, government power is subject to the same moral
restrictions that existed in individuals before they joined in a society. See id.
201. Id. at76.
202. Id. at 81.
203. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
204. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 81. Elsewhere Locke noted that "a rational creature
cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into subjection to another of his own harm ..."
Id. at 93. Thus, it must be assumed that all laws should be created for the benefit of those to
be governed.
205. See FLA. CoNST art. VII, § 10(c); Linscott v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth.,
443 So. 2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1983).
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Locke went on to explain that "the supreme power [the Legislature]
cannot take from any man part of his property without his own consent."
20
This restriction is embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Florida
Constitution. 207  Locke further explained that this includes efforts by a
government to "raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent
of the people... 208
Finally, Locke said "the Legislature neither must nor can transfer the
power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the
people have. '2 - As discussed above, this restriction is embodied in the
separation of powers requirement under the Florida Constitution. 0
A. The Right to Equal Protection of the Laws
Because it is so significant to the exercise of all rights in society, the
right to equal protection of the laws deserves some special attention. Every
Floridian has an inherent right to equal protection of the laws of this state.
21
As noted above, this right arises from the fact that the individual
relinquishes a certain amount of freedom in order to secure the rights society
212has to offer. However, there is no right of equality of outcomes. Anatole
France once mockingly said that "[t]he law, in its majestic equality, forbids
the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and
to steal bread. ' 213 While this comment is both harsh and humorous, it is also
true. The Florida Constitution does not attempt to cure all of the injustices
206. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 79.
207. See FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
208. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 81.
209. l at 82.
210. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
211. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (enumerating the inherent right to equal protection of
the laws). The question of when a right is fundamental, such that it falls within the scope of
the theory of inherent rights, can normally be determined by ascertaining the answer to one
simple question: Can the right be exercised without the aid of the government or others?
Sometimes the answer to this question can be ascertained by determining whether some wealth
transfer is necessary to enforce the supposed right. If a right can only be secured through the
government's coercion of others, then it is not an inherent right and is not, in any classic
sense, a fundamental right.
212. Many rights are either not naturally available to isolated individuals, or would have
no meaning to an isolated individual. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, AM. ECON. REV. 347-57 (1967). It was that author's view that "In the world
of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role. Property rights are an instrument of society
and derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations that he
can reasonably hold in his dealings with others." Id. at 347
213. THoMAs SOWELL, A CoNFLIcr OF VISIONS 88 (1987).
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and hardships of life, to do so would be beyond the power of any
constitution.
214
The right of equal protection of the laws forbids the government from
treating those things that are similarly situated as though they are different,
but it does not require the government to treat those things which are in fact
215different as though they are the same.As Locke said:
Though... all men by nature are equal .... [a]ge or virtue may
give men a just precedence; excellence of parts and merit may
place others above the common level; birth may subject some, and
alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those whom
nature, gratitude, or other respects may have made it due; and yet
all this consists with the equality which all men are in, in respect of
jurisdiction or dominion one over another, which was the equality I
there spoke of as proper to the business in hand, being that equal
right that every man has to his natural freedom, without being
• 216
subjected to the will or authority of any other man.
Recently, there has been a strong trend in our society to extend the
constitutional 17 theory of equal protection of the laws to require equality of
218
outcomes for particular groups or arbitrary classifications of people. All
214. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (explaining that even the United
States Constitution cannot "provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill").
215. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(construing the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution).
216. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 31.
217. It is important at this point to note the difference between constitutional rights and
legislatively created rights. Subject to the limits imposed by the constitution, the Legislature
is free to create statutory economic rights. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.01-.60 (creating the
right to receive workers' compensation under certain statutorily prescribed circumstances).
218. Often these efforts are accompanied by demands for government spending or
increases in taxation for the purpose of making various kinds of economic opportunities
available to groups of people who are believed to be disadvantaged. See, e.g., Allen W.
Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
1325 (1992); Mary Ellen Cusack, Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a
Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 173 (1993); Bert B. Lockwood Jr. et. al.,
Litigating State Constitutional Rights to Happiness and Safety: A Strategy for Ensuring the
Provision of Basic Needs to the Poor, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1 (1993). These efforts are
misplaced. As Locke noted, "[t]he great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their
property." LOCKE, supra note 25, at 71. Government does not normally produce wealth; it
obtains wealth through the taxation of its citizens. Establishing economic rights in certain
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rights of a constitutional nature are vested in individuals, not in groups.
When we attempt to confer preferences upon groups as opposed to
individuals we move in direct violation of the principle of equal
protection.1
9
A simple demonstration of this idea is that all citizens have an inherent
right to petition the government for redress of grievances. This right arises
based upon the individual's relationship with the government; 22 it does not
arise by virtue of membership in any particular group.22 1 Conf'ing the right
to redress grievances to members of particular groups, or granting some
groups a more expansive right, would deprive all others of the equal benefit
of that right. Thus, it is not only contrary to the notion of "individual"
liberties to find that rights arise from groups, but doing so directly violates
the principle of equal protection of the laws.
We may not all agree on which rights are constitutional in nature. But,
we can all agree on a core of rights that belong in the constitution, and we
must recognize that grossly expanding these rights into controversial areas
can cause even core rights to be called into question.222  This is not to
suggest that Legislatures are forbidden from conferring benefits,223 it simply
means that government is not compelled to do so as a matter of
constitutional law.
individuals necessarily implies a need to take money from some other individuals to meet the
demand imposed by the new economic right. In doing so, government risks impairing its
relationship with those from whom it removes wealth for the benefit of others.
219. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
220. U.S. CONST. art. I; FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
221. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, TnE IPOVEiuSHMENT OF PoLrncAL
DiscouRsE (1991) (explaining that "[a]n intemperate rhetoric of personal liberty in this way
corrodes the social foundations on which individual freedom and security ultimately rest").
222. Others have noted that interpreting rights too expansively can cause them to be so
disrespected that they are destroyed. See, e.g., Gerald B. Cope Jr., Toward a Right of Privacy
as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 633, 664 n.182 (1977) (citing
Kurland, The Private!, U. CHi. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 11).
223. See discussion supra pp. 29-33. Equal protection of the laws requires that persons
who are similarly situated be treated as though they are the same. Thus, if government
chooses to confer benefits on individuals for arbitrary reasons it would run afoul of the equal
protection requirement. Government can confer benefits, but it must comply with the law in
doing so.
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B. Rights in Property
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that property should not
normally be acquired by individuals from government. Additionally, the
rights properly considered constitutional are those that caused us to join into
society, and without which we would not have willingly joined the society at
all. These rights can be summarized as those necessary to enjoy life, liberty,
and property within the bounds of a civilized society.225 Locke considered
all such rights under the notion of property, and described the circumstances
226
under which primitive property rights evolved from common ownership.
He believed "acquisition and improvement" created a right of individual
ownership.227 One of the incidents of ownership is, of course, the power to
convey an ownership interest to others, so property rights could be
continued. 8 Natural limits to property rights existed in the form of limits
on the amount of property a person could put to a useful purpose, without
waste.229
The obvious limit to Locke's theory, the one he left unexplored, is the
lack of sufficient property available for "acquisition and
improvement., 230 This may cause market-based societies to appear
unfair. However, free markets are constantly devising new forms of
property,231 new ways of executing transactions in property,232 and new ways
of taking ownership in property.233  Thus, the problem Locke left
unexplored, the potentially limited supply of property, seems to be
constantly in the process of being overcome.
224. Government was not intended to be, and is normally not a wealth producer.
Accordingly, the wealth it transfers to one must usually be obtained from others.
225. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
226. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 16-30.
227. Id. at 18-19.
228. Id. at 28.
229. Id. at 19.
230. Id. at 16-30.
231. For example, we now recognize a wide range of intellectual property.
232. Much like their peasant forebears who gleaned fallen grain from the fields of land
owners, arbitrageurs now sit at computer terminals and "glean" small fractional profits by
exploiting the differences in the price of stocks between the stock exchanges. Some have
grown quite wealthy through this modem day gleaning process.
233. In modem times, we have developed stock markets in which anyone can buy an
interest in a publicly traded company. The right to purchase or sell stocks at a future date is
also a valuable property interest ("futures") that can be freely traded, and one can even
purchase futures in the currency used to purchase stocks or other commodities ("currency
futures").
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VI. OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
The Florida Constitution contains a body of non-fundamental legal
material. Much of this material was incorporated at various times for
234political reasons. While most of these provisions taken individually are
quite harmless, the overall importance of the constitution is diminished in
the minds of the public and lawmakers when legal material of lesser
significance is included in its pages. To the extent that these provisions are
innocuous, there is no real reason to remove them from the constitution other
than as a kind of housekeeping exercise. However, some provisions that are
purely gratuitous have the potential to be misinterpreted and should be
considered for removal.235 For example, article IX, section 1, establishes the
requirement that "[a]dequate provision shall be made . . . for the
establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of higher learning
,236and other public education programs .. .. " This provision is particularlytroubling because as Tocqueville said:
It cannot be doubted that in the United States the instruction of the
people powerfully contributes to the support of the democratic
republic; and such must always be the case, I believe, where the
instruction which enlightens the understanding is not separated
from the moral education which amends the heart.
23 7
However, some interpret article IX, section 1 to require a particular
level of school funding and would use it as a basis for allowing individuals
to sue the state for additional educational funding.238 If thejudiciary were to
expand on this simple statement, it could be used as a basis for requiring
234. D'ALEmERTE, supra note 7, at 16 (describing some constitutional language as
"meaningless" but "politically popular").
235. Id at 17 (noting that some provisions of the Constitution of 1968 were merely
"statements of asprirations"or were "precatory" in nature).
236. FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
237. I TOcQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 329.
238. One attempt to secure an expansive interpretation of this language was a partial
failure. See Coalition For Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d
400 (Fla. 1996). However, because the court left the door open to future challenges, the suit
secured a measure of success for those who wish to compel a higher level of school
funding. See also Barbara J. Staros, School Finance Litigation in Florida: A Historical
Analysis, 23 STETSON L. REv. 497 (1994); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New
Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995); John Powell,
Segregation and Educational Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools, 17 HALINE J. PUB.
L. & POL'Y 337 (1996).
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wealth transfers for the benefit of particular individuals or groups.
Therefore, its continued inclusion in the Florida Constitution offers little
value in exchange for the associated risk.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the most part, the Florida Constitution has served us well and
should not be changed. In considering whether specific constitutional
revisions should be adopted, we should ask ourselves the following
questions: What is the appropriate relationship between government and the
people, and is that relationship properly reflected in the social order that has
developed under the constitution? If not, can the problems we find in the
social order be addressed through the constitution? Are they fundamental in
nature, or should they be addressed through some other means?
With regard to each of the three branches of government, as well as
each officer and agency, we should ask if the system of checks and balances
in the constitution is well-ordered, and whether the divisions of power are
being respected. As a practical matter, we should ask whether the
government is functioning well, or whether the people would benefit from
some reorganization that must be accomplished through constitutional
means.
In answering these questions, the text of the document as well as the
purpose and ideas of the people who created the constitution should be
honored. It was once said that "[t]he peogle reign in the American political
world as the Deity does in the universe." 9 This statement was intended to
mean that, collectively, the people exercise complete control over their
government. If the Revision Commission accomplishes nothing else, we
hope that it will take some small steps towards restoring the truth of that
statement for the people of Florida.
239. I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 60. Tocqueville further comments that, "[i]n
America, the people form a master who must be obeyed to the utmost limits of possibility."
Id. at 64.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the January 29, 1997, decision handed down by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in RIS Investment Group, Inc. v. Department of
Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums, and Mobile Homes,1 there were a handful of cases that
addressed the creation of condominium units. The most important of these
cases were decided in the second and fourth districts and were at odds with
one another, despite that various sections of the Florida Statutes adequately
address and control precisely when a condominium unit is considered
created. While the second district was consistent in two of its most
important cases on this topic, the fourth district has made decisions at odds
with cases within its own district, as well as decisions at odds with those of
the second district. When faced with an opportunity to address the split in
the districts last January, rather than rectify the problem it helped to create,
the fourth district opted to further confuse an already unnecessarily
disconcerting area of law.
In Section II, this comment will survey, in addition to the RIS decision,
four of the most important decisions in this area, two of which came from
the second district, and two of which came from the fourth. Section EmI will
address the statutes that were controlling in each case, and Section IV will
address the question of whether the fourth district sought to create a third
type of condominium property not contemplated by the legislature.
H. THE CASES PRECEDING R!S
Although the fourth district previously decided at least two cases
concerning the point in time a condominium unit is created for purposes of
imposing assessment fees, in RIS, the court addressed only one of those
cases, apparently choosing to ignore the other. While the RIS decision is
based solely upon the fourth district's decision in Welleby Condominium
Ass'n One, Inc. v. William Lyon Co.,2 omitted from consideration-or at
least discussion-are the fourth district's decision in Winkelman v. TolP and
the second district's decisions in Hyde Park Condominium Ass'n v. Estero
1. 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
2. 522 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
3. 661 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Island Real Estate, Inc.4 and Estancia Condominium Assn v. Sunfield
Homes, Inc.5 Not surprisingly, Welleby is the single decision among the
aforementioned cases that is in concert with the fourth district's RS
decision. A brief synopsis of each pre-RIS decision, as well as the R!S
decision, follows.
A. Hyde Park Condominium Ass'n v. Estero Island Real Estate, Inc.
In Hyde Park Condominium Ass'n v. Estero Island Estate, Inc.,6 Hyde
Park appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of Estero Island Real
Estate. Pursuant to the summary judgment, the lower court declined to hold
Estero Island liable for assessments Hyde Park claimed were past due on
certain unimproved land owned by Estero Island. Estero Island acquired title
in November of 1981 to the subject unimproved real property located in
Hyde Park I Condominium, which was operated by the appellant. Estero
Island acquired title from Philip Werner, Jr., who was also an appellee in this
case. Werner acquired title in February of 1976. 7
In 1983, Hyde Park sought to recover from Estero Island past due
assessment fees from 1970 to 1983. Estero Island filed a notice of contest in
response to Hyde Park's Claim of Lien, and, in September of 1983, Hyde
Park issued a partial release of claim for assessments owed for the period of
1970 to February of 1976, when Werner acquired title. At that time, Hyde
Park filed a claim against the appellees for the assessments due from
February 1976 to 1983 and sought to foreclose upon the seven units owned
by Estero Island that.remained unimproved.8
The basis for Estero Island's refusal to pay was that, because the
property remained unimproved, the property constituted "lots" rather than
"units;" thus, according to Estero Island, because it owned "lots," it could
not be held liable for assessment fees to which only "units" were subject.
Upon the appellees' joint motion for summary judgment, the court agreed
that "the issue of law was whether the declaration of condominium provided
for assessments to come due against unimproved lots for proposed
apartments, or, whether the declaration only contemplated that assessments
were to be paid by 'completed apartments."' 9 Summary judgment was
entered in favor of the appellees.10
4. 486 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
5. 619 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
6. Hyde Park, 486 So. 2d at 1.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Upon appeal to the second district, however, the lower court's decision,
which was premised upon section 711.03(7) of the Florida Statutes, was
reversed." The lower court had determined that the unimproved property
owned by Estero Island did not fall within the statutory definition of
condominium property, which is defined as "units of improvements."' 2 The
second district disagreed and found that, under the 1969 Condominium Act
which controlled in this case,
condominium property includes land, all improvements, all
improvements on the land, and all easements and rights with the
condominium .... A "unit" is that part of the condominium
property "which is to be subject to private
ownership."... Therefore, under the 1969 Act, the only type of
private ownership available within a condominium is a "unit." For
this court to hold otherwise would, in effect, create property
ownership rights which were not contemplated by either the
legislature or the Hyde Park Condominium declaration.3
Therefore, the second district determined that the unimproved lots owned by
Estero Island were indeed "units" within the meaning of the applicable
statute,'4 and HYde Park was indeed entitled to those past due assessment
fees it claimed.'
B. Welleby Condominium Ass'n One, Inc. v. William Lyon Co.
The next of the cases, Welleby Condominium Ass "n One, Inc. v. William
Lyon Co., was decided in 1987 by the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
16
Welleby, the case upon which RIS was decided, involved a dispute between
the plaintiff condominium association, Welleby Condominium Association,
and the defendant land owner, the William Lyon Company. 17 The dispute
concerned assessment fees the Welleby Condominium Association levied
upon the unimproved lots owned by the William Lyon Company, all of
11. Hyde Park, 486 So. 2d at 2.
12. FLA. STAT. § 711.03(7) (1969).
13. Hyde Park, 486 So. 2d at 2. (citations omitted) (second emphasis added) (citing
FLA. STAT. § 711.03(9), (13) (1969)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 35.
17. Id.
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which were described in the declaration of condominium that was filed in
October of 1974.18
In March of 1986, Welleby filed Claims of Lien upon the subject land
for unpaid maintenance assessments, which it subsequently sought to
foreclose. Welleby alleged that the unimproved land owned by the
defendant was subject to such assessments pursuant to both section 718.116
of the Florida Statutes and the declaration of condominium. The defendant,
however, claimed that the unimproved land owned by it did not constitute
"'condominium parcels' or 'units"' as defined by either the declaration of
condominium or the Florida Statutes and, therefore, could not be subject to
the claimed assessments.
19
The fourth district determined that the issue before it was "whether the
landf owned by the [d]efendant [was] subject to assessments levied by the
[p]laintiff under the [d]eclaration of [c]ondominium and the Laws of
Florida., 20 In determining that the defendant land owner was not liable for
the claimed assessments, the court considered section 711.15(1) which read:
"A unit owner... shall be liable for all assessments coming due while he is
the owner of a unit."21 The court next considered section 711.03(15),22
which stated that a "'[u]nit' means a part of the condominium property
which is to be subject to private ownership. A unit may be in improvements,
land, or land and improvements together, as specified in the declaration."
23
The court next turned to the declaration for its definition of a "unit;"
however, the declaration, despite that section 711.15(1) holds "unit
owner[s]... liable for all assessments coming due... [,],24 failed to define or
mention "unit" or "unit owner." The court did recognize, however, that the
declaration, while "not us[ing] the word 'unit' as the object of
assessments[,] ... utilized the term 'condominium parcel' as the object of
assessments by the Condominium Association."2 This was determined by
the fourth district to be an intentional decision made by the scrivener of the
declaration as evidenced by the consistent and repeated use of the term, as
well as by the statement in the declaration that "'[t]he owner of each
18. Id. at 35-36.
19. Id. at36.
20. Id.
21. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at36 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.15(1) (Supp. 1974)).
22. This section, in effect at the time the declaration of condominium was recorded, is
presently codified at section 718.103(24) and has retained the exact language. FLA. STAT. §
718.103(24) (1995).
23. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 38 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.03(15) (Supp. 1974)).
24. Id. at36 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.15(1) (Supp. 1974)).
25. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 37.
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condominium parcel shall be liable to the condominium association for the
share of common expenses set forth.',
26
The declaration proceeded to define the term "condominium parcel" as
[a]n apartment together with the undivided share in the common elements
and all its easements, rights and interest which are pertinent to the
apartment."' 27  The declaration further defined "apartment" as an
.. [i]ndividual dwelling"' and, as the fourth district stated, "not raw,
unimproved lands."28  Accordingly, the court stated that the scrivener,
pursuant to section 711.03(15),29
chose to describe a "unit" in terms of a "condominium parcel",
which is an individual private dwelling. As permitted by [s]tatute,
this [d]eclaration specifically describes the object of assessments as
land and improvements, namely, an individual private dwelling,
and the use of the term "condominium parcel" is so specifically
used throughout this [d]eclaration of [c]ondominium, as to
preclude any other interpretation as to what the object of
assessments was to be against. Assessments, according to this
[d]eclaration, could not be assessed and levied against anything
other than an individual private dwelling, and the [d]eclaration
would not permit any interpretation allowing an assessment against
raw, unimproved lands upon which there is no private dwelling.
30
The fourth district did, however, recognize the very different decision
in Hyde Park, the most recent case at the time of the Welleby decision. The
Welleby court distinguished its decision from Hyde Park by relying upon the
statutory language contained in the sections that were in effect at the time of
each decision. In Hyde Park, the 1969 Condominium Act controlled, under
which section 711.03(13) defined "units" as including "any part of the
condominium property which was subject to private ownership."', This,
according to the fourth district, was a very broad definition that would
include unimproved property such as that at issue in Welleby and that,
therefore, the second district was correct in assessing the owner of
unimproved lands in Hyde Park.32
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 711.03(15) (Supp. 1974) (stating that a unit is as defined by the
declaration of condominium).
30. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 37.
31. Id. at 37-38.
32. Id. at 38.
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However, in Welleby, section 711.03(15), as opposed to section
711.03(13), was in effect, and the newer section defined "unit" differently.
The critical amendment, according to the fourth district, was the addition of
the phrase that "permitted a 'unit' to be described in any number of different
ways. 33 The court subsequently concluded that the declaration defined a
"'unit' as a private dwelling, thus exempting from an assessment, raw,
unimproved property' 34 and found that the Welleby Condominium
Association did not "have legal authority to levy assessment against the
[d]efendant's land. 35
C. Estancia Condominium Ass'n, v. Sunfield Homes, Inc.
In 1993, Estancia Condominium Ass' v. Sunfield Homes, Inc. was
decided.36 The second district rendered a decision consistent with its
decision in Hyde Park seven years earlier. In Estancia, the second district
reversed and remanded the case in which the appellee, Sunfield Homes,
despite failing to prove that "it was not the legal owner of twenty units [of
condominium property] under the applicable Florida Statutes and the
definition of 'unit' within the declaration[,J" 37 was declared exempt from
paying the assessment fees levied against it.
The declaration of condominium for Estancia Condominium was
recorded in 1981 and proposed a twelve-phase condominium. In 1983, an
amendment to the declaration was recorded that submitted to the
condominium the land for Buildings 200 and 600. Subsequently, in 1990,
Sunfield Homes purchased the land that had been dedicated to Building 600,
but upon which Building 600 had never been constructed. Accordingly, the
unimproved land remained subject to the declaration of condominium.
Upon acquiring title to the land, Estancia Condominium Association
began assessing Sunfield Homes for units 610-629. Sunfield Homes
subsequently refused to pay these assessments, and Estancia filed an action
to foreclose its lien upon such units for unpaid assessments. The trial court
entered judgment in favor of Sunfield Homes based primarily upon the
fourth district's holding in Welleby, which declared unimproved land
inconsistent with the definition of "unit" and, thus, immune to assessments. 0
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 38.
36. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1008.
37. Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
1997]
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The second district recognized that Welleby was controlled by an earlier
version of the statutory definition of "unit" and that the case before them
concerned the 1981 version, codified at section 718.103(16) of the Florida
Statutes. This section defined "unit" as "a part of the condominium property
which is subject to exclusive ownership. A unit may be in improvements
land, or land and improvements together, as specified in the declaration.
'A
Further, the declaration in Estancia defined a "unit" as "'the part of the
condominium property which is to be subject to exclusive ownership'-a
definition which is indistinguishable from the definition in Hyde Park.
'A2
Thus, the second district declined "to decide in this case whether [it]
agree[d] with the Fourth District's decision in Welleby" and held, in
accordance with its decision in Hyde Park, that Sunfield Homes was liable
for the assessments levied upon its unimproved land by Estancia.
43
D. Winkelman v. Toll
The most recent of the cases preceding RIS was decided in 1995 by the
fourth district. Winkelman44 is a case that was surprisingly consistent with
previous second district decisions and inconsistent with the fourth district's
own decision in Welleby. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the Winkelman
court's only mention of Welleby is found in its sole footnote in which the
court summarily dismisses the Welleby decision with respect to its present
contrasting decision.45
In Winkelman, the trial court held that the unimproved land owned by
the appellees was not subject to assessment fees because the contemplated
units were never constructed.46 However, the fourth district reversed
"[b]ecause... the property was subjected to condominium ownership upon
the recording of the amendment to the declaration adding it to the
condominium."41 Therefore, although the units described in the declaration
and added to the condominium through an amendment were never
41. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1010 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.103(16) (1981)). It is
interesting to note that the words that were critical to the Welleby decision denying the
assessments are identical to the words in the newer version: ... as specified in the
declaration."
42. 619 So. 2d at 1010.
43. Id.
44. 661 So. 2d at 102.
45. Id. at 107 fn.1.
46. Id. at 103.
47. Id.
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constructed, they were sub ject to assessments, and the owner of the
unimproved land was liable.4
The declaration of condominium for Mission Lakes Condominium was
recorded in 1980. The declaration contemplated nine phases which were to
be submitted by amendment pursuant to section 718.403. 4  This section
permits the developer of a condominium to describe in the declaration the
proposed number of phases, but permits the contemplated units to escape
assessments until the developer adds the phases by amending the
declaration; hence, this section of the statute is titled "Phase
condominiums." 50 Accordingly, the developer recorded the declaration, and
thereby submitted phase H to condominium ownership. Just over one week
later, the developer recorded an amendment adding phases I and III through
VIII to the condominium.51 In compliance with the applicable statute, the
developer attached land surveyor certificates upon substantial completion of
phases I and ]I;52 however, the remaining phases were never constructed.
5 3
In 1985, the Winkelmans purchased all the units in phase I of the
condominium and purchased all the units in phase II the following year. In
1987, ICON Development Corporation, an appellee in this case, acquired all
the units in phases I through VII. According to the fourth district, "[t]he
deed to these phases described the property by their description as contained
in the amendment to the declaration of condominium, and the deed was
specifically subject to the declarationo of condominium and amendments
thereto.
54
In 1989, the Winkelmans filed suit to recover from ICON the
assessment fees for the percentage of the common expenses of the
condominium owned by ICON but for which the Winkelmans had been
paying. Several years after instituting this action, ICON filed a counterclaim
to quiet title claiming that it had acquired title in fee simple and not subject
to the condominium form of ownership. In finding for ICON, the trial court
determined that, according to the declaration of condominium, only upon
substantial completion of the units could a phase in which the units were to
48. Id.
49. FLA. STAT. § 718.403 (1979).
50. Id.
51. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 104.
52. Section 718.104(4)(e) of the Florida Statutes requires that, upon substantial
completion of each phase submitted to condominium ownership, a certificate of a registered
land surveyor be recorded as an amendment to the declaration of condominium. The phase
may, however, be added to the declaration prior to substantial completion. FLA. STAT. §
718.104(4)(e) (1979).
53. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 104.
54. Id. at 105.
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be contained be submitted to condominium ownership. Furthermore, the
court relied upon sections 718.403(1) and (4) of the Florida Statutes for the
proposition that, because the subject property never became subject to the
condominium, the phases that were built acquired the entire interest in the
common elements for which they were assessed. 6 Thus, the court reasoned
that the units, by virtue of the declaration of condominium, could become
subject to the condominium only upon substantial completion and that,
because construction of the units never commenced, the units were never
substantially completed, the property in question was never subject to
condominium ownership, and ICON was not subject to the assessments that
the Winkelmans were attempting to recover.
57
However, upon appeal by the Winkelmans, the fourth district reversed
the lower court. Although section 718.103(16) permits the scrivener to
define a "unit" as "improvements, land, or land and improvements
together,... ,,58 it is crystal clear that "[i]t is the recording of the declaration
in the public records that subjects the property to condominium
ownership." 59 Further, because "[a] condominium is strictly a creature of
statute[,]'" 60 it is with the statute that the declaration must comply, and
should the declaration fail to do so, it is the statute that shall prevail.6
Accordingly, contrary to the findings of the lower court, the fourth district
found that, because section 718.104(2) of the Florida Statutes "mandates
that the condominium is created upon the recording of the declaration, the
55. Id.
56. Id. at 105. Section 718.403(1) states that
[a] developer may develop a condominium in phases, if the original declaration of
condominium submitting the initial phase to condominium ownership provides for and
describes in detail all anticipated phases; the impact, if any, which the completion of
subsequent phases would have upon the initial phase; and the time period within which each
phase must be completed.
Section 718.403(4) states that,
[i]f one or more phases are not built, the units which are built are entitled to 100 percent
ownership of all common elements within the phases actually developed and added as a part
of the condominium.
FLA. STAT. § 718.403(1), (4) (1979).
57. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 105.
58. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(16) (Supp. 1980).
59. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 105 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (1979)).
60. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 105 (emphasis added) (citing Suntide Condominium
Ass'n v. Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 463
So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
61. Id.
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certificate of substantial completion cannot be a condition precedent to the
creation of the condominium if it can be submitted at a later date."62
Additionally, section 718.110(3) similarly mandates that an amendment
to a declaration becomes effective upon recordation of the amendment
adding the subject property to the condominium, thereby subjecting it to the
declaration, as well.6  Therefore, as with section 718.104(2), failure to
improve the property already added to the condominium by amendment prior
to recordation of the amendment "does not prevent the inclusion of the land
in the condominium, because the amendment is effective when recorded." 64
To find otherwise would be to contradict the clear language of the statute.65
The fourth district found that the unconstructed phases owned by ICON
became subject to the declaration upon the recordation of the amendments
adding the phases and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with that finding.66 The court cited to Estancia for support for its finding
and briefly addressed, in a single footnote, its own decision in Welleby,
which the appellee ICON argued was inconsistent with both Estancia and
Hyde Park. While the court's decision in Welleby is contrary to its decision
in Winkelman, the court dismissed the contradiction by viewing Welleby as
having not addressed the issue of "whether the property dedicated to the
unconstructed units was part of the condominium. In fact, from a reading of
the opinion the court assumed that the property was part of the condominium
but not subject to assessments. 67 Thus, the fourth district, in a brief breath,
both contradicted and dismissed its perhaps iniquitous decision in Welleby
rather than seeking to rectify this past discrepancy.
E. RIS Investment Group, Inc. v. Department of Business and
Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums, and Mobile Homes
In RJS,68 the fourth district relied upon its decision in Welleby for
support and, at the same time, completely ignored its more recent decision in
Winkelman. Once again, the controversy involved whether the owner of
unimproved condominium property could be assessed for common expenses
on that property. RIS was the developer of the condominium at issue and
retained ownership of certain units. Although the subject units were
62. Id. at 106.
63. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 106 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.110(3) (1981)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 107.
67. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 107 fn.1.
68. 695 So. 2d at 357.
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eventually constructed, RIS failed to pay assessments on the units from the
time of recordation of the declaration of condominium until the time a
certificate of occupancy was issued on the units. RIS argued that it was not
until the certificate of occupancy was issued that the units were subject to
assessment fees, the time from which RIS did pay assessments.69
While the Department of Business and Professional Regulation,
Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (the
"Department") determined that RIS was liable for the assessments from the
date of recordation of the declaration of condominium, the fourth district
disagreed and reversed the Department's ruling.70 In so finding, the court
compared RIS to its decision in Welleby in which it exempted from
assessments developer-owned unimproved land because the declaration
made reference only to "condominium parcel," as opposed to "unit," which
was defined as an apartment or individual dwelling unit, a definition into
which the court believed unimproved land did not fall. The court analogized
these cases on the premise that the RIS declaration also expounded a
definition of "unit" that was inconsistent with unimproved land upon which,
therefore, assessments could not be levied.71  However, while it is
questionable that the declaration in R!S even defined the term "unit," what
the RIS declaration did provide was a description of what will constitute a
unit upon completion:
Each unit consists of the dwelling applicable to the [u]nit, less that
portion of the basic Building structure for the dwelling lying within
each dwellings['] maximum dimension as shown on the survey
graphic description and plot plan attached hereto .... The
boundary lines of each [u]nit are the unfinished surface of the
ceilings and floors, perimeter walls and any interior walls that are
shown within the maximum limits of each unit on the plot plan.72
Together with this description, the court considered two additional clauses
found within the declaration:
2.2 The Condominium... is divided into 160 [u]nits
which.. [.J are shown in the survey of the land on which a graphic
description of the improvements in which the [u]nits are located
and a plot plan thereof which, together with this [d]eclaration are in
sufficient detail to identify the common elements and each [u]nit
69. RIS, 695 So. 2d at 358.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 358-59.
72. Id. at 359 (emphasis omitted) (quoting section 3.2 of the RIS declaration).
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and the relative location and the approximate dimensions
thereof.... Each unit shall be a part of the Condominium Parcel
which contains the [u]nit.
3.4 ... The Condominium Parcel, consisting of the [u]nit
together with the undivided share of the common elements which
are appurtenant to the [u]nit, and the limited common elements
which are appurtenant to the [u]nit, constitutes a separate parcel of
real property, the ownership of which is in fee simple.73
It is upon these portions of the declaration that the court found a "clear"
intent by the scrivener "not to include [raw, unimproved] land.., within the
definition of a unit."74  Accordingly, the fourth district reversed the
Department and held that, because raw land did not constitute a "unit"
subject to assessments, RIS owed no assessments."
III. APPLICABLE STATUTES
In Winkelman, the fourth district recognized that a condominium is
strictly a creature of statute and that any declaration in derivation of the
statute cannot control.76 However, only sixteen months later, the court, as it
did in Welleby, once again applied a misinterpretation of the clear and
unambiguous language of the statute it had not too long before confirmed
was controlling. While in RS the fourth district relied upon its decision in
Welleby, the court not only clearly ignored its contrary decision in
Winkelman only a short time earlier, but ignored the contrary decisions from
the second district in both Hyde Park and Estancia. Presented with an
opportunity to address the discrepancy within its own district, as well as
between the second and fourth districts, the court failed to do so and
succeeded only in adding more confusion to what should be a crystalline
area of law.
In Hyde Park and Estancia, the second district relied upon the
applicable statute in each case. In Hyde Park, the statute in effect at the time
the declaration was recorded was section 711.03(9)7 7 which stated, in
pertinent part, that "condominium property includes land, all improvements,
all improvements on the land, and all easements and rights with the
condominium."78  Further, "[a] 'unit' is that part of the condominium
73. Id.
74. RJS, 695 So. 2d at 359.
75. Id.
76. 661 So. 2d at 105.
77. FLA. STAT. § 711.03(9) (1969).
78. 486 So. 2d at 2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.03(9) (1969)).
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property 'which is to be subject to private ownership.' '79 Therefore, based
upon this simple statutory language, the court determined that a "unit" is the
only type of condominium property subject to private ownership and that "to
hold otherwise would, in effect, create property ownership rights which were
not contemplated by either the legislature or the Hyde Park Condominium
declaration[;]y 80 accordingly, the court held that, because they were subject
to private ownership, unimproved lots were indeed "units" and subject to
assessments pursuant to section 711.03 of the Florida Statutes.
8
'
Likewise, in Estancia, the court again relied upon the clear statutory
language in deciding that the unimproved condominium property at issue
was subject to assessments. The statute here in effect was section
718.103(16)82 of the 1981 Florida Statutes, which contained some of the
same language to define a "unit" as the 1969 statute that controlled in Hyde
Park: "[It is] a part of the condominium property which is subject to
exclusive ownership. A unit may be in improvements, land, or land and
improvements together, as specified in the declaration. 83  Due to the
addition of the phrase "as specified in the declaration[,]" the court
considered the definition of the term "unit" that was contained in the
declaration. Because the Estancia declaration defined "'unit' as 'the part of
the condominium property which is to be subject to exclusive
ownership[,]' 84 and because it is clear that the statute subjects unit owners
to assessment fees, the court again found that unimproved condominium
property that was subject to private ownership was also subject to
assessments.8 5
The Estancia court, while refraining from commenting on whether it
agreed with the fourth district's decision in Welleby, expressed concern that
Welleby served to create a type of condominium property that was not
created or contemplated by the legislature.8 6  The court in Welleby
determined that, because the Welleby declaration used the term
"condominium parcel," defined within the declaration as an individual
79. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 711.03(13) (1969)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(16) (1981).
83. Id.
84. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1010.
85. Id. at 1010.
86. Id. The Estancia court stated: "It is arguable that the [f]ourth [d]istrict's decision
[in Welleby] allowed the declaration of condominium to create a third type of condominium
property that was neither a unit nor a portion of the common elements." Id.
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private dwelling, rather than "unit" as used in the statute, unimproved
property was not subject to assessment fees.
However, the reasoning espoused by the fourth district in Winkelman is
much more on target. In Winkelman, it appears that the developer wanted to
phase the condominium development, but for some reason submitted the
phases to condominium ownership prior to the construction of the buildings
and units in those phases. Although the declaration stated that substantial
completion was a condition precedent to condominium ownership, as the
court correctly stated, "[i]t is the recording of the declaration in the public
records that subjects the property to condominium ownership."'88 Thus,
despite the contention of the declaration, because "the provisions of the
declaration must conform to the statutory requirements[] and[,] to the extent
that they conflict therewith, the statute must prevail[,]" upon recordation of
the amendment adding the phases to the condominium, the unimproved
property became subject to condominium ownership and, therefore, subject
to assessments.
90
In RIS the effective statute was chapter 718 of the 1987 Florida
Statutes, which is virtually the same as the 1995 Florida Statutes.9' While
these statutes are quite similar, where the legislature has seen fit to clarify or
amend various sections of the statute, courts should give effect to that
legislative intent as evidenced by the amendments.92 Under this chapter,
section 718.103(23), which is identical to section 718.103(24) of the current
statute, provides that a "'[u]nit' means a part of the condominium property
which is subject to exclusive ownership. A unit may be in improvements
land, or land and improvements together, as specified in the declaration.
93
This is identical to the statutory provisions effective in Welleby,94 Estancia,95
and Winkelman.96 While this provision is quoted and relied upon throughout
these decisions, what the courts in Welleby and RIS appear to have
87. 522 So. 2d at 37.
88. 661 So. 2d at 105.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. FLA. STAT. § 718.101-.622 (1995); id. §718. 101-.622 (1987).
92. Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Recommended Order at 8,
Department of Bus. and Prof I Regulation, Div. of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and
Mobile Homes v. Sports Shinko (Florida) Co. Ltd., Case No. 96-001391 (State of Florida
Division of Administrative Hearings August 5, 1997) (No. 96-001391) (citing Rowles v. Div.
of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, 585 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991)).
93. Id. § 718.103(24) (1995); id. § 718.103(23) (1987).
94. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 35 (applying § 711.03(15) (Supp. 1974)).
95. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1008 (applying § 718.103(16) (1981)).
96. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 102 (applying § 718.103(16) (Supp. 1980)).
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overlooked are some other important provisions within the same statutory
section. For instance, the legislature provides that the assessments at issue
in the foregoing cases are to be "assessed against the unit owner. 9 7
Additionally, a "'[c]ondominium' means that form of ownership of real
property.. ., which is comprised of units that may be owned by one or more
persons, and in which there is, appurtenant to each unit, an undivided share
in common elements[,] '98 and it is a "'declaration of condominium' ... by
which a condominium is created." 99 Thus, it is apparent upon the faces of
these sections that, upon the recording of the declaration, a condominium is
created, which includes the units that are to be assessed. However
conspicuous this conclusion may be, to avoid any confusion, the legislature
clearly codified it at section 718.104(2):
A condominium is created by recording a declaration .... Upon
the recording of the declaration, or an amendment adding a phase
to the condominium under § 718.403(6), all units described in the
declaration or phase amendment as being located in or on the land
then being submitted to condominium ownership shall come into
existence, regardless of the state of completion of planned
improvements in which the units may be located.' °
While the portion of this statute that reads "regardless of the state of
completion of planned improvements in which the units may be located" was
added in 1990 r01 and was a subsequent amendment to the statute that was in
97. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(1) (1995); id. § 718.103(1) (1987) (effective at the time the
RIS declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(1) (1981) (effective at the time the Estancia
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(1) (Supp. 1980) (effective at the time the Winkelman
declaration was recorded); id. § 711.03(1) (Supp. 1974) (effective at the time the Welleby
declaration was recorded); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(1) (1969) (effective at the time the Hyde Park
declaration was recorded).
98. Id. § 718.103(10) (1995); id. § 718.103(9) (1987) (effective at the time the RIS
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(9) (1981) (effective at the time the Estancia
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(9) (Supp. 1980) (effective at the time the Winkelman
declaration was recorded); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(8) (Supp. 1974) (effective at the time the
Welleby declaration was recorded).
99. Id. § 718.103(14) (1995); id. § 718.103(13) (1987) (effective at the time the RIS
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(12) (1981) (effective at the time the Estancia
declaration was recorded); id. § 718.103(12) (Supp. 1980) (effective at the time the
Winkelman declaration was recorded); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(1 1) (Supp. 1974) (effective at the
time the Welleby declaration was recorded); id. § 711.03(10) (1969) (effective at the time the
Hyde Park declaration was recorded).
100. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (1995) (emphasis added).
101. Id. § 718.104(2) (Supp. 1990).
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effect at the time of recordation of the RIS declaration, as previously
mentioned, courts, in determining the correct meaning of prior statute, not
only have the right but have the duty to consider such subsequent legislative
amendments for purposes of clarification of legislative intent.102 Thus, in
this case the fourth district had not only the right but the duty to consider this
clarification when making its decision. This it failed to do. As the
Department argues in its current case against Sports Shinko (Florida) Co., a
case in which the same statute was in effect at the time of recordation of
declaration as was in effect in RIS,
in determining legislative intent, the subsequent clarifying
amendments... should be considered in determining the proper
meaning to be given to [this] sectionfl as [it] existed in 1987 and
still exist[s] today.
The obvious purpose of these amendments should be given their
stated effect especially because the amended provisions reflect not
only the Division's unwavering interpretation of the statute but also
the intent of the [l]egislature that has been in effect all along.103
Accordingly, despite that the court in RS misconstrued the combined effect
of the various definitions contained within the condominium statutes, the
legislature proceeded to spell it out. However, it appears that the fourth
district chose to ignore this particular statutory section and create its own
laws for which there is absolutely no support other than its earlier misguided
decision in Welleby.
The R!S court further erred in its reasoning by basing its decision solely
upon the few provisions in the RIS declaration that discussed the boundaries
of a unit and the description of the condominium. The court cited to section
3.2 of the declaration, which discussed the boundaries of a unit, as its
primary support for its decision that, "in reading the declaration[,] ... the
term 'unit' was not meant to encompass raw land. 104 The court then, as
additional support, cited to two sections that describe the condominium and
a condominium parcel.10 5 While the fourth district found in these portions of
the declaration a "clear" intent "not to include [raw, unimproved] land by
102. Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Recommended Order at 8,
Department of Bus. and Prof I Regulation, Div. of Fla. Land Sales, Condominiums, and
Mobile Homes v. Sports Shinko (Florida) Co., Case No. 96-001391 (State of Florida Division
of Administrative Hearings August 5, 1997) (No. 96-001391) (citing Rowles v. Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 585 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. R/S, 695 So. 2d at 359; see also supra text accompanying note 72.
105. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 73.
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itself within the definition of a unit[,] °"' 6 its finding is fallacious. As stated
by the Department in its pending case, pursuant to sections 718.403(2) and
(6) governing phase condominiums, the assertion of the fourth district and of
RIS
that the existence of plot plans, unit floor plans[,] and unit
boundaries in the [d]eclaration and its phase amendments is
evidence of intent that the units would come into existence at the
time of completion must ... fail as not supported by the statutory
scheme of the Condominium Act and provisions concerning phase
condominiums. The declaration or the amendment to the
declaration that provides for the phase condominium [] must
describe the land which may become part of the condominium and
the land on which each phase is to be built; the minimum and
maximum numbers and general size of units to be included in each
phase; each unit's percentage of ownership in the common
elements as each phase is added; the recreational areas and
facilities which will be owned as common elements by all unit
owners, and the membership vote and ownership in the association
attributable to each unit in each phase.
107
Thus, it is clear that the section of the RIS declaration that the fourth
district itself recognized as "discuss[ing] the boundaries of a unit"'08 cannot
be construed as evidencing an intention that a unit must be substantially
completed before assessment fees may be levied. Contrariwise, this type of
boundary description, as well as the additional descriptions cited by the
fourth district in support of its finding, is currently mandated by the Florida
Statutes, as it was in 1987 when the RIS declaration was recorded. 0 9
Accordingly, the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, on yet
another statutory ground, is erroneous and unsupported.
Additionally, the proffered reasoning in Welleby, upon which RIS was
decided, is painfully fallacious. The court refers to section 711.03(15), the
same language that was applicable in both Estancia and Winkelman, which
permits the scrivener, in the declaration, to define a "unit" as improvements
and/or land.1 0 However, because the scrivener used the term "condominium
106. RIS, 695 So. 2d at 359.
107. Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Recommended Order at 16-17,
Sports Shinko (No. 96-001391) (emphasis added).
108. RJS, 695 So. 2d at 359.
109. Sections 718.403(2) and (6) contain identical language in both 1987 and the
current edition. FLA. STAT. § 718.403(2), (6) (1987); id. § 718.403(2), (6) (1995).
110. FLA. STAT. § 711.03(15) (Supp. 1974).
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parcel" throughout the Welleby declaration and never used the term "unit,"
the court relied solely upon the definition of "condominium parcel" under
the declaration which read: "An apartment together with the undivided share
in the common elements and all its easements, rights and interest which are
pertinent to the apartment."' ,' In turn, an "apartment" was defined as an
"[i]ndividual private dwelling."' 1 2 Thus, because the scrivener "chose to
describe a 'unit' in terms of a 'condominium parcel', which is an individual
private dwelling[,]"' 3 it was only an individual private dwelling that could
be subject to assessments and not unimproved land.
However, while section 711.103(15),as have its preceding statutes since
Winkelman, grants to the scrivener the authority to define a "unit" in a
couple of different ways, what the statute does not do is grant to the
scrivener the power or authority to determine what property is to be subject
to assessments." 4 Section 718.103(1) very clearly states, as it always has,
that it is units, not condominium parcels or any other property, that shall be
subject to assessments' 15. Additionally, the statute defines, as it always has,
"condominium parcel" as specifically including a "unit; '16 thus, within the
term "condominium parcel" is a unit, and a "condominium parcel" by its
very definition is subject to assessments. Therefore, regardless of how a
"unit" or "condominium parcel" is defined, upon recordation of the
declaration, a condominium, and therefore a unit, comes into existence and
is subject to assessments. Again, because a court has the right and duty to
consider subsequent statutory amendments, while many of the statutory
provisions remained the same, if any provisions were subsequently amended,
the fourth district was obligated to consider these amended statutory
provisions and failed to do so.
IV. IF IT'S NOT A UNIT, WHAT IS IT?
The condominium statutes have always contemplated only two types of
property that are subject to condominium ownership: units and common
111. Welleby, 522 So. 2d at 37.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. FLA. STAT. § 711.103(15) (1995).
115. Id. § 718.103(1) (1995); id. § 718.103(1) (1987); id. § 718.103(1) (1981); id. §
718.103(1) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(1) (Supp. 1974); id. § 711.03(1) (1969).
116. This section states: "'Condominium parcel' means a unit, together with the
undivided share in the common elements which is appurtenant to the unit." Id. § 718.103(11)
(1995); id. § 718.103(10) (1987); id. § 718.103(10) (1981); FLA. STAT. § 718.103(10) (Supp.
1980); id. § 711.03(9) (Supp. 1974); id. § 711.03(8) (1969).
1997]
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elements." 7  Furthermore, while one may own an "undivided share in
common elements[,]"' 1 8 which are "the portions of the condominium
property which are not included in the units[,]""' 9 it is only the units that are
"subject to exclusive ownership.' l20 Thus, it logically follows that any
portion of condominium property that is exclusively owned must be a unit,
the only other type of condominium property being common elements which
are not subject to exclusive ownership.
However, the fourth district, in both Welleby and RIS, determined that
the condominium property that was subject to exclusive ownership in each
case was not units subject to assessments; 121 further, the court failed to
117. This section states: "'Condominium' means that form of ownership of real
property which is created pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, which is comprised of
units that may be owned by one or more persons, and in which there is, appurtenant to each
unit, an undivided share in common elements." Id. § 718.103(10) (1995); id. § 718.103(9)
(1987); FLA. STAT. § 718.103(9) (1981); id. § 718.103(9) (Supp. 1980); id. § 711.03(8)
(Supp. 1974); id. § 711.03(7) (1969).
118. Id.
119. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(7) (1995); id. § 718.103(6) (1987); id. § 718.103(6) (1981);
id. § 718.103(6) (Supp. 1980); id. § 711.03(5) (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. § 711.03(4) (1969).
120. Id. § 718.103(24) (1995).
121. In Welleby, the fourth district interestingly stated that, although the William Lyon
Company "was the owner of certain real property... described as follows: Units #101, #102,
#103, #104, #105, #203, #204, #401, #402, #421, and #422, of Welleby Townhome
Condominium One," 522 So. 2d at 36 (emphasis added), because the land described as the
aforementioned units had no construction upon it, and because the "scrivner (sic) of this
declaration sought to define a 'unit' as a private dwelling, [thereby] exempting from an
assessment, raw, unimproved property[,]" id. at 38, the units exclusively owned by the
William Lyon Company were not the units that were meant to be subject to assessments and
were, therefore, exempt. Id.
Similarly, in RIS, the fourth district once again demonstrated its lack of understanding of
this area of the law in finding that the developer-owned condominium property, which had
been submitted to condominium ownership upon the recording of the declaration, was not
subject to assessments because the buildings containing the units had not yet been constructed.
695 So. 2d at 359. This finding was based primarily upon the description of the boundaries of
a unit found within the RIS declaration, which discussed that
[e]ach unit [would] consist[] of the dwelling applicable to the [u]nit, less that portion of the
basic Building structure for the dwelling lying within each dwellings[] maximum dimension as
shown on the survey graphic description and plot plan... [and that] [t]he boundary lines of
each [u]nit [would consist of] the unfinished surface of the ceilings and floors, perimeter walls
and any interior walls that are shown within the maximum limits of each unit on the plot plan.
Id. Thus, because this description of the boundaries of a unit contemplated a completed unit,
the court determined that the scrivener meant only to subject completed units to assessments,
apparently completely ignorant of the section that requires the declaration to include such "a
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indicate what, if not units, the William Lyon Company and RIS owned. In
both cases, the declaration had been recorded, which, by statute, served to
create the condominium.12 2 Additionally, applicable to RIS, it was upon the
recording of the declaration that "all units described in the
declaration[s] .., as being located in or on the land then being submitted to
condominium ownership ... [came] into existence, regardless of the state of
completion of planned improvements in which the units may be located."1 3
Accordingly, the units described in the RIS declaration, despite having not
yet been constructed, were created at the time the declaration was recorded
and, since the only condominium property that has ever been subject to
exclusive ownership is units, it was only these unconstructed units that the
parties in Welleby and RIS could possibly have owned. Therefore, because
the William Lyon Company, in Welleby, and RIS, in RIS, could only have
owned units, and because the condominium statutes effective in both cases
dictated that unit owners are "liable for all assessments which come due
while [they are] the unit owner[s][,]" 124 the decision the fourth district
reached in these two cases could not have been arrived at logically.
What the fourth district has seemingly done is, as the second district has
pointed out, "allowo the declaration of condominium to create a third type
of condominium property that [is] neither a unit nor a portion of the common
elements[,]' 125 and for which there is no statutory authority. In fact, it was
precisely this result that the second district sought to avoid in its decision in
Hyde Park- "[T]he only type of private ownership available within a
condominium is a 'unit.' For this court to hold otherwise would, in effect,
create property ownership rights which were not contemplated by either the
legislature or the Hyde Park Condominium declaration." 26 It is unfortunate
that the fourth district does not share the second district's understanding of
the condominium statute.
graphic description of the improvements in which units are located." FLA. STAT. §
718.104(4)(e) (1995).
122. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (1995); id. § 718.104(2) (1987) (stating that "[a]
condominium is created by recording a declaration").
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. § 718.116(1)(a) (1995); id. § 718.116(1)(a) (1987); id. § 711.15(1) (Supp.
1974).
125. Estancia, 619 So. 2d at 1010 (commenting on the fourth district's decision in
Welleby).
126. 486 So. 2d at 2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 711.03(4), (9), (13) (1969)).
1997]
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V. CONCLUSION
The condominium statute permits a developer to create a condominium
with land as a unit, or improvements as a unit, or both land and
improvements as a unit.127 However, the statute does not permit a developer
to create a condominium and have units which are not subject to
assessments; 28 only common elements are not subject to assessments. 29
Through its RIS decision, the fourth district has once again demonstrated its
total lack of understanding of a very basic premise of condominium law-
one that every attorney who practices in this area, whether representing
developers or associations, understands-unless, of course, the attorney is
arguing before a court on behalf of a unit owner who seeks to avoid his or
her assessment obligation. Unless and until the fourth district recognizes the
error of its ways or the Supreme Court of Florida agrees to tackle the
daunting task of clarifying-apparently for the benefit of the misguided
fourth district-the clear language of the condominium statute, those
unfortunate enough to have to appear before the Fourth District Court of
Appeal will be hard-pressed to obtain a logical and legitimate-or even a
consistent-ruling regarding condominium assessments.
127. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(24) (1995); id. § 718.103(23) (1987).
128. Section 718.116(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides an exception to this
rule: "No unit owner may be excused from the payment of his share of the common expense
of a condominium unless all unit owners are likewise proportionately excused from payment,
except as provided [in this section]." Id. § 718.1 16(9)(a) (1995). The section then provides
exceptions for developer-owned units where the developer guarantees the assessments. Id.
129. Id. §§ 718.103(1), (7); 718.104(2); 718.116(I)(a) (1995); id. §§ 718.103(1), (6);
718.104(2); 718.116(1)(a) (1987).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, in Florida, interrogating officers were required to cease all
questions other than those to clarify the suspect's wishes pursuant to a
suspect's equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent.' However, after
the Supreme Court of Florida's recent decision in State v. Owen,2 and in
light of the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Davis,3
that is no longer the case. Now, a suspect in Florida must clearly and
1. See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992).
2. 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
3. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
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unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent.4 Following anything less
than an unambiguous invocation of one's rights, police officers are no longer
required to ask only clarifying questions but rather can proceed with their
interrogation.5
This comment will discuss both the prior and current state of confession
law in Florida. It will also address the impact the Davis decision had on
Owen, as well as the impact Owen will have on the handling of equivocal
invocations of one's rights in Florida. Part II will give some background on
both the constitutional and procedural protections afforded a suspect in
Florida. Part Id will address the factual situation of Owen. Part IV will deal
with the procedural posture of the case. The initial brief of the Appellant
State in Owen will be analyzed in Part V. Part VI will focus on the brief that
the Appellee, Owen, submitted to the Supreme Court of Florida. The
decision of State v. Owen will be discussed in Parts VUBIX; beginning with
the Grimes majority's and continuing with Justice Shaw's concurring
opinion and Justice Kogan's dissent, respectively. Part X will conclude that
the failure to require clarifying questions upon an ambiguous invocation of
one's right to remain silent, coupled with the application of a reasonable
person test, will best serve the State of Florida as a whole.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED FLORIDIAN WITH
RESPECT TO CONFESSION LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution
6
afford accused individuals due process of the law. The Fifth Amendment
provides, inter alia, that in a criminal case no individual be compelled to be
a witness against himself.7 The Sixth Amendment affords the accused with,
among other things, the right to the assistance of counsel.s Article I,
Sections 9 and 16 of the Florida Constitution mirror the United States
Constitution's Fifth and Sixth Amendments, respectively. Article I Section 9
provides A[n]o person shall.., be compelled in any criminal matter to be a
witness against himself,"9 much like the Fifth Amendment's right against
4. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 718.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Id.
9. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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self-incrimination. 10  Likewise, Article I Section 16 of the Florida
Constitution reiterates the protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment,
providing "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused... shall have the
right... to be heard in person, by counsel or both .,""
B. Procedural Prophylactic Protections
Federal case law has spawned protections beyond those provided by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The most
noteworthy of these are the Miranda v. State ofArizona rule 12 and the Edwards
v. State of Arizona rule.13 In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court
decided that in order to honor an accused's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, specific guidelines must be followed.14 The court required:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may
not question him.
15
In Edwards v. State ofArizona, the Court expanded on the Miranda rule.
In Edwards, the Court held:
[A]dditional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for
counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his
right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid
waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if
he has been advised of his rights .... [A]n accused.., having
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 and § 16(a), respectively.
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
15. Id.
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not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police.16
Much like the adherence to the principles of the Federal Constitution by
the drafters of the Florida Constitution, Florida courts have reiterated the
procedural rules of both Miranda and Edwards. In Traylor v. State,'7 the
Supreme Court of Florida refers to Miranda and its progeny, holding:
[T]o ensure the voluntariness of confessions, the Self-Incrimination
Clause of Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution, requires that
prior to custodial interrogation in Florida suspects must be told that
they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say will be
used against them in court, that they have a right to a lawyer's help,
and that if they cannot pay for a lawyer one will be appointed to
help them.
Under Section 9, if the suspect indicates in any manner that he or she
does not want to be interrogated, interrogation must not begin or, if it has
already begun, must immediately stop. If the suspect indicates in any
manner that he or she wants the help of a lawyer, interrogation must not
begin until a lawyer has been appointed and is present or, if it has already
begun, must immediately stop until a lawyer is present. Once a suspect has
requested the help of a lawyer, no state agent can reinitiate interrogation on
any offense throughout the period of custody unless the lawyer is present,
although the suspect is free to volunteer a statement to police on his or her
own initiative at any time on any subject in the absence of counsel. 18
III. THE FACTUAL SITUATION OF OWEN V STATE
In May 1984, Duane Owen was aVPrehended by the Boca Raton police
and identified as a burglary suspect. Owen was found to have many
outstanding warrants and, while in custody, initiated contact with the Boca
Raton police to expound upon his role in some of the charges he faced;
burglaries, sexual batteries, and murders in both Boca Raton and Delray
Beach.20
16. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (citations omitted).
17. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 957.
18. Id. at 965-66 (footnotes omitted).
19. Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207, 209 (Fla. 1990).
20. Id.
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Throughout the questioning, Owen was made aware of his rights under
Miranda and specifically renounced his desire for an attorney, but he recIuested
the presence of a familiar Delray police officer, Officer Woods. 1 The
interrogation of Owen was plagued with his confessions of crimes, followed by
a refusal to talk and, ultimately, his initiating contact with the officers to talk
again.22 On about June 18, 1984, Owen contacted police and confessed to
committing a burglary, sexual battery, and murder in Boca Raton on May 29,
1984.23 Owen's confessions revealed that his method of operation in these
crimes was to remove his clothing, burglarize, and usually, after subduing his
victim into an unconscious state, sexually assault the individual.24
On June 21, 1984, Delray Beach police obtained an inked impression of
Owen's footprint in connection with the March 24, 1984 slaying of a fourteen
year old babysitter in Delray. The victim, who was last heard from at about
ten o'clock that evening, was found to have been sexually assaulted and
murdered as a result of multiple stab wounds. 26 Investigators discovered a
bloody footprint at the scene of the murder.27 Delray police presented Owen
with both the inked footprint and the bloody footprint from the crime scene.28
The following is an excerpt of the interrogation between Officer Rick Lincoln
of the Boca Raton police force, Officer Mark Woods of the Delray Beach
Police Department, and Duane Owen:
OFFICER LINCOLN: Cthat I have to know, Duane. A couple
pieces of the puzzle don't fit. How did it come down? Were you
looking at that particular house or just going through the
neighborhood?
THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: I'd rather not talk about it.
OFFICER WOODS: Why?
OFFICER LINCOLN: Why? You don't have to tell me about the
details if you don't want to if you don't feel comfortable about that.
Was it just a random thing? Or did you have this house picked out.
That's what I'm most curious about. Things happen, Duane. We
can't change them once they're done.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id
24. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 210.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 209.
27. Id. at210.
28. Id.
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THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: No.29
After further Vuestioning, Owen stated that he had never been at that
house before. The officers then went on to ask Owen some other
questions regarding a bicycle:
THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: How do you know I even had a
bike? You don't even know that.
OFFICER LINCOLN: You tell me you didn't have a bicycle. See,
you won't lie, Duane. I know you won't lie when you are
confronted with the truth. Now, are you going to tell me you didn't
have a bicycle? I know that much about you now. You play by the
rules. Those rules are important. We all need rules. Now did you
have a bicycle? Of course, you did. Now, where did you put it?
THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: I don't want to talk about it.
OFFICER LINCOLN: I won't make you tell me something
you're not comfortable in talking about, Duane. But I do want to
know some of the things that shouldn't hurt that much to talk about.
What you did with the bicycle? How long you were outside the
house? Those kinds of things. I know what you're reluctant to talk
about and I won't press you on that.
THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: I don't see what them kind of
things got to do with it anyway.
OFFICER LINCOLN: It's all part of the crime, Duane.
3 1
Owen initially denied involvement in the March 24 murder, but later
confessed to the crime.32
IV. PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF OWEN V STATE
Duane Eugene Owen was charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to
death in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, for burglary, sexual batte 9,
and the first degree murder of a fourteen-year-old Delray Beach babysitter.
29. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 215 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
30. Answer Brief of Appellee at 55, Owen (No. 85,781); see also State v. Owen, 696
So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
31. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 215-16 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at210.
33. Id. at 209.
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Owen's conviction was primarily based on statements of a confession given to
police during custodial interrogation.34  Owen appealed his conviction,
contending that the confession was inadmissible due to
"(1)... improper... coercion [by police officers] in violation of his fifth
amendment right to remain silent," and (2) violation of his Miranda rights due
to continued questioning after invocation of his right to end the interrogation.35
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed Owen's conviction, based on his
second contention regarding violation of his Miranda rights, and remanded the
36
case for retrial. The court held that statements made by Owen during
interrogation such as "I'd rather not talk about it" and "I don't want to talk
about it," were "at the least, an equivocal invocation of the Miranda right to
terminate questioning, which could only be clarified. It was error for the
police to urge appellant to continue his statement."
37
Prior to Owen's retrial, the United States Supreme Court decided Davis v.
United States.38 In Davis, the Court held that:
After a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights under Miranda v.
Arizona,... law enforcement officers may continue questioning
until and unless a suspect clearly requests an attorney .... [I]f a
reference is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in
light of the circumstances would have understood only that the
suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, Edwards does not
require that officers stop questioning the suspect.
39
In light of Davis' clarification of Miranda, the State filed a motion in the
Circuit Court of Palm Beach County to reconsider the admissibili of Owen's
confession. 0 The circuit court held the confession inadmissible. ' The State
then sought certiorari review by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida.
This too, was denied, but the district court certified the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida:
DO THE PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED BY THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT IN DAVIS APPLY TO THE
34. Id. at 210.
35. Id.
36. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 211-12; see also State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
37. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 211.
38. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
39. Id. at 452 (citation omitted).
40. Owen, 654 So. 2d at201.
41. Id.
19971
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ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS IN FLORIDA, IN LIGHT
OF TRAYLOR?
42
V. THE APPELLANT STATE URGES THE COURT TO ANSWER THE CERTIFIED
QUESTION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE
The State in its initial brief asked the Supreme Court of Florida to answer
the certified question in the affirmative.43 The State's first contention that the
certified question should have been answered in the affirmative was that
Traylor v. State 44 should not apply to the instant case.45 The State relied on
the fact that Owen was initially decided based on the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation of the federal Miranda rule, and not on either the United States
or Florida Constitution.46 Therefore, in light of the limitation placed on the
Miranda rule by the United States Supreme Court's finding in Davis, those
findings should be applied to Owen's case.47
Here, the State distinguished Owen from the two cases relied on byS48 4
respondent: Haliburton v. State and Traylor v. State.49 The State contended
that both Haliburton and Traylor dealt with whether the suspects' confessions
were voluntary as required by both the Fifth Amendment and the state
constitution. In both the original trial and on remand from the United States
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Florida in Haliburton held the
defendant's confession to be involuntary due to a violation of state law.51
The State argued that Traylor, too, was distinguishable from Owen
because it also dealt with whether the defendant's confession was voluntary on
52constitutional grounds and thereby admissible. Conversely, Owen'sconfession was considered voluntary and not in violation of the Fifth
42. Id. at 202; see also Owen, 696 So. 2d at 716.
43. Initial Brief of Appellant at 5, State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997) (No.
85,781).
44. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
45. Initial Brief of Appellant at 6, Owen (No. 85,781).
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. 476 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1985).
49. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
50. Initial Brief of Appellant at 7, Owen (No. 85,781).
51. Id. (citing Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987) and Haliburton v. State,
476 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1985)) (involving a defendant who was not informed prior to questioning
that his sister had hired an attorney who wanted to see him).
52. Id. at 8 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992)). In Traylor, the court
analyzed the defendant's state rights under Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution and
Federal Constitutional Fifth Amendment rights against self incrimination. Traylor v. State,
596 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1992).
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Amendment, but the court found the confession violated Owen's Miranda
rights.53 Here, the State differentiated between cases involving constitutional
violations, like Traylor and Haliburton, and those non constitutional rules
intended to prevent violation of one's Fifth Amendment or state constitutional
right against self-incrimination, such as Miranda. The State emphasized that
Miranda warnings function to prevent coercion but are not protected by the
Constitution.54  The State reiterated that pursuant to Davis, the Traylor
rationale is inapplicable to the admissability of Owen's confession which
involved a violation of Miranda rights.55  To bolster recognition of the
distinction drawn by the State, the appellant referred the court to the similarity
between the instant case and other decisions made by or relied on by this same
court.5 6 Also, the State pointed out instances of where the court refused to
intertwine the violation of a constitutional right rationale with cases involving
the violation of prophylactic rules such as Miranda and Edwards.57
In State v. Craig, 5 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue of
whether the defendant was given adequate Miranda warnings and whether he
had in fact waived his right to counsel.59 The State noted the similarity of the
issue in Craig to the issue in Owen's caseCthe manner in which a defendant
invokes his right to remain silent.60 The State then proceeded to remind the
court of its own rationale in both the instant case and in Craig.61 The court in
these cases noted the distinction between issues of voluntariness of confessions
and issues of proper Miranda warnings and a defendant's invocation or waiver
of his right to remain silent.62 As willing as the court was to differentiate
between such issues, the State emphasized the court's reluctance to apply
63Craig to Haliburton. Here, it seems the State attempted to show that this
53. Initial Brief of Appellant at 7, Owen (No. 85,781).
54. Id at 8 (citing Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 1990); Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 9.
57. Initial Brief of Appellant at 9, Owen (No. 85,781).
58. 237 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970).
59. Id. at 738.
60. Initial Brief of Appellant at 9, Owen (No. 85,781).
61. Id.
62. Id. Appellant cited to Owen, where the court stated that "the confession was entirely
voluntary under the fith amendment and that no improper coercion was employed." Owen,
560 So. 2d at 210. Yet, the court went on to add: "Owen next argues that even if the
confession was voluntary under the fifth amendment, it was nevertheless obtained in violation
of the procedural rules of Miranda. On this point, we agree." Id.
63. Haliburton, 476 So. 2d at 194.
1997]
466
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
court's refusal to extend Craig to Haliburton 64 was analogous to theirargument that Traylor should not apply to Owen since Traylor and Haliburton
function as issues based on constitutional law and Owen and Craig were based
on federal rules of procedure.
65
The State further noted that the court, in first finding Owen's confessionto be inadmissible, relied Asolely on federal authority 6  in determining that
only clarifyinuestions may follow an ambiguous invocation of one's right to
remain silent. The State referred to the court's reliance in Owen on previous
interpretations of the Edwards rule.re The court specifically followed and
cited Long v. State69 which interpreted Edwards as requiring all questioning,
other than questions to clarify the defendant's eqtuivocal response, cease even
after an equivocal invocation of Miranda rights. Noting that the court felt
bound to apply Long to find Owen's confession inadmissible, the State relied
on Davis' interpretation of the Edwards rule to now compel the court to find
Owen's confession admissible. 71 Appellant State further reasoned that the
court should answer the certified question in the affirmative, stating AUnited
States v. Davis should apply in Florida and in the instant case. 72
64. Initial Brief of Appellant at 9, Owen (No. 85,781). Appellant quoted Haliburton:
The state argues that we should find appellant's waiver valid under our
decision in State v. Craig. We are unpersuaded... as the issues before us in
Craig were the adequacy of the preinterrogation warnings to inform the
defendant of his right to consult with an attorney and have the attorney with
him during interrogation and the manner in which the defendant expressed
his desire to waive counsel
Id. (quoting Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1985)).
65. Initial Brief of Appellant at 9, Owen (No. 85,781).
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. Petitioner noted that the court was referencing Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 664
(Fla. 1987).
68. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 210.
69. 517 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1988).
70. Initial Brief of Appellant at 10, Owen (No. 85,781). Appellant cited to Long, where
the court held:
We are bound by the United States Supreme Court decisions in Miranda
[and] Edwards... which we conclude mandate suppression of Long's
confession. Without this equivocal request for counsel, we would find this
confession voluntary and admissible. Miranda and Edwards, however,
establish a bright line test that controls this case and requires suppression of
the confession.
Long, 517 So. 2d at 667.
71. Initial Brief of Appellant at 11, Owen (No. 85,781).
72. Id. at 12.
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The State correlated the holding and rationale of the Davis decision in not
expanding the Edwards rule to the reasons why the Supreme Court of Florida
should not expand on its equivalent interpretation of the Edwards rule.73 In
Davis, with regard to the equivocal invocation of one's Miranda rights, the
court held: "[w]e decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying
questions. If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal
request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. 74
The Court in Davis acknowledged a lack of uniform standards among the
lower courts in applying Edwards to equivocal requests and, with its decision
in that case, attempted to maintain the bright-line standard for police
interrogations.75 The State emphasized the Supreme Court of Florida's prior
announcement of its need for maintaining the bright-line standard as well.
76
The State expounded by illustrating the similarities between Florida courts
adopting the Miranda and Edwards rules almost verbatim pursuant to Article I,
Sections 9 and 16 of the Florida Constitution.77 Summing up, the State noted
that "[i]n light of the fact that Florida and federal courts have been guided by
identical policy considerations, this Court should adopt the rationale and rule
of Davis. In other words, this Court should apply its pre-Edwards analysis in
Craig.
,7 8
A third reason given by the Appellant as to why the certified question
should be answered in the affirmative was that "[tlhe doctrine of law of the
case should not bar application of Davis to the instant case." 79 The doctrine of
the law of the case means "all questions of law which have been decided by
the highest appellate court become the law of the case which, except in
extraordinary circumstances, must be followed in subsequent proceedings,
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994)). The Davis court
went on to reiterate that decision's effect on the longstanding rules in Miranda and Edwards:
We held in Miranda that a suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel
during custodial interrogation even though the Constitution does not provide
for such assistance. We held in Edwards that if a suspect invokes the right to
counsel at anytime, the police must immediately cease questioning him until
an attorney is present. But we are unwilling to create a third layer of
prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when a suspect might want a
lawyer.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994).
75. Initial Brief of Appellant at 12-13, Owen (No. 85,781) (citing Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994)).
76. Id. at 14-15 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992)).
77. Id. at 15-16.
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id. at 20.
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both in the lower and appellate courts."80 Exceptions to this doctrine can be
made when "adherence to the rule would result in 'manifest injustice."' 8' In
urging the court to apply Davis in an exception to the law of the case doctrine,
the State equated the case history of Brunner Enterprises, Inc. v. Department
of Revenue with the case history of Owen. While Brunner was on remand,
the United States Supreme Court delivered an opinion that directly
contradicted the state court's decision in Brunner.83 In Brunner, exceptional
circumstances were found, and the law of the case doctrine dispensed with it.?
The State, in an attempt to persuade the court to do the same in the instant
case, emphasized fairness to the State in their pursuit of justice,s' a non
prejudicial effect on the defendant,86 and the chance to remedy the erroneous
interpretation of the federal rule.87 The State even went on to give accolades to
Justice Grimes' dissent and Justice Ehrlich's concurrence in which they reject
the notion that questioning must cease upon an equivocal invocation of
Miranda rights.88
VI. THE APPELLEE OWEN URGES THE COURT TO ANSWER THE CERTIFIED
QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE
First, Owen argued that the "law of the case" doctrine should not be used
as grounds for altering the previous decision of this court.89 Owen, like the
State, cited to Brunner but distinguished his case from that of Brunner.
90
Owen relied on the court's opinion in Brunner, stating "'no party is entitled as
80. Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1984).
81. Id. at 552-53 (citing Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965)).
82. Initial Brief of Appellant at 21, O3wen (No. 85,781).
83. Id. (citing Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552
(Fla. 1984)). Brunner involved a decision that out-of-state stock sold by a foreign corporation
could be taxed in Florida.
84. Id. (citing Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550 (Fla.
1984)).
85. Id. The State specifically said, "[p]reclusion of critical inculpatory evidence based
on an erroneous legal ruling would be a manifest injustice and would result in a total
miscarriage ofjustice." Id. at 22.
86. Initial Brief of Appellant at 21, Owen (No. 85,781). The State claimed "[t]he
defendant is in no different circumstance than he was during pendency of the direct appeal."
Id.
87. Id. at 22. Appellant stated: "[t]he continued adherence to a federal rule that does
not even exist does nothing to protect or uphold any state or federal constitutional right. The
doctrine of law of the case should not be used to perpetuate this costly error." Id.
88. Id. (citing Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207, 216 (Fla. 1990)).
89. Answer Brief of Appellee at 11, Owen (No. 85,781). Id.
90. Id.
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a matter of right to have the law of the case reconsidered, and a change in the
law of the case should only be made in those situations where strict adherence
to the rule would result in 'manifest injustice.' 91
While practically using the same quote as the State did in their brief,92
Owen urged that the present case is not one of those exceptional situations, as
was Brunner.93 Owen rejected the correlation between Brunner and Owen, in
that the intervening decisions by the United States Supreme Court warrant
different results.94  He stated: "[s]pecifically, contrary to the situation in
Brunner, Davis does not alter the law in Florida nor is it clearly applicable to
the facts of this case." 9
5
Owen urged that there were three differences that should make Davis
inapplicable in the present case.96  First, Davis concerned the equivocal
invocation of one's right to counsel, whereas Owen involved the defendant's
right to have questioning cease upon his statement 'I'd rather not talk about
it.' ' 97 Second, the Appellee used dicta from the Davis case9 s to support their
notion that when a defendant's request seems ambiguous, the clarification
approach is best.99 Finally, Owen provided that the established law in Florida
is that once a suspect indicates in any manner that he does not want
questioning to continue, the questioning must cease at once. 1°
The Appellee felt the Davis decision in no way altered the law based on
Article I, Section 9, of the Florida Constitution and, therefore, the law of the
case should not be reconsidered. 101 Ironically, in light of how the Supreme
Court of Florida actually answered the affirmative question posed to them in
the instant case, Owen argued that the only way the law of the case should be
changed was if the court were to conclude: "(1) Davis applies with equal force
91. Id. at 12 (quoting Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550,
552-53 (Fla. 1984) (citations omitted)).
92. See Initial Brief of Appellant at 21, Owen (No. 85,781) where the State said, "[t]he
[S]tate asserts that strict adherence to the erroneous ruling would result in 'manifest
injustice."' Id.
93. Answer Brief of Appellee at 12, Owen (No. 85,781).
94. Id. Appellee referred to Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307
(1982). Asarco was the case whose decision directly contradicted the outcome of Brunner,
while Davis is the related case decided prior to Owen's retrial.
95. Answer Brief of Appellee at 12, Owen (No. 85,781).
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id.
98. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994). The Courtt said that often
clarifying questions will be good police practice in determining whether a right to counsel is
being invoked. Id.
99. Answer Brief of Appellee at 14, Owen (No. 85,781).
100. Id. at 15. Appellee was referring to Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
101. Answer Brief of Appellee at 15, Owen (No. 85,781).
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to the right to remain silent and to terminate questioning; (2) the statements
'I'd rather not talk about it.' and 'I don't want to talk about it.' are equivocal;
[ad]s(3 the Florida Constitution should be interpreted consistent with
Davis."'
Owen's next argument was one the State chose not to dissect: that
Owen's statements "I'd rather not talk about it" and "I don't want to talk about
it" were only equivocal invocations of his right to remain silent."3 On direct
appeal the court held that Owen's "responses were, at the least, an equivocal
indication of the Miranda right to terminate questioning .,,f0 Appellee
continued on to identify the court's earlier interpretation of an equivocal
response in Long v. State quoting: "[w]hen a person expresses both a desire for
counsel and a desire to continue the interview without counsel, further inquiry
is limited .,,105
Appellee defined Owen's statements as courteous, clear, and unequivocal
expressions of his right to remain silent.10 6  Appellee blasted the further
questioning by Officers Woods and Lincoln as clearly violative of Owen's
Miranda'°7 rights, stating they badgered, cajoled, 108 and "pressed him to
talk. ,"
10 9
Owen referred to Miranda and its progeny' as standing for the essential
principle that the defendant has the right to terminate questioning by indicatin
his right to remain silent in any manner and at any point in the interrogation,
r
and that this right be meticulously upheld by the police 12 On this point,
Appellee concluded Owen's statements were not ambiguous and, since they
dealt with his right to remain silent rather than his right to counsel, Davis
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 211.
105. Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 644, 667 (Fla. 1987) (citations omitted); see also Answer
Brief of Appellee at 16, Owen (No. 85,781).
106. Answer Brief of Appellee at 17, Owen (No. 85,781). Appellee said "[there is no
part of 'I'd rather not talk about it' that expresses the desire to continue to answer questions"
and "'I don't want to talk about it' is unequivocal." Id.
107. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). In Miranda the Court held the
defendant's right to terminate questioning must be Ascrupulously honored." Id.
108. Answer Brief of Appellee at 17, Owen (No. 85,781).
109. Id. at 16 (quoting Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207, 211 (Fla. 1990)).
110. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
111. Id. at 103-04. The Court held that the suspect Acontrol[s] the time at which
questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation." Id. The
Court also provided that the interrogation must cease when the suspect indicates in any
manner his right to remain silent. Id. at 10 1-02.
112. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, where the Court found the defendant's invocation
of right to cut off questioning must be Ascrupulously honored." Id.
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should not apply and Owen's confession should remain inadmissible." 3
Appellee's last argument importuned the court to uphold their earlier decision
in relying solely on the Florida Constitution as the governing law of the
case.1 4 As stated above, Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution
mirrors the Fifth Amendment provision against self-incrimination. 15 Owen
relied mainly on the court's decision in Traylor v. State, in bolstering his
position that Florida law serves as an independent basis for the court's
decision: 116 "'when called upon to decide matters of fundamental rights,
Florida's state courts are bound under federalist principles to give primacy to
our state constitution and to give independent legal import to every phrase and
clause contained therem.'lT
Next, Appellee focused on the similarities between how this court
decided Haliburton v. State, on remand in light of the United States Supreme
Court's intervening decision in Moran v. Burbine H s and the present case and
its relationship to the United States Supreme Court's Davis' decision. 120 In
Haliburton, the defendant was not told prior to police interrogation that his
family had hired an attorney to represent him, in violation of his rights.' 2'
While pending retrial, the United States Supreme Court decided Moran
holding that questioning is to end only upon the defendant specifically
requesting an attorney.' 2 Just like the instant case, the Supreme Court of
Florida had the opportunity to reconsider the Haliburton decision in light of
Burbine.123 In choosing to rely solely on the Florida Constitution the Supreme
Court of Florida rejected the United States Supreme Court's narrower
interpretation in Burbine, and again held the confession inadmissible as it
violated Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution. 24 Correlating the
decision in Haliburton with the instant case, Appellee urged the court to apply
Florida law and reject Davis' narrow interpretation of a defendant's proper
invocation of his right to remain silent.
25
113. Answer Brief of Appellee at 28, Owen (No. 85,781).
114. Id.
115. Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides, "[n]o person shall... be
compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself." Id.
116. Answer Brief of Appellee at 29, Owen (No. 85,781).
117. Id. (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla. 1992)).
118. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
119. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
120. Answer Brief of Appellee at 30, Owen (No. 85,781).
121. Haliburton, 476 So. 2d at 192.
122. Answer Brief of Appellee at 30, Owen (No. 85,781) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412 (1986)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 31.
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VII. JUSTICE GRIMES, WRITING FOR THE MAJORITY OPINION, ANSWERS
THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE
Justice Grimes and the majority began with a recapitulation of the facts
and procedural posture of Duane Owen's case. 126 The justices emphasized the
case against Owen was primarily based on his confession given to Officers
Lincoln and Woods. 127 They also reiterated the court's finding on direct
appeal, stating that although Owen's confession was voluntary under the Fifth
Amendment, it was nonetheless obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.
28
The major factors of the earlier decision were ambiguous responses given by
Owen to questions1 29 the Supreme Court of Florida characterized as "relatively
insignificant" details of the crime which amounted to "at the least, an
equivocal invocation of the Miranda right to terminate questioning."'
130
Another point the Grimes group highlighted was that the court's earlier
decision was, as the Appellant's brief argued, based solely on a previous
interpretation of federal rule: interrogation, other than clarifying questions,
must cease upon a suspect's equivocal invocation of his Miranda rights.'3 '
This procedure was not followed by Officers Woods and Lincoln in obtaining
the inculpatory statements made by Owen, so the confession was ruled
inadmissible, and the trial court decision reversed because the court was
unable to find admitting the confession to be harmless error. 32 Next, the
majority discussed how the supervening decision in Davis,133 which concerned
equivocal invocation of one's right to counsel, related to the instant case,
which concerned equivocal invocation of one's right to remain silent. 34 As if
in direct response to appellee's brief, 135 the court held that the Davis rule
126. State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1997).
127. Id. at 717.
128. Id.
129. See Owen, 560 So. 2d at 215. Owen was asked by Officer Lincoln a number of
times if he had ever been to the house before, to which Owen finally replied "I don't want to
talk about it." Also, Owen was asked if he had been scoping out that particular house to rob
and he responded with "I'd rather not talk about it." Officer Lincoln also asked Owen
questions regarding if he had a bicycle with him the night he committed the crime and where
was the bike now. To that, too, Owen responded with "I don't want to talk about it." Id.
130. Id. at211.
131. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 717.
132. Id.
133. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). In Davis, the Court held, police can continue an
interrogation beyond clarifying questions until the suspect makes a clear and unequivocal
request for counsel. Id.
134. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 717.
135. See Answer Brief of Appellee at 15, Owen (No. 85,781). Appellee made a
statement that in order for Davis to apply to the present case, the court will have to conclude
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applies to a suspect's right to remain silent and determined Owen's confession
to be admissible.
136
In support of their finding, the court cited to two cases from the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals: Coleman v. Singletary137 and Martin v.
Wainwright. 13 In Coleman, the court was faced with a similar issue as in the
present case of whether or not the defendant's confession, after an equivocal
assertion of his right to remain silent was admissible.iY9  Grimes and the
majority quoted the Coleman court which stated: "[b]ecause we are bound to
follow the Supreme Court's holding in Davis, our decisions creating a duty to
clarify a suspect's intent upon an equivocal invocation of counsel are no longer
good law." Next, referring to Martin, the Coleman court expounded:
"[f]urthermore, we have already recognized that the same rule should apply to
a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal references to the right to cut off
questioning as to the right to counsel.''
Grimes and the majority summed up their holding by stating "Davis now
makes it clear that, contrary to our belief at the time, federal law did not
require us to rule Owen's confession inadmissable.' 4a  Additionally, the
majority opinion paralleled the Appellant's brief, in that it acknowledges that
its earlier decisions, including Owen, were validated by the courts previous and
erroneous interpretation of federal law. 143 The opinion, like Ap4pellant's brief,
emphasized the rationale of the court in State v. Craig 4 as being a
predecessor to the notion that Davis should be followed in Owen.14
5
Subsequently, the majority, through Grimes, refuted Appellee's
contention that Traylor v. State dictated a finding that Owen's confession
should be deemed inadmissable, pursuant to Article I, Section 9 of the Florida
Constitution.146  Grimes' group stated that Owen's reliance on the court's
that "Davis applies with equal force to the right to remain silent and to terminate questioning."
Id.
136. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719.
137. 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994).
138. 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1985).
139. Coleman, 30 F.3d at 1421.
140. Id. at 1424 (citing Martin v. Wainright, 770 F.2d 918, 924 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
141. Id. The court quoted Martin stating "[w]e see no reason to apply a different rule to
equivocal invocations of the right to cut off questioning." Id.
142. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 718.
143. Id. at 718-19; see also Initial Brief of Appellant at 6-10, Owen (No. 85,781).
144. 237 So. 2d 737, 739-40 (Fla. 1970). In Craig, the court found that an ambiguous
request for a lawyer does not require police to clarify the suspect's wishes. Id. at 740.
145. See Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719; see also Appellant's Brief at 6-10, Owen (No.
85,781).
146. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719. The court specifically stated, "Traylor does not control
our decision in this case." Id.
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words in Traylor regarding Section 9 that "if the suspect indicates in any
manner that he... does not want to be interrogated, interrogation... must
immediately stop,,14 7 was inapplicable 148 In what seems to be ambiguous and
equivocal in and of itself, the majority claimed Owen "reads a meaning into
these words that we never attributed to them."'149 The majority attempted to
clarify by illustrating, as did Appellants in their brief, that the words "in any
manner mirror the language of Miranda and are therefore not additional
safeguards to the federal law.a'
Additionally, Justice Grimes' majority touched upon the fact that Traylor
involved voluntariness of a confession, rather than invocation of Miranda
rights,' 52 as appellant's brief also argued.' 53 After rejecting Owen's argument
in favor of applying Traylor to the instant case, the majority went on to
acknowledge that though they are authorized to disregard the findings of the
United States Supreme Court in Davis, they were unwilling to do so.54 The
justices were more persuaded by the policy concern of the Court in Davis that
the bright line that officers have been afforded, due to decisions like Miranda
and Edwards, would become dim if equivocal statements by suspects allowed
for questioning to terminate. 55
Again, consistent with issues raised by Appellant in the initial brief, the
majority felt that "[t]o require the police to clarify whether an equivocal
statement is an assertion of one's Miranda rights places too great an
impediment upon society's interest in thwarting crime."' ' h  Next, the majority
tackled the issue of whether the intervening decision in Davis7 provided an
exceptional circumstance to the "doctrine of law of the case." 5  They held
that the doctrine serves as a means for judicial economy, and is not an
indisputable directive, but rather a self-imposed limitation to achieve that
147. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 966. The court in Traylor referred to the Florida
Constitution, Article I, Section 9.
148. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting from the FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Initial Brief of Appellant at 7, Owen (No. 85,781).
154. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719.
155. Id. at718-19.
156. Id. at 719.
157. Id. at 720. The doctrine of the law of the case provides that "all questions of law
which have been decided by the highest appellate court become the law of the case which
must be followed in subsequent proceedings, both in the lower and appellate courts." Brunner,
452 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1984). Only in exceptional circumstances in which manifest
injustice will result, can the court reconsider and remedy an earlier erroneous ruling which has
become the law of the case. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720.
[Vol. 22:459
475
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Connolly
goal. 158 Also, the majority noted that "[ain intervening decision by a higher
court is one of the exceptional situations that this Court will consider when
entertaining a request to modify the law of the case."' 5 9
The majority concluded that in light of the United States Supreme Court
ruling, Davis should be applied as the law of the case in Owen's retrial in order
to prevent a manifest injustice by forcing the State to adhere to the court's
previous erroneous interpretation of the federal law.' However, the majority
did not push the envelope as far as the State may have wanted them to. The
majority recognized the State's preference to forgo the retrial and simply have
both Owen's confession and original convictions reinstated, but refused to
overturn its previous decision for a retrial. 16' By answering the certified
question in the affirmative, the majority summarized that "Owen stands in the
same position as any other defendant who has been charged with murder but
who has not yet been tried.' 62
VIII. SHAW'S CONCURRING OPINION: WHAT IS "CLEARLY?"
Justice Shaw's concurring opinion walked that fine line between
concurrence and dissent. While voicing an agreement with the majority's
holding that now in Florida, pursuant to Davis, a suspect must clearly invoke
his Miranda rights to terminate questioning after a previous voluntary waiver
of that right, Justice Shaw also voiced his dissatisfaction with the majority's
own ambiguity as to what "clearly" means.
163
The discrepancy Justice Shaw had with the majority was that although he
agreed with the Davis standard of one's need to "clearly invoke" the right to
remain silent he felt Florida's standard should include an explanation of what
will be construed as a clear invocation. 64 To support his suggested broadening
of the Davis standard, Justice Shaw used Traylor, the same case the majority
hesitated to apply. He emphasized the federalist principles which illustrate
that a state may exceed the protections afforded to its citizens by the federal
158. Id. (citing Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1965)).
159. The majority cites both Brunner and Strazzulla in support of this reasoning. Id. at
720 (citing Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1984),
and Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720.
163. Id. at 721 (Shaw, J., concurring). Justice Shaw specifically stated: "I concur in
the majority opinion, as far as it goes, but write specially to express my view as to what
constitutes a 'clear' invocation of the right to cut off questioning in Florida." Id.
164. Id.
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government in order to better safeguard those individuals.16 He quoted much
of the Traylor decision, specifically focusing on the concept that often times
federal decisions serve as adequate guidelines for state courts, though it is
frequently necessary for the state courts, in order to meet local concerns, to
elaborate on the federal findings. 166 Expressly, Justice Shaw noted the court's
statement in Traylor:
[F]ederal precedent applies equally throughout fifty diverse and
independent states .... [T]he Court oftentimes is simply
unfamiliar with local problems, conditions and
traditions .... [N]o court is... more sensitive or responsive to
the needs of the diverse localities within a state, or the state as a
whole, than that state's own high court. In any given state, the
federal Constitution thus represents the floor for basic freedoms;
the state constitution, the ceiling. 1
67
In Justice Shaw's own words, in order to "comport with federalist
principles,"'168 Florida needs to adopt a standard of what is a "clear"
invocation of one's rights by looking at the totality of the circumstances when
the statement is made by the suspect.169 Due to the diverse cultural makeup of
the region Justice Shaw expressed the concern of adhering to a strict standard
of what is deemed "clear." 70 For the less educated migrant worker, or the
newly emigrated Floridian, "clearly" invoking one's right to remain silent may
be a far cry from the invocation made by the second year Nova law student
who just recently wrote an article on the issue. 17 1 In order to combat this
potential problem, Justice Shaw suggested that Florida adopt a reasonable
person standard in ascertaining whether an invocation of the right to remain
- ,,172
silent was done "clearly. He stated, "[i]n my view, a suspect 'clearly'
invokes the right to cut off questioning when a reasonable person would
165. Id. at 721-22
166. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 721-22.
167. Id. at 721 (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961-62 (Fla. 1992)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 721-22. Justice Shaw emphasized that much of Florida's population consists
of non-English speaking immigrants from the surrounding countries and islands, who are
often poorly educated. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 721-22.
171. Id. at 722. Shaw offered the example that "to require a migrant worker with a
limited education and strong regional dialect to 'clearly' invoke his or her constitutional rights
with the same precision and forcefulness as a urologist or a nationally-recognized trial lawyer
is simply unrealistic." Id.
172. Id.
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conclude that the suspect has evinced a desire to stop the interview. All the
circumstances surrounding the statementCincluding the suspects schooling,
command of English, and ethnic backgroundCshould be considered."' 173
In a somewhat haphazard way, Justice Shaw threw in a brief statement
about the equivocal nature of Owen's statements. Citing to the court's
conclusion that Owen's "responses were, at the least, an equivocal invocation
of the Miranda right to terminate questioning." 174 Justice Shaw fashioned his
own depiction of equivocal statements. He created a spectrum where
statements rank from "no invocation" of rights having been made to "an
equivocal invocation" having been made, and finally "a clear invocation"
having been made. 175 He categorized Owen's statements as lying between
equivocal and clear and used that assessment in his agreement with the
majority, stating, "I agree that under these circumstances this case must be
remanded for reconsideration under the Davis standard. 176  His analysis,
stretching the meaning of the word, of Owen's statements ended there. He
seemed to just accept the court's previous determination that Owen's
statements were equivocal, and therefore deemed Davis applicable. Justice
Shaw summarized his opinion by reemphasizing his agreement with the
majority that Davis should be followed, but cautioned the majority that
"without further elucidation this standard is in danger of being used as a 'one
glove fits all' criterion.' 77
IX. JUSTICE KOGAN'S DISSENT STATING THAT HE WOULD ANSWER THE
CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE
Chief Justice Kogan, in his dissent, forcefully rejected the majority's
adoption of Davis and what he referred to as the "threshold standard of clarity"
approach.17 8 Particularly, he supported the retainment of what he called "the
clarification" approach, which requires only questions to clarify the suspects
wishes after an ambiguous statement to remain silent or a request for an
attorney is made by that individual. 179 Justice Kogan portrayed the benefits of
applying the clarification approach, rather that the threshold standard of clarity
173. Id.
174. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 211.
175. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 722.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Kogan identifies the "'threshold
standard of clarity' approach as one used by federal courts in situations involving ambiguous
invocations of Miranda. The term refers to the notion that one must clearly invoke the
Miranda rights in order for questioning to cease. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 722 n.9.
179. Id. at 722-23.
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approach, as being threefold. Kogan argued that the clarification approach,
rather than the Davis threshold standard of clarity approach, provides officers
involved in an interrogation setting with a more workable guideline.180  He
refuted the Grimes' majority opinion that the Davis rationale preserves the
bright line rule.' 81
Justice Kogan, like Justice Shaw, expressed a grave concern over
allowing individual officers to determine whether a right has been "clearly"
invoked by the suspect. 182  Acknowledging Shaw's concurrence, Kogan
referred as well to the difficulties likely to face interrogating officers, due to
183the diverse educational and cultural background of Florida residents. In
addition, Kogan referred to "[o]ther factors such as a suspect's physical
condition, level of intimidation, level of fear, or lack of linguistic ability
[which will] also make the task of identifying a clear invocation of Miranda
rights a difficult one."
i 4
Justice Kogan's rationale mirrored and often directly quoted from Justice
Souter's concurring opinion in Davis. He suggested that in order to eliminate
the guesswork associated with determining which invocations are clear and
which are not, Florida courts should simply continue to follow the clarification
approach. 8 5  Another advantage Kogan saw in retaining the clarification
approach was the consistency it would afford both in situations where the
suspect initially invokes his right to remain silent and in situations where the
invocation is pursuant to a previous knowing and intelligent waiver of that
right.186 Again citing to Souter's concurring opinion, Kogan said, "applying a
single approach is consistent with Miranda's promise of a 'continuous'
opportunity to exercise one's Miranda rights.' 87
Besides setting better guidelines for police, Justice Kogan felt the
clarification approach served both society's interest in minimizing crime and
the interest of the accused individual.188 In support of his contention that the
clarification approach has sufficiently dealt with Florida's fight on crime,
180. Id.
181. Id. at 723. Kogan referred to the majority opinion citing to Davis creating "a
bright line that can be applied by officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation
without unduly hampering the gathering of information." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, 453 (1994).
182. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 723.
183. Id. at 724.
184. Id. at 723.
185. Id. Kogan, borrowing from the concept announced by Justice Souter in his
concurring opinion in Davis, specifically said "the 'clarification' approach puts this judgment
call into the hands of the party that is most competent to make itCthe individual suspect." Id.
186. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 723.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 723-24.
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Justice Kogan again cited to Justice Souter's concurrence in Davis where he
said:
[T]he margin of difference between the clarification
approach ... and the one the Court adopts is defined by the class of
cases in which a suspect, if asked, would make it plain that he
meant to request counsel .... While these lost confessions do
extract a real price from society, it is one that Miranda itself
determined should be borne.
189
Justice Kogan, in agreement with Justice Souter, did not see the clarification
approach as an impediment to effective interrogation techniques. Moreover,
Justice Kogan denounced the threshold standard of clarity approach as often
disregarding the rights of the accused.' 90 While he specifically criticized the
Davis majority's opinion on this issue, Justice Kogan simultaneously rejected
the Grimes majority's adoption of such an analysis. T9 He found two particular
faults with the Davis rationale.
First, from Kogan's viewpoint, the Davis majority, while acknowledging
that suspects in a custodial interrogation setting may often be effected by such
elements as intimidation, a limited grasp of the language, and linguistic skills,
wrongfully dispelled these factors as acceptable risks "in light of the
protections already afforded these suspects by the Miranda warnings."'
192
Justice Kogan began his analysis by claiming that he found two faults with that
rationale, but he actually went on with criticism quoted from Justice Souter. 93
In essence Justice Kogan, through Justice Souter, expressed his disfavor with
employing a heightened level of communication necessary to invoke the rights
of the accused when these individuals often struggle with language barriers,
lack of education, and fear and intimidation brought on by the sometimes
overwhelming setting of a police interrogation. 194  On this, Justice Kogan
concluded "Davis and the majority in the instant case place a hurdle in front of
those individuals who are the most likely to have difficulty surmounting that
189. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 453 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring)).
190. Id. at 724. Kogan stated that "[i]n my opinion, the 'threshold standard of clarity'
approach does not adequately account for [the rights of the accused] and consequently tips the
scale in favor of law enforcement interests." Owen, 696 So. 2d at 724.
191. Id.
192. Id (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994)).
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 469-70 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring)).
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hurdle and successfully invoking their rights."'195 In response to this problem,
he advocated continuing to require officers to ask clarifying questions after an
ambiguous invocation of one's rights.
196
Second, Justice Kogan faulted the Davis majority's finding and the
majority's following of the notion that simply the reading of one's Miranda
rights compensated for any hardships bestowed on the accused by applying the
threshold standard of clarity approach. 197 He, again using Souter's words from
Davis, feared that once a suspect's initial, perhaps, ambiguous request is
ignored by police, the suspect will be hesitant to assert another request be it
equivocal or unequivocal, thinking his next plea will also fall on deaf ears.
198
Kogan reemphasized his feelings that the clarification approach is best suited
to address the needs of the police, society, and the accused.199
Justice Kogan finalized his opinion with disdain for the majority's refusal
to apply the clarification approach and reaffnrn Owen based on the authority
bestowed on them by the Florida Constitution.200  Specifically, Kogan
disagreed with the majority's opinion that their decisions following State v.
Craig201 were based on federal rulings such as Mosley and Edwards, and that
those federal cases were the primary reasons for the shift from the threshold
standard of clarity approach to the clarification approach.20 2 Justice Kogan
said, "any change that might have occurred in the Florida law on this issue
subsequent to Craig was not solely the result of decisions from the United
States Supreme Court. It is my belief that article I, section 9 of our state
constitution played a significant part in resolving this issue."
203
In sum, Justice Kogan would have answered the certified question in the
negative, since he felt the clarification approach is the best approach to use in
Florida and, much like the Appellee in his brief that the Florida Constitution
serves as an independent basis to reaffirm Owen. 
°4
195. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 724.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. This is a paraphrasing of Justice Souter's argument from Davis, where he said
"in contravention of the 'rights' just read to him by his interrogator, he may well see further
objection as futile." Davis, 512 U.S. at 472-73 (1994).
199. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 724.
200. Id. at 725.
201. 237 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970). In Craig, the court refused to apply the clarification
approach. Id.
202. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 725.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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X. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to a suspect's equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent,
interrogating police officers in Florida are no longer required to ask clarifying
questions.20 The key to the majority's decision in Owen, as well as in Davis,
seems to be the word "required." Both courts acknowledged that clarifying
one's wishes upon an ambiguous statement to possibly assert Miranda rights
will often be good police practice.20 6 Consequently, in Florida, clarification is
not mandatory in such a situation, although it still seems to be preferred. In
this day and age where the "get tough on crime" attitude is so prevalent, the
majority's decision to give police more leeway in interrogations seems
appropriate.
Justices Shaw and Kogan voiced concerns with the difficulty in applying
the clearly invoke standard in such a diverse community that exists throughout
Florida. They seem to worry that the uneducated migrant workers cry of, "No
quiero hablar,"207 will be ignored. Justice Shaw, however, fashioned an
adequate solution to the problems that may be faced due to language and
educational barriers. His suggestion of applying a reasonable person test is a
commendable one. In a society as diverse as Florida, it is likely the police
force will reflect the surrounding community, at least making the language
barrier not such an obstacle with which to contend. On the other hand, asking
whether a reasonable person in this situation would find this individual as
invoking his right to remain silent provides a test that will help overcome
educational and other barriers. The key to Shaw's approach being effective is
that for all surrounding circumstances to be accounted for when assessing
whether Miranda rights have been asserted. The adoption of what Kogan
referred to as the "threshold standard of clarity" approach coupled with Shaw's
subjective reasonable person test will provide the necessary protections for
Florida's criminal suspects, the police, and society at large.
Beth Connolly
205. Id.
206. Id.; see also Davis, 512 U.S. at 452.
207. "I don't want to talk" in Spanish.
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I. INTRODUCTION
All too often, a criminal defendant is faced with an overzealous
prosecutor devoted to winning at all costs. This "win at all costs" mind-set
can lead to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and continues
to be a basis for reversing numerous convictions in Florida.
1
1. See Smith v. State, 699 So. 2d 629, 643-46 (Fla. 1997)(reversing death sentence and
remanding for resentencing based on that prosecutor's continued use of redacted statements of
the co-defendant against Smith); DeFreitas v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2462, D2465-66 (4th
Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1997)(reversing because that prosecutor impermissibly asked the jurors
to place themselves in the position of the victims and asked them to think how they would feel
if the crime happened to them, and because the prosecutor impermissbly compared the
defendant's case and the O.J. Simpson case); McLellan v. State, 696 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor bolstered witness' testimony by saying
patients give honest histories to their doctor, and thus, commented on facts outside the
evidence, because the doctor in question did not testify); Walker v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly
D1543, D1543 (5th Dist. Ct. App. June 27, 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor's
comment: "The defendant in order to claim entrapment had to say 'if it wasn't for the action
of the government, I would not have even thought or tried to do what I did,"' was fairly
susceptible to being interpreted as a comment on the defendant's right to remain silent); Fryer
v. State, 693 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor
repeatedly expressed his personal opinion of the veracity of a police officer, and stated that
defense counsel 'knew' his client was guilty); Jackson v. State, 690 So. 2d 714, 718 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor argued that the defendant was guilty of
a crime greater than the one for which he was tried); Perez v. State, 689 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (reversing for interecting accusations of racism which were not
justified by the evidence or relevant to the issues); D'Annunzio v. State, 683 So. 2d 151, 153
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing because the prosecutor argued the defendant failed to
produce alibi witness although there was no evidence of the identity of the witness or whether
the witness knew material facts); Baldez v. State, 679 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)(holding "it is improper for a prosecutor to comment on the defendant's demeanor when
the defendant is not on the witness stand"); Raupp v. State, 678 So. 2d 1358, 1361 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing because the prosecutor insinuated that there were missing
witnesses who had information, and the defendant had secreted those witnesses); Cisneros v.
State, 678 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing because the prosecutor
argued that the police officer was "not the type of man that would come in here and violate
that sacred oath.")(emphasis omitted); Northard v. State, 675 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1996)(finding the prosecutor's argument improper because it asked the jury to
determine who was lying as the test for deciding guilt); Williams v. State, 673 So. 2d 974, 975
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing for the prosecutor's attempt to bolster the credibility
of police officers); Knight v. State, 672 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)(reversing because the prosecutor attacked the credibility of defense counsel, resorted to
personal attacks on defense counsel, argued facts not in evidence, and commented on the
defendant's right to remain silent); Willis v. State, 669 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)(finding that the prosecutor's attack on the credibility of an alibi witness on the
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Although prosecutorial misconduct may occur prior to or during the trial
of a criminal case, such as during the discovery period,2 during examination
of witnesses,3 or during opening statement,4 this note will be strictly limited to
a discussion of prosecutorial misconduct which occurs during closing
argument, and will focus on Florida case law.
This note is divided into nine parts. Following the Introduction, Part II
will briefly define the purpose of closing argument, and Part III will examine
the prosecutor's duty. Part IV will address a variety of improper comments
made during closing argument. Part V will review the "Invited Response" or
"Fair Reply Rule," Part VI will discuss the "Harmless Error Doctrine," 6 and
Part VII will discuss preserving the issue for appeal. Part VIII will briefly
address a disciplinary action through The Florida Bar, and Part IX will
conclude that reversal of convictions has failed to deter prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument, and that the issue is deserving of closer
attention by Florida trial courts.
basis that the witness was not listed until four months after the defendant's arrest was
improper).
2. See McArthur v. State, 671 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing
where the state provided inaccurate and misleading information concerning the test results of
victim's clothing).
3. See Boatwright v. State, 452 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)(reversing
because ihe prosecutor asked a witness whether the prior witnesses had lied).
4. See Northard v. State, 675 So. 2d 652, 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(reversing
in part because the prosecutor's comment during opening statement that the jury would return
"a verdict that simply reflects the truth; that the defendant in this case was caught red-
handed," could have resulted in the jury voting to convict because they believed the defendant
had committed the crime, even if the state had not met its burden of proof).
5. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1985)(explaining when defense
counsel argues improperly and provokes the prosecutor to respond, the court will weigh the
impact of the prosecutor's remarks, and take into account defense counsel's opening salvo).
6. Section 59.041 of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part:
No judgment shall be set aside or reversed, or new trial granted by any court
of the state in any cause, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of
the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence or for error as to
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to
which application is made, after an examination of the entire case it shall
appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
This section shall be liberally construed.
FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1995).
Tobin
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II. CLOSING ARGUMENT
Perhaps the most exciting and dramatic part of a criminal trial is closing
argument, because it affords the attorneys the final opportunity "to argue the
facts in evidence and/or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.,
7
However, it is also at this point in the proceedings that a prosecutor may have
become so devoted to winning the case for the victim, or for the citizens of the
State of Florida, that his or her emotions intrude and result in a "win at all
costs" closing argument not based on the facts brought out during trial. For
this reason, it is important to keep in mind the purpose of closing argument.
In Bertolotti v. State,8 the Supreme Court of Florida stated the purpose of
closing argument:
The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence
and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence. Conversely, it must not be used to inflame the
minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an
emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the
logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.
9
More recently, in Terry v. State,10 the Supreme Court of Florida reasoned that
"[t]he purpose of closing argument is to help the jury understand the issues by
applying the evidence to the law. Thus, the purpose of closinp argument is
disserved when comment upon irrelevant matters is permitted."'
I1. THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY
The prosecutor's duty has been addressed in numerous Florida appellate
cases. More than sixty years ago in Roach v. State,12 the Supreme Court of
Florida noted that "[a prosecutor] occupies a semijudicial position. . with no
greater duty imposed on him than to preserve intact all the great sanctions and
7. Willis v. State, 669 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(citing Jones v.
State, 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1992); Robinson v. State, 610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Bertolotti
v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985)).
8. 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985).
9. Id. at 134. See also Weiand v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1707, 1708 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. July 11, 1997); Hightower v. State, 592 So. 2d 689, 693 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(Gersten, J., dissenting); Jackson v. State, 522 So. 2d 802, 809 (Fla. 1988); Rosso v. State,
505 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
10. 668 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1996).
11. Id. at 963.
12. 146 So. 240 (Fla. 1933).
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traditions of the law.' 3 Thirty-three years later, in Adams v. State,14 the
Supreme Court of Florida added that "attorneys for the State should refrain
from inflammatory and abusive argument, since they are officers clothed with
quasi-judicial powers."15
In Tribue v. State,'6 the Second District Court of Appeal stated a
prosecutor has a duty to refrain from making improper comments that may
tend to affect the fairness and impartiality of the trial, 17 and as expressed by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, it is the duty of a prosecutor "to be fair,
honorable and just."' 8 With regard to fairness of opposing party and counsel,
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar'9 provide a lawyer shall not:
[I]n trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness
of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil
litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
20
The First District Court of Appeal in Cochran v. State,2' held that "[i]t is
the duty of a prosecuting attorney in a trial to refrain from making improper
remarks or committing acts which would or might tend to affect the fairness
and impartiality to which the accused is entitled.,
22
13. Id. at 240. See also Young v. State, 195 So. 569 (Fla. 1939).
14. 192 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1966).
15. Id. at 764-65.
16. 106 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
17. Id. at 633. See also Mack v. State, 461 So. 2d 142, 143-144 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230, 1235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Wilder v.
State, 355 So. 2d 188, 189-90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(Boyer, J., dissenting); Kirk v.
State, 227 So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
18. Boatwright v. State, 452 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
19. FLA. RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-3.4. Florida Rules of Professional
Conduct are found in chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
20. Id. at 4-3.4(e).
21. 280 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
22, Id. at 43. See also Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d (Fla. 1976); Briggs v. State, 455 So.
2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Hufham v. State, 400 So. 2d 133, 136 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Davis v. State, 397 So. 2d 1005, 1008 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 126, 128 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Knight v. State, 316 So.
2d 576, 578-79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Tobin
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In Kirk v. State,23 the prosecutor read off a list of defense witnesses who
did not testify, and asked the jury where those people were. 24 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal held the prosecutor's closing argument was
prejudicial and required a new trial. The court noted a prosecutor has a
greater responsibility than defense counsel, 25 and explained:
The prosecuting attorney in a criminal case has an even greater
responsibility than counsel for an individual client. For the
purpose of the individual case he represents the great authority of
the State of Florida. His duty is not to obtain convictions but to
seek justice, and he must exercise that responsibility with the
circumspection and dignity the occasion calls for.
26
IV. FOUL BLOWS
In Berger v. United States,2 7 Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court and stated:
The [prosecuting] Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.28
23. 227 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
24. Id. at 42.
25. Id. at 43.
26. Id. See also Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287, 295 (Fla. 1976)(Sundberg, J.,
dissenting); Sandoval v. State, 689 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Mack v.
State, 461 So. 2d 142, 143-144 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Mulford v. State, 416 So. 2d
1199, 1201-02 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Peterson v. State, Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d
1230, 1235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Cochran v. State, 280 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1973).
27. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
28. Id. at 88 (emphasis added); see also Craig v. State, 685 So. 2d 1224, 1229 (Fla.
1996); Hampton v. State, 680 So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Boatwright v.
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Despite the Court's condemnation of improper argument, the issue continues
to arise in Florida appellate courts. Numerous examples of "foul blows"
struck by prosecutors during closing argument are discussed below.
A. Commenting on Defendant's Right to Remain Silent
All prosecutors are aware they are prohibited from commenting on a
defendant's right to remain silent.29 In the first half of 1997, Florida courts
held that many comments made by prosecutors during closing argument were
fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the
defendant's failure to testify.30 Additionally, as noted by the Supreme Court
of Florida in State v. DiGuilio,31 comments on a defendant's failure to testify
can be of an "almost unlimited variety. 32
During trial in Davis v. State,33 the prosecutor commented on the lack of
an identification defense, and stated: "Well, I didn't hear that from either of
these Defendants." 34 Although the case was reversed on other grounds, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal warned that the comment should not be
repeated at the new trial because it was "fairly susceptible of being interpreted
, ,,35
by the jury as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. While in
Knight v. State,36  the prosecutor made numerous references to
"uncontradicted testimony"37 of the police officers, and stated "God forbid
you should believe a police officer whose testimony went uncontradicted by
these Defendants who told you specifically what happened in this case."
38
State, 452 So. 2d 666, 667-78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Rolle v. State, 268 So. 2d 541,
542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Marsh v. State, 202 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
29. See J. Allison DeFoor II & Randolph Braccialarghe, Florida Reverses its Per Se
Reversal Rule on Improper Prosecutorial Comment on a Defendant's Rights to Remain Silent,
13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1119, 1122 (1986).
30. See Walker v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1543, D1544 (5th Dist. Ct. App. June 27,
1997)(reversing because the prosecutor argued that the defendant was not entitled to an
entrapment defense because he had remained silent); Dean v. State, 690 So. 2d 720, 724 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)(reversing because the prosecutor argued that the defendant had failed
to explain why he used an assumed name and failed to produce identification).
31. 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
32. Id. at 1135-36.
33. 683 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
34. Id. at 575 n.1.
35. Id. at 574-75.
36. 672 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
37. Id. at 591.
38. Id.
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted none of the comments were
invited, and held the prosecutor's remarks were improper and commented on
the defendant's right to remain silent.
39
Recently, in Dean v. State,4 0 the prosecutor told the jury that they had not
heard a reasonable explanation for the defendant using an assumed name and
failing to produce identification n.4  The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed and found the prosecutor's comments to be "particularly egregious,"
because the only person who could have given that testimony was the
defendant himself.
42
However, not all similar comments have been held improper. For
example, in Priestly v. State,43 the prosecutor remarked during closing
argument that the defendants raising an entrapment defense would "have to
show or has to be shown through evidence to you-in other words, through
the State's presentation of evidence to you that they were entrapped.""44 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal held the remarks merely called the jury's
attention to the rule that the defense must prove the affirmative defense of
entrapment, unless the State's case itself shows entrapment.45 Therefore, the
comments were proper and not violative of the defendant's right to remain
silent.n6
In Walker v. State,n7 the prosecutor stated: "The defendant in order to
claim entrapment had to say 'if it wasn't for the action of the government, I
would not have even thought or tried to do what I did.'4 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal held the remark to be an improper comment on the
defendant's right to remain silent,4 9 and noted, "Florida's courts have guarded
against juries considering even the slightest suggestion that a defendant's
failure to take the stand on his own behalf is evidence of guilt."50 The fifth
district found the remarks were not harmless error and reversed. 51
Finally, in Spry v. State,52 the defendant did not take the stand. The
prosecuting attorney, referring to a scene from the movie "Guide to the
39. Id.
40. 690 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
41. Id. at 724.
42. Id.
43. 450 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
44. Id. at 292.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1543 (5th Dist. Ct. App. June 27, 1997).
48. Id. at D1543.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at D1544.
52. 664 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Married Man," in which one character advised another that even if he got
caught in an act of infidelity '[o]ne of the rules of the game, always deny it
-never admit anything... even if you get caught in the act."' 53 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal stated: "We would think that the fact that we have
been compelled to reverse so many convictions because of improper
comments on silence would result in prosecutors getting the message, yet they
seem to keep coming up with arguments which can have a double meaning,
and thus risk error.",54 Apparently, many prosecutors have yet to read Spry.
B. Exhorting the Jury to "Do Its Job" and Convict
In United States v. Young,55 the prosecutor argued:
I don't know whether you call it honor and integrity, I don't call it
that, [defense counsel] does. If you feel you should acquit him for
that it's your pleasure. I don't think you're doing your job as jurors
in finding facts as opposed to the law that this Judge is going to
instruct you, you think that's honor and integrity then stand up here
in Oklahoma courtroom and say that's honor and integrity; I don't
believe it.56
Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court and stated: "The prosecutor was also in error to try to exhort the jury to
'do its job'; that kind of pressure, whether by the prosecutor or defense
counsel, has no place in the administration of criminal justice."" However,
the court concluded the jury was not influenced by the improper remarks.58
A variety of improper comments were made by the prosecutor in Ryan v.
State.59 The prosecutor asked the jury not to set the defendant free into the
community not only because she lied, but because she was rich and would
"thumb her nose at small Martin County and say, 'Well, we really pulled one
over those guys."' 60 The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted "[a]rguments
53. Id. at 41.
54. Id. at 41-42.
55. 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
56. Id. at 5-6.
57. Id. at 18.
58. Id.
59. 457 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
60. Id. at 1088.
Tobin
491
: Nova Law Review 22, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
which beseech the jury to convict a defendant for any reason except guilt are
highly prejudicial and are strongly discouraged.'
A similar holding was made by the First District Court of Appeal in
Pacifico v. State. In Pacifico, the prosecutor commented "[i]f the defendant
walks out of here a free man today, that's your decision," and, "[n]ow, does
he walk out of this courtroom today laughing, or do you make him take
responsibility for what he did to [victim] that night?, 63 The first district held
the comments were improper and, when considered together, "appears to
constitute an implicit instruction to the jurors that it was their duty to society
to return a verdict of guilty, a practice deemed to be reversible error."
64
C. Personal Attacks on Defense Counsel
Without question, the vast majority of criminal prosecutions are
competently and ethically tried by the prosecuting attorneys of this state. Too
often, however, a prosecuting attorney succumbs to the temptation of putting
the defense counsel on trial rather than the issues. "This temptation must be
resisted completely in every case. 65 In Westley v. State,66 although the First
District Court of Appeal found the prosecutor's remarks were not a personal
attack on defense counsel, the court warned "the prosecutor's indulgence in
improper argument is a perilous practice."
67
In Adams v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida stated prosecutors are
not permitted to make references in closing argument to defense counsel
"which are so extreme and of such a nature that they could be prejudicial" to
the trial of the accused.69 In Briggs v. State,7° the prosecutor questioned the
personal integrity of defense counsel by suggesting defense counsel had not
been truthful and had deliberately mislead the jury. 1 The First District Court
of Appeal held "[v]erbal attacks on the personal integrity of opposing counsel,
rather than appropriate comments on the credibility of witnesses and
61. Id. at 1089.
62. 642 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
63. Id. at 1182.
64. Id. at 1182-83.
65. Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 522 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
66. 416 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
67. Id. at 20.
68. 192 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1966).
69. Id. at 764 (where the prosecutor said "[i]et me just show you what perverted and
distorted things a lawyer can do when he wants to do it").
70. 455 So. 2d 519 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
71. Id. at 520.
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inferences to be drawn from the evidence before the jury, are wholly
inconsistent with the prosecutor's role."
72
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has strongly disapproved of these
comments. In Landry v. State,73 when the prosecutor attempted to denigrate
defense counsel by arguing the defense had "conjured up" a witness,7 the
fourth district held that the comment was highly improper. Verbal attacks on
defense counsel can "poison the minds of the jury,"76 and attacks on the
personal integrity of defense counsel are "utterly and grossly improper.' 77
Prosecutors continue to launch personal attacks on defense lawyers and
exceed the bounds of proper argument. In many cases, the state's closing
argument may cause one to wonder who is on trial, the defendant or the
defense counsel.78
72. Id. at 521.
73. 620 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
74. Id. at 1101.
75. Id.
76. Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
77. Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15, 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
78. See Knight v. State, 672 So. 2d 590, 590 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(where
prosecutor attacked the credibility of defense counsel for objecting to the state's introduction
of inadmissible evidence); Landry v. State, 620 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993)(where prosecutor suggested the defense conjured up a witness or, in other words, was
presenting false testimony); Valdez v. State, 613 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993)(where prosecutor argued the defense failed to give the jury an accurate story); Alvarez
v. State, 574 So. 2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)(where prosecutor stated: "So, if
you are nitpicking and trying to insult somebody's intelligence, as the defense is really doing
today")(emphasis omitted); Huff v. State, 544 So. 2d 1143, 1144 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989)(where prosecutor opined the defense was a fabrication); Waters v. State, 486 So. 2d
614, 616 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(where prosecutor repeatedly characterized defense
counsel's argument as a "smoke screen"); Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1984)(where prosecutor referred to defense counsel as a fancy lawyer from a big city,
and accused him of not being totally honest with the jury); Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519,
520 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)(where prosecutor suggested defense counsel "was not being
truthful and was deliberately misleading the jury"); Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15, 15-16 n.
I (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(where prosecutor asked, "[w]ould you buy a used car from this
guy, ladies and gentlemen of the jury?")(emphasis omitted); Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d
1230, 1233 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979)(where prosecutor stated "not only do they have to
get into these disguises and crawl down there and deal with people like this, but they have to
deal with people like his lawyer"); Carter v. State, 356 So. 2d 67, 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (where prosecutor argued defense counsel was trying to "distort the evidence" and
mislead the jury); Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1966)(where prosecutor said
defense counsel's statements perverted and distorted things, and violated his oath as a lawyer);
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D. Calling the Defendant a Liar
In O'Callaghan v. State,79 during the defendant's trial testimony about
his presence at the crime scene, the prosecutor stated: "That's a lie. I would
like to go to the bench., 80 In response, the Supreme Court of Florida stated it
is "unquestionably improper" for a prosecutor to assert that the defendant has
lied.8' "Any trial lawyer should know that this type of conduct is completelyS,,82
beyond the limits of propriety. However, the remarks did not warrant a
reversal of the conviction.
This year, in Washington v. State,84 the defendant denied the accusations
of sexual battery and sexual activity with a minor and the prosecutor, in
addressing the defendant's testimony, stated:
Joseph Goebbels, who was a propaganda minister for Germany
back at the time of Adolf Hitler, had a theory. He believed that you
should lie to the people but that you shouldn't lie with small lies
because you can get caught in small lies. What you should do is
you should lie big, come up with a big lie because that's something
that you might be able to have the people buy is the big lie. Of
course, at that time it was that the Jews were responsible for
everything that was wrong in the world and they should be
exterminated. Well, the defense in this case is nothing but a big
lie.85
The Second District Court of Appeal in Washington stated: "[I]t is difficult
for us to perceive a more egregious and prejudicial statement,'' , and held "[i]t
is 'unquestionably improper' for a prosecutor to state that the defendant has
lied ... it constitutes an improper statement of opinion by the prosecutor.
87
The second district concluded it had "no choice but to reverse Washington's
judgment and sentence., 88
Douglass v. State, 184 So. 756, 757 (Fla. 1938)(where, in a prosecution for incest, the
prosecutor suggested that defense counsel was also guilty of incest).
79. 429 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1983).
80. Id. at 696.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 687 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
85. Id. at 280.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing O'Callaghan v. State, 429 So.2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1983)).
88. Id.
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In Bass v. State,89 the prosecutor told the jury "[i]f you want to tell
Jimmy Wayne Bass he lied, there is only one verdict, guilty. The man is
guilty."90 The First District Court of Appeal concluded the prosecutor's
remarks "could have been and were likely construed by the jury as directing
them to 'send a message' about lying in the courtroom rather than focusing
their attention on whether the state had proven Bass' guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." 91
A similar comment was made by the prosecutor in Jones v. State.92 The
Jones prosecutor did not mince words when he said: "What about Tyrone
Jones? I submit, that when Tyrone Jones took the stand, he lied to
you..... ..93 The First District Court of Appeal reversed because of the
"improper comments and argument and the state's tenuous case against
Jones . ... 2,94 However, in Brown v. State,95 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held "[i]t is clearly not improper for either counsel in closing
argument to characterize specific witnesses as liars, so long as counsel relates
the argument solely to the testimony of the witnesses and evidence in the
record.
, 96
E. Commenting on Defendant's Demeanor
The Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed a comment concerning, 97
the defendant's demeanor in Baldez v. State. In Baldez, the prosecutor said
the defendant was "glaring" at the witness while the witness was on the
stand.98  The fourth district stated: "It is improper for a prosecutor to
comment on the defendant's demeanor when he is not on the witness
stand." 99 The court also held the prosecutor used the defendant's demeanor to
bolster the credibility of the witnesses by suggesting they were truthful simply
because they testified in the face of intimidation. 
°°
89. 547 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
90. Id. at 682 (emphasis omitted).
91. Id. at 682-83.
92. 449 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
93. Id. at314.
94. Id. at 315.
95. 678 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
96. Id. at 912.
97. 679 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
98. Id. at 826.
99. Id. (citing Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1986)).
100. Id. at 827.
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A similar argument was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. In
Pope v. Wainwright,l0' the prosecutor stated: "I don't know if you saw it; but
I saw it, [Pope] was grinning from ear-to-ear. This is supposed to be a
wrongful accused man, grinning from ear-to-ear? I don't know why he grins
from ear-to-ear."' 0 2 In Pope, the court held the prosecutor's comments were
clearly improper, but were not reviewable on appeal because of the
defendant's failure to object and move for a mistrial.'0
F. Bolstering the Credibility of Police Officers
In Fryer v. State,10 4 the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of an
officer at least six times. 0 5 The Third District Court of Appeal held the
prosecutor's remarks were "patently improper and violative of the rules of
professional conduct,"' 06  and concluded the "prosecutor's remarks
compromised the jury's ability to fairly evaluate the evidence and, in turn,
Fryer's right to a fair trial.',
10 7
In Cisneros v. State, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained the
reasons why attempting to bolster the credibility of a police officer is
improper:1
0 8
First, although such comments may not in some instances constitute
an affirmative statement of the prosecutor's personal belief in the
veracity of the police officer, they do constitute an inappropriate
attempt to persuade the jury that the police officer's testimony
should be believed simply because the witness is a police officer.
Second, such comments make reference to matters outside the
record and constituted impermissible bolstering of the police
officer's testimony.10 9
The fourth district's explanation was brought about by the prosecutor's
closing argument in Cisneros, wherein he made numerous statements about
101. 496 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1986).
102. Id. at 802.
103. Id.
104. 693 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
105. Id. at 1047.
106. Id. at 1047-48(citing Cisneros v. State, 678 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Davis v. State, 663 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ramos, 579 So.
2d 360 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Singletary v. State, 483 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); FLA. RULEs OF PROFEssIONAL CONDuCT 4-3.4(e)).
107. Id. at 1048.
108. 678 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
109. Id. at 890 (citations omitted).
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the police officer's credibility: "To win a case he jeopardizes his career, to
win a case he's going to put someone in jail?... He's not the man to come
in here and violate that oath."' 10
Similarly, in Williams v. State,"' the prosecutor stated: "I submit to you
that it's not reasonable to consider that sworn police officers, doing their job,
could come into court and perjure themselves."' 1 2  The court found the
comment improper and stated: "An attempt by the prosecuting attorney to
bolster the credibility of police officers testifying in the case is improper
argument entitling the defendant to a new trial."
'' 13
This type of improper argument is no stranger to the Fourth District
Court of Appeal. In Davis v. State,'1 4 the court condemned the prosecutor's
argument when he remarked:
The Judge is also going to tell you that you have the right to
determine or to evaluate somebody's testimony by what they have
to gain from it .... What does Officer Hadden and Officer Kahir
have to gain by putting their careers in jeopardy, taking the stand
and perjuring themselves?" 5
In Clark v. State,1 6 the Fourth District Court of Appeal condemned an
argument almost identical to the prosecutor's argument in Davis, and
concluded "[i]n no uncertain terms, the prosecutor's argument was that police
officers would not testify falsely because they have too much at stake and
would not risk their jobs."'1 7 Further, in Landry v. State, a case replete with
improper comments, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
conviction and sentence because of the prosecutor's improper closing
argument During closing argument, the Landry prosecutor referred to the
110. Id. at 889 (emphasis omitted).
111. 673 So. 2d 974 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
112. Id. at 975.
113. Id. (citing Robinson v. State, 637 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Clark
v. State, 632 So. 2d 88, 91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
114. 663 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1995).
115. Id. at 1380 (emphasis omitted).
116. 632 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. Id. at 91.
118. 620 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The Landry prosecutor was
previously chastised in Klepak v. State, 622 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In
Klepak the prosecutor argued to the court that the jury was "made up of buffoons" and
"lobotomized zombies" and suggested that their verdict was returned because they were
"eating pizza or salads instead of deliberating." Id. at 20. Further, the prosecutor said this
jury is "a classic reason I don't believe in the jury system." Id. Presently pending is another
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"unblemished record"' 19 of the police officers several times. The fourth
district found the prosecutor's claim was unsupported by the record and
"constituted impermissible bolstering of the officers' testimony."'120
G. Sending a Message to the Community
The Supreme Court of Florida has stated that urging the jury to consider
the message its verdict would send to the community at large is "an obvious
appeal to the emotions and fears of the jurors.'' In Boatwright v. State, 2
the prosecutor stated: "I'm asking you to do your job today, here in this
courtroom and send these folks a message .... This is our country, this is our
nation, it's time to send 'em-send criminals a message we're not gonna
tolerate it any more .. ,,1 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
"[t]he 'send 'em a message' argument may have some cachet in the political
arena, but it is grossly improper in a court of law. It diverts the jury's
attention from the task at hand and worse, prompts the jury to consider
matters extraneous to the evidence.'
2 4
Last year, in Campbell v. State,125 the Supreme Court of Florida
reiterated its holding in Bertolotti: "'Message to the community' arguments
are impermissible-they are 'an obvious appeal to the emotions and fears of
the jurors.' These considerations are outside the scope of the jury's
deliberation and their injection violates the prosecutor's duty to seek
justice .... ,126 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed Campbell "due to
improper conduct by the prosecutor,"'127 and warned:
[W]e are deeply disturbed as a Court by continuing violations of
prosecutorial duty, propriety and restraint. We have recently
addressed incidents of prosecutorial misconduct in several death
penalty cases. As a Court, we are constitutionally charged not only
with appellate review but also "to regulate... the discipline of
appeal involving the same prosecutor wherein one of the issues on appeal is whether "THE
PROSECUTOR COMMITTED INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT BY VIRTUE OF HIS
CLOSING ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY." Brief for Appellant at 29, Cochran v. State, No.
97-00189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. filed June 23, 1997).
119. Landry, 620 So. 2d at 1 101.
120. Id.
121. Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985).
122. 452 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
123. Id. at 667.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. 679 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1996).
126. Id. at 724 (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985)).
127. Id. at 726.
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persons admitted" to the practice of law. This Court considers this
sort of prosecutorial misconduct.., to be grounds for appropriate
disciplinary proceedings. It ill becomes those who represent the
state in the application of its lawful penalties to themselves ignore
the precepts of their profession and their office.
128
H. Appeals to Sympathy, Bias, Passion or Prejudice
The Supreme Court of Florida has addressed a prosecutor's appeal to
sympathy, bias, passion, or prejudice on several occasions. In King v.
State,129 the prosecutor mentioned during opening and closing arguments that
the victim was a mother.130 The Supreme Court of Florida concluded the
comments did not affect the verdict and were harmless error.13 1 However, in
regards to additional remarks made during closing argument of the penalty
phase, the court stated: "if 'comments in closing argument are intended to and
do inject elements of emotion and fear into the jury's deliberations, a
prosecutor has ventured far outside the scope of proper argument.""' 132 The
court ordered a new sentencing proceeding before ajury' 33
In Rhodes v. State,134 at the conclusion of the prosecutor's closing
argument, he urged the jury to "show Rhodes the same mercy shown to the
victim on the day of her death.', 135 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed
and found the "argument was an unnecessary appeal to the sympathies of the
jurors, calculated to influence their sentence recommendation. ' 136
The Third District Court of Appeal also addressed the issue in Edwards
v. State,137 where the prosecutor argued to the jury, "[a]ll I'm going to ask you
for is justice. I ask you for justice both on behalf of myself and the people of
the State of Florida, also on behalf of [victim's] wife and children.' 3 8 The
court held "[t]he prosecutor's argument was an improper appeal to the jury for
128. Id. at 725 (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985)). See also
Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993); Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 1990).
129. 623 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993).
130. Id. at 488 n.1.
131. Id. at 488.
132. Id. (quoting Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 1988)).
133. Id. at 488-89.
134. 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989).
135. Id. at 1206.
136. Id.
137. 428 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
138. Id. at 359 (emphasis omitted).
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sympathy for the wife and children of the victim, the natural effect of which
would be hostile emotions toward the accused.,
139
I. Miscellaneous Comments
1. Referring to the Defendant as a Criminal
In Pacifico v. State, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted "a
prosecutor may use a defendant's prior conviction as an impeachment tool,
but it is improper to refer to the defendant's previous convictions for the
purpose of indicating that he or she has a propensity to commit crime."'140 At
trial, the prosecutor argued to the jury "[t]his defendant is a criminal, and he
needs to be convicted.'' Moreover, it is improper to imply that a defendant
has committed other crimes, or that the defendant may commit a future
crime. 142 It is also improper to comment on prior felonies and to state what
they were for when the defendant correctly admitted the number of his felony
convictions. 1
43
2. Commenting About When a Defense Witness Was Listed
In Willis v. State,144 the prosecuting attorney "suggested that one of
Willis' alibi witnesses was not to be believed because the witness was not
immediately listed on the defense's pretrial witness list. ' 145  The Third
District Court of Appeal held that it was improper to attack the credibility of
an alibi witness merely because that witness was not listed until four months
after the defendant was arrested. 146 The court noted "the decision of whether
or when to list a particular witness on a pretrial witness list is beyond the
control of the witness.'
147
139. Id.
140. 642 So. 2d 1178, 1183 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Davis v. State, 397
So. 2d 1005, 1008 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
141. Id.
142. Gleason v. State, 591 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
143. Gavins v. State, 587 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
144. 669 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
145. Id. at 1091.
146. Id. at 1094.
147. Id.
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3. Commenting on the Role of the Jury
In Landry v. State the prosecutor argued to the jury: "'[Y]ou took the
oath whether you like the law or not. And, you know, when you're asked
about your decision here being final, our system is huge. You have appellate
courts, you have the supreme court."' 48 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
agreed those remarks suggested to the jury that their role was only an advisory
one, because it would be reviewed by appellate courts.
149
4. Currying Favor with the Jury
Additionally, in Landry v. State the prosecutor made references to his
military service in the Persian Gulf.1?° The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that although such a comment alone was not reversible error, it was an
improper attempt to "curry favor with the jury .... . 151 The court noted this is
especially true where the comment "is entirely irrelevant to any issue being
tried or argued.152 The fourth district reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
153
5. Personal Belief of the Prosecutor
In Jones v. State, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that it is
improper and inappropriate for a prosecutor to express a personal belief in the
guilt of the accused, or in the veracity of the state's witnesses. 15 The fifth
district concluded that the combined effect "of the prosecutor's improper
comments and argument and the state's tenuous case against Jones convinces
us that on balance Jones did not receive a fair and impartial trial ....", In
Jones, "the prosecutor alluded to or stated his personal beliefs in Jones' guilt
and the veracity of the state's witnesses ....". Over thirty years ago, the
Supreme Court of Florida addressed such comments:
148. 620 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 4kh Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Landry, 620 So. 2d at 1103.
154. 449 So. 2d 313, 314-15 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
155. Id. at315.
156. Id. at314.
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It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the sound rule of practice that the
prosecution will not in argument express belief in the guilt of the
defendant 57 and will not make inflammatory reference to the
victim's family. 58 Competent counsel avoid such breaches of legal
propriety and the courts will scrutinize such offensive conduct with
great care. 1
59
6. Asking the Jury to Determine Who Is Lying
Last year, in Northard v. State, 60 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
found the prosecutor's closing argument1 6' "impermissible because it
improperly asked the jury to determine who was lying as the test for deciding
if the appellant was not guilty.' 162 The Northard prosecutor told the jury
"you're going to have to believe that the defendant was telling the truth and
the officer was lying ....,,163 The fourth district noted these type of remarks
"constitute error because they invite the jury 'to convict the defendant for a
reason other than his guilt of the crimes charged.""564
7. References to Witnesses Not Called
In Landry v. State, the prosecutor suggested there was other evidence
, 65
that was not brought to the jury's attention. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal found this to be "clear error, made more egregious by the fact" the
prosecutor's remarks were made to the jury even after the prosecutor's motion
157. Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fla. 1965)(citing Tyson v. State, 100 So. 2d
254 (1924)).
158. Id. (citing Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1952)).
159. Id.
160. 675 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
161. In Northard, the prosecutor argued:
If you believe the defendant's events the police cannot possibly be telling you
the truth, and you've got to decide if that's what they did and they got up here
and deliberately fabricated evidence and fabricated testimony for you in order
to convict this guy. In order to find him not guilty you're going to have to
believe that. And that's what your verdict, in order to find him not guilty
you're going to have to believe that the defendant was telling the truth and
the officer was lying strictly about the twenty-dollar bill because there's really
not much else.
Id. at 653.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Bass v. State, 547 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1989)).
165. 620 So. 2d 1099, 1101-1102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
[Vol. 22:485
502
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/1
1997]
to allow him to comment on the excluded evidence had been denied.1 66 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal stated: "There are few errors which could
fundamentally affect a jury verdict in a criminal trial more than a prosecutorial
argument tantamount to 'trust me, there's more evidence here but I can't get it
in because the judge won't let me.' 167
8. Racial Comments
In Perez v. State,168 the defendants, Perez and Rodriguez, were inmates
at the Dade County Jail. They were found guilty of the improper exhibition of
a weapon and aggravated assault on a corrections officer. Although there was
no evidence of a racial factor contributing to an incident in jail, the prosecutor
argued a racial war had divided the inmates, the defendant was part of the
war, and that a defense witness thought along racial lines.169  The Third
District Court of Appeal stated:
It is, of course, highly improper to interject even a reference to, let
alone an accusation of racism which is neither justified by the
evidence nor relevant to the issues into any part of our judicial
system. It is particularly reprehensible when this is done by a
representative of the state in a criminal prosecution.
70
9. Commenting on Defendant's Failure to Produce a Witness
The defendant in D'Annunzio v. State171 was convicted of two counts of
lewd and lascivious assault on a child. 172 Prior to trial, a notice of alibi was
filed by the defense.173 However, at trial, the defense did not call any alibi
witnesses. 174 During closing argument, the prosecutor informed the jury that
the defendant had filed a notice of alibi, said they were going to put witnesses
on the stand, but did not call one witness to testify about the whereabouts of
the defendant at the time of the crime.175 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
166. Id. at 1102.
167. Id.
168. 689 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
169. Id. at 306-07.
170. Id. at 307.
171. 683 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
172. Id. at 152.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 152.
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held a "prosecutor can only comment on the defendant's failure to produce a
witness when the witness knows material facts which are helpful to the
defendant's case and the witness is available and competent to testify.', 176 The
court found there was no evidence establishing the identity of the alibi
witness, and whether he or she was competent, or whether he or she knew
material facts. 1
77
V. INVITED RESPONSE DOCTRINE
This year, in Fryer v. State, the Third District Court of Appeal found the
comments of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Young, to
be particularly instructive:
178
The situation brought before the Court of Appeals was but one
example of an all too common occurrence in criminal trials-the
defense counsel argues improperly, provoking the prosecutor to
respond in kind, and the trial judge takes no corrective action.
Clearly two improper arguments-two apparent wrongs--do not
make for a right result. Nevertheless, a criminal conviction is not
to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments
standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in
context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. To help
resolve this problem, courts have invoked what is sometimes called
the "invited response" or "invited reply" rule. [T]he Court must
consider the probable effect the prosecutor's response would have
on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly. In this context,
defense counsel's conduct, as well as the nature of the prosecutor's
response, is relevant. [T]he reviewing court must not only weigh
the impact of the prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into
account defense counsel's opening salvo. Thus the import of the
evaluation has been that if the prosecutor's remarks were "invited,"
and did no more than respond substantially in order to "right the
scale," such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction.
1 79
The Fryer court reversed the conviction although the defense initiated the
improper comments. As noted in the concurring opinion of Fryer, a
prosecutor must object to improper comments by defense counsel at the time
176. D'Annunzio, 683 So. 2d at 153 (citation omitted).
177. Id.
178. 693 So. 2d 1046, 1048.
179. Id. (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1985)).
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they are made in order for the trial judge to impose timely restrictions on
defense counsel.18 0 "The doctrine of invited comment does not contemplate
that a prosecutor will sit silently while defense counsel pursues an
impermissible line of argument so that he or she can then pursue his or her
own impermissible and highly prejudicial response."181
VI. HARMLESS ERROR RULE
Improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument are subject to
the harmless error rule as provided in section 59.041 of the Florida Statutes:
No judgment shall be set aside or reversed, or new trial granted by
any court of the state in any cause, civil or criminal, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection
of evidence or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure,
unless in the opinion of the court to which application is made,
after an examination of the entire case it shall appear that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice. This section
shall be liberally construed.1
82
Additionally, section 924.33 of the Florida Statutes provides "[n]o judgment
may be reversed unless the appellate court is of the opinion, after an
examination of all the appeal papers, that error was committed that injuriously
affected the substantial rights of the appellant. It shall not be presumed that
error injuriously affected the substantial rights of appellant."'8 3
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the harmless error test
"places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that
the error contributed to the conviction.',
84
In King v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida stated the standard of
review is whether the prosecutor's comment was "so prejudicial as to vitiate
the entire trial."' ' In State v. Murray,18 6 the Supreme Court of Florida noted
180. Id. at 1051. (Sorondo, J., concurring specially).
181. Id.
182. FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1995).
183. FLA. STAT. § 924.33 (1995).
184. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)(quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
185. 623 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1993)(citing State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955 (Fla.
1984)).
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"prosecutorial error alone does not warrant automatic reversal of a conviction
unless the errors involved are so basic to a fair trial that they can never be
treated as harmless.' 8 7
The Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. DiGuilio, advised that the
"harmless error analysis must not become a device whereby the appellate
court substitutes itself for the jury, examines the permissible evidence,
excludes the impermissible evidence, and determines that the evidence of
guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on the permissible
evidence."' 8 8 The DiGuilio court went further and stated:
Overwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate the fact that an
error that constituted a substantial part of the prosecution's case
may have played a substantial part in the jury's deliberation and
thus contributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may have
reached its verdict because of the error without considering other
reasons untainted by error that would have supported the same
result. 189
VII. PRESERVING THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL
The law is clear that "improper prosecutorial comment which does not
constitute fundamental error must be objected to and a motion for mistrial
requested to preserve [the] issue for appeal."'190 When the objection is
overruled, "[t]he objection itself calls the court's attention to the error alleged
to have prejudiced the party making the objection and to the possibility that a
mistrial may be in order."' 19 However, in Pait v. State192 the Supreme Court
of Florida stated:
[W]hen an improper remark to the jury can be said to be so
prejudicial to the rights of an accused that neither rebuke nor
retraction could eradicate its evil influence, then it may be
considered as a ground for reversal despite the absence of an
186. 443 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1984).
187. Id. at 956.
188. 491 So. 2d 1129, 1136 (Fla. 1986).
189. Id. (quoting People v. Ross, 429 P.2d 606, 621 (1967)(Traynor, C.J. dissenting),
rev'd sub nom. Ross v. California, 391 U.S. 470 (1968)).
190. Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1986)(citing State v. Cumbie, 380
So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980)).
191. Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 288 (Fla. 1990)(citing Simpson v. State, 418 So.
2d 984, 986 (Fla. 1982)).
192. 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959).
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objection below, or even in the presence of a rebuke by the trial
judge. 193
In Knight v. State, the prosecutor made a variety of improper
comments.19' However, defense counsel failed to object to each of the
impermissible remarks. 195 The Fourth District Court of Appeal observed that
"[w]e recognize that appellant failed to object to several of the prosecutor's
improper comments and only made one objection at the end of the state's
closing. However, this court has held that 'if the improper comments rise to
the level of fundamental error, then multiple objections are not necessary." ' 196
Most recently, in DeFreitas v. State,197 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed although defense counsel failed to object, request a curative
instruction, or move for a mistrial.9" In taking this action, the court stated:
"we 'perceive very few instances where remarks or conduct by an attorney are
of such sinister influence as to constitute reversible error absent objection."" 199
The fourth district found a portion of the prosecutor's closing remarks fell
well within this category when the prosecutor asked the jurors to imagine how
terrifying it would be if a gun with a laser was pointed at their chest by the
defendant. 20 0  Golden rule arguments are improper, the lines are clear and
bright, and they enjoy no safe harbor in the trial of a criminal case.20 '
Additionally, the court found the prosecutor compounded the misconduct
when he compared the DeFreitas case with the "O.J. Simpson" case.20 2 The
fourth district reversed, but stressed defense counsel's duty to object:
"[D]efense counsel has the duty to remain alert to such things in fulfilling his
responsibility to see that his client receives a fair trial. Except in rare
instances where a grievous injustice might result, this court is not inclined to
excuse counsel for his failure in this regard.,
20 3
193. Id. at 385.
194. 672 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
195. Id. at 590-91.
196. Id. at 591 (quoting Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (citing Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
197. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2462 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1997).
198. Id. at D2466.
199. Id. (quoting Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc. 668 So. 2d 1016, 1023 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1996)).
200. Id. at D2469 n.7.
201. Id. at D2465.
202. DeFreitas, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at 2465-66.
203. Id. at 2466.
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Finally, it should be noted that in order for a prosecutor to avail himself
of the doctrine of "invited comment" a prosecutor must object to defense
counsel's improper comments at trial. 04
Vi1. DISCIPLINARY ACTION
In State v. Murray, and cases cited therein, the Supreme Court of Florida
suggested disciplinary action20 5 may be appropriate in some cases: "When
there is overzealousness or misconduct on the part of either the prosecutor or
defense lawyer, it is proper for either trial or appellate courts to exercise their
supervisory powers by registering their disapproval, or, in appropriate cases,
referring the matter to The Florida Bar for disciplinary investigation.
'20 6
IX. CONCLUSION
Despite warnings, admonitions, and reversals of convictions by Florida's
appellate courts, prosecutorial misconduct continues, as evidenced by the
Second District Court of Appeal's remarks this year in Weiand v. State:
2 07
The law, as a profession, carries with it not only competency
requirements but also ethical and professional requirements. As a
result, lawyers have an obligation not to present legally correct
arguments but also to present them in a professional manner.
204. Fryer v. State, 693 So. 2d 1046, 1051 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
205. Rule 3-7.8(a) provides:
Whenever it shall be made known to any of the judges of the district courts of
appeal or any judge of a circuit court or a county court in this state that a
member of The Florida Bar practicing in any of the courts of the district or
judicial circuit or county has been guilty of any unprofessional act as defined
by these rules, such judge may direct the state attorney for the circuit in which
the alleged offense occurred to make in writing a motion in the name of the
State of Florida to discipline such attorney, setting forth in the motion in the
name of the State of Florida to discipline such attorney, setting forth in the
motion the particular act or acts of conduct for which the attorney is sought to
be disciplined.
FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3-7.8(a) (1997).
206. Murray, 443 So. 2d at 956 (citing Arango w. State, 437 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1983);
Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 372
So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1979)(Alderman, J., concurring specially)).
207. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1707 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 11, 1997).
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Unfortunately, too many lawyers are forgetting their obligation of
professionalism.0 8
It appears prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument will continue in
Florida unless the trial courts recognize closing arguments which are designed
to be inflammatory, as opposed to dramatic, and either grant mistrials, or
proceed with a disciplinary action through The Florida Bar.20 9 Perhaps a
proper deterrent would be to require prosecutors and defense counsel to attend
oral argument when there are issues of prosecutorial misconduct and invited
response.
It is imperative that lawyers be aware of the specific ethical obligation
they assume when they step into the role of an advocate.2 10 "If attorneys do
not recognize improper argument, they should not be in a courtroom."21' All
attorneys should govern themselves by the words of Chief Justice Gerald
Kogan: "[Y]ou can win your cases, you can win the tough ones, but you have
to do it with dignity and with honor .... We are a noble and an honorable
profession."21
2
Candice D. Tobin
208. Id. atD1708.
209. FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-7.8(a).
210. See Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida
Law, 21 NoVA L. REv. 231, 278 (1996).
211. Luce v. State, 642 So. 2d 4, 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
212. Honorable Gerald Kogan, Keynote Address at the Annual Nova Law Review
Banquet March 29, 1996,21 NOVA L. REv. 1, 4 (1996).
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